Abstract
This paper argues that the allure of conspiracy theories lies in their evolutionary origins, specifically in our capacity to communicate unrepresented threats. Drawing on threat-detection psychology and error management theory, it posits that these theories serve as adaptive responses to perceived threats and social coalition-building, rather than as flaws in reasoning.
1. Introduction
In the spring of 2014, one of us received an email from his aunt containing a newspaper article. This article claimed to present an analysis by renowned economists, predicting disastrous outcomes for the Czech national economy as part of a grand scheme allegedly orchestrated by German and American forces. Intrigued, he delved deeper into the supposed analysis, only to discover that there was no such economist, and the entire data set and all the sources were fabricated.
He promptly responded to his aunt, presenting the facts he had uncovered in an attempt to assuage her concerns. However, her reply surprised him: “It does not matter that there is no such economist. The analysis is accurate, and I have a gut feeling that all the predictions are correct. You do not care about this country enough if you think otherwise.” It dawned on him then that she was disseminating this fabricated analysis to everyone she knew. Moreover, she soon moved on to a new concocted story, continuing this pattern ever since.
This anecdote raises the question: Why is misinformation attractive and why does it tend to proliferate throughout society?
Although the current debate on this topic is rapidly developing, most approaches to conspiracy theories and misinformation are epistemic or pathological. They focus on how individuals acquire, process, and understand information, often at the individual proximate level, trying to explain what makes conspiracy theories justified for them (Bernecker, Flowerree, and Grundmann 2021; Coady 2006; Dentith 2014, 2023; Douglas, Sutton, and Cichocka 2017). Researchers often attribute their spread to people's gullibility, deteriorating analytical skills, or even mental disorders (Douglas et al. 2019; Wagner-Egger 2022). However, these explanations have limitations, as they do not fully account for conspiracy theories' widespread appeal and cultural success.
To address these discrepancies, we put forward a cultural evolutionary perspective (Blaine and Boyer 2018; Van Prooijen and van Vugt 2018). When we place the phenomena of conspiracy theories within historical and cultural contexts, we can classify them into several tropes, such as the (1) deliberate spreading of disease, (2) hidden internal enemies, (3) external threats, and (4) apocalypticism. All these types of threat-related stories share essential characteristics, including the concern of potential threats to crucial resources, women, children, and information (Alloa 2021; Delumeau 2014; Gottschall 2021; Schweitzer 2018; Van Prooijen et al. 2022). The recurrence of these tropes suggests that their origin is more likely to be socially adaptive rather than purely epistemic (Acerbi 2019; Binnendyk and Pennycook 2022; Van Prooijen and van Vugt 2018).
In this paper, we argue that the allure of conspiracy theories is not primarily about the reasoning of the individual pieces of information they present. Instead, it is about how they engage our evolved cognitive mechanisms using evolutionarily valid cues, which are underscored by psychological mechanisms such as our threat detection and error management systems (Mercier 2020; Van Prooijen and van Vugt 2018; Van Prooijen and Douglas 2017).
During periods of social instability, anxiety becomes a dominant emotion (Allport and Postman 1947; Dennis-Tiwary 2022), putting our cognitive system on alert (Mercier 2020) and increasing our sensitivity to potential threats and our tendency to perceive patterns that might signal danger (Boyer 2021; Cordonier, Cafiero, and Bronner 2021; Uscinski and Parent 2014). For example, conspiracy theories about secret government plots often gain traction during times of information ambiguity (Acerbi 2019; Chen et al. 2021; Mercier 2020).
In this state of heightened alertness, we are motivated not only to be suspicious of threatening coalitions but also to build protective coalitions in case the perceived threat becomes real (Mercier 2020). Consequently, misinformation and conspiracy theories, by presenting perceived risks, resonate with our cognitive system. Historical research supports the notion that susceptibility to conspiracy theories varies and may increase during cultural instability (Delumeau 2014). For instance, during the Great Fear in France in 1789, widespread panic and rumors of an aristocratic conspiracy fueled the unrest that would lead to the French Revolution (Lefebvre 1932 [1973]). Similarly, conspiracy theories related to sorcery have been linked to some of history's worst atrocities (Hutton 2017).
Given the evolutionary roots of our attraction to conspiracy theories, restrictive measures alone may not be sufficient to combat their spread. In fact, such measures could heighten suspicion and exacerbate the issue (Acerbi 2020; Altay, Berriche, and Acerbi 2023). Instead, the results of our research imply that strengthening democratic institutions to foster social stability could reduce people's proclivity to conspiracy attitude (Altay, Berriche, and Acerbi 2023; Pierre 2020).
In this article, we aim (1) to challenge the epistemic approach by arguing that our proclivity to conspiracy theories and threat-related misinformation is driven by specific cognitive mechanisms, such as threat detection and error management, that have been shaped by our evolutionary history. Furthermore, we posit that conspiracy theories are better understood as evolved pro-social attitudes, rather than beliefs that can be justified or debunked. (2) We will illustrate our claim with examples of successful conspiracy theories that emerged during periods of cultural instability and emphasize the recurrence of their narratives; (3) conclude that our susceptibility to disinformation and conspiracy theories has adaptive roots, stemming from evolved pro-social attitudes rather than mere beliefs. Therefore, enhancing trust in societal institutions, rather than imposing restrictions, emerges as an effective strategy to mitigate the spread and acceptance of conspiracy theories and misinformation.
2. Understanding the Persistence of Conspiracy Theories: An Evolutionary Perspective, Psychological Mechanisms that Underpin Proclivity to Conspiracy Theories and Environmental Conditions
In the era of information overload, the persistence of misinformation and conspiracy theories presents a complex challenge. Despite the wealth of accurate information available, many individuals continue to endorse and propagate conspiracy theories. This phenomenon is not limited to any particular culture or society but is a universal human tendency. In this part of the article, we delve into the evolutionary and psychological underpinnings of this proclivity toward conspiracy theories, distinguishing our position from the prevailing consensus in the philosophy of conspiracy theories. Drawing on a range of interdisciplinary research, we explore how our evolved cognitive mechanisms, shaped by the harsh realities of our prehistoric past, may contribute to the persistence of conspiracy theories in today's society. We examine the role of emotions such as fear and anxiety in conspiracy thinking, and how social dynamics can further exacerbate the spread of conspiracy theories. This exploration provides a nuanced understanding of why proclivity to conspiracy theories persists and offers insights into potential strategies for mitigating its impact.
The field of conspiracy theory research has grown significantly in recent years. However, the terminology and definitions used across different studies vary (Douglas et al. 2019; Green et al. 2023; Kapantai et al. 2021; Uscinski and Enders 2022), necessitating a clear understanding of these terms for accurate problem assessment (Altay, Berriche, and Acerbi 2023). The term “conspiracy theory” is often pejoratively applied to the beliefs of political rivals without epistemic justification (Dentith 2014; Uscinski and Enders 2022), a practice that should be avoided.
In this paper, we propose to view “conspiracy theories” not merely as a subset of misinformation, but as evolved pro-social attitudes. These attitudes involve the spontaneous production, acceptance, and dissemination of narratives that may contain incorrect or false data. This perspective allows us to distinguish between “conspiracy theories” and “theories of conspiracy.” “Conspiracy theories” are evolved pro-social attitudes whose proclivity depends on specific cognitive mechanisms beyond rational justification, while “theories of conspiracy” are the result of a rational descent process, where these attitudes are critically evaluated and can be rationally justified. This distinction aligns with the consensus in the philosophy of conspiracy theories differentiation between warranted and unwarranted conspiracy theories but extends it by emphasizing the social and evolutionary aspects of conspiracy theories (Coady 2006; Dentith 2014, 2018, 2023).
Many researchers, when analyzing our proclivity to conspiracy theories, point to their epistemic or pathological roots (Meyer, Alfano, and de Bruin 2021; Peters 2021). This perspective is based on the view that the primary goal of our cognition is to attain correct beliefs (Fodor 2000, 68; Williams 2021, 334). If this is the case, any deviation from this goal, such as the endorsement of conspiracy theories, could be seen as a systemic flaw. As a result, a significant portion of the scholarly discourse on conspiracy theories revolves around distinguishing between rational (warranted) and irrational (unwarranted) beliefs (Dentith 2014, 2023; Duetz 2023; Keeley 1999 [2006]). Once unwarranted theories are identified, they are often attributed to either a lack of analytical skills or mental pathology (Douglas et al. 2019; Wagner-Egger 2022).
To put it differently. Although experts may differ in their opinions on the root of conspiracy theories, they all agree that their primary purpose is epistemic—to inform us about our environment. Nonetheless, most conspiracy theories remain wrong (unwarranted)—they argue—despite their intention because they only inform us about the world in a flawed manner (Keeley 1999 [2006] ; Lewandowsky and van der Linden 2021; Norman 2021; Uscinski and Enders 2022).
2.1. The Epistemic Character of Conspiracy Theories: Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories Consensus
In recent years, a consensus has emerged within the philosophy of conspiracy theories, suggesting that conspiracy theories are not intrinsically irrational, and believing in them is not necessarily unjustified (Coady 2006; Dentith 2018; Stokes 2018). This consensus views conspiracy theories primarily from an epistemic perspective, focusing on whether and under what conditions conspiracy beliefs might be warranted.
Nevertheless, once we try to establish demarcation criteria between warranted and unwarranted conspiracy theories, we immediately face challenging obstacles.
For instance, consider the following: three stories, and try to determine which one is a conspiracy theory, an actual event, or purely entertainment. (a) A narrative about a plot hatched by aristocrats aiming to stage a coup in support of Protestants, which commenced with the carefully planned assassination of three government officials. (b) A narrative suggests that since January 1941, Roosevelt and his close advisors had been devising a strategy to incite an attack by the Japanese on the US, thereby creating a justification for the country's entry into the war. (c) A narrative about a clandestine group within a Swedish security agency that conceals sex trafficking crimes and multiple murders.
The first story occurred in Prague in 1618 and is known as the “Third Defenestration of Prague” (Wilson 2009). The second story is the Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge conspiracy theory propagated by John T. Flynn (Flynn 1945). Lastly, the third story is the plot of one of the most successful crime trilogies of our time: The Millennium Trilogy (Larsson 2005–7 [2016]).
The problem with deciding which conspiracy is warranted and unwarranted lies not in the inner structure of these tales but in their context. Without additional information, it appears virtually impossible to distinguish a conspiracy theory from an actual event or a piece of entertainment (Palecek, forthcoming; Keeley 1999 [2006]).
To bypass the demarcation problem, we need to consider an intriguing fact: our minds seem to have an appetite for conspiracies. There is a striking resemblance between a substantial portion of our entertainment and conspiracy theories (Butter 2020, 457–68; Gottschall 2021; Schweitzer 2018; Van Prooijen et al. 2022, 25-48). Storylines involving conspiracies, whether by individuals or groups, constitute a significant part of the entertainment industry, indicating our strong affinity for conspiratorial narratives. For instance, plots revolving around individual or group threats, spanning various levels of conspiracy and organized crime fiction, account for approximately 40 percent of all book sales. Around 20 percent of all films are explicitly crime films, and roughly 50 percent of all film productions feature significant crime content, with over 800 horror films and nearly 1 million Facebook likes (Greer and Reiner 2012, 245-78; Nave, Rentfrow, and Bhatia 2020). This prevalence of conspiracy narratives in our entertainment suggests that our fascination with conspiracy theories extends beyond their potential truth or falsity, hinting at deeper psychological and social factors at play.
The epistemic approach, while seemingly plausible, encounters significant difficulties when trying to explain the peculiarities of conspiracy theories (Palecek, forthcoming; Keeley 1999 [2006]). Conspiracy theories may seem to resemble a set of strategic beliefs, but they are fundamentally different. For instance, if we were to provide you with strategic information about stock market developments, such as a brief window of opportunity to buy Apple company shares, you would likely share this information only with a select group of people with whom you typically cooperate, to gain an advantage. It would be highly unlikely for you to start persuading as many people as possible about the actual value of this information. This behavior starkly contrasts with that of those who propagate conspiracy theories. Although conspiracy theories often masquerade as strategic information, their proponents tend to proselytize, attempting to gain as many new supporters as possible.
It is well-documented that those who propagate conspiracy theories often exhibit a nomadic character. This means that a proclivity to a conspiracy theory positively correlates with the intentional pursuit of additional conspiracy theories (Acerbi 2022; Bratu 2020; Williams et al. 2022). In simpler terms, if someone shares one conspiracy theory, they are more likely to embrace others. Recent research further supports this, showing that those who propagate conspiracy theories actively seek out more conspiracy theories on the internet (Acerbi 2022; Bratu 2020; Williams et al. 2022).
One of the most puzzling characteristics of conspiracy theories is that they often emerge even when a genuine conspiracy is at play. When an event results from a real conspiracy, alternative conspiracy theories tend to arise and gain traction. Take, for example, the 9/11 terrorist attacks. While these attacks were indeed the result of an Islamist conspiracy, an alternative conspiracy theory emerged claiming that the attack was an inside job orchestrated by President Bush's administration (Van Prooijen and van Vugt 2018).
Let us consider, for instance, one potential root cause often suggested: that conspiracy theories are simply a result of an individual's impaired instrumental rationality or psychological disposition. If this were the case, we would anticipate seeing random variations in the types of conspiracy theories that emerge. The conspiracy theories propagated by such minds would presumably be in constant flux, reflecting our continuously evolving cultural landscape.
Furthermore, the concept of epistemic vigilance, as proposed by Sperber (2009) and further developed by Mercier (2020), provides a compelling counterpoint to the idea that the proclivity toward conspiracy theories is a matter of flawed reasoning. Epistemic vigilance refers to our cognitive ability to critically evaluate the information we receive, particularly when it comes from social sources. This cognitive mechanism, honed by evolution, allows us to discern reliable information from unreliable, and to adjust our beliefs accordingly. If the essence of a conspiracy theory were merely the information it offers for our justification, as some suggest (Bortolotti, Ichino, and Mameli 2021; Bonetto et al. 2018; Dentith 2014), then the application of epistemic vigilance should effectively counteract this false information, preventing it from altering our beliefs (Mercier 2020). However, this is not what we observe. Despite the application of critical thinking and the availability of accurate information, conspiracy theories persist (Cortada and Aspray 2019; Frankfurter 2006). Some studies have even indicated a substantial portion of the population engaging in such behavior. For instance, surveys have revealed that more than 60 percent of Americans endorse some form of conspiracy theory (Connolly et al. 2019). Moreover, an examination of the latest conspiracy theories compared to past ones reveals a pattern of similarities (Delumeau 2014; Miani, Hills, and Bangerter 2022). This stability and cross-cultural presence suggest that the proclivity toward conspiracy theories is not simply a matter of reasoning, but rather, it may be a deeply ingrained cognitive response to perceived threats, shaped by our evolutionary past (Frankfurter 2006; Van Prooijen and Douglas 2017; Van Prooijen and van Vugt 2018). This perspective opens up new avenues for understanding and addressing the persistence of conspiracy theories in our society.
2.2. The Evolutionary Basis of Conspiracy Theories
From an evolutionary perspective, the persistence of misinformation tropes, such as conspiracy theories, might seem perplexing, given their apparent lack of value. It is important to consider that the acquisition of correct information has been undeniably valuable for survival (Sperber 2009). Organisms with access to reliable information are more likely to survive and thrive in their environment, while those with inaccurate or incomplete data put themselves at unnecessary risk. This suggests that the ability to obtain accurate information has been a crucial factor in natural selection, as it minimizes costly mistakes, dating back to the origins of the evolutionary process.
Second, if an individual's proclivity to believe conspiracy theories is merely a deviation from the norm, it could lead to social isolation. A deviant individual might be seen as unattractive and would lack opportunities to mate. Consequently, they would have fewer opportunities to pass on their genes, meaning their genetic traits would become scarce over time and eventually disappear altogether (Mercier 2020; Stewart-Williams 2018). Yet, despite the clear advantages of accurate information, misinformation, and conspiracy theories persist.
2.3. The Prehistoric Conditions and Conspiracy Theories
To understand how the proclivity for conspiracy theories evolved, it is crucial to consider the stark differences between our current environment and the prehistoric conditions that shaped our cognitive mechanisms. Prehistoric small-scale societies faced harsh environments characterized by scarce resources, frequent competition and conflict, and constant threats from wild animals and natural hazards. Accidents, inter and inner group violence and illnesses, often with opaque causes due to a lack of medical knowledge, were common and could result in high mortality rates (Boyer 2022; Chagnon 2013). These conditions likely had a profound impact on human psychology, fostering a heightened sensitivity to potential threats (Van Prooijen and van Vugt 2018). In such an environment, the ability to quickly and efficiently detect potential threats—even at the risk of occasional false positives—could have been a valuable survival skill. This could explain why our minds are prone to conspiracy theories, which often involve the perception of hidden threats and connections. Therefore, the widespread occurrence of conspiracy theories may be seen not as an anomaly, but as a testament to our evolved cognitive mechanisms and their complex interactions with our social and cultural environments.
It is no coincidence that much of what is referred to as conspiracy theory falls within the scope of those risky areas that humanity distrusts, such as threats from the outside, a conspiracy from the inside, and threats to women and children. Cultural evolution has molded human groups to be especially cautious within these problematic realms, leading to a heightened sense of the risk of overlooking potential danger (Boyer 2018).
2.4. The Alliance-Detection System and Conspiracy Theories
Van Prooijen and van Vugt (2018) highlight our ability to recognize coalitions as a potential source of our proclivity to conspiracy theories. They argue that humans have developed an alliance-detection system, enabling them to identify groups of individuals who are cooperating with each other (Kurzban, Tooby, and Cosmides 2001). This system is not only used to detect potential threats, but also to recognize beneficial alliances that can provide resources such as food, shelter, and mates (Pietraszewski, Cosmides, and Tooby 2014; Tooby and Cosmides 1988). However, this system can sometimes lead to the belief in conspiracy theories, particularly when alliances appear suspicious or threatening. This is referred to as the by-product hypothesis, which suggests that the belief in conspiracy theories is a nonfunctional extension of human coalitional psychology, causing individuals to sometimes perceive hostile coalitions conspiring against them. Research indicates that humans naturally identify cooperative coalitions. For example, in politics, people instinctively categorize others based on their party affiliations (Pietraszewski et al. 2015). Moreover, signs of cooperation can often override other prominent perceptual cues used for social categorization. An example of this is race: while people tend to classify others based on racial differences under normal circumstances, this tendency significantly decreases when there are cues suggesting interracial cooperation, such as shared language or clothing (Kurzban, Tooby, and Cosmides 2001). In essence, humans possess cognitive mechanisms that allow them to rapidly identify both friendly and hostile cooperative alliances.
For explaining proclivity to conspiracy theories, the ability to recognize threatening coalitions cannot be sufficient. Alongside the negative emotions that make us fear threatening coalitions, there must also be a positive psychological reward. This could be the positive feeling derived from the ability to spot these coalitions and warn others in time, as well as the inclination to build up a protective counter-coalition by spreading warnings as widely as possible. This is true even if it risks ridicule from some.
Throughout our collective cultural evolution, cooperation with others has been a vital tool in order to reduce the risk of any potential threat (Turchin 2016). As already mentioned, forming a protective coalition is a useful strategy to minimize potentially dangerous situations.
Human cooperation has two conditions: Initially, individuals in a society are driven to cooperate while resisting being taken advantage of by others (Boyer 2018, 2022). Secondly, since cooperation on the part of other members is scarce and hard to come by, it has become an area of competition within the same group.
Social support is also a zero-sum game: the more support anyone receives, the less is available for others (Boyer 2022). By utilizing the right strategies, group members can be recognized as valuable and respected by their peers. Notably, they will also possess a reputation for being aware and alert to any potential threats or exploitation that could harm vital resources (Boyer 2022; Blaine and Boyer 2018). In other words, everyone wants to be a prophet. It means to be recognized as an individual capable of warning others beforehand, in order to prevent such scenarios from occurring. This desire to be a prophetic figure may explain why the aunt in the anecdote is so intent on persuading all family members about her alleged insights.
2.5. The Function of Conspiracy Theories as Warning Signals
In essence, suspicion about a conspiracy operates like an anxiety-driven warning signal. Its primary determinant is not its content (or its “aboutness”) but its function. The function alerts us to potential danger (Van der Tempel and Alcock 2015). Consider our ancestors: when they spotted an enemy group approaching for an attack, their reaction was immediate, driven by fear (Barlow 1988 [2002]; Horwitz 2013). But what if the danger was merely suspected? What if they noticed cues—such as clouds on the horizon, indications of a predator, or footprints of a hostile group—that suggested a threat, but there was no immediate danger? In other words, what if the potential threat was distant in space and/or time?
In the face of potential threats, the optimal human response is to remain vigilant, and ready to act should the threat materialize into a genuine danger. This state of heightened alertness is often accompanied by anxiety, a crucial emotion that primes our minds for action (Barlow 1988 [2002]; Horwitz 2013).
Anxiety and fear, while often used interchangeably, are distinct emotions that serve different functions (Dennis-Tiwary 2022; Heeren 2020). Fear is an immediate, direct response to a perceived threat. It is a primal emotion that triggers our “fight or flight” response, preparing our bodies for potential danger. Fear is typically short-lived and subsides once the threat has passed. It is a concrete emotion, tied to specific, identifiable threats in our environment.
On the other hand, anxiety is a more complex, future-oriented emotion (Dennis-Tiwary 2022). It is characterized by a sense of unease or worry about potential threats that may or may not be real. Unlike fear, which is a response to present danger, anxiety anticipates future threats, often without a clear source. This anticipation puts our minds into a state of heightened alertness, increasing our vigilance and readiness to respond to potential threats. While fear can be seen as a survival mechanism, anxiety can be viewed as a preparatory tool, priming us for possible dangers ahead (Dennis-Tiwary 2022).
Although fear has often been associated with conspiracy thinking, this association may not fully capture the complexity of the phenomenon (Van Prooijen and Douglas 2017). Instead, it is more accurate to associate conspiracy thinking with anxiety (Grzesiak-Feldman 2013; Green and Douglas 2018). Individuals prone to conspiracy thinking are often hyper-vigilant, constantly scanning their environment for potential threats, regardless of their immediacy or reality. This anxiety-driven mindset leads them to perceive a cabal of enemies plotting against them, a classic trope in conspiracy theories.
In his work, Van Prooijen argues that conspiracy thinking is driven by existential threats (Van Prooijen 2020). While compelling, this argument may not cover the full range of threats that can trigger conspiracy thinking. Existential threats indeed provoke anxiety, but they are not the only source. Other forms of instability, particularly cultural or social, can also induce anxiety and lead to conspiracy thinking. Therefore, viewing conspiracy thinking through the lens of anxiety allows for a broader understanding of the various triggers and manifestations of this phenomenon.
Distinct from fear, anxiety is an anticipatory response to uncertain or potential threats (Allport and Postman 1947; Dennis-Tiwary 2022; Mercier 2020). It puts our minds into a state that we call “an alert mode,” thereby increasing our propensity toward conspiracy thinking. When danger is imminent, human action and cooperation become highly efficient. The immediate threat triggers fear, a powerful motivator that prompts swift and decisive action. Fear focuses our attention on the present danger, enabling us to respond effectively to the immediate threat.
However, when a threat is merely suspected, not confirmed, the situation is less clear-cut. The threat is not immediate, but it could become so at any moment. In this state of uncertainty, the most effective evolutionary strategy is to signal readiness to cooperate. This ensures that protective coalitions are in place and that others are prepared to act if the threat becomes a reality (Bliege Bird and Power 2015; Henrich and Muthukrishna 2021).
In this context, the narrative accompanying this signaling is of secondary importance (Rosenberg 2018). The primary goal is to communicate readiness and willingness to cooperate, to ensure mutual protection against the potential threat. The specific details of the threat, while they may be compelling and contribute to the sense of urgency, are less critical than the overall message of preparedness and unity.
This dynamic illustrates the complex interplay between our emotional responses and our social behaviors in the face of potential threats. It underscores the role of anxiety in increasing our proclivity toward conspiracy thinking, and highlights the importance of cooperation and communication in our evolutionary response to potential dangers.
2.6. The Error Management
The anxiety-driven mindset underpinning conspiracy thinking can be understood in the Error Management Theory (EMT) context. EMT, a concept developed in the field of evolutionary psychology, posits that cognitive systems have evolved to minimize the total cost of errors, rather than the total number of errors (Haselton and Nettle 2006). In other words, when faced with uncertainty, our minds are designed to err on the side of caution, favoring errors with less costly consequences over those with more severe outcomes.
In the context of threat detection, this means that our cognitive systems are biased toward false positives—detecting a threat where none exists—rather than false negatives, which would mean missing a real threat. This bias is a result of the asymmetrical costs associated with these two types of errors. A false positive, or a false alarm, might lead to unnecessary anxiety and precautionary measures, but a false negative could result in serious harm or even death if a real threat is overlooked.
This error management strategy is particularly relevant to conspiracy thinking. The anxiety-driven mindset of individuals prone to conspiracy thinking leads them to perceive threats and conspiracies, even in the absence of clear evidence. This tendency to “see” hidden plots and cabals can be seen as a form of false positive error in threat detection. However, from an EMT perspective, this bias toward false positives makes sense. Research into foraging societies has demonstrated that the potential of becoming a target of an assault from another human group or facing exploitation by competitive inner-circle groups is relatively high (Gat 2006; LeBlanc and Register 2004). As such, leveraging threat detection and error management is integral in minimizing risk and gaining additional benefits. In an uncertain world, being overly cautious and prepared for potential threats—even if they turn out to be non-existent—is a safer strategy than risking the potentially disastrous consequences of missing a real threat.
Therefore, the propensity for conspiracy thinking, driven by anxiety and a heightened sensitivity to potential threats, can be seen as an adaptive response to uncertainty, shaped by the evolutionary pressures of our prehistoric past.
2.7. The Social Instability
Furthermore, recent studies emphasize that our ability to identify potential threats is significantly influenced by the broader societal context in which we find ourselves (Green et al. 2023; Altay and Acerbi 2022; Cordonier, Cafiero, and Bronner 2021). This highlights the critical role of environmental instability in fostering an increased inclination toward misinformation (Alper 2021; Cordonier, Cafiero, and Bronner 2021; Delumeau 2014; Lefebvre 1932 [1973]). In times of heightened cultural anxiety, our cognition becomes more sensitive and displays a tendency to switch to an “alert mode,” making us more attuned to detecting even the slightest disruptions. This heightened vigilance can be an effective strategy for anticipating potential risks in an uncertain environment where external and internal threats are challenging to predict (Boyer 2021).
In such situations, the cultural context becomes crucial in shaping our perception of and response to potential threats. Factors such as social norms, shared values, and collective experiences contribute to our understanding of what constitutes a danger and how we should react to it. Consequently, during periods of increased cultural anxiety, our threat detection system becomes more fine-tuned and alert, amplifying our sensitivity to perceived risks and making us more susceptible to conspiracy thinking.
This heightened sensitivity, while advantageous in helping us navigate complex and uncertain situations, can also lead to the proliferation of conspiracy theories, as individuals become more prone to interpreting ambiguous or unrelated events as potential threats. The cognitive rewards associated with detecting these perceived dangers further reinforce this behavior, creating a feedback loop that perpetuates the spread of conspiracy theories.
Consider the studies focusing on the dynamics of the modern workplace. Research suggests that when the climate of an organization is unstable—prompted by a manager or an uncertain situation—employees’ behavior alters drastically (Hitchen 2021; Lopes, Kamau, and Jaspal 2019). They become hypervigilant, seeing malicious intent and potential danger at every turn. Employees start to perceive even the most mundane occurrences as signs of an impending disaster that could threaten their job security. All events seem intentional rather than coincidental, leaving them feeling vulnerable and suspicious with regard to threats from within or outside the workplace. Moreover, some employees begin disseminating threat-related conspiracies in order to demonstrate that they are of worth to the group and can identify potential danger. Additionally, these workers sensitively observe the reactions of their peers. To put it differently, an increase in instability at work correlates with an inclination toward a conspiracy attitude (Hitchen 2021; Lopes, Kamau, and Jaspal 2019; Liu, Yang, and Gu 2021).
This proclivity relies on psychological mechanisms developed over time in response to challenging environmental conditions. Research and experiments validate this perspective that proclivity to conspiracy theories is underpinned by several psychological mechanisms, such as (1) threat-related detection, (2) intergroup competition for support, and (3) signaling readiness for cooperation in case a threat turns into real danger. When matters become escalate, we are driven to prove our worth by gaining the approval and backing of others. Doing so demonstrates that we can recognize a potential risk or issue in order to protect ourselves and our group (Boyer 2022).
2.8. Concluding Insights: The Evolutionary Roots of Misinformation and the Allure of Conspiracy Theories
In conclusion, the persistence of misinformation and conspiracy theories in our society can be traced back to our evolutionary past. Our ancestors' survival depended on their ability to quickly detect threats and form protective alliances, leading to the development of cognitive mechanisms that are still at play today. These mechanisms, while beneficial in a prehistoric context, can lead to the endorsement and propagation of misinformation in our current information-rich environment.
The emotions of fear and anxiety, integral to our threat detection system, play a crucial role in conspiracy thinking. They put our minds into alert mode, increasing our readiness to perceive potential threats and act upon them. This can lead us to perceive patterns and connections where none exist, a key characteristic of conspiracy thinking.
Our fascination with conspiracy theories extends beyond their potential truth or falsity, hinting at deeper psychological and social factors at play. The prevalence of conspiracy narratives in our entertainment suggests a strong affinity for conspiratorial narratives, which may be a reflection of these deep-seated cognitive tendencies.
Furthermore, our alliance-detection system, developed to identify cooperative alliances, can sometimes lead us to perceive hostile coalitions conspiring against us. This tendency, while potentially maladaptive in the context of modern society, is a testament to our evolved cognitive mechanisms.
The epistemic approach to understanding conspiracy theories, while seemingly plausible, encounters significant difficulties when trying to explain their peculiarities. Conspiracy theories often masquerade as strategic information, but their proponents tend to proselytize, attempting to gain as many new supporters as possible, starkly contrasting with the sharing of strategic information, which is typically limited to a select group of cooperators. Furthermore, these proponents often exhibit a nomadic character, actively seeking out more conspiracy theories on the internet. This behavior, coupled with the tendency for conspiracy theories to emerge even when a genuine conspiracy is at play, suggests that the proclivity toward conspiracy theories extends beyond an individual's impaired instrumental rationality or psychological disposition.
However, it is not just these cognitive mechanisms that make conspiracy theories so attractive to our minds. The typical plots of conspiracy theories, often involving hidden threats, secret alliances, and intricate webs of deceit, are imbued with evolutionarily valid cues that resonate with our deep-seated cognitive tendencies. In the next part of this discussion, we will delve deeper into these typical plots and explore how they contribute to the allure of conspiracy theories.
3. Examples of Recurrence of Conspiracy Narratives
In the previous section, we explained how conspiracy theories are better seen as a social-adaptive attitude rather than a belief. It stems from our evolved psychological mechanisms that enable us to sense potential danger, compete for social support, and stay prepared in case a threat becomes real. These mechanisms increase their activity in times of instability, making us more prone to conspiracy theories. Conspiracy theories serve as a tool for us to gain social support and form alliances in defense against perceived threats.
They serve as a warning signal against threats and an invaluable asset in competition with others seeking the same support. As a result, the specific content of a conspiracy theory holds little explanatory value (Rosenberg 2018); instead, its capacity to evoke anxiety is crucial, as this is what grants such theories their enhanced and widespread appeal.
While it is true that any narrative could theoretically be possible, not all of them are considered attractive to our minds. There is competition in terms of appeal, which means the relative cogency of competing narratives for events or phenomena as judged by our cognition (Acerbi 2019). Central to this competition is the ability of each theory to evoke anxiety in those who hear them. In this context, plausibility is not gauged through reasoning, as conspiracy theories are not a matter of belief. Instead, in their heightened state of alert, our anxiety-driven minds assess plausibility based on the perceived evolutionary valid cues (Mercier 2020) of threats to crucial resources such as women, children, vital sources, and information. The higher the anxiety triggered by instability, the greater the proclivity toward conspiracy thinking. In this state, the window for coincidences narrows, and all events are evaluated as potential intentional threats. This is also why the form of conspiracy theory is usually a neatly stitched story that imitates strategic information (Gottschall 2021; Palecek, forthcoming; Rosenberg 2018).
A comparative analysis of contemporary and historical conspiracy theories reveals a pattern of recurring themes, or “tropes” (Miani, Hills, and Bangerter 2022; Delumeau 2014). These tropes, which serve as evolutionarily valid cues, include: (1) narratives about the intentional spread of disease (Delumeau 2014; Bruns, Hurcombe, and Harrington 2021; Miani, Hills, and Bangerter 2022); (2) tales of covert enemies threatening society from within (Delumeau 2014; Enders et al. 2021; Moskalenko and McCauley 2021); (3) stories of a collective adversary menacing the majority society from the outside (Delumeau 2014; Enders et al. 2021; Ekman 2022; Miani, Hills, and Bangerter 2022); and (4) “apocalyptic” narratives forecasting the imminent total destruction of society (Delumeau 2014; Miani, Hills, and Bangerter 2022; Uscinski, Parent, and Torres 2011). Furthermore, the most compelling misinformation typically involves potential threats to our most valued resources, including women, children, and the information (Delumeau 2014; Miani, Hills, and Bangerter 2022).
Historical instances of cultural instability have often posed significant inherent risks. One can look to the experiences of European populations, who faced a series of culturally destabilizing events that left profound impacts on the continent. These events include the plague pandemic of 1346–50, the Ottoman wars, and the invention of the printing press (Arrizabalaga 2018; Pickering 2020). The plague pandemic, for instance, decimated an estimated 30%–60 percent of the population in many areas, causing widespread fear, loss, and instability (Cohn 2012; Finley and Koyama 2018). The Ottoman wars, on the other hand, led to near-constant warfare and political upheaval (Delumeau 2014; Pickering 2020).
However, the invention of the printing press had a particularly profound impact on cultural stability. This revolutionary technology dramatically subverted the traditional gatekeepers of information, such as monasteries and universities (Anderson 1983 [2006] ; Delumeau 2014). While the printing press undoubtedly democratized access to information, it also had darker consequences. The shift in control over information led to an absence of trusted authority figures to oversee and validate information, leading to widespread instability and increased anxiety as people grappled with determining the credibility of books and source materials (Delumeau 2014).
The correlation between the invention of the printing press and the witch-hunting campaigns is not coincidental (Delumeau 2014; Hutton 2017). Despite the noble objectives behind Gutenberg's machine, it also made false information more accessible and widespread. For example, evidence from surviving records reveals how astrology books 1 and pamphlets containing accusations of witchcraft and sorcery exploded in number after printing started to take off (Aurigemma 1976 [2017]; Delumeau 2014). As a result, one can understand why this particular milestone led to a prevailing sense of uncertainty despite bringing knowledge closer to the population than ever before (Ferguson 2017; Delumeau 2014).
This historical episode serves as a potent reminder of the potential consequences of dramatic shifts in information exchange. The invention of the printing press can be likened to a social experiment that inadvertently amplified the plausibility of conspiracy theories by disrupting established information gateways. Today, we find ourselves in a parallel situation with the advent of the internet. Much like the printing press, the internet has democratized access to information, but in doing so, it has also disrupted traditional information gatekeepers, leading to the widespread accessibility of false information. This disruption has ushered in a new era of instability, where the credibility of information is constantly under scrutiny, thereby increasing societal anxiety. It is perhaps no coincidence that the proclivity toward conspiracy theories has re-emerged as a significant issue in this digital age. The parallels between these two periods of the information revolution underscore the profound role that changes in information exchange play in shaping our social and cognitive landscapes. In these periods of disruption and instability, the evolutionarily valid cues present in conspiracy theories become particularly resonant, explaining the increased proclivity toward such theories.
Consequently, it is clear that these three events—the pandemic, the Ottoman wars, and the invention of the printing press—contributed substantially to a period of destabilization accompanied by a significant volume of widespread conspiracy theories (Delumeau 2014; Finley and Koyama 2018; Pickering 2020).
In the subsequent sections, we will present examples of typical conspiracy narratives that have been successfully propagated and repeatedly surfaced during times of cultural instability (Delumeau 2014; Lefebvre 1932 [1973]). These narratives, despite their varied contexts, share a similar structure that resonates with contemporary instances of widespread misinformation. The recurring nature of these narratives suggests an inherent appeal, driven by their ability to captivate attention and resonate with our cognitive biases. Central to their appeal are the evolutionarily valid cues embedded within these plots. These cues, honed by our evolutionary past, make these narratives particularly compelling and attractive, thereby facilitating their propagation and persistence over time. This reiteration further emphasizes that conspiracy theories are a matter of socially adaptive attitudes rather than beliefs. To support this view and illustrate the power of these evolutionarily valid cues, we will now delve into specific examples of the most attractive tropes.
3.1.1. The Topic of the Deliberate Spread of Disease–Contagion
Our innate fear of contagion likely exists as a survival mechanism that has informed the development of the human mind. Throughout our evolution, it has become instinctive to avoid anything considered contagious in order to protect ourselves from danger. This “behavioral immune system” operates unconsciously and is triggered by cues associated with diseases, such as bad smells, unusual appearance, or physical contact with contaminated objects (Karinen and Chapman 2019; Schaller and Park 2011). As a result, a wide range of practices has caused us to avoid contact with what are typically regarded as dangerous, sacred, or powerful items. Studies suggest that this interaction can evoke an unconscious sense of infectiousness, leading to associating objects with a strong ability to spread their influence—either for positive or negative ends (Atran and Norenzayan 2004; Boyer 2001).
Overall, recognizing sources of contamination is a crucial part of our evolved psychology and has helped protect us from disease and illness throughout human history. By tapping into this psychological mechanism, conspiracy theories serve as a protective mechanism to eliminate anything that could be a possible source of threat and fuel sufficient emotions to form a protective coalition. However, in certain circumstances, the consequences can be devastating.
The narrative of the deliberate spread of dangerous contagion is the first group of the most attractive tropes of conspiracy theories and misinformation.
In 1349, Guillaume de Machaut wrote the poem Jugement du roy de Navarre (“Judgement of the King of Navarre”), which was very popular in its time. In this poem, the accusation appears in verse 22 that Jews deliberately poisoned the wells and thus spread the plague. Their alleged goal was the extermination of Christians. Although the Pope repeatedly banned this poem, this did not stop it from spreading (Delumeau 2014; Finley and Koyama 2018; Machaut 2016). In parallel with its dissemination, spontaneous pogroms took place against the Jews, whom the Christians accused of spreading the plague. For example, the pogrom in Nuremberg on 5 December 1349 broke out even before the epidemic could reach the city (Arrizabalaga 2018; Delumeau 2014; Finley and Koyama 2018).
The plague is not a solitary example. Other pandemics, like the Cholera Pandemic of the nineteenth century, were also salient examples of how misinformation and sociocultural instability correlate. This period was notably characterized by a proliferation of conspiracy theories centered around the idea that this devastating and deadly disease had been deliberately unleashed upon people by government forces or elites in order to control or eliminate them (Snowden 2019).
Today, we can clearly observe the recurrence of conspiracy theories containing the same narrative of deliberate disease spread, albeit with different diseases at the forefront. HIV, chemtrails, cholera, or Covid-19 has replaced the plague, but the core elements of these narratives remain strikingly similar (Cohn 2012; Šrol, Ballová Mikušková, and Čavojová 2021; Fraulin, Lee, and Bartels 2022).
In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, for instance, we have seen the rise of anti-vaccination conspiracy theories (De Coninck et al. 2021). These theories often stem from deep-seated fear and a natural human instinct to avoid potential contagion. Vaccination, by its very nature, involves the introduction of a foreign substance into the body, which can trigger this instinctive anxiety and make such theories seem plausible to many (Mercier 2020).
Moreover, these theories are often propagated by individuals who believe that vaccines are part of a larger plot by powerful entities to cause harm or exert control. This narrative taps into the recurring theme of deliberate disease spread seen in historical conspiracy theories. While the specifics may vary, the core of this misinformation narrative remains consistent: a secret cabal is intent on spreading invisible diseases or dangerous substances to cause harm, targeting innocents to gain an advantage (Miani, Hills, and Bangerter 2022).
The persistence of these narratives across different diseases and historical periods underscores the enduring appeal of conspiracy theories. This appeal is driven by evolutionarily valid cues within these narratives, which resonate with our primal fears and instincts. These cues, honed by our evolutionary past, make these narratives compelling and attractive, emphasizing that conspiracy theories are socially adaptive attitudes, not beliefs. The trope of the deliberate spread of disease, with its potent combination of fear, uncertainty, and a clear enemy, is a prime example of this, often re-emerging in times of crisis and instability. This sets the stage for our next discussion on the trope of the internal enemy threat.
3.1.2. The Topic of the Threat of an Internal Enemy
One of the most compelling narratives in conspiracy theories is the trope of the internal enemy. This trope involves the idea of a hidden group of conspirators within society who are plotting against the common good. This narrative is particularly powerful because it taps into our fear of betrayal and deception, and our desire to protect our community from harm.
On Palm Sunday in 1678, local beggar Marie Schuh from Wermsdorf in The Margraviate of Moravia (today's Czech Republic) attended church. An acolyte noticed that she took the communion bread out of her mouth and hid it in her prayer book. The local priest suspected her of witchcraft and promptly informed the authorities. The owner of the manor, Countess Angele Sybille Galle, reacted with horror and installed an inquisition tribunal immediately, headed by prosecutor Heinrich Franz Boblig of Edelstadt. The inquisitor “discovered” a vast conspiracy of sorcerous holding of sabbats at Peterstein (Peter's Stones), where they performed repugnant rituals. It led to the torching and execution of more than one hundred people and was finally halted eight years later upon the direct order of Emperor Leopold I of Habsburg (Šindelář 1986).
This story illustrates one of the last witch trials in the former Austrian empire, revealing the structure of an age-old conspiracy that repeated itself for many years, not only in Europe (Singh 2021; Hutton 2017). During times of sociocultural instability, such as periods of war, famine, or disease, people are more inclined to turn to conspiracy theories, such as those involving witches (Hutton 2017). The act of hiding communion, a violation of a crucial Catholic rule, served as a valuable cue for a threatening alliance. The acolyte in this example was motivated by a desire to be recognized as a reliable member of society who could identify threats before they become real dangers, thus attempting to compete for support in case the threat materialized (Boyer 2022).
For centuries, the idea of a cabal lurking within the shadows, manipulating events for its own gain, has been widely popularized. However, the common thread remains the same: deception and secrecy are employed by conspirators who, at face value, appear to be honest and just people. Beneath their veneer lies a more sinister truth—where invisible power is exerted by means of harming those outside the inner circle. Such activities are often carried out in moments of crisis, feeding into these individuals' morally questionable objectives (Singh 2021).
The structure of evil in modern conspiracy theories, such as the QAnon conspiracy theory, mirrors that in historical beliefs about witchcraft (Enders et al. 2021; Miani, Hills, and Bangerter 2022). Both narratives involve a hidden group of conspirators using magical or semi-magical powers to plot against society. These conspirators are often depicted as respectable members of society, making it difficult for people to recognize the threat they pose (Miani, Hills, and Bangerter 2022). This fuels a sense of uncertainty and anxiety, leading people to form coalitions to ensure readiness in case the threat materializes. The parallels between the structures of historical misinformation like witchcraft and modern conspiracy theories suggest that these narratives serve a similar function in human societies: to prepare for times of sociocultural instability and mobilize or form protective coalitions in case the threat becomes real.
Moving from internal threats, we now turn to the narrative of external enemies in conspiracy theories. This narrative often intertwines with internal threats, suggesting a conspiracy between forces within and outside our gates. In the next subsection, we will explore this narrative further, examining its historical and modern manifestations.
3.1.3. The Topic of the Threat of an External Enemy
According to some recent experiments, the external enemy narrative has the strongest attractiveness (Blaine and Boyer 2018). Nevertheless, the external enemy threat is usually combined with the fear of hidden internal enemies who conspire with those outside.
For hundreds of years, the Ottoman Empire, Muslims, and their internal supporters represented the common anxiety and threat of external enemies for southern and central Europeans (Delumeau 2014; Ingram 2009; Randall 2020). 2 They supposedly conspired with hidden internal enemies: the so-called “Oriental conspiracy” was a conspiracy theory concerning “Moriscos” 3 or “Kristianlar” 4 who allegedly conspired with the Ottomans against Christianity. In parallel with this conspiracy theory came the mass murder and massive relocation of the Moriscos minority in Spain (Delumeau 2014; Ingram 2009) for allegedly conspiring with external enemies against Christendom.
An analogical modern conspiracy theory that follows a similar pattern is the Eurabia conspiracy, or—even more recently—the so-called Great Replacement conspiracy (Ekman 2022; Camus 2012), which concerns an alleged conspiracy of European elites to replace the original European culture with Muslims and other immigrants (Camus 2012). This conspiracy theory became even more popular in the EU during the “migrant crisis” of 2015 (Ekman 2022). The threat is represented by Muslims from abroad who are attempting to corrupt European culture in league with their internal conspirators: European liberals and Muslims already settled in the EU.
Analogously, we can present the conspiracy theory concerning millions of Mexicans on the border who are preparing to rape American women as an example of a repetitive narrative. Wicked Democrats are allegedly conspiring to bring them into the US (Cosentino 2020). In the tragic case of the El Paso shooting, Patrick Crusius's behavior was based on a similar structure of misinformation. The shooter's manifesto, posted online before the attack, expressed anger and hatred toward immigrants and people of Mexican descent. The shooter claimed that his actions were necessary to protect the United States from being invaded by immigrants. The “Great Replacement” conspiracy theory is also associated with the Christchurch mosque massacre in New Zealand in 2019. Brenton Tarrant, the terrorist who killed 56 Muslims attending Friday prayers, posted a manifesto online before the attack, which he specifically called “The Great Replacement” (Ekman 2022).
The recurring motif in both historical and contemporary examples is the perceived threat of visible enemies at our gates, who are allegedly conspiring with hidden agents within our ranks against the innocent. This narrative taps into our primal fears of invasion and exploitation, particularly when it comes to essential resources such as women and children, who symbolize the future of our society. These narratives often paint a picture of a society under siege, with the enemy not only coming from outside but also from within, creating a sense of pervasive threat and uncertainty. This dual threat serves to heighten the sense of urgency and danger, making the narrative more compelling and the call to action more pressing. It is a powerful tool for rallying support and justifying extreme measures in the name of protection and survival. This narrative, like the others we have discussed, is not just a story but a social tool, serving functions that are deeply rooted in our evolutionary past and our social present (Miani, Hills, and Bangerter 2022). As we continue to explore these narratives, we will see how they adapt and evolve to fit the changing social and cultural landscape, reflecting our deepest fears and our most pressing concerns.
3.1.4. The Apocalyptic Conspiracy
As we delve deeper into the narratives that fuel conspiracy theories, we encounter the apocalyptic conspiracy. This narrative takes the threat to an even higher level, invoking the ultimate end of the world as we know it. This narrative is not just about the threat of disease, internal enemies, or external enemies; it is about the existential threat to humanity itself. The apocalyptic conspiracy narrative taps into our deepest fears and anxieties about the future of our species and our planet. It paints a picture of a world on the brink of destruction, with powerful forces conspiring to bring about the apocalypse. This narrative is particularly potent because it creates a sense of urgency and existential importance that is not present in other conspiracy theories. Let us explore this narrative in more detail, starting with its historical roots and then looking at its modern manifestations.
We can use the introduction to the controversial Malleus Maleficarum for its characterization of an apocalyptic conspiracy: “In the midst of disasters of the collapsing secular world […] when the evening of the world declines towards its setting and the evil of men swells up […],” Satan “knows in great anger […] that he has little time remaining […] he has also caused a certain unusual heretical perversity to grow up int land of the Lord” (Kramer and Sprenger 1486 [2009], 69; italics added).
Even though the text originates from the fifteenth Century, the essence of its introduction still echoes today. The anxiety is produced by a presumably deteriorating world. The world includes morally repugnant enemies who are conspiring against humanity with Evil itself. This “doom on our doorsteps,” threatening humanity's existence, can be understood metaphorically (as an ecological catastrophe or cataclysmic collision with planet Nibiru/Planet X, for instance) 5 or literally (as Satan himself). 6
Anxieties caused by the sense of the impending end of the world were (and also are) usually interconnected with other threats: from external enemies conspiring with internal enemies or supernatural powers, including contagion. For example, not only were the Ottomans and Kristianlar threatening the Danube monarchy, but these human enemies were accompanied by immortal beings. The increasing insecurity concerning Ottomans also correlates with vampires that appeared at the Military borders of the Habsburg monarchy (Giuseppe 2014; Pickering 2020; Randall 2020). 7 Hysteria concerning vampires lasted for 25 years (Giuseppe 2014). 8
Nevertheless, what makes the apocalyptic conspiracy narrative distinctive from the others is its evocation of the ultimate end of the world as we know it. This can generate a sense of urgency and existential importance that is not present in other conspiracy theories. Nevertheless, the pattern remains the same (Enders et al. 2021; Hutton 2017; Moskalenko and McCauley 2021). Again, a group of wicked individuals conspires with the ultimate Evil to bring about the end of our society, or at the very least is reluctant to combat the powers of evil effectively.
3.2. Women, Children, and Information as Possible Targets
Building on the exploration of various threat-related tropes that fuel conspiracy theories, we now shift our focus to a shared element in these narratives: the targeting of crucial societal resources, particularly women and children. These groups, often perceived as vulnerable and in need of protection, serve to amplify the perceived threat and enhance the appeal of these conspiracy theories. This is not a random choice; it is a powerful evolutionary cue. It taps into deep-seated fears and protective instincts, making these narratives even more compelling and emotionally charged (Delumeau 2014; Gottschall 2021; Miani, Hills, and Bangerter 2022).
To illustrate this, let us examine a conspiracy theory that combines internal threats with the threat of pollution, and children or women as potential targets. In the period leading up to the French Revolution, several conspiracy theories led to riots in Orleans. Documented outbreaks of violence, requiring military intervention, occurred in 1750, 1768, and 1769 (Delumeau 2014). The circulating rumors centered around the government allegedly conspiring with gypsies, the police, and the Oratorians to kidnap children. According to this conspiracy, the government was harboring a prince missing an arm. Conspirators kidnapped children, amputated their hands, and presented them to the prince for a suitable replacement (Delumeau 2014). 9
Interestingly, similar rumors resurfaced in Orleans in 1956 (Morin 1969). This time, the alleged conspiracy involved clothing merchants, all of Jewish origin, who were supposedly organizing the kidnapping of women and girls for prostitution. Once again, police intervention was necessary.
Comparing these historical examples with the more recent Pizzagate conspiracy (Cosentino 2020), the structure remains consistent. Again, morally reprehensible individuals conspire against society and target children or women. From a cultural evolutionary perspective, women and children are the most precious resources because without them there will be no future (Chagnon 2013).
The Free Energy Suppression Conspiracy theory is another example of a conspiracy theory focusing on the alleged concealment of information by plotting elites (Barkun 2003). It suggests that a cabal of powerful elites is actively suppressing technologically viable, pollution-free, no-cost energy sources from the public, maintaining control over banks and governments by obscuring the secrets of renewable energy sources. Supporters believe these groups are manipulating patent offices, media outlets, and educational institutions to ensure modern society is unable to access free, clean, renewable energy. Some even allege that these organizations are killing scientists who refuse to stay silent about their inventions. 10 The core of this misinformation is therefore a suspicion that a group of people is plotting against others, concealing precious resources from them—namely information.
3.3. Concluding Insights: Recurrence of Conspiracy Narratives
This section has delved into the recurring narratives that underpin conspiracy theories, revealing their enduring appeal and their ability to tap into our deepest fears and anxieties. We have seen how these narratives, whether they concern the deliberate spread of disease, the threat of internal or external enemies, or the impending apocalypse, all share a common structure that resonates with our evolved psychological mechanisms. These narratives serve as a warning signal against threats and a tool for competition for social support, reflecting our innate desire to protect ourselves and our communities from harm. Furthermore, we have seen how these narratives often target our most valued resources, such as women, children, and information, amplifying the perceived threat and enhancing the appeal of these conspiracy theories. The persistence of these narratives across different historical periods and cultural contexts underscores their enduring appeal and their role as socially adaptive attitudes rather than beliefs. As we move forward, it is crucial to keep these insights in mind, recognizing the power of these narratives and their ability to shape our perceptions and behaviors in times of sociocultural instability. In summary, historical research implies that there may be evolved tropes of conspiracy theories that make us more prone to believing them. As this part suggests, the more intuitively plausible an explanation seems, the more likely our cognition is to recognize it as having merit, even without strong empirical evidence.
This suggests that certain features or tropes of conspiracy theories may have evolved to become more attractive to our cognitive processes, even if they are not based on empirical evidence. Considering vital human resources, these narratives are more likely to be accepted. This can help explain why certain conspiracy theories persist and are widely believed, despite a lack of evidence or empirical support.
4. Conclusion
In conclusion, this research has illuminated the complex interplay between anxiety, social instability, and the proclivity for conspiracy thinking. Our cognitive systems, honed by evolutionary pressures, are biased toward detecting threats, even in the absence of clear evidence. This bias is particularly pronounced in individuals prone to conspiracy thinking, whose anxiety-driven mindset leads them to perceive threats and conspiracies where none may exist.
We have also challenged the traditional epistemic approach to understanding conspiracy theories, arguing that our proclivity toward such theories is not merely a result of individual reasoning or psychological disposition. Instead, it is a manifestation of deeply ingrained cognitive mechanisms shaped by our evolutionary past. These mechanisms, while beneficial in a prehistoric context, can lead to the endorsement and propagation of misinformation in our current information-rich environment.
Furthermore, our societal context significantly influences our ability to identify potential threats. In times of heightened cultural anxiety and instability, our cognition becomes more sensitive and displays a tendency toward misinformation and conspiracy theories. This is evident in historical and contemporary examples of conspiracy narratives, which often recur in times of societal crisis and uncertainty.
However, it is important to note that while this research has suggested a correlation between anxiety and a proclivity to conspiracy theories, further research is required to investigate this relationship more thoroughly. Particularly, future studies should focus on the potential correlation between anxiety and the inclination toward conspiracy theories, primarily based on historical material.
Moreover, this research suggests that increasing stability in society could effectively reduce the propensity for conspiracy thinking. As our minds are more prone to conspiracy theories in times of instability, fostering a more stable environment could potentially mitigate this inclination. However, this is a complex issue that requires further exploration and understanding.
In the end, it is crucial to remember that conspiracy theories are not merely beliefs but socially adaptive attitudes shaped by our evolutionary past. Understanding this can help us approach the phenomenon of conspiracy thinking more nuanced and effectively, ultimately contributing to a more informed and resilient society.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
We would like to express our profound appreciation to our friend and colleague, Iva Svacinova, for her invaluable feedback throughout this research project. We would also like to thank Jaroslav Danes, Ronald Loeffler, Mark Risjord, Robert Stojanov, and Adela Klara Paleckova for their contributions and insights. Together, their support and feedback have greatly improved the quality of this work.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publicationof this article: This research project, titled ‘Misinformation and Anxiety in Culture,’ is conducted under the auspices of the Philosophical Faculty at the University of Hradec Kralove, Czechia - EU.
Correction (September 2024):
The article has been updated to correct the spelling mistake in three references.
