Abstract
Climate change is expected to eventually affect hundreds and millions of people and they will require resettlement, since their existing habitations will no longer remain liveable. Resettlement as a response to climate change impacts (or an adaptation strategy) is now becoming increasingly acceptable. But for humanitarian agencies, essentially focused on protecting and assisting the victims of human rights abuses, resettlement is an unchartered territory. They can, however, learn much from resettlement experience of development agencies, international as well as national. This article presents resettlement experience associated with development projects, its strengths and weaknesses, and looks at its implications for planning climate change resettlement.
Keywords
Introduction
As many places, now liveable, become unliveable due to climate change, the affected people will be forced to relocate (Ferris, 2011). This will be the case not only with atolls of the Papua New Guinea islands in the Pacific Ocean, or Maldives in the Indian Ocean, or the continental coastal areas experiencing rising sea levels as in Bangladesh, but also in many other larger parts of the globe where communities are living under constant threats of flooding, drought and such other disasters. The latest report of the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (UN IPCC, 2014) predicts that climate change will displace hundreds and millions of people in developing countries by the end of this century.
In India, climate change impacts will be severe. Climate change will affect agriculture on which approximately 60 per cent of the population depends for livelihood, water storage in the Himalayan glaciers, which are the source of major rivers and groundwater recharge, rise in sea level and the consequent threats to a long coastline and large habitations (including Bombay and Calcutta). Climate change will also cause increased frequency of floods, and droughts, which, in turn, will impact India’s food problem and water security (PLARRDIA, 2013). People from some places have already begun moving to escape the effects of climate change, and as climatic conditions worsen, hundreds and thousands more are expected to follow suit. The scientists of the Oceanography Studies Department of the Jadav University recently reported that due to rising sea levels, three islands in the Sunderbans, namely Lohachachara, Suparibhanga and Bedford have completely submerged in the Bay of Bengal, and the fourth island Gramara now vastly eroded is fighting a losing battle. This has forced the people of these islands to relocate to mainland areas (Ghosh, Hajra & Mukhopadhyay, 2014). What is worse, displaced from their lands and livelihoods they had no option but to move on their own. Till now they received no resettlement assistance from the government or any other source, nothing at all.
The UN IPCC in its very first report had identified human mobility as a major consequence of climate change (UN IPCC, 1900). Resettlement as a response to climate change impacts (or an adaptation strategy) has since gained wide acceptance (UN, 2010). For small island countries, such as Kiribati, this may indeed be the only option left (Loughry & McAdam, 2008: 51).
Resettlement is not going to be an easy way out, though. This is intrinsically a disruptive and impoverishing process in which human rights violations occur all too frequently. Humanitarians, with their considerable protection experience, are undoubtedly well placed to assist and protect the victims of human rights abuses (Ferris, 2011). But that is not all. They will also need to find adequate land, engage with host populations, and identify the livelihood and resettlement options to secure for climate-displaced groups the chance to re-establish a life worth living (Leckie, 2012, 2013).
In the humanitarian agencies, not enough is known yet about the management of climate-induced resettlement. For them (such as, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, international non-governmental organisations and the Red Cross, Red Crescent movements) resettlement remains largely an uncharted territory. This is attributable largely to their preoccupation with conflict-induced displacement, and, to some extent with displacement resulting from disasters. ‘Humanitarian actors have valuable expertise in protecting and assisting populations …. They have much less experience in planning relocations’ (Ferris, 2012).
Much resettlement experience, relevant to climate change-induced displacement, exists in development agencies—international as well as national. The World Bank has built up enormous resettlement experience over the years (World Bank, 1994). Enormous experience also exists in national development agencies, as they are the ones that actually carry out resettlement operations on the ground (Mathur, 2011, 2013). This resettlement experience is not entirely positive, though (Oliver-Smith et al., 2014: 23–25).
The poor performance of resettlement need not come as a surprise. Resettlement is an inherently complex process. It is this complexity that gives rise to the kind of problems, which are not readily amenable to rational planning and implementation methods, and predisposes resettlement efforts to failure (De Wet, 2006). But not everyone agrees. Other experts regard a lack of proper inputs, including legal and policy frameworks, political will, funding, social impact assessments (SIAs), planning, consultation, careful implementation and monitoring, as factors that account for failures (Oliver-Smith & Sherbinin, 2014; Scudder, 2015). If right inputs are provided, successful resettlement outcomes are possible.
A Review of Resettlement Experience in Development
If any lessons from resettlement experience in development are to be learnt for climate change resettlement, it will be useful to first briefly review this experience, its strengths as well as its weaknesses.
Size and Consequences
Development projects have long been known as a significant cause of forced displacement, but in the past 10 or 15 years or so; the pace and volume of displacement has been truly mind-boggling. Worldwide, development projects are estimated to displace more than 15 million people every year, according to Cernea in a personal communication to Oliver-Smith (2009: 3). In India alone, development projects in the last 60 years are estimated to have displaced roughly 60 million people, some of them more than once, reducing most of them to a state of permanent poverty. This figure, large as it is, may yet be an underestimate (Mathur, 2013: 1).
The displacement impacts of development projects are massive (Robinson, 2003). Experience has shown that most people, who experience relocation, are unable to recover their previous standards of living and end up worse off than before. Generally, the worst affected happen to be among the poorest. They lose their homes, lands, livelihoods and social networks, remain inadequately compensated, and are forcibly moved to unfamiliar places. On the lives of tribal people and women, in particular, displacement is known to have produced some of the worst impoverishing effects. A sudden increase in impoverishment is indeed the most visible impact on the lives of people, displaced by development projects (Mathur & Marsden, 1998).
On the basis of his extensive anthropological and sociological research on poorly performing development projects, Cernea (1995) found eight recurrent characteristics that often put the displaced people to the risks of impoverishment. These eight main risks are the following: (a) landlessness, (b) joblessness, (c) homelessness, (d) marginalisation, (e) increased morbidity, (f) food insecurity, (g) loss of access to common property resources and (h) social articulation. These processes tend to occur simultaneously, with variable intensities in different locations. Together, they constitute what has come to be known as a risk model: the risks to be avoided if displaced people are not be left worse off.
Main Strengths
The major strengths of resettlement associated with development projects include the following: (a) resettlement policy and (b) resettlement planning.
Resettlement Policy
In response to mounting evidence confirming that much impoverishment results from the shortcomings of development management, the World Bank in 1980 issued its first policy on involuntary resettlement (World Bank, 1980). This was meant for its own staff to guide them in carrying out operations in this sensitive area with the aim of safeguarding the interests of displaced people. The policy has since undergone some revisions and is currently under further revision. Although the World Bank policy lacks legal enforceability, yet as a funding agency, the World Bank has enough leverage to ensure that resettlement is carried out by borrowers in accordance with its own resettlement policy.
The basic elements of the World Bank involuntary resettlement policy may be summarised as follows: given the disruptive nature of the forced resettlement process, the World Bank policy is to avoid it as far as possible. For people who, despite all efforts to avoid it, must still be resettled, the policy directive is to ensure reestablishment in ways that improve their standards of living and not just restore them to pre-project poverty levels. The World Bank policy is also emphatic that for resettlement not to be reduced to the physical relocation of people and reproduction of their pre-displacement conditions, all resettlement operations must be planned and implemented as development programmes.
The World Bank resettlement policy has indeed played an important role in improving resettlement outcomes overall. Scudder (2015: 278) notes: ‘There is no doubt that the Bank’s resettlement guidelines have had a major impact on minimising the number requiring resettlement. They have also improved planning to the extent that the majority of resettlers are made less poor than would have otherwise been the case.’
The other international agencies, including the Asian Development Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the Australian Aid (AusAid 2012) have since formulated their own resettlement policies, using the World Bank policy guidelines as a ‘good practice’ model.
Some governments have also issued their own resettlement policies in recent years. In India, the first resettlement policy was issued in 2004, and with minor changes, reissued in 2007. This has now been converted into a law and merged with the land acquisition law. ‘The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, and Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act 2014’ makes resettlement a legally enforceable right (GOI, 2013).
Resettlement Planning
This is another ‘good practice’ of resettlement in development. It is well known that by itself a policy, howsoever well intentioned, is not enough. The success of the policy depends on how well it is implemented. The instrument devised to ensure effective implementation of the policy is the Resettlement Action Plan (RAP). International development financing agencies now require a resettlement plan before considering any funding request for development projects.
When displacement is on a large scale, the policy requires the preparation of a RAP, and the planning for resettlement needs to begin during the earliest stages of project preparation. Essentially, resettlement plans are built around a development strategy and package aimed at improving or at least restoring the economic base for those who lose land, livelihoods and other resources at no cost to themselves. The budget provided in the resettlement plan must be adequate, especially budget for activities meant to generate alternative means of income generation for the affected people.
The plan is based on the findings of a SIA, which generally involves census data, socio-economic survey data, study visits to the field and consultations with the affected people and other stakeholders, including the concerned officials.
The resettlement plan: (a) assesses the full range of adverse impacts, including the loss of land and immovable property and assets; (b) enunciates principles and guidelines to mitigate the loss; (c) categorises the potentially affected persons by loss and defines for each category the specific entitlements to compensation and assistance; (d) outlines the measures to facilitate relocation and ensure income restoration; (e) provides for adequate budget and (f) specifies the responsibilities for managing resettlement and monitoring its progress.
Main Weaknesses
As the experience has shown, even the best intentions of resettlement policy and the most meticulous planning of resettlement have not always produced trouble-free resettlement outcomes (Picciotto et al., 2001). In many cases, neither the policy nor the resettlement plans have worked, as intended. This will be evident from the following quick assessment.
Policy: Gap between Promise and Performance
Although the promulgation of the World Bank policy on involuntary resettlement policy in 1980 was an important step forward, yet issues remain with its compliance. The World Bank, often in a hurry to disburse loans, regardless of their social and economic consequences, soon began ignoring, in project after project, compliance with its own resettlement standards, and as a result, an otherwise well-meant resettlement policy has lost much that it initially promised. Even when the policy guidelines are clear, the ‘performance gap’—the gap between the policy guidelines and their implementation is becoming wider, not narrowing down.
Often, these policies have been honoured more in breach than in observance, not only by the borrowers but also by the World Bank itself. The severe indictment of the World Bank for ignoring its own policies in the case of the Sardar Sarovar dam in India is one of the earliest widely reported cases (Morse & Berger, 1992). Many more such cases have since come to light (Clark et al., 2003). Too often, the World Bank has looked the other way, when its policies were being openly disregarded in implementation.
The borrowing governments are a part of this problem too. Increasingly, they see the World Bank policy as an imposition, even an infringement of their sovereignty, and resent it. The conflict arises mainly because the minimum resettlement standards set in the World Bank policy are on a higher side than those in the national laws. For example, while encroachers on government land have no right to resettlement in India, the World Bank policy does not regard the lack of title as any bar to resettlement assistance. In such cases, the World Bank insists that borrowers follow its policies, even if they are at variance with national policies and laws (Price, 2008).
Failures of Plan Implementation
The implementation of resettlement plans has been even more unsatisfactory. Too often, the relocation of affected people has been seen as the end of the resettlement exercise, not rebuilding their livelihoods in the new place. But what is truly appalling is that relocation has been essentially carried out through official coercion (WCD, 2000).
Resettlement failures arise from certain glaring planning oversights. A couple of examples are worth noting. Most failures stem from thoughtless location of resettlement sites, and there is no way to overcome this deficiency at a later stage. In planning resettlement, it is necessary to share with the affected people information on all its aspects, such as, the suitability of the site, the assistance needed in moving, the timing of the move, the income-generating possibilities and such other issues (Davidson et al., 1993). But planners prefer to identify and develop resettlement sites all by themselves without consulting the people who have to resettle there. When people find that the new site lacks access to income-earning opportunities, especially good agricultural land or proximity to market, they are left with no option but to abandon it and move elsewhere.
Equally critical is failure to consult the host populations in planning resettlement. This neglect can prove counterproductive, as the potential for resettler–host conflict is always present in these situations. Conflicts arise because of competition over a limited land area, as well as over access to job opportunities, social services and political power. Yet, planners fail to take account of the already existing pressure on resources. The host populations generally look at newcomers with some suspicion. In such circumstances, if hosts get the feeling that outsiders are being pampered, resettlers will find it difficult to adjust to the new environment.
Successful Resettlement
Admittedly, there are examples more of failed resettlement than of successful ones. This may, however, be due to a certain bias among researchers. Chambers (1983) acknowledged this candidly: ‘Social scientists get more kudos from researching failure than success.’ Echoing a similar view, Cernea (1991: 188) also observed: ‘Historically, social scientists have been much better at recording development’s tragedies than preventing them.’
While the resettlement record remains generally disappointing, resettlement has not always ended as a disaster for the displaced people. There have been encouraging outcomes as well, but they never get much noticed or reported. Though small in number, there are cases where relocated people are now enjoying a standard of living higher than before, and also see for them a better future ahead. In this context, two examples of such ‘good practices’ from resettlement literature are given below.
A Resettlement Success Story from a Dam Project in India
A good example is the success achieved in resettling people displaced by the Mahi Bajaj Sagar Dam in Rajasthan, India (Mathur, 1997). The people of Khandu village in Banswara district were relocated to a colony named as Khandu colony (retaining the old village name) about 30 years ago. This move has proved to be a boon to over 1,000 families of this colony situated on the outskirts of Banswara, a large town, which is also the headquarters of Banswara district. Proximity to an urban centre has given them opportunities to improve their lot in many ways: access to jobs—more jobs can be found in a city than in isolated relocation centres—access to business opportunities, and access to better educational facilities. With the spiralling real estate prices in the Banswara area, their properties are now worth many times more than what they actually paid, giving them a sense of real affluence. The people of Khandu colony do not miss their former Khandu village because the entire village moved as one group to the colony. Thus, the social network has remained intact. In fact, the Khandu colony now is a thriving community. It is a success story, but it is also important to bear in mind that Khandu was the home village of the chief minister of Rajasthan, who first established a new resettlement agency and put a senior officer in charge of the operations.
What contributed to this success story of resettlement? The major factors identified that contributed to successful resettlement include:
Top-level commitment Strengthened institutional set-up People moved close to a large town that offered better opportunities for jobs, business, education and other civic services Sharp rise in urban property prices giving the people a sense of affluence Entire village moved as a social group, retaining its original name Khandu
Success in Resettling People Displaced by a Rail Project in the Philippines
The Light Rail Transport 3 (LTR3) project is part of a wider development of the Light Rail Transport (an over-ground light rail system) for Metropolitan Manila. The LTR3 was built along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, which acts as the main inner ring road for Metro Manila and which suffers badly from traffic congestion. The project involved the resettlement of 4,053 families from a site in Quezon City to make space for the LRT Terminal. These residents had been squatting on the land, which is owned by the National Housing Authority, some households for as long as 20 years. An Interagency Committee, made up of representatives from local government and municipal departments, was set up to manage the resettlement and it worked with locally elected community-based organisations (CBOs) to negotiate compensation and manage the resettlement process. As could be expected, the involvement of many groups in decision-making process around resettlement led to a protracted process, which led to some delays in implementation of the project, with associated costs to the Department of Transport and Communications (the project owner). However, the role of CBOs in selecting the new housing site and negotiating compensation packages meant that the resettlement was much more satisfactory than many other cases in Metro Manila, where resettlers are frequently relocated up to 40–50 km from the city centre in rural areas with limited livelihood opportunities for the (urban) resettlers. One of the key strategies in this case was to inform the local CBO leaders of the budget for the resettlement site and allow them to search and select a site for themselves. The result was that the CBO leaders were able to find an affordable site which was sufficiently close to the original community, and which had good transport links. Furthermore, CBO leaders ensured that the site met with the approval of residents by arranging bus trips to the possible sites and giving out information about them, so that residents could vote whether or not to accept the potential sites on offer (Meikle & Walker, 2000: 38–39). Consultation process caused delays, but it produced a negotiated compensation package and relocation process that the affected groups found satisfactory.
What contributed to success in resettlement? The major factors identified that contributed to successful resettlement include:
Proper advance planning Relocation job entrusted to a special representative committee Extensive consultations with the affected people through local CBOs Site selected was close to the original community with good transport connections
Resettlement Experience in Development for Climate Change Resettlement
In recent years, considerable interest has grown in learning from the experience of resettlement in development and other contexts for climate change-induced planned relocation (de Sherbinin et al., 2011; Ferris, 2012, 2013; Ferris, Cernea & Pettz, 2011; McAdam, 2010). Some lessons from development-related experience for climate change resettlement are discussed, as follows:
Undertake resettlement as a last resort: Because resettlement is essentially a disruptive process, it should be undertaken as a last resort, and in that case the displaced people should be entitled to compensation and assistance in ways that improve their standard of living. Develop policies and laws: Experience suggests that the affected people face the risks of impoverishment if there is no policy. If negative outcomes of resettlement are to be avoided, adoption of a socially sensitive, development-oriented, climate change resettlement policy should be the starting point. Policies by themselves cannot protect displaced people in getting their due. Laws are also needed to make resettlement a legally enforceable right. Prepare a resettlement plan in advance: Planning must begin as soon as it is established that resettlement would be unavoidable. The basic purpose of resettlement planning is to protect the affected population against the risks of impoverishment that are inherent in the process of resettlement. Detailed planning is essential to (a) identify adverse social impacts/ impoverishment risks and (b) mitigate impacts/risks, if they are found unavoidable. Resettlement is a long-term development process and implemented as such, not limited to the short span of a project’s timetable. Ensure that plan has adequate budget provision: Resettlement should not be regarded as a goodwill gesture towards people facing climate change-induced displacement. Affected people should receive assistance in resettlement as a matter of right. Successful resettlement requires substantial budgetary resources to meet all costs on implementing the resettlement plan. ‘Even the best managers of a resettlement project-component would not be able to produce miracles and prevent impoverishment that looms over those displaced, if not given adequate financial means’ (Cernea, 2008: 63). Find adequate land for resettlement: Acquiring land for development projects has now become a major challenge. It is going to be equally difficult to acquire land for resettling climate change-displaced people as well (Leckie, 2013). Yet, without enough land it is not possible to carry out resettlement. Rebuild livelihoods: Resettlement must be seen not simply as relocating people to new sites but as a long-term process of rebuilding livelihoods of displaced people. People should be moved where possibilities exist or could be created to rebuild livelihoods that are lost due to resettlement. If people discover that income-earning opportunities are not enough, they will abandon that place and move elsewhere in search of livelihood opportunities. Focus on development in resettlement: Those requiring resettlement are often the poorest people. Those better off do not wait for the last minute and can easily fend for themselves. In fact, they prefer to manage their resettlement themselves. Resettlement must therefore be so planned that it results in improved living conditions for the poor, not merely in duplication of their poverty conditions as they were before. Move people as a group: The displaced people should be moved as an existing group to preserve the community cohesion and to avoid the break-up of social networks. Before moving people to the resettlement site, it is also important to ensure that it is fully developed with essential civic services, its layout reflects gender and other social concerns, and is not far from the original communities. Involve all in resettlement activities, including host communities: Consult and involve all affected people and their local organisations (CBOs) not only in resettlement planning but also in its implementation and monitoring. The participation process should begin from the earliest stages and continue through all stages. The host populations should necessarily be involved in the consultation process to avoid any possible resettler–host conflict that may erupt later, upsetting the entire resettlement effort. Strengthen management capacity: While the intentions of a policy may be the noblest, these may not succeed in saving the affected people from the impoverishing effects of resettlement. An implementation agency, too, must be in place and be in a good shape. This alone can translate the policy objectives into good resettlement outcomes. Experience suggests that resettlement training can play an important role in building capacity for resettlement management. Ensure commitment to resettlement: Finally, there must be commitment to do resettlement well. A World Bank study of irrigation projects found poor resettlement performance in the states of Karnataka and Maharashtra due to the absence of commitment at the highest level of government. This indeed is a major factor that makes the greatest difference to resettlement outcomes.
Conclusion
Despite its frequent failures, much experience with development-related resettlement can be useful especially for planning slow-onset climate change resettlement—all the way from preparing policy guidelines to implementing resettlement plans and their monitoring. It must, however, be noted that the planners of development-related resettlement enjoy a certain advantages, not accessible to the planners of climate resettlement. Unlike natural disasters (earthquake and tsunami, for example), displacement from development projects is not something that happens all of a sudden, with no warning. Resettlement planners of development projects can foresee displacement ‘happening’ much before it actually occurs, as this often results in an unavoidable consequence of development which is planned purposely. This gives these planners time to do planning well in advance, which involves several steps, such as conducting SIA, preparing for relocation and rebuilding livelihoods in new settlements, monitoring and other related development activities. In addition, with funds assured for the resettlement budget, they are in a position to carry out all planned activities in an effective and a timely manner.
While development-related resettlement experience will certainly be relevant for slow-onset climate change displacement, because this also allows enough time for planning purposes, its relevance for sudden-onset climate change resettlement will be limited. For sudden-onset displacements, experience that can be useful is post-relocation development-related reconstruction experience. The purpose of resettlement is not only to hurriedly remove people to safer places and provide some emergency relief; it is also to ensure that their resettlement is planned well ahead of time, lost livelihoods are rebuilt, and their living standards improved or at least not remain lower than what they were before resettlement.
In spite of the efforts being made to adapt communities to climate change, some people will still need to be relocated, warns Walter Kelin (Balk, 2014). The question is: when to start relocation? The Sanremo meeting (jointly organised by the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Georgetown University’s Institute for the Study of International Migrations) held in Sanremo, Italy in mid-March 2014 concluded that relocation should be undertaken only when no other means of adaptation are available to enable people to stay in their homes (Ferris, 2014b; Weerasinge, 2014).
Governments seem generally reluctant even to consider resettlement of climate change affected communities, let alone begin planning resettlement for those likely to be displaced for reasons of climate change. For example, there is nothing in a recent government of India document to reflect the need to plan for such an eventuality (PLARRDIS, 2013). But as Ferris (2014b) notes
if climate change does make more areas uninhabitable and people need to be moved, then governments have a responsibility to start thinking about that possibility and to begin planning. In particular national systems—likely to include legislation, coordination arrangements, allocation of specific responsibilities and funding—need to be put into place. These steps do not happen overnight.
Resettlement planning should begin early otherwise relocation hurriedly carried out at the last minute will only make things worse.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
The author is grateful to Elizabeth Ferris for the encouragement to write this article and the opportunity provided to participate in the Consultation ‘Planned Relocations, Natural Disasters and Climate Change: Consolidating Good Practices and Planning for the Future’ (jointly organised by the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Georgetown University’s Institute for the Study of International Migrations) in Sanremo, Italy, 12–14 March 2014. He is also grateful to Michael Cernea for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of the article (circulated to the Consultation participants).