Politics of Exclusion: The Case of Scheduled Castes in the Panchayats of Karnataka

Dominant Caste

The concept of ‘dominant caste’ is taken from the conceptualisation of M. N. Srinivas (1987: 97). He wrote,

A caste may be said to be ‘dominant’ when it preponderates numerically over the other castes, and when it also wields preponderant economic and political power. A large and powerful caste group can be more easily dominant if its position in the local caste hierarchy is not too low.

This concept has been subject to revisions, not least by Srinivas himself, who saw the changes occurring since he first articulated this definition and, therefore, needed to bring in other characteristics to be more in tune with existing conditions. Thus, he also included the number of educated people in a caste and the occupations they pursued (ibid.).

Legitimacy

The concept of ‘legitimacy’ has been discussed for many years, to discern whether a government has valid grounds (legitimacy) to govern. In more recent times, it is generally considered within the ambit of democracy. An important question that has usually been discussed in this context is that of public order. In as much as governance involves the rule of the few over the many—those who are subject to this rule should feel that this rule is legitimate, acceptable and that they will comply with the pronouncements of these few. On the other hand, as Max Weber suggested, the fact that people submit to any order implies that they believe in the legitimacy and authority of the entity imposing such an order (in Stillman, 1974: 33). Thus, when there is a willingness to submit to the order of a few it also ensures and furthers the stability of the government (Grafstein, 1981).

Political legitimacy implies that the entity wielding political power is morally justified in doing so (Buchanan, 2002: 689). Political power, on the other hand, ‘is the attempt to make, apply and enforce rules monopolistically over the broadest class of citizens,’ (ibid.: 690). Political legitimacy may not by itself get the people to comply with the pronouncements of the government, though the government would prefer that they are not obliged to use coercive measures which would be difficult and costly (ibid.: 694). However, Buchanan’s contention is that rather than project a ‘consent theory’ to explain why some people wield political power and others do not, it is more convincing to bring democratic theory to explain such inequalities. In this explanation, it is now suggested that the inequalities in power can be justified by the citizens having ‘an equal say’ in ‘determining who will wield political power’ and ‘determining what the most fundamental laws are,’ (ibid.: 710). This will also suggest an adequate explanation about why people would submit to such a rule and that the government has now the required credibility or legitimacy to wield power. There is also the indication that legitimacy is related to participation in the political institutions and, in fact, participation enhances legitimacy. Conversely, a lack of participation of all or almost all citizens reduces the legitimacy of these political institutions. In the Indian State, no group is excluded from political participation due to their group identity, and the participation of most people is at the minimal level that such inclusion occurs (that is, voting). The practice of exclusion, however, is found more often in the manner in which representatives are elected. Reservations, too play a role in the exclusion of some groups even if the stated intention is to ‘include’, rather than exclude any group.

What does the above have to do with the state of affairs of the Panchayats and the reservations that have been provided to the people of the Scheduled Castes? We suggest that the question of legitimacy comes into this situation in several ways. The laws enacted, not only to constitute the Panchayats but the details of the structure and functions of these institutions, were also essentially imposed from ‘above’, that is, initially through the Constitutional Amendment (73rd) and then the specific Panchayati Raj Acts of the State governments. At the village level, the ordinary people have to live with these institutions and in the form in which they have been ‘imposed’ on them. Hence, while the institutional set-up has ignored the traditional structure of society and the functioning of the local groups who could be considered as the ‘dominant castes,’ it is now incumbent on these groups to accept the new ruling as a fait accompli.

This is not necessarily bad. Pitkin’s (1967) four types of representation: (a) authorised, where a representative is legally empowered to act for another; (b) descriptive representation, where the representative stands for a group by virtue of sharing similar characteristics such as race, sex, ethnicity or residence; (c) symbolic representation, where a leader stands for national ideas; and (d) substantive representation, where the representative seeks to advance a group’s policy preferences and interests; are indeed made possible through the reservation policy. The policy in its application is an interaction of all four types of representation, though at the Panchayat level lends itself to descriptive representation. Though Pitkin’s herself dismissed this descriptive representation as she rejected its key assumption of a link between characteristics and action, other authors like Phillip (1995), Young (2000) and Mansbridge (1999) have elaborated on the importance of political presence, whereby decision making requires the participation of key groups if democratic representative decisions are to be made (Childs & Lovenduski, 2012: 2).

Taking the argument further, Jane Mansbridge (1999) argues that descriptive representation can be justified in four contexts: contexts of mistrust, uncrystallized, not fully articulated interests, historical political subordination and low de facto legitimacy. The point being that there is some kind of a link between substantive and descriptive representation. Therefore, even though Panchayat was imposed from above it paved the way for enabling the ‘political presence’ of the Schedule Castes’ in the public sphere allowing them a presence in Panchayats and places of decision making. Hence, by stressing the importance of deliberative democracy the authors point to the importance of having these excluded groups present as it then enables them to insert their interests.

This could be seen as the theoretical context in which the Panchayats and reservation within it were introduced in their present form. They are meant to be inclusive and the affirmative action of reservations of seats for various groups ensures that Panchayats do not become institutions that completely ignore or exclude certain sections of society.

While this may be the context in which Panchayats were introduced, would dominant groups and upper castes accept it? We need to bring in the concept of legitimacy here and examine whether the people who are subject to the new institutions of local governance see their role and status in a new light. The Scheduled Castes, on the other hand, have been subjected to great indignities in the past and the new institutions may present them with the means to come out from such a situation. However, they too would face difficulties to see the reversal in their roles—though, possibly in a more positive light than the dominant castes would see them.

Dominant Castes in Karnataka

In Karnataka the two traditionally dominant castes, viz., the Lingayats and the Vokkaligas, have been numerically and economically dominant, influential in controlling and managing resources and wield substantial influence on the State’s political process. The State’s political leadership, since Independence, has mainly comprised representatives from either one of these two dominant castes (as chief ministers, besides several cabinet rank ministers). These two castes have well drawn out political boundaries representing important zones of southern and northern parts of the State. The south is identified with the dominance of Vokkaligas and the north with Lingayats. This is the result of the re-organisation of the State in 1956 when eight districts (four each from Bombay and Hyderabad Karnataka areas) were added which were the strongholds of the Lingayat population. It was in this area that Lord Basaveshwara, the twelfth-century saint, preached Veerasaivism. This changed the caste balance of the State when the Lingayats (or Veerasaivas) became the dominant caste, with greater numerical representation than the Vokkaligas who were dominant before 1956 in the erstwhile Princely Mysore with 11 districts. Thus, from 1947 to 1956, the State had Vokkaliga chief ministers and from 1956 to 1972, it was ruled by Lingayats (Manor, 1972). The two communities have continued their dominance with brief gaps when Devaraj Urs, R.K. Hegde, Veerappa Moily and S. Bangarappa from non-dominant castes became chief ministers. When this study was conducted, the chief minister was B. S. Yediyurappa, who hails from the Lingayat community. He was succeeded by Sadananda Gowda from the Vokkaliga caste and Jagadish Shettar, belonging to the Lingayat community. Previous to this government, a coalition governement was led by H. D. Kumaraswamy of the Vokkaliga caste. However, the current assembly, elected in May 2013, has put a break to these two dominant communities as the present Congress-I government is headed by Siddaramaiah, who hails from the Kuruba community, a non-dominant caste group in the state. Notwithstanding, the dominance of these communities continue to make inroads in the state politics.

The six Grama Panchayats selected for the study were drawn from these two areas, and the districts including them are Mandya in the south and Gulbarga in the north. Three Grama Panchayats from the respective district were selected for the study. Table 1 provides data on the representation of disadvantaged groups of society in the Panchayat Raj Institutions (PRIs) of Karnataka.

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Table 1.

Membership Representation of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Women in Karnataka PRIs

S. No.	Panchayat	Total Members	Women	SC	ST	BC-A	BC-B	General
1.	Zilla Panchayat	1,005	373 (37.1)	184 (18.3)	84 (8.4)	268 (26.7)	66 (6.6)	403 (40.1)
2.	Taluk Panchayat	3,695	1,555 (42.1)	678 (18.4)	361 (9.8)	983 (26.6)	248 (6.7)	1,425 (38.6)
3.	Grama Panchayat	91,402	39,318 (43.0)	16,997 (18.6)	9,880 (10.8)	24,316 (26.6)	6,028 (6.6)	34,181 (37.4)
4.	Total	96,102	41,246	17,859	10,325	25,567	6,342	36,009
5.	Percentage to the total	100.00	42.9	18.6	10.5	26.6	6.6	37.5

Source: Government of Karnataka (2008).

Note: Percentages in parentheses.

In Karnataka, women members occupying reserved seats exceed the mandated quota of one-third of the seats—taken together for all the three Panchayats (that is, Zilla, Taluk and Grama Panchayats), about 43 per cent of the Panchayat seats are occupied by women. Scheduled Castes form 18.6 per cent of the membership followed by Scheduled Tribes with 10.7 per cent. Members belonging to Other Backward Classes (Group-A) comprised 26.6 per cent and Group-B 6.6 per cent of the total membership. It is significant that the dominant castes, Lingayats and Vokkaligas, come under Group-B. However, members of these two castes also contest in the general category (that is, unreserved) and many of them win, thus making for a substantially higher proportion of members from these castes than their quota as OBCs would suggest.

A similar pattern emerges from the two districts (Mandya and Gulbarga) selected for the study. Table 2 provides district-wise and category-wise reservation in these districts.

The Karnataka Panchayat Raj Act of 1993 defines castes belonging to Group-A as most backward and castes under Group-B as more backward. The Vokkaligas and Lingayats come under Group-B while Kurubas and Gollas come under Group-A. Further, Group-A castes get 80 per cent of the one-third reservation and Group-B castes get 20 per cent. The Lingayats and Vokkaligas were included in Group-B mainly to check their dominance in the working of the PRIs. Despite their lower proportion in the Panchayats in comparison with the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, their presence and dominance is far more significant and decisive in the functioning of Panchayats at all the three levels. This is also reflected in the functioning of the six Grama Panchayats selected for the present study. Table 3 provides Grama Panchayat-wise information on membership and the number of members interviewed during fieldwork.

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Table 2.

Statement Showing Number of GPs, Members and Categories in the Selected Districts

S. No.	No. of GPs, Members and Categories	Mandya		Gulbarga
		No.	Percentage	No.	Percentage
1.	Scheduled Castes	543	14.16	1,479	26.56
2.	Scheduled Tribes	235	06.13	516	09.27
3.	Backward Caste; Group-A	1,042	27.17	1,608	28.86
4.	Backward Caste; Group-B	241	06.28	359	06.45
5.	General	1,774	46.26	1,608	28.86
	Total members including women members	3,835	100.00	5,570	100.00
6.	No. of women members to the total	1,655	43.15	2,487	44.65

Source: Mandya and Gulbarga Zilla Panchayats (2008).

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Table 3.

Panchayat-wise Contacted Members (N = 86)

S. No.	Grama Panchayat	Frequency
Mandya district
1.	K. Shettihalli	14
2.	Hodagatta	14
3.	Holalu	14
Gulbarga district
4.	Haravala	15
5.	Kadakola	14
6.	Nelogi	15
	Grama Panchayat	86

Source: Computed from the administered questionnaire.

Socio-economic Profile of the Panchayat Members

An examination of the socio-economic profile of the members drawn with the help of a questionnaire helped to understand their attitudes, perceptions, opinions and concerns about various issues related to the functioning of the Panchayat.

As noted from Table 4, of the total members interviewed, 58.1 per cent were male and 41.9 per cent female; 93 per cent were married, 5.8 per cent unmarried and one was a widow. A majority of the members (almost 70 per cent) were in the young and middle age groups and the remaining were in the older age groups. More than 98 per cent of the total members were Hindus and the remaining were Muslims. The educational levels of members indicated that 25.6 per cent were illiterate, 16.3 per cent had primary school education, 15.1 per cent had higher primary, 22.1 per cent had a high school education, 11.6 per cent had completed PUC and 9.3 per cent had a degree-level education. Agriculture (farmers) was the primary occupation (52.3 per cent), and 9.3 per cent were agricultural labourers. Most of the women members were housewives (61.1 per cent). In terms of land holdings, 18.6 per cent did not own agricultural land and depended largely on wage labour. Of the remaining, about 81 per cent owned landed property with the majority of them being small farmers (54.7 per cent). Field visits revealed that a majority of these farmers was working as wage labourers and were unable to cultivate their lands due to persistent drought conditions.

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Table 4.

Socio-economic Indicators of the Members

S. No.	Indicator	Frequency	Percentage
1.	Sex
	Male	50	58.1
	Female	36	41.9
	Total	86	100.0
2.	Marital status
	Married	80	93.0
	Unmarried	5	5.8
	Widow	1	1.2
	Total	86	100.0
3.	Age
	18–25 years	1	01.17
	26–35 years	27	31.39
	36–45 years	32	37.21
	46–55 years	16	18.60
	56 and above	10	11.63
	Total	86	100.00
4.	Religion
	Hindu	85	98.8
	Muslim	1	1.2
	Total	86	100.0
5.	Educational status
	Illiterate	22	25.6
	Primary	14	16.3
	Higher primary	13	15.1
	Secondary	19	22.1
	PUC	10	11.6
	Graduation	8	9.3
	Total	86	100.0
6.	Occupation
	Agricultural labour	8	9.3
	Unskilled labour	1	1.2
	Farmer	45	52.3
	Housewife	22	25.6
	Social worker	1	1.2
	Any other	9	10.5
	Total	86	100.0
7.	Land ownership
	Landless	16	18.6
	Marginal farmer	7	8.1
	Small farmer	47	54.7
	Medium farmer	8	9.3
	Large farmer	8	9.3
	Total	86	100.0

Source: Computed from the administered questionnaire.

Political Profile of Members

Affiliation with different political parties and active participation in their functioning/activities affirms that a politically active person possesses knowledge and understanding of the political affairs of the system in which he or she participates. With the system of reservations in Panchayats having been in existence for nearly two decades, persons belonging to disadvantaged groups of society have been able to affiliate themselves to both national and regional parties and are also able to involve themselves in the decision-making process. Table 5 illustrates this point.

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Table 5.

Political Profile of the Members (N = 86)

S. No.	Particulars	Frequency	Per cent
1.	Contest and won in election (category wise)
	SC (Reserved)	11	12.79
	ST (Reserved)	03	03.49
	Women (Reserved)	36	41.86
	OBC - Group-A	20	23.26
	OBC - Group-B	03	03.48
	General	13	15.12
	Total	86	100.0
2.	Membership in Grama Panchayat
	Member	74	86.04
	Vice-President	06	6.98
	President	06	6.98
	Total	86	100.0
3.	AIADMK	1	1.2
	CONGRESS-I	57	66.3
	BJP	6	7.0
	JD (S)	17	19.8
	BSP	1	1.2
	Independent	4	4.7
	Total	86	100.0
4.	First time contested
	Yes	74	86.0
	No	12	14.0
	Total	86	100.0
5.	Like to be in field
	Yes	74	86.0
	No	12	14.0
	Total	86	100.0

Source: Computed from the administered questionnaire.

A close look at Table 5 indicates that of the total members interviewed the majority were women (41.86 per cent), followed by Backward Caste Group-A (23.26 per cent). Of the total members contacted, 11 belonged to Scheduled Castes, three each to Schedule Tribe and Backward Caste Group-A and 13 to the general category. With regard to their status in the Panchayat, 74 (86.04 per cent) were members, seven (6.98 per cent) were Presidents and the remaining seven (6.98 per cent) Vice-Presidents. In Karnataka, the Grama Panchayat elections are contested on a non-political party basis but even so the representatives identify themselves as members of various political parties. As seen from Table 5, 57 (66.3 per cent) members identified with Congress-I, 17 (19.8 per cent) with the Janata Dal (Secular), six with the BJP, one each with the AIADMK and the BSP and four were independent. Discussions with the members revealed that a majority (86 per cent) of them were first-time elected representatives and only 12 members had been members of Grama Panchayats. When asked whether they would like to contest elections and continue in politics, 74 members (86 per cent) expressed willingness and the remaining 14 per cent expressed unwillingness.

One of the important questions to the members was regarding who had persuaded them to contest Grama Panchayat elections and the responses were varied and interesting. Table 6 provides this information.

As revealed from Table 6, the multiple responses from the members identify several individuals and groups who had motivated them to contest elections. Of many responses, 68 members (79.1 per cent) were persuaded by the local political leaders and by local village leaders (62.8 per cent). The next among persuaders were community leaders (39.5 per cent), followed by family members (29.1 per cent) and MLA (17.4 per cent). A significant fact is that a majority of members was influenced by local leaders and community elders. This is indicative of the influence of the local leaders in sponsoring candidates who otherwise may not have chosen to contest the elections and points to the presence and dominance of local elites in deciding who should contest elections.

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Table 6.

Persons who Persuaded Representatives to Contest Elections (N = 86)

Persuaded by	Yes	%	No	%	Total	%
MLA	15	17.4	71	82.6	86	100
Local party leaders	68	79.1	18	20.9	86	100
Patron (local village leaders)	54	62.8	32	37.2	86	100
Community elders	34	39.5	52	60.5	86	100
Religious/caste group	12	12	74	74	86	100
Family member	25	29.1	61	29.1	86	100

Source: Computed from the administered questionnaire.

Perceptions of Members about the Status and Role of Their Membership

One of the important expectations of rural local governance is that it should be inclusive, where collective decision making would be the norm and every member, irrespective of social and economic background, can actively participate in decision making. The Grama Panchayats were meant to have such a participative decision-making framework. However, due to the interplay of caste, class, political party, region and gender, the members of socially disadvantaged groups of society were restrained to some extent from performing their legitimate role as Presidents, Vice-Presidents or members. With a view to understand how the members were persuaded and supported by local and community leaders to function either on their own or independent of any pressure, we discussed some of the following issues with the members and their responses are as follows.

What kind of pressures were the members subjected to from their peer groups? Discussions with the members indicated that issues such as getting houses and housing sites, sanction and renewal of licenses, contracts for construction of roads, drainage, civil works, street lights, etc., bring considerable external pressures on the representatives. As seen from Table 7, the family members (80.23 per cent), caste groups (75.58 per cent) and political groups (67.44 per cent) were in the forefront in exerting pressure on members to provide various benefits. In wielding pressure, the public also had members under their control, especially to get houses sanctioned for themselves or members of the family or community through different housing schemes, such as Ashraya, Ambedkar Housing Scheme and to have independent toilets under the total sanitation scheme. This also applied to employment generation schemes and in other contexts, to old age pensions, etc.

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Table 7.

Members Experiencing Pressure in the Work Situations

Pressure put by	Yes	No	Total
Caste groups	65(75.58)	21(24.42)	86(100)
Political groups	58(67.44)	28(32.56)	86(100)
Opposition members	50(58.14)	36(41.86)	86(100)
Officials	45(52.33)	41(47.67)	86(100)
Family members	69(80.23)	17(19.77)	86(100)
Public	36(41.86)	50(58.14)	86(100)

Source: Computed from the administered questionnaire.

Notwithstanding the above, the representatives had to carry out certain responsibilities as members of Grama Panchayats, like attending meetings, visiting their constituencies and oversee the planning and implementation of development programmes. To what extent the members of Grama Panchayats were able to carry out their responsibilities is presented in Table 8.

The interviewed members stated that they generally did not miss the monthly meetings of the Grama Panchayats and they tried to attend them on a regular basis. However, the same spirit was absent in the case of visits to their respective wards or constituencies. Of the members, 48.8 per cent visited their wards daily, 18.6 per cent visited them on alternate days. One-third of the members visited their constituencies once in a week and the remaining only once in a month. Family responsibility, particularly for the women members, was the reason for such irregular visits. Domestic duties or household chores were neither reduced nor shared by men when women became political leaders and elected representatives. This was particularly true of economically poor members and those from vulnerable communities, who had to earn their living despite being political leaders. Connectivity to constituencies and affordability of bus fare was an important issue for poorer members. Illiteracy was a factor for women Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe members that curtailed more active participation. This actually paved the way for male members from these households to attend to their wives’ constituency problems and the voters recognising them (husbands) as their de facto leaders. Instances from the field indicated that the problems concerning wards and individuals were addressed by the male members who were related to elected women representatives. A further case of dominance of local leaders (not of Scheduled Castes) was evident in the case of the Hodaghatta Grama Panchayat in Mandya district and in Nelogi and Harwala Grama Panchayats in Gulbarga district, where the village problems were discussed and solved by these leaders on behalf of Scheduled Caste members.

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Table 8.

Participation of Members in Grama Panchayat Activities (N = 86)

	Attending Meetings	Frequency	Percentage
1.	Yes	86	100.0
	No	–	–
	Total	86	100.0
2.	Frequency of visits
	Daily	42	48.8
	Alternate days	16	18.6
	Once in a week	25	29.1
	Once in a month	3	3.5
	Total	86	100.0
3.	Preparation of plans/budgets
	Prepared by the Secretary	48	55.6
	Prepared jointly by the Secretary and the President	10	11.8
	Prepared under the guidance of the general body	03	3.5
	Prepared under the guidance of a few influential members	25	29.1
	Total	86	100.0
4.	Satisfied with financial position of Panchayats
	Yes	20	11.6
	No	66	87.2
	Total	86	100.0
5.	Successful in implementing development works
	Yes	48	55.8
	No	38	44.2
	Total	86	100.0
6.	Self-assessment
	Very good	15	17.43
	Good	40	46.51
	Average	27	18.51
	Not satisfactory	04	04.65
	Total	86	100.00

Source: Computed from the administered questionnaire.

Who actually prepares action plans and budgets of the Grama Panchayats? More than 55 per cent of the members said that the Secretary of the Grama Panchayat prepared the plans and budgets. Less than one-third of the members (29 per cent) indicated that plans and budgets were also prepared under the guidance of influential members. The President of the Panchayat was hardly ever taken into confidence while preparing plans and budgets, although he is a joint signatory of cheques issued by the Grama Panchayats. More than 87 per cent of the respondents were concerned about the poor financial status of Grama Panchayats and the resulting slowdown in the implementation of development programmes, which was not up to their expectations. While self-assessing their performance only 15 members felt that they were able to do ‘very good’ work, more than 46 per cent rated their performance as ‘good’, while 18 per cent regarded their own work as ‘average’.

Moving from members’ participation and performance in the working of Grama Panchayats, some general issues were discussed with them, which have a significant bearing on the overall performance of Grama Panchayats in a given socio-economic, political and cultural context. Their perceptions of these issues are presented in Table 9.

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Table 9.

Members’ Perceptions on General Issues (N = 86)

S. No.	Members’ Perceptions	Freq.	Per cent
1.	About re-contesting Panchayat elections
	Yes	66	76.7
	No	20	23.3
	Total	86	100.0
2.	Favouring a second-term or third-term reservation of seats
	Yes	53	61.6
	No	33	38.4
	Total	86	100.0
3.	About any individual/s in the village, who can be considered dominant/powerful
	Yes	79	91.9
	No	7	8.1
	Total	86	100.0
4.	Among rural elites, do they articulate a view that women or members of any SC/ST groups should be prevented from being members, or Presidents or Vice-Presidents of the Panchayats
	Yes	64	74.4
	No	22	25.6
	Total	86	100.0
5.	About a claim that the presence of a person of a particular group is against traditional practices, or is not legitimate, or a ‘reversal of the natural order’
	Yes	64	74.4
	No	22	25.6
	Total	86	100.0

Source: Computed from the administered questionnaire.

Representatives who were members of Scheduled Castes were in favour of extending reservation of seats and positions of authority in the Panchayat Raj Institutions (PRIs) because it kept them in the mainstream polity and facilitated, at least to some extent, to the betterment of their communities in particular and village development in general. Given another opportunity, they would like to contest elections for a second time even for unreserved seats. More than 76 per cent were willing to contest the next Grama Panchayat elections. Those who did not want to contest felt that the rotation of seat reservations should occur only once in ten years (and not every five years) and this was also supported by those who wanted to contest elections. More than 61 per cent favoured reservation of seats for a second consecutive term. In one sense, it may indicate a lack of confidence among representatives to face elections without reservation of seats. Nevertheless, it also shows a more realistic perception of their situation and their virtually non-existent chances of being elected to an unreserved seat. The reasons for not wanting to contest elections again were mainly lack of resources, lack of family support and their continuing lack of interest in electoral politics.

Are their village affairs or activities controlled by dominant and powerful individuals? The reply was in the affirmative. The majority of members indicated that their villages do have influential and powerful individuals who have access to resources and also share a good rapport and network with politicians, officers and others in positions of power.

As suggested by the representatives, the electorate also seems to be somewhat against affirmative action or at least to leadership emerging from the Scheduled Castes. Even people from the Scheduled Castes do not seem to favour their own people as their leaders. It is significant that a majority of people and the elites in the villages would not like to support local leadership emerging from the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes, and women, and also from occupying positions such as President and Vice-President.

There is a clear indication, as stated by members belonging to Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes and by women, that were it not for the reservation of seats and office bearers’ posts in Panchayats, the locally dominant leaders belonging to castes such as Vokkaligas and Lingayats would not have allowed them to contest the elections and occupy these seats. The rural social atmosphere still includes such practices as untouchability, caste based discrimination in economic matters, disparity in wage rates and access to basic amenities, etc. One can observe strong traditional rivalries between dominant caste groups and Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribes and practices like keeping these groups from entering temples.

Situational Analysis

In the context of the reservation of seats for both Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes and for women, Karnataka has a distinct history. The system of reservations came into vogue way back in 1874, when the then Princely Mysore State earmarked seats for members of backward classes in the Mysore Administrative Service. Further, it was extended to larger sections of society through successive Backward Classes Commissions. Likewise, it was during the Janata party rule in the early 1980s that 25 per cent of the seats in the Panchayati Raj institutions were reserved for women. Therefore, one can argue that the people in Karnataka had already experienced the existence of institutional measures in the form of reservation of seats even before the present Panchayats were set up. That, however, has not made a reservation of seats and president’s posts in Panchayats for the Scheduled Castes more acceptable to the members of non-Scheduled Caste castes, who also have to contend with the reduction of the number of seats and posts available to them.

If we take the meaning of legitimacy to denote institutions of government that are acceptable to the people, there is no evidence of people opposing the PRIs on the grounds of inclusion of hitherto marginalised or alienated sections, such as the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and women, in positions of power. When the system was introduced in 1993 with a Constitutional mandate, there was no organised protest against such a move, irrespective of political parties or caste groups. Likewise, there was no protest over the decision of the Parliament (through the enactment of the 73rd Constitutional Amendment) to allow a woman or a Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe to head a Panchayat when the members of dominant and high castes are ordinary members (or not even members, due to the reservations preventing them from contesting elections). There was acceptance (even if there was a lack of any enthusiasm for these provisions) of what was passed as an Act of Parliament. Towards enabling people’s participation too, the system of governance is legitimate under Panchayati Raj, since the rules, regulations and the capacity-building mechanisms are created so that a congenial environment is provided for the people to participate. This refers to both the holding of the people’s assembly (as Gram Sabha) and the transparency mechanisms that the Act upholds.

An important consideration in the case of Mandya district is that it is a district dominated by Vokkaligas in State politics and the Grama Panchayats as well (see Chandrashekhar, 2009). With the rule that is presently in vogue, Vokkaligas qualify for reserved seats among Backward Castes. They are also a strong agricultural caste and are in a position to contest and win unreserved seats. Both these factors result in a very large number of seats in the Grama Panchayats being occupied by Vokkaligas. ² This also facilitates the dominance of individuals from this caste who are representatives (or even when they are not elected representatives) in the Panchayats. The dominance of Panchayats by members of the dominant castes is not unusual in Karnataka and, more often than not, it is the dominant individuals from these castes who control the functioning of the panchayats. At times, these ‘big men’ of the village are not even elected representatives, but their local standing enables them to control the Grama Panchayats (see Inbanathan & Gopalappa, 2003).

There are, however, several intervening features in the functioning of the Panchayats, where, despite the provisions of the Panchayati Raj Act giving space to people of disadvantaged groups, there are also subtle and latent curbs and checks on their behaviour as leaders and their participation in Panchayat matters. This is where we need to make a clear distinction between participation in contrast to mere representation. In this, Karnataka, despite its long and shining history of affirmative action, the Dalit movement and representation of vulnerable sections even before the 1993 Act, closely resembles the situation in Tamil Nadu (Inbanathan & Sivanna, 2012).

The first significant situation is the selection of candidates from the reserved categories, particularly the Scheduled Castes (and Scheduled Tribes). In the very first stage of selecting suitable candidates to contest the elections, the study shows that adjustments were made by choosing persons who would co-operate with the leaders from the dominant caste(s) and would not start asserting their new-found status. One should also recognise here the changes in the social structure of various districts in the State where one or two middle castes have risen to positions of dominance by virtue of the various reform policies. Field studies in Gulbarga and Mandya provide ample proof of the reluctance of the members of the hitherto politically dominant castes to surrender their dominance, and instead, contrive to have their ‘own’ candidate to contest and win. This is further demonstrated in the verbatim reply of the respondents quoted in Box 1.

While not supportive of the reservation for Scheduled Castes in various positions of the Panchayats, they make special efforts to have candidates whom they can control (see also Inbanathan, 1999). As one respondent from Gulbarga asked, ‘How can we survive if power goes to Scheduled Castes?’ This may very well be an extreme view and not justified either, keeping in view the fact that presidents in Karnataka’s Grama Panchayats are not endowed with considerable power. However, virtually everyone among non-Scheduled Caste groups shares the feeling that if power goes to Scheduled Caste members it will be at their expense. Belonging to groups that have been dominant for years, in the economic (land ownership and wealth), as well as in the political field, they are reluctant to be ‘ruled’ by the Scheduled Castes. Another perceived threat to the upper/dominant castes is that, unlike in the past, young Dalits today are better educated, strong-willed and politically knowledgeable. Further, Gulbarga has been influenced by the Dalit Panthers movement of Maharashtra as well as by the Dalit Sangarsh Samithi (DSS) movement of Karnataka. It also had a local leader, Shyamsunder, who mobilised the Dalit youth to fight for their rights. In Mandya too, the DSS is quite deep-rooted and strong. It has awakened and created awareness among the Dalits to fight for their rights and make use of the facility of reservations. Thus, the dominant castes are unhappy with the fact that they have to surrender power to the new Scheduled Caste leaders (as Presidents), the very people who were subservient to them and whom they dominated for many years.

The transfer of leadership from the dominant to the marginalised groups can be seen in various ways. One extreme is the intolerance in surrendering power to the groups that were considered as being at the ‘bottom of society’. The second is for the dominant groups to face the challenges of greater awareness and improved capacity of Scheduled Castes to don the mantle of leadership. A third dimension supported or put forth in both the districts by a few members of the traditional leadership states that ‘whoever comes must be good, and who will work for the welfare of the community’. They observe that one has to obey the changes imposed by the government or the Constitution. However, selecting candidates should be on the basis of bringing in good candidates who were educated and those who will work. This, however, is not happening, according to them. A view that has also been articulated is that better and improved leadership of people from the Scheduled Castes has been seen due to their organisational abilities. The DSS and other organisations have empowered the Scheduled Castes—both leaders and the common people. Thus, they are perceived as being able to provide better leadership.

There is a gender dimension too in their reluctance to having Dalits as Presidents. In both districts and more so in Gulbarga, a male President is preferable to a woman if they are both members of Scheduled Castes. Moving a no-confidence motion (a practice that has been in vogue for several years, even from the beginning of the new Panchayati Raj following the enactment of the Panchayati Raj Act of 1983) and other forms of non-cooperation to a woman as President show that a male representative is usually preferred.

It is interesting to note that the communities that were dominant were not only the traditionally dominant castes, but also those that had come to prominence in recent decades due to the policies of the government. For example, in the Grama Panchayats of Mandya district, Vokkaligas were no doubt the dominant community, actively involved in matters relating to local governance, besides participating in other decisions pertaining to the area’s economy and polity. However, this situation was complicated by the new-found assertion of middle castes due, in no small part, to the reservation of seats in employment. Besides the Scheduled Castes, the Besthas (Fishermen) have entered into a triangular combination with the Vokkaligas and the Scheduled Castes. In fact, this region has witnessed caste-related tensions between these communities, mostly on the issue of protective discrimination.

The field data from Mandya district reveal that a number of candidates have come under the influence of local caste and political leaders (like MLAs). Alliances between members of the elite groups, mostly from upper castes, the Scheduled Castes and the fishermen were formed to share economic benefits. This is a significant development considering that the Grama Panchayats lie in a politically important area and there are a number of socio-political processes encouraging alliances across caste and class groups. The areas of the district where we selected Grama Panchayats enjoy a moderate degree of affluence. However, the villages still suffer from a shortage of drinking water and other basic amenities. This has often caused conflict between Grama Panchayat members resulting in factional politics and division of members on political party lines. The poor and lower castes are also excluded from basic facilities such as drainage, sanitation, village roads, electrification and housing. In Gulbarga district, there is domination by the richer castes. Caste-based discrimination is quite severe and members of the weaker sections rarely participated in Panchayat activities. The members of the Grama Panchayats do not cooperate and take up developmental programmes with any commitment. There are internal quarrels mostly based on caste-based discrimination and ignorance of members from the vulnerable sections. Lingayats and Scheduled Castes are the numerically larger communities here and the former is the dominant caste with considerable land owned by them. The Grama Panchayats (GP) have politically influential leaders both within the Panchayat and outside. Although the members of the GP are literate, there was resistance to the devolution of political power to the members of the Scheduled Castes by members of the upper castes (notwithstanding the Act).

The upper/dominant castes know that they have to give in when the priority is to respect the Constitutional mandate but they try to get the best for themselves from the existing system. They select candidates from among the Scheduled Castes who are capable of working but take up issues in a non-confrontational manner and enable the dominant castes have their way. However, inherent in this exercise is a bitter feeling that they (upper castes) have to now listen to the Scheduled Castes or at least have to converse with them. As an ex-headman from the Vokkaliga caste said, ‘Since the olden times, we have been living like kings. Now we have to be under the control of these (Scheduled Caste) people’. Nevertheless, the same upper castes do cooperate at times when benefits have to go to the beneficiaries proposed by them. As a member stated:

Old leaders (like Shankar and Chowdaiah) do help, give us importance and offer suggestions but there is a feeling of contempt inside. There are also a few who are very jealous and do not cooperate but give considerable trouble. The intensity and extent of such non-cooperation is high wherever the concerned Scheduled Caste member or President is a woman.

Various efforts are made by members of dominant castes on the eve of elections or when one has to field candidates for elections to the Panchayats to bring pressure on the day of filing nominations, put the Scheduled Caste candidates under certain compulsions and tempt them with money to finance the cost of canvassing votes. All this is done by the rich in the dominant castes (Gowdas) to capture the process of selecting beneficiaries and controlling the grants that come to the Panchayat once their candidate wins. The candidate who later becomes the elected Panchayat member is forced to approve the decisions taken by these dominant caste leaders. They (members of dominant castes) choose persons among Schedule Castes (male or female) who are ready to listen to them and dance to their tunes. Once they are elected the functions of representatives and Presidents and Vice-Presidents are taken over by members of the dominant castes.

Leaders of the upper/dominant caste often created situations where the Scheduled Caste President had to obey or face negative consequences such as opposition from other members, or a no-confidence motion being moved against them. As a Scheduled Caste representative remarked, the dominant caste leaders on occasion divided the different Scheduled Caste members and created conflict among them. They started discriminating against the Scheduled Caste members or spread rumours among the electorate that Scheduled Caste representatives were corrupt and made the Scheduled Caste community rebel against their own community representatives.

Members of dominant caste groups justified their behaviour by asserting that Scheduled Caste members were illiterate and/or ignorant of what needs to be done and the contents of government letters. The responses quoted in Box 2 supports this as well. What is the use of electing such leaders? Reservation of seats to Scheduled Castes is acceptable if the educated among them contest elections. The dominance of the upper castes is mostly due to the ignorance of Scheduled Castes about rules, procedures and fear of officials. It so happens (according to them) that most of those who are incapable or incompetent are from the Scheduled Castes and women. An important factor in the Grama Panchayats of our study is that in most places, the dominant castes had preponderant strength compared to the Scheduled Castes. Even when they were not, they were able to wield considerable influence by virtue of their economic strength, based on ownership of land. Members of dominant castes were land owners who employed most of the Scheduled Caste members. Even after being elected members of the Panchayats the Scheduled Castes continued to work as labourers for the dominant caste landowners.

Women members from Scheduled Castes suffer a double discrimination—as women and as Scheduled Castes. Apart from having their views ignored in the Panchayats, many women stated that the male representatives did not even allow them to speak in the meetings. In the same way, wherever there are educated, knowledgeable women members, there is no cooperation. Vokkaligas, Lingayats, other backward but non-Scheduled Castes, all get together and ill-treat the Scheduled Caste members in subtle ways. For example, no work is given to the Scheduled Caste members without commissions or control. They are mislead and prevented from taking the right decisions, or join up with officials of the upper caste to exploit the other Scheduled Caste members. In a case in Mandya district, the President’s post was first open to a candidate from a general category, but the next time it went to a Scheduled Caste. Between the two terms, there was complete transformation in the attitude of the upper caste members from cooperation with the President in the first term to total defiance and causing trouble for the Scheduled Caste President in the second term. In another case, the Scheduled Caste candidate was kidnapped by the dominant caste supporters and was not released until after the elections. He was offered a bribe to stay away from elections. The situation becomes even more tense when a Scheduled Caste wins from a general seat. This is not to be borne by the dominant and upper castes who do not have any legal support to oppose a Scheduled Caste contesting for a general seat, and in the process depriving them (upper castes) of a chance to win that seat (that is, if the person of a Scheduled Caste group were to contest and win).

In both districts, despite the existence of the Panchayati Raj system for nearly two decades in its present form, there was very little improvement in the condition of the Scheduled Castes. For example, in many of our study villages, the practice of preventing the entry of ex-untouchables into temples continues. They are not served by the village barber or washer man. However, the youth among Scheduled Castes have become more assertive and demanding. As a result, many backward or forward castes have united to oppose this new force.

Thus, there are variations in the views of respondents about the issue of Scheduled Caste leadership and support of the dominant castes who prefer ‘dummy’ candidates rather than active and assertive ones. However, it is the view of some respondents that mere educational advancement is inadequate without adequate political skills. In adverse circumstances and exploitative official machinery, the skill to rule or administer is pre-requisite for political empowerment of the marginalised candidates. The economic status of the elected member or head of a Panchayat plays a major role in giving importance to the person, or in giving value to her/his words and actions in the Panchayat. Nobody gives any importance to a daily wage earning poor woman or man among the Scheduled Castes, even if one is a representative or leader. There are a few, according to our respondents, who have gained success as leaders and are strong, have DSS support and the backing of Scheduled Caste leaders at higher levels and, most important, they come from a relatively better off economic background. If a person, though a Scheduled Caste, is elected unopposed and is also respected by upper castes, such a person gets linked to them as a political leader rather than as a representative of the Dalits. It is this blend of interests that makes anyone’s candidature acceptable to upper castes and who, in turn, use them to meet their own socio-economic and political goals in the long run.