Abstract
The concept of human need and human well-being are commonly used in social work literature. However, their relationship remains unexplored. Although there is some literature on the relationship between human needs and human well-being in other fields, there is little literature explicitly analysing the nature of this relationship. Drawing on literature on both human needs and human well-being scholars from disciplines such as development studies, social policy, psychology, social work and so on, I argue that the relationship between human needs and human well-being is constitutive and instrumental-normative; and it is a two-fold relationship. Human needs are constitutive of human well-being, and human needs are preconditions for realising human well-being; they result into human well-being when adequately satisfied. I conclude by noting that this nature of relationship demonstrates that human needs are fundamental in promoting and realising human well-being. One cannot talk about human well-being without human needs. Therefore, social workers should focus on identifying and meeting clients’ human needs in order to promote their well-being.
Introduction
Vast amounts of literature exist on human needs. The literature explores the meaning and nature of human needs. It also examines the relationship between human needs and development, social policy, avoidance of harm and well-being (see Gough, 2017; Narvaez & Noble, 2018; Noble et al., 2018; Ryan & Deci, 2017). Similar to human needs, there is substantial literature and increasing research on human well-being. The research is from different disciplines such as social work, sociology, psychology, economics and development studies. The research concerns the nature of human well-being, meaning, types of well-being, what constitutes human well-being, human well-being indicators, promoters and conditions that negatively affect human well-being (see Diener et al., 2009; Gasper, 2007a; McGillivray & Clarke, 2006; Scott, 2012). This body of literature has demonstrated that well-being is both objective and subjective (Gough, 2017; Narvaez & Noble, 2018; Noble et al., 2018; Ryan & Deci, 2017).
Although there is literature on the relationship between human needs and human well-being, the nature of the relationship between the two is not explicitly stated and analysed. Indeed with the exception of Ryan and Sapp (2007), other authors such as Clarke (2006), Dean (2010), Gasper (2007b, 2009), Max-Neef (1991) and Wiggins (1991) who have looked at the relationship between the two do so in a few sentences and move to other relationships. For instance, Max-Neef (1991) using the terminology of quality of life only notes that it (well-being) depends on the possibilities an individual has to satisfy his/her fundamental needs, while Dean (2010) notes that human well-being is connected to human need. However, Dean does not show how the two are connected and the nature of this connection. Put differently, how are the two related? Are the two the same, similar or different?
Answering these questions and analysing the relationship between human needs and well-being is important because, as Gasper (2007b) observes, well-being is currently an appealing concept in social policy and development practice. It is assumed to be working ‘better’ than other concepts in relation to development practice and thinking (Gasper, 2007b; Gough et al., 2007). The term, unlike other terms such as poverty, is positive in nature, that is, well-being is good and desirable in itself (Balyejjusa, 2015a; Gough, et al., 2007). The conceptual analysis points out the ways in which human needs contribute to human well-being. This will not only contribute to a comprehension of the human well-being concept, since it is a novel and complex one, but also the human need concept (see Gasper, 2007b; Gough, et al., 2007). This will guard against the human well-being concept of experiencing a similar fall as was the case with the basic needs concept 1 in the 1980s (Gasper, 2007b). This is vital since the meaning and nature of well-being are not yet agreed upon, as Diener et al. (2009) and Gough et al. (2007) argue. Such a scenario can easily lead to the abandonment of the terminology as was the case with the basic needs.
More important to social work, the analysis helps to address or solve the conceptual problem of a human needs theory in social work. For instance, in relation to the conceptual problem, Dover (2016, p. 12) points out: ‘one conceptual problem concerns the relationship of human needs and human well-being’. This is fundamentally important since the two concepts are commonly used in social work literature (see for example Hepworth et al., 2002; National Association of Social Workers [NASW], 2017; Towle, 1944). For instance, according to the International Federation of Social Workers (2022), the purpose of social work is to enhance well-being, while the NASW (2017) states that the primary mission of the profession is to enhance well-being by meeting human needs. Therefore, the analysis helps in clarifying the nature of their relationship, which in turn will clarify their adoption and use during social work practice.
The purpose of this article is to carry out a conceptual analysis of the nature of the relationship between the concepts of human needs and human well-being and second to demonstrate how these two concepts can be practically used during social work practice. Drawing on some works on human needs and human well-being by different scholars, the article shows that the relationship between human needs and human well-being is constitutive and instrumental-normative. Human needs make up human well-being or are an integral component of human well-being and they are pre-conditions for realising human well-being. When human needs are adequately satisfied, human well-being is achieved or promoted. The article starts with a brief background/literature review on the concept of human needs and human well-being. Included here is the meaning of the concepts and what constitutes human needs and human well-being. This is followed by a conceptual analysis of the relationship between human needs and human well-being where human needs are demonstrated to have a constitutive and instrumental-normative relationship with human well-being. It is also argued that for social workers to ensure the meeting of the human needs of their clients so as to enhance their well-being, they must frame their clients’ human needs as social rights. This is because doing so not only raises their clients’ consciousness about their violated social rights but also empowers them to take action to ensure that their social rights are not violated by the duty-bearers. A conclusion pointing out that adequate satisfaction of human needs is fundamentally important to the achievement of human well-being is given.
Background: Human Needs and Human Well-being
Human needs and human well-being are important concepts in analysing and discussing human life. The two terms inform us or aid us in understanding how human beings are doing in their life, environment and society. This section discusses the meanings and nature of the two concepts followed by a conceptual analysis of the relationship between the two. The section looks at human needs first and thereafter human well-being.
Human Needs
The concept of ‘human needs’ has been part of human society as an on organising concept for a long time. Indeed the Bible has many verses concerning human needs such as Matthew 6: 32–33, Ephesians 4: 28 and Philippians 4: 11–12 and 19. Furthermore, philosophers such as Karl Marx and Rousseau wrote about human needs in their works (Dean, 2010; Doyal & Gough, 1991; Heller, 1976; Springborg, 1981). However, it is important to point out that although Marx used the concept of needs, he never attempted to define it or discuss its nature. For instance, Springborg (1981, p. 1) notes: ‘it is true that Marx makes explicit his support for the doctrine of true and false needs in a fleeting reference, mainly confined to footnotes’. Despite the concept of human need having a long history as an organising concept, its meaning, nature and aspects that constitute it are not agreed upon. It has varied meanings in everyday usage and in technical or academic spheres (Balyejjusa, 2015a). For instance, while commenting on the varied meanings within academic spheres Gasper (2007b, p. 54) notes:
During a workshop in the needs-wants project it became evident that the participants—psychologists, economists, philosophers, sociologists, anthropologists—held to no consistent usage of ‘need’, as individuals, not only across disciplines. Yet most of us had read and thought about needs since the 1960s or 1970s. We jumped between different usages almost from one sentence to the next.
As such, according to Gasper (2007b), Hellsten (1995), Reader (2006) and Taylor (1959), the term need can be used as a verb (as in X needs Y), a noun (as in the object or something needed) and a satisfier of human needs (as in food is a satisfier of the human need of health). Furthermore, the term is used to refer to desires, preferences, wants, values and drives (Doyal & Gough, 1991; Hamilton, 2003; McGregor et al., 2009; Wiggins, 1998). However, Doyal and Gough (1991), Frankfurt (1998) and Thomson (1987) differentiate between needs and these terms.
The complex nature of the need concept goes beyond the meanings attached to it to the ways it is used. According to Reader (2006), the term is used in both occurrent and dispositional senses. An occurrent need refers to the lack of an object of need while a dispositional need refers to needing by virtue of being human. A dispositional need is used in an ontological sense, as that which calls for maintaining and promoting our being (Balyejjusa, 2015a; Dean, 2010; Reader, 2006). Therefore, all human beings have dispositional needs. Despite needs being used in the two senses, Reader (2006) maintains that a deprived person (occurrent needing) has no more needs than a wealthy person or one without occurrent needing. Occurrent needing is connected and has its foundation in dispositional needs.
Due to this multiplicity of usages, Des Gasper (2004, 2007b) devises a framework to aid the analysis and use of the term. He argues that the term can be used in the following ways/modes: descriptive/explanatory, instrumental and normative/prescriptive. Under a descriptive mode, needs refer to positive entities that relate to drives or wants. Instrumentally, needs refer to prerequisites for meeting a given end; they are means to an end. Normatively, needs refer to justified priority requisites or requirements considered very important for people to have (Gasper, 2007b; Rauschmayer et al., 2011; Yamamori, 2016). In this article, I refer to this as ‘instrumental-normative’. In any case, Gasper (2009) argues that normative needs are a subset of instrumental needs. Gasper (2004) asserts that descriptive needs are equivalent to the noun use of the term, while instrumental needs are equivalent to the verb use of the term needs. The instrumental mode may also have aspects of occurrent needs since needing something may be due to its lack of it. For instance, a situation where a person is in a state of needing food may be due to that person experiencing hunger at that particular moment.
Gasper’s framework is helpful in defining what needs are in a normative way. According to Doyal and Gough (1991), needs are a particular kind of universal goal aimed at avoidance of objective harm. This meaning focusses on needs that fall under Gasper’s (2004, 20007b) normative mode (instrumental-normative). Furthermore, this meaning implies that human needs are necessary conditions for avoiding objective harm (Doyal & Gough, 1991; Frankfurt, 1998; Thomson, 1987; Wiggins, 1991; Yamamori, 2016). The idea of needs as preconditions also fits Braybrooke’s (1987) relational formula (X needs Y in order to Z). This formula demonstrates the importance of the needs and also reduces the confusions that arise due to various usages of the term (Balyejjusa, 2015a; Braybrooke, 1987; Gasper, 2004). As earlier noted, this meaning of human needs portrays human needs as necessary or matter of a necessity. Then, what does necessity or necessary mean?
According to Aristotle’s Metaphysics V, 1015a20 necessary is:
(a) that without which, as a condition, a thing cannot live; e.g. breathing and food are necessary for an animal; for it is incapable of existing without these; (b) the conditions without which good cannot be or come to be, or without which we cannot get rid or be freed of evil; e.g. drinking the medicine is necessary in order that we may be cured of disease, and a man's sailing to Aegina is necessary in order that he may get his money. (Ross’ translation)
Although Aristotle’s definition helps us to understand what necessary means, it is too restrictive and part (a) seems to concern basic biological human needs. Furthermore, part (b) includes needs that fall under Gasper’s (2004, 2007b) instrumental mode, yet the above meaning of human needs (Doyal & Gough’s definition) is normative in nature. However, a more inclusive definition of necessary is that of Adam Smith. He asserts: ‘by necessaries I understand not only the commodities that are indispensably necessary for the support of life, but whatever the custom of the country renders it indecent for creditable people, even of the lowest order, to be without’ (Smith, 1776, p. 691). It is these necessaries that Max-Neef (1991) and Thomson (1987) call fundamental human needs, while Wiggins (1991) refers to them as vital needs. Therefore, human needs in this article are used in the sense of that which human life or flourishing cannot be without (see Thomson, 1987).
Adam Smith’s definition of necessary raises another issue of what constitutes human needs. Different theorists have developed lists of human needs but with some overlap. These are mainly in psychology, development studies, social work and social policy. The most prominent psychological theories include Maslow’s (1970) theory of motivation and Deci and Ryan’s (2000) theory of self-determination. On the other hand, the most prominent in development studies and social policy are Doyal and Gough’s (1991) theory of human need, Max-Neef’s (1991) matrix of needs and satisfiers, Gil’s (1992) basic human needs and Bradshaw’s (1972) taxonomy of need. According to Doyal and Gough, there are two universal human needs, that is, physical health and autonomy. On the other hand, Max-Neef lists nine needs, including subsistence, protection, affection, understanding, participation, idleness, creation, identity and freedom. Gil (1992) lists six human needs, including biological-material, social-psychological, productive-creative, security, self-actualisation and spiritual. Bradshaw lists normative, felt, expressed and comparative needs. On the side of psychological theories, Deci and Ryan list autonomy, relatedness and competence, while Maslow lists physiological, safety, belonging, self-esteem and self-actualisation. This article utilises a combination of these taxonomies while conceptually analysing the relationship between human needs and human well-being.
Human Well-being
Similar to human needs, human well-being is a complex terminology. It has multiple and varying definitions, competing conceptualisations, indicators, approaches and measurement procedures (Diener et al., 2009; Gasper, 2007a; Gough et al., 2007; McGillivray, 2007; McGillivray & Clarke, 2006; Scott, 2012; Veenhoven, 2006). This complexity and lack of an agreed-upon meaning are due to the term being ‘novel’ in the social sciences (Gough et al., 2007). Although there is no agreed-upon definition, Gasper (2002, p. 450) notes that well-being ‘might mean any evaluation of a person’s situation or, more fittingly, any such evaluation that is focussed on the person’s “being”’. On the other hand, Veenhoven (2000, p. 3) defines well-being as ‘the degree to which an individual is well’. Although the definitions seem to be different (being versus well), they both focus on a person’s state and evaluation of that state. This ‘well’ or ‘being’ is in relation to self, others (human beings), environment (both physical and social) and supernatural being (God). This essentially means well living with self, others, environment and God (Gasper, 2007a; White, 2010). This is well captured by Max-Neef’s (1991) existential needs 2 categories (having, doing, interacting and being), Gasper’s (2007c) grammar of well-being 3 (having, doing/being and mental states) and Allardt’s (1976) basic needs classification 4 (having, loving and being).
Despite the absence of a universally agreed-upon definition, it is generally agreed that well-being is made up of both objective and subjective aspects (Chaigneau et al., 2021). For instance, Gasper (2005, p. 2) maintains: ‘well-being is an umbrella concept that embraces both subjective well-being and objective well-being’. However, Gasper (2002, 2005) cautions careful use of the terms, since the terms refer to what is being measured and how it is being measured. Objective well-being concerns externally and normatively approved aspects of human life, such as longevity, health, and appropriate housing. On the other hand, subjective well-being concerns and measures the internal states of a person (happiness and satisfaction) (Chaigneau et al., 2021; Doyal & Gough, 1991; Gasper, 2007b). Both the external and internal aspects of individuals’ well-being can be measured objectively, that is, by experts (without involving the opinions and judgements of those being evaluated); or subjectively, that is, through self-reports by those being evaluated (Chaigneau et al., 2021; Gasper, 2002, 2005; Phillips, 2006).
This categorisation of well-being does not make understanding of the concept any better or easier, since it leads to four likely forms of well-being (objective-subjective, objective-objective, subjective-objective and subjective-subjective). However, Veenhoven’s (2000, 2006, 2012) categorisations are clearer. He understands human well-being to be made up of life chances or opportunities (liveability of the environment and life-ability of the person) and life outcomes (utility of life and appreciation of life). Liveability of the environment focuses on the conditions of living, while life-ability focusses on an individual’s ability to deal with his/her environment (conditions of living). This includes coping, adaptation, awareness and actualising capabilities (Veenhoven, 2000). Veenhoven asserts that the combination of life-ability and living conditions and their existence in adequate amounts leads to life outcomes. These may include a long life, a healthy life, a happy life, a satisfied life and so on. In the process of conceptually analysing the relationship between human needs and human well-being, it is demonstrated that human needs constitute the life chances and life outcomes domains of well-being, and they are also preconditions for the life outcomes domain of well-being.
Methodology
As already noted above, this article is conceptual in nature. A literature search was carried out on books and journal articles on human needs and well-being. A purposive selection of books/book chapters with lists of human needs and human well-being was carried out. Three books/book chapters with lists of human needs and human well-being were selected respectively for comparison purposes. The selected books/book chapters are from the following disciplines: psychology, social policy, development studies and philosophy. The lists of human needs and human well-being were compared to observe the similarities and differences in the lists. The comparison demonstrates the nature of relationship between human needs and human well-being.
Nature of Relationship between Human Needs and Human Well-being
As earlier noted, this article conceptually analyses the nature of the relationship between human needs and human well-being drawing on the literature from diverse disciplines. The section has two main subsections, that is, human needs as constitutive of human well-being and human needs as instrumental, in a normative way, to human well-being. The constitutive relationship is explored first, and thereafter the instrumental-normative relationship.
The Constitutive Relationship
What constitutes human well-being is better captured by indicators of well-being. It is in the indicators that dimensions of human well-being, although not all of them, are spelt out. A closer look at these indicators in Table 1 shows that they are similar to human needs. These indicators correspond to the human well-being dimensions, that is, life chances and life outcomes. However, as noted in the background section, human well-being is a complex term. This is due to its being novel in the social sciences (Gough et al., 2007), and different disciplines (sociology, psychology, economics, anthropology, development studies and so on) researching it from their own perspectives (McGillivray, 2007). Therefore, it is important for readers to note that the dimensions discussed here may take different forms or names in other disciplines. In addition, different terms (capability, quality of life, human development, human poverty, life satisfaction, welfare, living standards, living well, and human flourishing) are used to refer to the same by the different disciplines (McGillivray, 2007; McGillivray & Clarke, 2006). Indeed, the terms used here may be different from those used in other disciplines. However, these terms either fall under the life chances dimension, life outcomes or both.
An analysis of Table 1 shows there are similarities between what constitutes human needs and human well-being. The items listed by the different scholars of human well-being are similar in some respects to those listed by scholars of human needs. The similarities imply that human needs are constitutive of human well-being and vice versa. Indeed O’Brien (2010) argues that the two concepts are at times complementary and overlapping. Table 1 shows three lists of indicators of human well-being and three lists of needs by the respective scholars. One can observe that whatever is listed in the list of well-being indicators appears in all three, two or one of the lists of human needs.
Using Veenhoven’s (2006) well-being conceptualisation framework the indicators listed are either life chances/opportunities of a good life or life outcomes/the good life itself. For instance, health, education, autonomy and competence are examples of life outcomes aspects of human well-being (see Clarke, 2006, for a similar argument). On the other hand, relationships, employment/work, safety and community are examples of the life chances aspect of human well-being. Indeed Doyal and Gough (1991) argue that these are universal preconditions for health and autonomy. However, the divide between life chances elements and the life outcomes elements is not fixed in stone. Some items viewed as life outcomes also conveniently fit under the life chances category. For example, education can be both an opportunity for a good life (life chance), and at the same time, the attained education in form of the skills and knowledge can be a good life itself (life outcome).
Lists of Human Needs and Human Well-being Indicators by Different Scholars
When the very well-being indicators are analysed using the Max-Neef’s (1991) matrix of human needs (axiological 5 and existential), indicators fall under either the existential human needs of being (qualities), having (things) or interacting (settings). For instance, health, autonomy, sense of community and safety, happiness, life satisfaction and education fall under the being domain of the existential human needs category, while food and water, work, relationships, spiritual aspects, and security fall under the having domain of the existential human needs. It is the environment well-being indicator that falls under the interacting domain of the existential human needs category. These very well-being indicators would fall under either Allardt’s (1976) basic needs classifications of having, loving or being. Allardt’s being and having human needs categories are similar to Max-Neef’s (1991) having and being existential human needs categories. However, the relationship indicator of well-being falls under the loving basic needs classification. But as already pointed out, the divide between these dimensions is not fixed in stone.
This analysis is similar in some respects to Gasper’s (2007c) and Raphael et al.’s (1996) argument that well-being is made of three domains. According to Raphael, et al., it is made up of the being, belonging and becoming dimensions, while to Gasper it is made up of the having, doing/being and mental states dimensions. The being and having domains are similar to my argument above. The belonging is similar to Allardt’s loving basic needs, while the becoming domain is similar to Max-Neef’s doing existential human needs. Gasper’s mental states dimension (feelings and satisfaction) can conveniently fit under the being dimension as per my argument above. All this shows that human needs are constitutive of human well-being.
The implicit or explicit use of human needs items in discussing human well-being, as shown above, implies that human needs constitute human well-being as both life chances and life outcomes. They are part and parcel of human well-being. Individuals cannot discuss or talk about human well-being without necessarily talking or using human needs (see Balyejjusa, 2015b; Costanza et al., 2007; Doyal & Gough, 1991; Gasper, 2007b; Max-Neef, 1991; Wright, 2012)
Instrumental-normative Relationship
The term instrumental can be misleading, especially in well-being research. It refers to prerequisites for an objective. However, not all prerequisites and objectives are normative in nature (see, Gasper, 2004, 2009). Since well-being is a normative concept, the instrumental term here is used in a normative way (instrumental-normative). It is looking at prerequisites that are essential to achieve human well-being (resources for attaining well-being). Indeed Gasper (2007b, 2009) argues that it is these kinds of needs (normative needs or mode C) that relate directly to human well-being. As already indicated, well-being is good and desirable; it is a universal good. The adequate satisfaction of these needs leads to realising well-being, it is an outcome of the process of meeting human needs (Chaigneau et al., 2021). For instance, Gil (1992, p. 18) argues that ‘social health and well-being depend always on an adequate level of fulfilment of these basic human needs’. These needs cut across cultures, nations and continents. However, there are cultural variations in the satisfiers and the meanings and understandings (see Doyal & Gough, 1991; Max-Neef, 1991; Wright, 2012). The relational/instrumental linkages may not be limited to a single linkage (A→B) but they may be multiple linkages (A→B→C→D) (see Braybrooke, 1987; Gasper, 2007b). This will be demonstrated later on.
The instrumental relationship of human needs and well-being can be equated to Veenhoven’s (2000, 2006, 2012) life chances and life outcomes dichotomy. Indeed, Clarke (2006) uses the fulfilment of Maslow’s hierarchical needs to measure human well-being in eight South-East Asian countries. Similarly, Balyejjusa (2015b) discusses a number of opportunities (needs) for a good life/well-being. According to Doyal and Gough, satisfaction of human needs (universal intermediate needs) leads to realising physical health and autonomy 6 (it will be demonstrated later how autonomy leads to well-being). Physical health and autonomy are being aspects (existential needs) of the subsistence, and protection and freedom needs (axiological needs) respectively (Max-Neef, 1991).
It should also be noted that autonomy may not only be social or physical but a psychological need (see Ryan & Sapp, 2007). Ryan and Sapp (2007) argue that the psychological need for autonomy, together with the psychological need for competence and relatedness leads to human wellness/well-being (psychological well-being) by ensuring psychological growth, integrity, and subjective well-being. Therefore, Doyal and Gough (1991) maintain that adequate satisfaction of the human need for autonomy and physical health leads to what they call ‘avoidance of objective harm’. Indeed this translates to human well-being, since Max-Neef (1991, p. 16), using the quality of life terminology, argues that ‘quality of life depends on the possibilities people have to adequately satisfy their fundamental human needs’. For instance, Ryan and Sapp (2007) point out that an environment which is autonomy supportive or facilitates adequate satisfaction of the human need for autonomy leads to a person experiencing subjective wellness, instead of insecurity, distress and unhappiness.
To better capture the relationship (instrumental) between the different elements of human needs and human well-being, the idea of looking at needs as strategies is helpful (see Costanza et al., 2007; Rauschmayer et al., 2011). Using Max-Neef’s (1991) and Allard’s (1976) categories of needs, that is, existential and axiological, and basic needs classifications respectively, human needs are strategies for meeting well-being elements shown in Table 1 . For instance, Balyejjusa (2015b) demonstrates that having peace and security (need) is a strategy for satisfying well-being elements of health, freedom of movement, good physical environment (neighbours, calmness, cleanliness), body integrity (sleeping well, freedom from sexual harassment and abuse), working well, learning well, security of property, engaging in work and pursuance of learning, contributing to life of others, being able to think and imagine, and having peace of mind.
The outcomes of having peace and security and other needs (strategies) are similar to some of Martha Nussbaum (2011) central capabilities. 7 For instance, life, bodily integrity, imagination and thought, emotions, affiliations and control over one’s environment are all similar to Balyejjusa’s (2015b) well-being outcomes of person having peace and security. Indeed Nussbaum notes that these are important elements of people’s quality of life. Therefore, peace and security provide an opportunity or is an opportunity for individuals to live a life they values, which can be understood as their well-being.
The relationship between the needs as strategies for realising human well-being elements may not be a single linkage but multiple linkages. A particular human need can lead to achieving a well-being element and the achieved well-being element in turn is a strategy for realising another well-being element. For instance, healthcare as a human need can lead to achieving the well-being element of health (physical health and psychosocial health). However, the achieved health leads to realising the well-being elements of human autonomy, happiness and life satisfaction (see Costanza et al., 2007). The relationship graphically presented is as follows: Healthcare→Health→Human autonomy, happiness and life satisfaction. However, the relationship between healthcare and these very well-being elements (health, autonomy, happiness and life satisfaction) can take another linkage, that is, adequate access to healthcare leads to happiness and life satisfaction, which lead to health. Graphically the relationship is as follows: Healthcare→Happiness and Life Satisfaction→Health.
Although these strategies can lead to realising life outcomes/well-being, the concerned individuals must play an active role in utilising these strategies or opportunities or life chances (see McGregor, 2010). Presence/availability of physical security and healthcare may not necessarily lead to realising physical health if the concerned individual does not actively engage in utilising the available healthcare. Similarly, availability of a non-hazardous work may not necessarily lead to a person actually working if the person does not actively search for work, get it and eventually works. Nussbaum (2011) indeed observes that although capabilities can derivatively belong to groups, they first and foremost belong to individual persons. This active role may be understood as autonomy of agency in Doyal and Gough’s (1991) sense. The individual must come up with aims and strategies to achieve his/her life goals and objectives or well-being goals. However, it is important to note that society also plays a role in ensuring that these opportunities are available to its members (see Costanza et al., 2007). These may be in the form of societal preconditions including negative and positive rights, production of sufficient and appropriate needs satisfiers and so on (Doyal & Gough, 1991).
Implications for Social Work Practice
Just establishing and conceptually analysing the relationship between human needs and human well-being is not enough in promoting human well-being. Since social work is a practice-based profession, the analysis should be taken to the level of action to ensure that clients’ human needs are adequately satisfied in order to promote their well-being, since it is the primary mission of social work (NASW, 2017). The question is how can social workers use this knowledge, especially of the instrumental-normative relationship between human needs and human well-being during social work practice? This is because, although human needs exist and are real, as argued by Wronka (2017), that does not mean that they are automatically satisfied. Indeed social workers engage in identifying, naming and assessing human needs during practice (Ife, 2012), but this does not mean that these needs are always and automatically satisfied. Identifying, naming and assessment of human needs does not in any way assign obligations or duties for meeting them. Although human needs have a moral force due to objective harm involved in the face of unsatisfied human needs (Braybrooke, 2005), this in itself does not assign particular obligations or duties for meeting them. As such, any unmet human needs are satisfied on a benevolence basis/compassionate ground (Gabel, 2016). In order for human needs to be adequately satisfied, social workers need to link them to human rights. This is because, although human rights do not exist (Wronka, 2017), they assign obligations, responsibilities and duties for meeting the human needs (Dean, 2013, 2015; Ife, 2012; Wronka, 2017). This is important since meeting human needs requires resources. However, as Dean (2013) argues, assigning responsibilities, duties or obligations does not necessarily mean that the duty bearers will carry out their duties. Despite this, it is good to know the duty-bearers for meeting human needs so as to promote people’s well-being. Therefore, human rights provide the legal mandate for meeting the human needs of the rights holders (Gabel, 2016; Gough, 2017; Wronka, 2017).
Although social work as a profession aims at promoting human rights of all people (International Federation of Social Workers [IFSW] 2021), in this article, the linkage of human needs is not with human rights in general but with social rights. Unlike human rights that are broad, including both positive (social and economic rights) and negative rights (civil and political rights), social rights only focus on welfare issues (Dean, 2013, 2015; Noonan, 2006). Indeed, sometimes the concept of welfare is used interchangeably with the concept of well-being. Unlike negative rights such as freedom of expression and association that do not require resources to be provided, social rights such as the right to housing and healthcare require a lot of resources in order to be protected. Since this article analyses the relationship between human needs and human well-being, focussing on social rights is more appropriate for this article. Social rights are individualised social entitlements bestowed by legislations in a welfare state (Dean, 2013, 2015; Noonan, 2006). They are social because they are conceived, developed and carried out within a social context. The legislations create two social categories, that is the rights-bearers/holders and the duty-bearers. The rights-bearers are the entitled individuals whose human needs social institutions must meet (Dean, 2015; Gough, 2017; Noonan, 2006). Usually, it is governments which are the primary duty-bearers for the social rights of their citizens (Berthold, 2015; Dean, 2015; Ife, 2012). According to Dean (2015, p. 3), social rights include ‘social security, employment protection, housing, education, health and social care’. The examples listed by Dean (2015) are similar to some of the human needs listed earlier. Indeed Gabel (2016) and Ife (2012) argue that human rights, in general, are needs-based claims. Although Dean (2015) and Noonan (2004, 2006) discuss the history of social rights, especially in Britain, as having developed in the twentieth century in the context of the development of the capitalist economy, this is beyond the scope of this article, which focusses on analysing the relationship between human needs and human well-being as used in social work.
Despite the fact that promoting human rights is a core principle of the social work profession (IFSW, 2021), Androff (2018) argues that human rights are rarely used by social work practitioners. Androff (2016) developed a human rights-based framework for social work practice which focusses on five principles: human dignity, non-discrimination, participation, transparency and accountability. However, I discuss two reasons why social workers should link human needs to social rights, especially in the context of the vulnerable and disadvantaged groups of people in Uganda, in particular. Linking human needs to social rights is very important in social work because social workers work with people and categories of people who are vulnerable, disadvantaged and discriminated against (NASW, 2017). These include refugees, women, children, religious minorities, ethnic minorities, elderly, and the poor, among others. It is usually these categories of people whose human needs go unmet. It is these unmet human needs social workers should frame as social rights in order to raise the consciousness and empowerment of the vulnerable and disadvantaged.
Linking the human needs of the marginalised, vulnerable and disadvantaged individuals, groups and communities will lead to their consciousness of their social rights. Very often and many times when individuals, groups and communities experience disadvantage, marginalisation and vulnerability for some time, they develop a mindset of not having any human rights in general and social rights in particular. But also, this mindset could be due to ignorance about their social rights (Longres & McLeod, 1980). For instance, in Uganda when poor people fail to meet their human needs such as healthcare, education and housing, they tend to phrase their requests to have these needs met in form of begging the government. ‘We beg the government to help us with food supplies, healthcare, education, housing, etc.’ has become a common phrase in Uganda. Yet, the Uganda’s 1995 Constitution clearly stipulates that the state shall endeavour to fulfil the fundamental rights of all Ugandans. For instance, in relation to these rights, the Republic of Uganda [RU] (1995, p. 22) outlines that the state will ensure that ‘all Ugandans enjoy rights and opportunities and access to education, health services, clean and safe water, work, decent shelter, adequate clothing, food security and pension and retirement benefits’. If social workers frame the human needs of these people as social rights, then these people will get to know or become aware of the duty-bearer for fulfilling their social rights. The government has both legal and moral obligations to fulfil its duty (Gabel, 2016). In this situation, the government is a violator of its obligations in relation to the social rights of these vulnerable and disadvantaged people. The begging requests are because they are not aware that the government is in fact the duty-bearer. The social workers can change this mindset during practice by framing these human needs as social rights. Indeed Dean (2020) argues that human consciousness is not only a mental process but also constructed through human processes. It is the social workers’ human process of framing their clients’ human needs as social rights that raises their consciousness about their social right and the duty-bearers.
Second, social workers’ framing the human needs of their clients as social right does not only lead to the consciousness of their clients about their social rights and duty-bearers but also leads to their empowerment. According to Dean (2020), human consciousness precedes human action. Indeed the IFSW (2021) argues that development of critical consciousness is central to emancipatory practice whose goal is empowerment and liberation of people. Although this is the case, the two are quite different. Clients’ consciousness of social rights, as already pointed out, is about awareness of their social rights and duty-bearers. However, clients’ empowerment in relation to their social rights is about clients being able to take action by demanding that duty-bearers carry out their obligations of ensuring that their social rights are fulfilled. Social workers’ framing their clients’ human needs as social rights clearly demonstrates to the clients that there is a social institution which is responsible for fulfilling these social rights. Due to the consciousness of their social rights, clients are empowered to speak up about the duty-bearers’ violations and seek redress (Berthold, 2015; Breton, 1994; Gabel, 2016). When for instance, the human need for housing, healthcare, education and employment are framed as entitlement to housing, healthcare, education and employment, clients cease to view them as favours from the duty-bearers but as entitlements that they can demand for. For instance, in the case of Uganda, the vulnerable and disadvantaged people would just demand that the state provides resources, goods and services so that they can meet their human needs so that their social rights are protected. The talk of begging the government to help them, as earlier pointed out, would cease. Social workers doing this (framing needs as social rights) in Uganda in part will promote one of the guiding principles (human rights-based approach to service delivery) of the National Social Protection Policy (RU, 2015). It is maintained that ‘communities shall be empowered to know and claim their rights and demand accountability from duty bearers and institutions implementing social protection interventions’ (RU, 2015, p. 26).
Conclusion
Although there is extensive literature on human needs and human well-being, the concepts are complex. This is not helped by their deployment in social policy design and implementation, development practice and social science disciplines. However, human needs are necessities for human flourishing. They are pre-conditions for human beings to avoid serious objective harm (Doyal & Gough, 1991; Gough, 2000, 2004; Thomson, 1987). On the other hand, human well-being is an evaluation of a person’s life situation. This evaluation may focus on either objective life situation, subjective life situation or both (Gasper, 2002). Looked at differently, the objective conditions are the living conditions or life chances/opportunities/strategies for a good life, while the subjective situations are part of the life outcomes or the good life itself (Veenhoven, 2000, 2006, 2012). However, well-being can also be looked at in existential perspective: being, having, doing, interacting and loving (Allardt, 1976; Gasper, 2007c; Max-Neef, 1991).
From the analysis, human needs constitute both the living conditions/life chances/opportunities for a good life and life outcomes domains of well-being. The opportunities for a good life include housing, security, education, health, relationships with others, nutritional food and employment. Some of these items such as health and education also fall under the life outcomes domain of human well-being. These items can be categorised under the existential human needs of having—housing, employment, nutritional food; being—health, autonomy, happiness and education; interacting—environment; and loving—relations with others. It is the being category of human needs that is equivalent to the life outcomes domain of well-being. Apart from human needs being constitutive of human well-being, they are also preconditions for human well-being, thus, having an instrumental-normative relationship. The adequate satisfaction of these needs results in realising physical health, autonomy, happiness and life satisfaction, which are being elements of well-being. Therefore, the needs-existential (having, being, loving and interacting) are strategies for realising the human well-being, especially the being dimension.
It is important to note that the constitutive and instrumental-normative relationship sometimes overlap. The constitutive and instrumental-normative relationship makes human needs fundamental in realising human well-being. Therefore, social workers, governments, state institutions, NGOs, policymakers and service providers should prioritise human needs in their actions and decisions. They should heavily invest in efforts, projects, policies and programmes that promote and guarantee adequate satisfaction of human needs. One way of doing this, especially for social workers, is framing the human needs as social rights. This specifies who the duty-bearers for meeting human needs are, thus raising the consciousness of and empowerment of their clients. This way, their efforts will ensure that human beings realise human well-being. This is because human needs are not only constitutive of human well-being but also pre-conditions (instrumental-normative) for human well-being. Adequately satisfying human needs automatically leads to human well-being realisation (Costanza et al., 2007; McGregor, 2010). The meeting of human needs could be in the form of having, being, doing, belonging, becoming and loving (Allardt, 1976, Gasper, 2007c; Max-Neef, 1991; Raphael et al., 1996). In any case, social workers’ interventions and government or agencies’ actions and policies are aimed at achieving human well-being (Gough et al., 2007; NASW, 2017; O’Brien, 2010).
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.