Ethnic Conflict and the Politics of Spoils in Nigeria

Introduction

Violence in Nigeria seems to play a prominent role in the central discourse of Africa’s most populous country. A lot of the violence can be attributed to the disputes between the Fulani herdsmen, semi-nomadic pastoralists who traverse the country, especially in south and central Nigeria, and farmers. The issue is not new; clashes between different groups of Fulani herders in search of grazing land for their cattle and the farmers have killed thousands of people in Nigeria over the past two decades. In 2014, more than 1,200 people lost their lives according to the Global Terrorism Index. Judging by the upsurge in casualty figures––in 2018, more than 1,300 were killed (International Crisis Group Report, 2018)––one can argue that these clashes have crippled the country’s economic development, impaired its national security and caused large-scale social unrest. The scale of violence perpetrated by this community, combined with rising ethno-political clashes, has violated the rights of millions of innocent citizens impacting the very idea of nationhood. A lot of the killings, reportedly caused by Fulani herdsmen, have now attracted global attention. To stop the spread of violence a thorough revamping of the national security system is needed if an effective strategy is to be implemented against the marauding pastoralists.

By way of background, Nigerian history has for decades been marked by different ethno-political controversies which have periodically caused bouts of aggression and brutality. From the establishment of the Fourth Republic onwards in 1999, the Nigerian political system has had to deal with ethno-political interests that have affected the peaceful coexistence of various communities, fuelling political chaos and conflict in both rural and urban areas of the country. Although the former Republics also witnessed many vicious ethno-political struggles in the past, nothing compares to the brutality that is taking place currently especially in Nigeria’s middle belt.

The return of democracy in 1999 after a protracted period of military control saw growing aggression amongst diverse communities culminating in ethnic militancy, ethno-religious conflicts, rebellions and ethnic killings in Nigeria’s various settlements (Ayo, 2007). With the exception of a few areas, local political life in Nigeria used to be serene. But researches indicate that it was control over political power that was mostly responsible for a series of ethnic brutalities that occurred in the Fourth Republic (Otite, 1990; Osaghae, 1995; Nnoli, 1978). The situation deteriorated into a constant state of killings and destruction fuelled by ethnic conflicts which had their root in the political upheavals of 1966, 1983 and 1993 (Aluko, 2003).

Some scholars argue the evidences show that Nigeria’s political establishment deliberately supported this ethnic conflict to suit its own vested interest, encouraging a ‘us versus them’ thinking that reinforced social cleavages (Ikelegbe, 2005). Imbalanced policy decisions and the manner of resource allocation in the nation left a vacuum in the equitable welfare of regions and communities. This led to many minority–majority skirmishes, essentially disagreements over farmlands, grazing areas and water resources climaxing in Fulani herders taking up arms and resorting to violence. Feeling the absence of a national identity, the pastoralists were successful in influencing the non-urbanised younger members of their community to spearhead brutal attacks and exercise illegitimate power.

Against this background, this article attempts to focus on the nexus between spoils politics and the accentuation of ethnic sentiments in the politics and governance of Nigeria. In the first section, we try to examine why has there been a breakdown of inter-ethnic relations triggering the violence carried out by Fulani herdsmen which began to gain prominence during the political dispensation of President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan (2010–2015) and continued later into President Muhammadu Buhari’s administration. This analysis tries to offer a logical and problematised debate on the connection between exploitative government policies and the development of the Fulani’s hegemony in the Nigerian state.

The Nature of Nigerian Ethnic Configuration

Nigeria with 170 million people has the highest population in Africa (Nnoli, 2007). It is also home to hundreds of languages and ethnic groups—more than 400 minority and majority ethnic groups speaking 510 languages, according to Ethnologue, (2005). Three majority ethnic groups together form half of the country’s total population (Osaghae, 1991). Thus, three major ethno-linguistic groups make up a sizeable segment of the total population (Otite, 1990). Among these three major languages there are at least 20 million people who speak the same dialect (Otite, 1990, p. 8). Besides these, there are 10 other languages spoken by 1 to 5 million speakers and about 60 local languages spoken by a 100,000 speakers (Aluko, 2003). Then there are also a couple of dialects spoken by smaller populations which are phonetically endangered (Otite, 1990).

Nigeria’s multiple ethnic identities can be considered as a microcosm of Africa. Various ethnic groups are spread widely across the nation’s 36 states. The ethnic diversity of Nigeria is not only intriguing in terms of minority–majority ethnic variables, but it is also variegated in terms of ethnic and social dimensions of the country. Despite striving for a unified political identity (Osaghae, 1998, p. 7), the country showcases a variety of ethnic groups, each with its specific lifestyle and heritage. Ethnic minorities also have their own socio-political makeup focussed on their own individuals and economic goals (Osaghae, 1986).

The languages spoken in Nigeria are subdivided into nine critical linguistic sub-groups, including the Kwa sub-group spoken in the southwestern regions; the Ijaw sub-group spoken in the Niger-Delta area; the Atlantic sub-group which joins Fula; the Benue-Congo sub-group which fuses Tiv, Jukun, Edo, Igbo, Igala, Idoma, Nupe, Gwari, Yoruba and a couple of other local languages of the Cross River part, that is the Efik, Ibibio, Anang and Ekoi; and the Adamawa-Ubangi language, for instance, the Awak, Waja, Waka, and Tula prevalent in northern Nigeria (Coleman, 1960). The Nilo-Saharan group is spoken in Nigeria primarily as Kanuri though the inhabitants of Bagirmi and Zerma, who are closely related, and are also present in the country (Albin-Lackey & Rawlence, 2007). The Afro-Asiatic group has a greater etymological connection and is made up of Hausa, Margi and Bade among others (Burton, 1992). A couple of social groups (for instance, the minority of Fulani and the Tiv) are treated as outcastes though they are added to the description of the major ethnic groups in Nigeria. An example of this is the Kwa sub-group which has existed for about 4,000 years (Mnoma, 1995).

Necessarily languages are associated with the major ethnic groups. For instance, the Yoruba speak Yoruba, the Igbo speak Igbo while the Hausa speak Hausa. When the country’s period of colonisation ended both the minorities and the majorities established a level of peaceful coexistence with the nationalists striving to build a strong political system. The nationalists were the political elite whose initial focus was to get rid of the hitherto untouchable British and secure control over all the ethnic majority and minority areas in order to put into place a balanced and just administration in spite of the diverse roots and livelihoods of the people (Mitchell, 1987). However, after achieving this initial aim, and gaining independence in the majority and minority regions it appeared that the government began to get influenced by their own ethnic leanings, using it to secure their own political goals and control the country’s rich resources leading to what Richard Joseph called ‘prebendalism’ (Joseph, 1983).

Ethno-Political Sentiments in Political Governance in Nigeria

Nigeria began its post-colonial life on 1 October 1960 with great hopes under a common political order modelled after the British parliamentary system. Later, it was thought that Nigeria’s great potential could be achieved under a more localised political system. But as events showed these hopes were dashed. It was believed that the collapse of the First Republic in Nigeria (1963–1966) occurred largely because the 1964/1965 general elections, conducted under the watch of Prime Minister Alhaji Tafawa Balewa (Ikelegbe, 2005), were rigged. The political system that was installed was flawed. It faced complaints of malpractice, fraud and intimidation that triggered diverse ethnic feelings and worse of all it led to the killing of more than a thousand innocent citizens (Osaghae, 1998). A total breakdown in law and order became the main reason for the military to snatch political control away from the civilians. Eventually a series of coups ushered a 13-year military rule in the country.

In 1979, Nigeria made a second attempt at restoring a democratic system with the military willingly handing over power to President Shehu Shagari in a successful transition programme. However, as in the First Republic, this experiment tottered, lasting for just four years. The 1983 general elections held by President Shagari’s government (Diamond, 1987) was marked by ethnic violence allegedly engineered by the ruling National Party of Nigeria (NPN) which used the state’s security machinery to manipulate the electoral results in their favour. The nation’s reactions to this electoral fraud assumed violent dimensions in various parts of the country (Nnoli, 2007). Perhaps the most extreme response happened in the south-western states where massive destruction of lives and property took place (Osadolor, 1998). A few months later, again the military intervened, detaining the principal political actors identified with an ethnic community. The army suspended the Constitution, decimated political structures, effectively ending any attempt to restore democratic rule in the country.

The country returned to another political phase in May 1999, the Fourth Republic. Subsequent electoral attempts after that have not fared better if one considers the escalating ethnic minority–majority clashes and the deadly attacks that took place. Indeed, most subsequent elections that have taken place have seen ethnic violence in three phases: the pre-election period, during the elections and the post-election stage as seen in the 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015 elections (Ugiagbe, 2014). The 2003 general elections, for instance, witnessed a series of assassinations, killings, demonstrations and the wanton destruction of public and private properties. In a similar vein, the 2007 elections were generally regarded as a sham. It was marred by ethnic tension, intimidation and outright violence between majority–minority groups in various parts of the country. Police stations, the Independent National Electoral Commission’s (INEC’s) offices and other government buildings were burnt by protesters (Voice Daily, 2015). In a few months before the polls, an attempt was made to bomb the headquarters of the INEC in Abuja using a bomb-laden petrol tanker. Again in 2011, the INEC’s office in Suleja in Niger state was bombed and several election workers killed. This attack was considered to have been the result of aggrieved ethnic sentiments (Ugiagbe, 2014).

As protests over election results increased, members of certain ethnic communities were being killed (Jega, 2000). The same was true of the 2015 general elections. According to Ekejuola (2015), the electoral process witnessed the loss of more than 800 lives during the pre-election phase, almost all due to ethnic-based violence. Election day itself was marked by numerous killings and destruction of facilities in various parts of the country.

Scholars have identified several reasons behind Nigeria’s constant distress. A major factor has been the changing contours of the concept and manifestation of ethnic hegemony and the role of ethnic minority–majority sentiments in the country (Wada, 2006; Ukiwo, 2003; Nnoli, 1978). In a way, the rise of ethnic-political stress was a premeditated strategy adopted by leading politicians in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic to intimidate the local population and reinforce their own party’s supremacy. Ethno-political hegemony has become so entrenched in Nigeria that a meritorious candidate’s political ambition cannot be achieved without the approval and support of an ethnic majority (Wada, 2006; Ukiwo, 2003). This is not a new phenomenon in the country’s politics and has remained a constant factor ever since the return of democracy in 1999. The political elites have succeeded in making themselves major actors in the political process by using or misusing the ethnic factor.

The remaining sections of this article will examine the concept of ethnicity, the nature of ethnic hegemony, as well as the role of ethnic minority–majority sentiments in the political governance of Nigeria. A number of case studies from the past and the present administrations in Nigerian are used as examples to illustrate the reasons behind the spread of violence provoked many times by the Fulanis and the growth of anti-Fulani sentiment.

Discourse on Ethnicity and Spoils Politics in Nigeria

Ethnicity is conventionally regarded as the race, affiliation and even origin of a community (Agbu, 2004; Ikelegbe, 2010) which is defined in terms of state boundaries, especially in Nigeria. Ethnicity is considered as the basis for the fulfilment of some political goals, such as a community’s prosperity and an ability to attain self-accomplishment on one hand and adaptability on the other. Diversity in ethnicity creates a heterogeneous and dynamic nation which has been the case in Nigeria’s post-colonial-national politics. Ethnicity is derived from the primary Greek word, ἔθνος ethnos (from the modifier ἐθνικός ethnikos which was drafted into Latin as ethnic) (Otite, 1983). However, the English translation for this is ‘society’, which reflects Nigeria’s situation. The post-colonial Nigerian state was amalgamated from several ethnic entities to form one country. Ethnicity is conceptualised as ‘the business or assembly of ethnic identity and contrast to pick up an advantage in circumstances of rivalry, strife or participation’ (Osaghae, 1998). This definition is preferred because it foregrounds two issues that are vital to our discussion on ethnicity. The first is that ethnicity is a characteristic rather than any pre-planned status and can be manipulated by political actors. The second is that ethnicity not only leads to conflict or aggressive relations but also to collaboration and alliances. A corollary to the second point is that ethnic clashes are evident in different structures, including voting, groups, administration and other conditions that do not necessarily result in negative outcomes.

Ethnicity can be seen in the conduct of ethnic groups. Ethnic groups often have peculiar attributes, worldviews and myths that can be traced to a collective history, parentage, dialect, race, religion, culture and domain. While every one of these factors do not mandatorily qualify as a group, the critical point remains that such a group claims a typical identity that separates it from the others. Thus, it can be said that structures such as state, religion and elite establishments influence the formation of ethnic groups since these conditions are frequently self-distinguishing with acknowledgments to qualify the self and others (Subaru, 1996).

Ethnicity is not only a matter of shared characteristics or socially shared traits, but also the consequence of transaction between the outer or other self and the self-recognisable proof (Nnoli, 1978). Most scholars of ethnicity agree on the essential constitutive components of ethnic groups, but questions such as how these groups are framed, why they have the ability to sporadically trigger clashes and what needs to be done to keep them away from the risks of violence are not addressed. Additionally in most cases, individuals from ethnic minorities are seen as subjects or objects to be segregated and or ostracised. However, in spite of the negative effects of violence and the clashes it causes, ethnic diversity can also be considered as a basic test for the strength and attachment of a group of people.

Talking of Nigeria as a former British’s colony, Nwabughuogu (1996) posits that ‘the antecedents of variability and “free political occasions” were entrenched even in the colonial system, and the amalgamation of the nation did not consider the diversities in native “history, culture, tongue or religion”’. He adds that a nation generally should be beyond diversity or ethnicity, despite the presence of such ethnic groups. In a more real sense, everything that is considered or characterised as ‘no country’ is practically homogeneous. That is, no country is mono-ethnic. The majority of countries in sub-Saharan Africa are essentially multinational, meaning that a large number of countries in sub-Saharan African region are made up of different ethnic groups. To a certain extent, the absence of sentiment or indices of a fundamental character produce a national consciousness, even amongst people of distinct ethnicities. However, in the case of Nigeria the bane of ethnicity is rooted in a primordial differentiation which has resulted in a fight over resources and other political privileges. Presently, ethnicity as a phenomenon has not attracted any critical awareness, rather attention has been fixed on resources, a major condition for ethnic hegemony, minority–majority ethnic sentiments, violence and abuse in a modernised society (Osaghae, 2001).

Ethnicity is viewed as identity especially from the point of view of an outsider, that is, those who do not have a place in a group. Indeed, ethnicity has become a tool for identity construction and mobilisation, and many times has been employed for inter-communal violence and rebellious formations in different parts of Africa (Nzogola-Ntalaja, 1999, p. 32). Ethnicity and ethnic conflicts, a majority of which are triggered by both the majority and the minority groups, have remained a major source of violence in the country (Rupesinghe, 1987, p. 527). One such country suffering this endemic challenge is Nigeria where several of its states have been at the receiving end of conflicts related to ethnicity with serious consequences on developmental efforts as well as quests for nationhood, institutional stability, democratic development and peaceful coexistence (Agbu, 2004, Ikelegbe, 2010).

Currently, a key academic debate focusses on whether ethnic inconveniences, ethnic hegemony and minority–majority ethnic sentiments will vanish or lessen over a period of time. Some experts in the field of ethnicity feel that it is a major factor to continue to exist as a strong political union in various post-colonial states: others aver that it is a momentary condition that will finally vanish at a fitting time (Wada, 2006; Ukiwo, 2003; Nnoli, 1978). Irobi (2013) asserts that ethnicity is an impression that is built around separation, grouping or diversification––all brief factors that will vanish with time. Political analysts argue that urbanisation and the spread of a global identity, a current trend, will eventually diminish ethnic dimensions. They also doubt that politics out rightly affects the build-up of ethnicity or its consciousness. This opinion is workable in the ‘pre-comrade political era’ (Subaru, 1996; Wada, 2006; Ukiwo, 2003; Nnoli, 1978). However, this view of ethnicity, portrayed as a modernist approach, also corresponds with a globalised view in the belief that ethnicity will finally be discarded. This theoretical perspective emphasises the use of an assimilative approach.

In Nigeria, the subject of ethnicity contains both dictatorial and political approaches. In other words, the proximity to an ethnic group in Nigeria is motivated by the desire to wield political control or for personal gains. In spite of all the experiences and consequences that such proximity has caused the polity, most regions of western Africa have not had productive governments. Rather, the presence of rich resources, rapid urbanisation and utilisation of ‘osmosis’ programmes have continued to incite ethno-political arrangements (Lenshie & Abel, 2012). Ethnicity in the African context is the continent’s trademark which cannot disappear. This is also due to the continuous grip of primordialism that tends to attach an indispensable significance to ethnicity.

According to Joseph (2014), primordialists assume that past histories and underlying foundations of Nigerian ethnic groups are of basic importance in ascertaining their contemporary political noteworthiness. This thinking goes against the position of various other scholars who think it has a lesser significance. For primordialists, ethnicity is always inherent in politically heterogeneous respects. For instance, many analysts are interested in setting up political plans that suit ethnic diversity (Subaru, 1996; Wada, 2006; Ukiwo, 2003). Irobi (2013) reveals that those who champion the course of ethnicity actually oblige ethnic and political diversification for the sole purpose of receiving stipends and in the process reinforce territorial independence. This has been successfully experimented in Western societies (Irobi, 2013).

While none of the theoretical perspectives outlined above offer a course of action that can completely eradicate ethnicity-based challenges and sentiments, putting together the two schools of thought can offer some basic ways that can help in managing such sentiments. For instance, an averagely educated civil servant can reduce adversarial ethnic positions. Administrative control of ethnic rivalry is a reasonable way to deal with the adverse effects of ethnicity politically. Although this approach is yet to produce a one hundred per cent efficacy it has the potential to enhance the recognition of diverse ethnic groups in Nigeria. Nnoli (1980) advocates that ethnically-oriented political situations should be reduced, not by minority–majority ethnic sentiments, but by the presence of national associations which unequivocally see and oblige existing ethnic ‘divisions and interests’.

Considering the political issues confusing Nigerians, it is necessary that the two systems be understood. While there are indispensable ways to enable an ‘osmosis’, there have also been schemes to monitor ethnicity trends. For instance, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), the party in power in Nigeria from 1999 to 2015, considered an option of rotational administration between the north and the south as a way to deal with or cushion the effects of ethnic fissures and the harmful political and socio-economic consequences they can cause to a country. But reneging on the rotational arrangement and the subsequent turn-out in the 2011 and 2015 general elections led again to heightened ethnic-cum-political issues; strategic politicking also incited new levels of viciousness in the polity. The following section historicises and contextualises experiences of ethnicity in Nigerian polity.

Ethnic Hegemony in Nigeria

Examining the events happening in contemporary Nigeria, one can argue that the traces of ethnic influence can be seen in the current administration of President Buhari. Certain facts reinforce this statement. For instance, frequent violent attacks have occurred because of the government’s inability to strengthen security systems which could have prevented the Fulani ‘civilian army’ from ravaging vulnerable areas that were bereft of any defence or security mechanisms. Had effective security measures been put in place the attacks could have been stemmed.

At each point when ethnic hegemony was identified, the affected groups depended on their own ethnic communities as a primary line of defence. In doing so, the establishment officially passed the buck onto them, especially as their own forces could not contain the law and order situation. Tempting them with political rewards, such groups would be manipulated into defending targets of the herdsmen’s ire. Although President Buhari’s government, which was duty-bound to guard affected territories, did successfully persuade smaller ethnic groups to help out, it also ended up putting them into dangerous situations, sometimes at the cost of their lives.

When the government did intervene to end hostilities, as it did against the Boko Haram insurgency, it was viewed as a defender. Once this risk had been taken, it was believed that other ethnic groups would feel more secure in their nation. This strategy sounded radical but this was the rationale behind an effective administrative policy for quite a long time and it served the nation well.

To be fair, it is not surprising that Fulani herdsmen have been feeling oppressed given the years of exploitation of the nation’s resources by political leaders. There was no commitment by the leadership to build the nation’s institutions and infrastructure, or to sort out the Fulani’s land and grazing issues through well planned legislations. A reason behind the Fulani herdsmen violence was that the political leaders whilst in power did their utmost to exploit and abuse the system to reinforce their current positions rather than finding solutions to existing issues. They took advantage of agitated ethnic sentiments and violent upheavals to curry favour along with every possible line of diversity such as ethnicity, geopolitical affiliation, religion and state of origin (Obadare & Adebanwi, 2013).

Reports currently state that the fierce attacks on farmers and other agriculturists by Fulani herders all over Nigeria have been on the rise under the administration of President Buhari who is a Fulani by birth (Kingdom News, 2017). Ever since President Buhari assumed office in 2015, he has not put forward a workable plan on how best to tackle these attacks or squash the numerous Fulani ‘rebellions’. Between 2010 and 2017, the activities of this nomadic group have increasingly threatened the lives and livelihood of many Nigerian communities (Kingdom News, 2017). Reports have indicated that over 5,000 lives have been lost and over 100,000 have been internally displaced because of the attacks by Fulani herdsmen in the country’s north-central region (Onwubiko, 2017). Many rural communities have had to disperse and their habitats thrown into confusion. Communal cohesion has been fragmented and the very survival of the local populations has been endangered. After instigating attacks, the Fulani herdsmen tend to occupy the lands of the victims, illegally claiming properties, evicting the legitimate farm-owners––all without any preventive action being taken by the government’s security forces or indeed any meaningful step being taken by the state to stop the Fulani’s occupying and possessing these lands (Ibrahim, 2018).

There appears to be a consistent pattern in the state’s inertia. Examine its apathy when riots erupted near Jos city in 2010. The list of attacks and number of communal conflicts have only increased despite growing national and international clamour (Stein, 2016) for a stringent response by the government. One only has to note some related statistics; from 1996 to 2006 about 121 people lost their lives in clashes that occurred in Bauchi and Gombe states alone. On 13 July 2014, ten people were murdered as a result of a conflict between ranchers and Fulani herders in Pagani street of Langtang, north local government, Plateau state (Ovuakporie & Agbakwuru, 2016). A far more brutal incident happened a day later when more than 50 people died in the Pilagani region of Marakun local government area, Zamfara state (Mikailu, 2016). In May 2015, more than a 100 people were massacred in various townships and camps located in Ikura, Benue state, allegedly by herders. In June 2015, about seven towns were invaded by Fulani herders in Agatu local government area when farmers were executed in the Ikpele and Okpopolo towns of the state; and more than 6,000 inhabitants were displaced in Agatu local government, Benue state (Okeke, 2014). Again in 2016, no fewer than 1,042 inhabitants were murdered in Benue State (Stein, 2016). Roughly, ‘15 local government areas out of 23 in Benue state, including Agatu, have been invaded by the herdsmen, killing thousands of residents, destroying homes and farmlands, raping wives and daughters of the community residents since the menace began’ (Opejobi, 2016). Another notable target of attacks by Fulani herdsmen’s has been the Ukpabi-Nimbo community in Enugu state where about 300 herdsmen armed with guns and machetes killed six people, setting houses and vehicles ablaze (Opejobi, 2016). In 2018, at least a 100 innocent farmers and inhabitants were slaughtered by Fulani herders, in Okokolo, Akwu, Ocholonya, Adagbo, Ugboku and Aila (Nicholas, 2018). Other notable areas and groups which bore the brunt of these ‘invasions’ include Plateau (Berom community), Lagos (Agege), Ekiti (Oke Ako community), Taraba (Gashaka), Ibadan (Lagelu), Delta (Orissa community), Kwara (Lagun, Iyana Offa, Offa communities), Akure, Nasarawa, Abia and Imo states.

Considering the statistics of the 2014 massacre, Mercy Corps, a humanitarian international non-government agency in its 2015 report stated that the Fulani herdsmen were the deadliest militant group in Nigeria responsible for the killing of 1,229 people in 2014 alone—an increase from 63 similar type of deaths that occurred in 2013. Fulani militants in 2014 accounted for 57 per cent of all deaths as against the 43 per cent recorded by Boko Haram insurgents (Mercy Corps, 2015). As mentioned earlier in 2015, Fulani herders were rated the fourth deadliest brigand or violent sect out of 163 countries analysed in the Global Conflict Index (Global Conflict Index, 2015). All these needless deaths and violence showcases the non-existent state of peace in Nigeria. The report by Mercy Corps estimates that the endless conflict between local farmers and Fulani herdsmen across the country, especially in its north-central region has annually cost Nigeria approximately $14 billion of potential revenue (Onwubiko, 2017). In spite of these alarming ratings and statistics and the consistent rise in the number of casualties, the government has not taken any action against this community (Idegu, 2018).

The central argument of this article, therefore, is that the Fulani herdsmen’s violence has always been about wielding some form of power to compel the state to achieve certain predetermined outcomes, all of which have been worsened by the exploitative tendencies of Nigeria’s greedy elites and poor political leadership. Although previous studies have explored how constitutional and other structural reforms have been put in place to reduce spoils politics and ethnic disputes in Nigeria, limited attention has been paid to how political leaders have used their own ethnic leanings or group affiliations to access political power.

Local politics that differentiates one ethnic group from another and demarcates ethnic boundaries has been an issue for a long time in Nigeria. Since 1960, ethnic affiliations have become an increasingly sensitive issue especially in local politics: in fact, it has become the primary basis for organising local political and ethnic groups (Hembe, 2003). Specifically in Nigeria, local politics has been a major factor in shaping ethnic relations in the country’s multicultural terrain. The country has adopted many strategies to dispossess and discriminate against political and ethnic minorities. Long after its independence, the country’s national identity and integration did not change even after the attempted secession of the eastern region between 1967 and 1970 (Alubo, 2006).

The implementation of Sir Arthur Richard’s constitution of 1946 marked a turning point in the history of the country. The colonial policy that favoured the Hausa majority and other ethnic groups over the minority Fulanis ended in disrupting decades of harmonious relationship between the ethnic groups of this vast region. Such groups asked for greater recognition to be paid to their identity, also requesting for their own republican state but their demands fell on deaf ears (Ekeh, 2004).

The regionalisation of the country into six geo-political zones under the disguise of political convenience has helped strengthen local push-pull factors, enhancing minority–majority based ethnic identities, sentiments and hegemony. All the six geo-political zones in the country had so many ethnic groups that it was not possible to showcase every single ethnic perspective (Eteng, 2004). While the establishment of the six zones in Nigeria was based on political principles and ethnic identity, and an attempt to further the unity in diversity, it was clear that national unity and integration had been greatly threatened by ethnic and religious crises that evolved from some of these regions over time (Olumide & Ekanade, 2011).

Ethnic issues continue to play a significant role in Nigerian local politics. The present demands for autonomy, separate states and secession based on ethnicity have not only challenged and threatened the political stability of Nigeria but have also led to the extreme ethnic sentiments and ethnic insurgencies seen in the attacks by Fulani herdsmen (Okoli & Atelhe, 2014). Local politics in Nigeria stems from distinct ethnic group aspirations to achieve certain rights ranging from self-recognition to struggles to achieve autonomy, a separate state and even sovereignty. The incessant reassertion of identities by minority ethnic communities to carve out an exclusive territory for themselves by the coercion of other communities, and an imposition of their cultural orientation all feed into creating a situation of ethnic hegemony.

In view of this, a person belonging to the minority group at the helm of affairs assumes a more powerful and privileged role and has the danger of making majority ethnic groups feel marginalised and underprivileged. Minority ethnic groups are experiencing marginalisation from majority ethnic groups. Thus some minority ethnic groups to affirm their equality with majority ethnic groups have put them at risk of being more marginalised. Generally many ethnic groups within the nation are rethinking strategies to shake up their hitherto torpid identities in order to make political room for themselves.

Conclusion

The study argues that new forms of checks and balances should be installed to contain the ethnic problems that have chronically beset Nigeria. If implemented, they will also have the potential to encourage national integration as well as unity. The country’s immense ethnic diversity which contributes to the enrichment of its composite tradition has also been a primary source of violence unleashed by the minority, mainly by the Fulani herdsmen, and it has proved to be an intractable obstacle to national peace and development. A few ethnic communities favouring violence are detrimental to the Nigerian nation.

The inability of the present political administration to cope with the demands of ethnic groups in Nigeria and the constant fear of exclusion frequently results in a reassertion of their ethno-political identity resulting in a threatened national loyalty. Under such conditions, ethnic hegemony becomes a tool to purchase administrative power. The reinvention or reassertion of minor ethnic groups’ identities is primarily aimed at demarcating or securing an exclusivist territory for themselves, and imposing their influence, homogeneity or cohesiveness. The ethnic trouble in a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society like Nigeria is no doubt a complex phenomenon with an inherent capacity to burst into explosive ethnic chauvinism, and inevitably, violence. A move to restore historical indigenous scripts or revive the culture of major ethnic groups should be analysed in relation to the broader issues of political realities and the re-building of an ethno-political identification and diversification as well as the struggle for political space.

The ethnic problem of Nigeria cannot be dealt in isolation from other cumbersome issues that surround the subject of identity politics. The solution to the ethnic problem depends on the critical evaluation of the prevalent situation which must take into account the aspirations of the people. An important step is to understand the sensitivity and complexity of ethnic problems which have the danger of dividing the nation. Nigeria’s political history proves the existence of dual function of ethnicity as a unifier on one hand and a divider on the other. Any attempt by any major ethnic institution to assimilate minority ethnic organisations will result in the alienation of the latter. In contrast, the safety and development of identities and cultures of the minorities cannot be emphasised enough. There should not be any question of ethnic opposition or predominance at the cost of others. There is a critical need for a complete overhauling of policies and resolutions, and timely action from both national and state governments which are perfectly placed to protect and be sensitive to Nigeria’s ethnic diversity in order to avoid any forms of death and destruction.