The Jharkhand Andolan : A silencing of Muslim voice(s)

I Introduction

This article, at one level, is about the statehood movement for Jharkhand, a region inhabited by diverse adivasi communities in central India, that led to the formation of a separate state in 2000 and realisation of a long-standing demand of its people. But at another level, it shows how the mainstream accounts of the movement have undermined the contribution of the Muslim inhabitants to its success.

The subaltern turn in historiography has changed the way we read history/histories (Bahl 1997; Prakash 1990). The omissions and silence(s) that happen at the stage of ‘fact creation’ provide us with a lens to apprehend how events become facts (Trouillot 1997). Taking cues from the sociological and historical understanding of silencing, this article shows how Muslim voices were rendered inaudible in the historiography of Jharkhand’s statehood movement (Jharkhand Andolan). Although several scholars of the movement (Raj 1992; Sarkar 2003; Singh 1983) trace it back to the early days of Adivasi insurgencies against the British colonial forces, the major uprisings that took the shape of a subnational movement can be attributed to the formation of the Jharkhand Party (JP) in 1950 (Sengupta 1982). The demand for a separate state was strengthened with the emergence of the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM) and the All Jharkhand Students’ Union (AJSU) during the decades spanning from late 1970s to the final moment of separation in 2000. Growing militancy and political expediency ¹ together forced the then Central Government led by Atal Bihari Vajpayee to accept the demand for Jharkhand. Several other communities like Kudmi Mahatos, Harijans and Muslims (mostly from Ansari community known as Momins), and not only Adivasis, participated in the statehood movement (Sengupta 1982) giving it the shape of an ethnonationalist movement (Prakash 1999).

However, while working on the Jharkhand Andolan ² that sought freedom from the exploitation by outsiders and the recognition of a separate state, what I encountered was absolute silence on Muslim participation in this movement. The Muslims were made absent in the production of the Andolan—their absence was a constitutive part of the process through which histories were being written. Studies by scholars writing on the Jharkhand statehood movement have largely discounted the presence of Muslims in the Andolan (Munda and Bosu Mullick 2003; Sengupta 1982; Singh 1983). By contrast, writings about the Andolan in the vernacular media along with the oral accounts recount details of the Muslim presence and contribution.

This marginalisation provoked me to gather traces of the Muslim presence scattered in different vernacular newspapers, books and personal archives of Andolankaris ³ so as to restore narratives that were being silenced in the prevailing accounts. In the second section of the article, I look into the concept of silence as developed by Trouillot. In the third section, I discuss significant writings on the Jharkhand Andolan to show how the presence of Muslims has been actively pushed to the footnotes. The fourth section is built upon the narratives of Muslims’ presence in the Jharkhand Andolan, using the personal archives of Andolankaris along with vernacular media reports. Here, I focus on how Jharkhandi ⁴ Muslims were aware of their probable and ongoing silencing. They saved their documents as evidence to show posterity that Muslims were an integral part of the Jharkhand Movement. In the words of Zubair Ahmed, once an undisputed Muslim leader of Jharkhand Mukti Morcha and now an egg-vendor in Doranda, Ranchi, ‘Ye humari punji hai. Aanewali peedhiyon ko pata to chale ki uske baap-dada kaise lade the alag rajya ke liye’ (This [the documents] is our treasure. Our future generations must know how their forefathers had fought for the separate state [of Jharkhand]). The concluding section looks into the organisations that Jharkhandi Muslims formed as a consequence of their sidelining in the new state.

II Conceptualising silence

According to Trouillot (1997: 31–61), if history is conceived through ‘how history works’, rather than ‘what history is’, the process of its production needs appropriate attention. In this process, silence becomes both a constitutive component and its derivative (Trouillot 1990). Silences enter the production of history, Trouillot argues, in four stages—‘the moment of fact creation, the moment of fact collection, the moment of fact retrieval and the moment of retrospective significance’ (Trouillot 1997: 38). Although the first two stages may have distinctive values, the two stages can occur together. These two stages are well connected because the events that are chosen to be engraved (in palaces, books, streets and any possible site) become ‘facts’ and consequentially guide the process of archiving. However, this is not to say that all the engraved elements gradually become part of archives as the archive too is a space of power (Foucault 1972) and determines which voices will be heard. The power to exclude constitutes one of the fundamental aspects of an archive and it inevitably carries ‘distortions, omissions, erasures and silences’ that do not allow every story to be told (Carter 2006: 216).

The first two stages of fact creation and fact collection seem to be so obvious that we forget to interrogate their embedded politics of presence and absence. The very histories engraved in the ‘living brains, fossils, texts, buildings’ (Trouillot 1997: 39) are syntheses of presences and silences. Thus, well before the appearance of historians on the scenario, agents with unequal powers establish their authority over the means of historical production and, to some extent, control the ways histories are produced at a later stage. This unequal distribution of power of the agents to determine the future course of history shows how some events become more equal than others.

While the unequal distribution of historical power determines the first two stages of production of history/histories, the third stage of fact retrieval depends on the frequency of retrieval. Even a description of the past, similar to a ‘sportscaster’s blow-by-blow description of a game’ (Dray 1982: 203), is affected by unequal retrieval. As Trouillot (1997: 43) rightly points out, ‘Some facts are recalled more often than others; some strings of facts are recalled with more empirical richness than others even in blow-by-blow recounting’.

These three stages make it difficult for historians to use the fourth stage of retrospective significance to replace the silences with mentions. That the fourth stage is considered by Trouillot (1995) as the final one, does not make agents/actors of history/histories disappear. The intensified and solidified silences accrued in the prior three stages maintain their clout over the fourth stage and it becomes erasure—‘more effective than the simple absence of memory, faked or genuine’ (Trouillot 1997: 48). The silences thus act as constitutive components in the production of history. The unequal powers over the means of historical production are reproduced throughout these stages to make silence a permanent, constitutive element of historical narratives.

However, in the narrations on production of history/histories what remains missing is the spoken/oral histories that Trouillot (1997) calls live sources. The speech acts are not considered worthy if the voices of authority and power do not testify in their favour (Langton 1993). The lack of power in spoken words do not let them qualify as archived materials and further entrench the silence (Carter 2006). And so, voices at the margins that do not conform to the dominant ideas and narratives are silenced through ignorance, if not intentionally (Harris 2001). Our memories too get shaped through these silences and gradually become what Nora (1989) terms ‘archival’ since these are enmeshed in the ‘continuing existence of the physical traces produced by members of society in their activities’ (Carter 2006: 220).

Gradually the narratives that did not qualify to be archived due to the unequal distribution of historical power lose their essence in common parlance as well and such silence is imbibed as natural. Historical silences, then, are considered as something that never happened or were never spoken of. As we live in a time when participation in the positive history/histories such as struggles for national independence, struggles for modern values of freedom, liberty and justice make us legitimate claimants of contemporary social and political rights, the archival silences can work adversely for silenced communities. Their elimination from the historical narratives makes them ‘lesser citizens’ in contrast to those whose struggles are remembered and celebrated. Schwartz and Cook (2002: 18) argue, ‘Without archives, memory falters, knowledge of accomplishment fades, pride in a shared past dissipates. Archives counter these losses.’ People who are denied speech and voice cannot make their experiences and struggles audible and thus cannot ‘influence the course of their lives or of history’ (Gal 1994: 407).

Such silencing beckons us to consider what Dotson (2011: 242) calls ‘testimonial quieting’—a condition where ‘an audience fails to identify or at least recognise her as a knower in order to offer testimony’. Speakers need an audience to testify or at least recognise her/him as a ‘knower’. Without this recognition, the speaker/speakers certainly fail to make their experiences register. This line of thought is pursued by black feminism. Collins (2000) in her seminal work Black Feminist Thought shows how the experiences of black women are undervalued as the audience fails to go beyond the stigmatising ‘controlling images’ (Dotson 2011: 242) that make the stereotypes seemingly ‘natural, normal and inevitable parts of everyday life’ (Collins 2000: 69). These attempts at silencing come not from simple ignorance but rather from an active unknowing as Mills (1999: 18) suggests. While talking about such ignorance, Tuana (2006: 13) argues, ‘In instances such as these it is not simply facts, events, practices, or technologies that are rendered not known, but individuals and groups who are rendered “not knowers”’. Testimonial quieting occurs from such active unknowing. It is what affects the ‘intellectual courage’ (Fricker 2007: 49) and ‘epistemic agency’ (Townley 2003: 109) of the silenced communities.

In the following sections, I discuss how the mainstream writings on the Jharkhand Andolan silenced the Muslim communities with scholarly indifference. These studies of the movement have remained conspicuously silent on the presence of Muslim leaders and Muslim-run organisations and their demands. After giving an account of the Jharkhand Andolan below, I focus on the Muslims’ presence and their participation since the early days of the movement. What comes through is how fact creation and collection, and the unequal frequency of fact retrieval accompanied with the ‘testimonial quieting’ (Dotson 2011) contribute to the silencing of Muslims in the historical narratives of Jharkhand Andolan.

III Outlining the antecedents of the Jharkhand Andolan

While several strands and trajectories of the Jharkhand Andolan have been identified by scholars at different times (Roy 1982; Sengupta 1982; Das 1990; Rana 2002), I draw attention to the dominant phases in the Jharkhand agitation below. By outlining the movement’s trajectories, I try to bring out the absence of any consideration of Muslims at those junctures where their presence played a determining role in changing the composition and trajectory of the movement.

The alienation of Adivasis in the Jharkhand region was, at one plane, a direct consequence of British intervention (Das 1990; Sengupta 1982). The Permanent Settlement Act, 1793, by Britishers opened up the spaces for Dikus or outsiders ⁵ that led to several agrarian rebellions ⁶ (Chatterjee 2002). This first phase of Company rule is characterised as the period of open agrarian revolt (Munda and Keshari 1992). The following period of the British regime is described as an ethnic revolt since ethnic identity became the major instrument against the Dikus resulting in identity-based movements such as the Santhal insurrection, the Sepoy Mutiny, the Sardaro agitation, Kherwar Movement, the Birsa Munda movement and Tana Bhagat movement (Chatterjee 2002: 112–30). The fight against the Dikus was a struggle to preserve and retain cultural identity.

The politicisation of Adivasi identities took shape with the formation of the Chotonagpur Unnati Samaj (CUS) in 1915 (Ghosh 2016). It was dominated by tribal Christians and leaders such as Joel Lakra, Theble Oraon and Bandiram Oraon. The Samaj submitted a petition to the Simon Commission in 1928 demanding special administrative units for Chotanagpur and Santhal Pargana. Faced with an electoral setback in 1937, the CUS in May, 1938 merged with the Chotanagpur Catholic Sabha and Chotanagpur Kisan Sabha to form the Adivasi Mahasabha, the first formidable organisation in this region that called for separate statehood and an end to Diku-raj ⁷ (Rana 1992: 397).

During the Independence movement and soon after Independence in 1947, the Adivasi Mahasabha realised the necessity to accommodate the non-Adivasi population of this region as without them the broader movement for the state of Jharkhand seemed quite impossible. And so, in the Jamshedpur session of 1947 the newly perceived situation was discussed leading to the formation of the JP in the Ranchi session of 1949 (Rana 1992). The JP was formally launched on 01 January 1950 and added a new momentum to the Jharkhand statehood movement (Mahapatra 1983). JP’s major success was in the country’s first General Elections when it won 32 out of 53 seats that it contested in this region (Singh 2004). This victory showed its popularity across the Chotanagpur and Santhal Pargana region, then administered by the state of Bihar. In 1956, JP submitted its claims for separate statehood to the State Reorganisation Commission (SRC) but it was rejected on the grounds that the region did not have an Adivasi majority nor a common language (Ekka and Sinha 2004). The politics of SRC was reflected in its crucial decision to not in- corporate the lands claimed from West Bengal, Orissa (now Odisha) and Madhya Pradesh (Das 1992; Ghosh 2016).

SRC’s denial to grant statehood to the Jharkhand region affected the credibility of the JP and in the 1962 elections it could bag only 20 seats. This led the undisputed leader of the JP, Jaipal Singh Munda, to merge it with the Congress in 1963 (Ghosh 1991). At this juncture, several factions arose within the JP and coupled with the late ‘60s Naxalite movement as well as the Marxist influence across the industrial belt of Jharkhand, the movement for statehood took a shift toward left-wing politics (Ghosh 1991; Rana 2003; Roy 1982). While the A. K. Roy-led Marxist Coordination Committee (MCC) kept the movement in the industrial belt intact, the leader of the Santhal Pargana, Shibu Soren, along with the leaders of the Shivaji Samaj ⁸ Vinod Bihari Mahato, combined their interests and created the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM) in 1973. For the next three decades, the JMM dominated the politics of the Jharkhand movement (Xalxo 2003).

The establishment of a broader Jharkhandi identity (Nathan 2003) that started with the formation of the JP came full circle with the foundation of JMM. In its constitution, the JMM called itself the Party for all Jharkhandis, including the Adivasis and the non-Adivasis.

The inclusion of Sadans ⁹ and Moolvasis ¹⁰ as part and parcel of the movement grew from the recognition that though several Jharkhandis were converts to Islam and Christianity, their basic cultural roots were the same and hence they must be termed as Jharkhandi (Xalxo 2003). Such inclusion led to what Corbridge (1988) calls ethnoregionalism. Politics of unique cultural identity significantly strengthened the claims of indigeneity and garnered international attention (Shah 2010). Notably, three different strands of the movement became visible—the indigenous politics, identity-driven territorial claims and developmental dreams. Prakash (1999: 113–39) describes it as ethnic sub-nationalism that claims the recognition of identity on the one hand, and on the other, cites the lack of development as a ground to seek political autonomy.

Following the formation of the JMM, we can discern three major stages of the movement—first, the formation of the AJSU and the Jharkhand Coordination Committee (JCC); second, the formation of the Committee on Jharkhand Matters (CoJM) and finally, the formation of Jharkhand Area Autonomous Council (JAAC). By the time the Janata Government came to power in 1977, all the National Political parties had their respective Jharkhand cells. The ‘seemingly dead political movement started gaining strength from 1978 onwards’ as Munda and Keshari (1992: 75) document. When the Congress came back to power in 1980, it tied up with the JMM leading to a coalition in the 1985 assembly elections where JMM gained 14 seats and became formidable enough to become one of the major opposition parties.

However, most Jharkhandi leaders, once elected, turned into ‘yes men’ of the major political parties and failed to fight for the cause of separate statehood. This situation led to the formation of the AJSU that would not limit itself only to memorandums and petitions but would make Delhi hear its claims. Within one year of the AJSU’s foundation, the JCC was formed in 1987 ‘with the intention of coordinating different factions of the Jharkhand movement—the lack of which had so far been the one factor responsible for the ineffectiveness and slowing down of the movement’ (Munda and Keshari 1992: 76). About 53 organisations of different hues including labourers, women, intellectuals, teachers and students came together in the JCC and took up the fight for political autonomy and the reconstruction of the age-old Jharkhand movement against embedded internal colonialism.

That the formation of JCC had created enough of an impact on the Government of India was reflected in consecutive meetings of the Coordination committee with both the State and Central Government representatives. The meeting with the Commissioner of South Chotanagpur on 31 May 1989 had a significant outcome as it was the first time that the Government accepted the ‘realistic’ grounds of the movement along with the recognition that it was not only a demand of Adivasis as Sadans and Moolvasis were also represented in huge numbers, making it a demand of all those staying in the Jharkhand area (Munda and Keshari 1992). Subsequent meetings with Government officials resulted in the formation of the CoJM that after examining the several demands of the people in the region submitted its report in May, 1990 to the then Home Minister M. M. Syeed. The CoJM report clearly considered the area to be a ‘separate cultural unit’ and recommended the status of a separate state (CoJM 1990). This report also recommended in a supplementary note that without the formation of a single political administrative unit covering the Chotanagpur and Santhal Pargana region of Bihar and the bordering areas of West Bengal, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa, it was not possible to adequately meet the aspirations of the people (CoJM 1990: 50). These recommendations ultimately led to the formation of Jharkhand Area Autonomous Council (JAAC) in 1995 with Shibu Soren as the chairperson. Ultimately, in 1998, as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its allies came to power and pledged to form a Vananchal ¹¹ state, the movement reached its final stage. And gradually the Jharkhand state was carved out on 15 November 2000 from the state of Bihar while undermining the demands of adding areas of West Bengal, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh to its territory.

This brief account of the movement shows how the movement was represented over time. On the one hand, we see the shifts in the movement as it takes an ethnic turn from its agrarian orientation and then from its ethnic cast to a class-based Marxist turn and then finally adopting a sub-national/ethnoregional identity. However, the presence of Muslim leaders or commoners does not feature in these accounts. As we will see in the next two sections, Muslims were not only foot soldiers, they also led the movements. But, once they realised that they were being eliminated politically, they began to form their own units/organisations. I show how the Muslim presence was undermined by drawing upon histories explored through vernacular sources—books, pamphlets and newspapers (Prabhat Khabar and Ranchi Express, from 1987–2000)—along with several interviews conducted with Muslim Andolankaris. I also refer to a few instances where Jharkhandi Muslims understood how they would be excised from mainstream historical accounts and therefore archived their role in the movement to preserve their side of the story.

IV Muslims in Jharkhand: Gazetteers, archives and vernacular resources

R. R. Diwakar, the Governor of Bihar from 1952–1957, in his book Bihar through Ages (Diwakar 1959) notes that Muslims in Chotanagpur have mixed with tribal residents for over 800 years. Their cultural intermingling, Father Hoffmann, a German Jesuit linguist observes, shows up in the borrowing and amalgamation of Arabian and Persian words in Munda dialects (ibid.). While referring to the Muslim presence during Sher Shah’s period, Macpherson and Hallet (1917: 27) in the Ranchi District Gazetteer note, ‘During this period there must have been a considerable immigration of Muhammadans into the country, as villages composed entirely of Muhammadans are found scattered over the district’. Kumar (1970) points out that during the first quarter of the 19^th century, Muslims of the weaving caste started settling in Chotanagpur. The major reason behind such migration was the collapse of the weaving industry in Biharsharif and Gaya. The promotion of British cotton goods coupled with the crisis of indigenous weaving tools had engendered this migration.

From the 18^th century onwards, ‘local feudal lords encouraged Muslim military adventures from Bihar and up country to settle in this district to render them military service, not only against local risings, but also against external attacks’ (Macpherson and Hallet 1917: 76). However, only a few Muslims went in for military adventures and did not contribute much to the growth of the Muslim population here (Kumar 1970; Sengupta 1982). Other accounts, too, show that Muslim Gowala ¹² families have been living in Gowalatoli, Doranda (a Muslim-dominated locality in Ranchi) for more than 200 years (Vidyarthi 1969). Kumar (1970) also refers to Nadir Mian, a practising lawyer, who soon became the leader of the Muslim trading community and founded the first mosque, Handewala Mosque, in Upper Bazar, Ranchi in 1852. Badi Masjid, also known as Jumma Masjid, was established later in the Upper Bazar in 1867. Kumar attributes the later increase in the number of Muslims in this city to the ‘natural accrual added by immigrants who came to seek employment, particularly in post-1940 era’ (ibid.: 143). These scattered references across these texts make it clear that Muslims have long resided in this region. As Vidyarthi (1969: 44) points out, ‘tribals were the original inhabitants and among the non-tribals, the Muslims were the first early settlers in the Ranchi area’.

In 1912, when the state of Bihar was carved out from Bengal, the demand for a separate state comprising Chotanagpur and Santhal Pargana was made for the first time. Abrar Tabinda in his book titled Jharkhand Andolan mein Musalmanon ki Bhagidari ¹³ mentions that the first person to make the call for separate statehood was a Muslim man namely Asmat Ali. Both Afsar Ali ¹⁴ and Jha (2009) refer to the presence of Asmat Ali but I could not find any further references to his role in the movements. The name of Chiragh Ali, who also called for separation from Bihar in 1919, comes up in accounts by Tabinda (2011) and Ali ¹⁵ but there is scarce further detail. Both Asmat Ali and Chiragh Ali, however, are alive in the oral histories of Muslim participation in the Jharkhand Movement. During my fieldwork, whenever I met a Muslim Andolankari, the first sentence that I heard was, ‘You must know that Asmat Ali was the first person to give the call for separation from Bihar’. The obviousness in their words indicated that they were unaware of the absolute absence of Asmat Ali in the writings on the Jharkhand statehood movement. Even the two Hindi language newspapers, Prabhat Khabar and Ranchi Express had merely carried Asmat Ali’s name without any further details.

The literature in the English language concerning the movement is filled with references to the Simon Commission’s visit to the region and the submission made by Chotanagpur Unnati Samaj for separate administrative unit in 1928 (Prakash 1999; Ghosh 2016). However, this literature fails to mention that the Chotanagpur Separation League also submitted a memorandum to the Simon Commission demanding the formation of a separate province (Ekka and Sinha 2004). The Chotanagpur Separation League, in fact, had several members from the Ansari community comprising Muslim weavers.

While the existing literature (Munda and Keshari 1992; Rana 1992, 1996) though discusses the emergence and actions of the Adivasi Mahasabha, it certainly overlooks that there were around 0.7 million Muslims who supported the Mahasabha in its initial days. Safiq Ansari ¹⁶ argues that Muslims were not only present in the Mahasabha, they were also passionately active in the political curriculums of the Momin Conference. As early as in 1923, the Momin Conference ¹⁷ called for a rally at Murma demanding separate statehood. Ansari notes the overwhelming presence of Muslims from different parts of the region.

In 1936, the Conference also passed a resolution in favour of a separate state. It was well known that the Mahasabha had the support of the Muslim league (Rana 1992; Ghosh 2016). Khan Bahadur Habibur Rahman of the Muslim League donated about Rs. 100000 to Jaipal Singh Munda for his fight for a separate Jharkhand state. A few scholars held that it was a friendly gesture ¹⁸ while others read ideological support behind the donation (Rana 1992).

However, the correspondence between R.S. Shukla and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel ¹⁹ , shows how the Congress perceived this relationship. The Muslim league was accused of supporting a separate Adivasistan that would act as a sort of corridor between West and East Pakistan. Jaipal Singh Munda, nevertheless, always wanted a solution within the geographic contours of India. The Adivasi Mahasabha’s efforts to address the non-Adivasi communities in the late 1940s was driven by the fear of alienating the large number of Muslim supporters that had been there since the inception of the statehood call. In this period, the division between the Momin Conference and the Muslim League became so sharp that during 1946-47 leaders of the Momin Conference, like Abbas and Rahim Bux, asked the Adivasis to leave the front led by Jaipal Singh Munda in favour of the Congress. ²⁰ With the diminishing clout of the Muslim League post-Partition, Munda realised the significance of Muslim support in the movement and gradually a more united forum, the JP, was formed. However, while talking about the formation of the JP, scholars like Rana (1992), Munda and Keshari (1992), Ekka and Sinha (2004), Munda and Bosu Mullick (2003) overlooked the significance of the Muslim presence in this context.

In 1962, Jaipal Singh Munda along with Zahur Ali gave the slogan ‘Jolah–Kolah bhai bhai’ ²¹ (Ansari 1995). This was a political statement showcasing the unity of Adivasis and Moolvasi Muslims of whom more than 90 per cent were from weaving communities (Ansaris). However, Jaipal Singh Munda’s decision to merge JP with the Congress was not welcomed by most Muslim leaders. Iliyas Majid (2013) in his book titled Jharkhand Andolan aur Jharkhand Gomke Horo Saheb notes that Muslim leaders of JP continued their support to the N. E. Horo faction in 1963. On 12 March 1973, when under the leadership of Horo, the JP submitted its memorandum to the Prime Minister urging for the separate state of Jharkhand, he was accompanied by the central treasurer Mohd. Rafiq (Majid 2013).

The formation of the JP thus was a consequence of the realisation that Moolvasi Muslims, Adivasis and Christian Adivasis have been in a culturally symbiotic relationship that is manifested in the assertion of an ethno-regional identity. To remove Moolvasi Muslims from its historical accounts results in what Dotson (2011) calls ‘testimonial quieting’. Such eliminations are also crucial in shaping the collective memory/memories—precisely in constituting how Muslims would be (un)remembered.

V The gradual articulation of resistance

The presence of Muslims in the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha during its foundation is well documented by Ansari (1995). Muslims in the JMM were not only active members, they were found in the leadership role as well. Hussain Ansari (Santhal Pargana), Dr Saba Ahmed (Giridih) and Hasan Rizvi (Jamshedpur) became MLAs in consecutive elections while Prof. Abu Talib Ansari became the Secretary, Central Committee, JMM, during the late 1980s.

The active presence of Muslims and the efforts of the Congress to divide the Adivasi–Moolvasi unity (Munda and Keshari 1992) led to a ‘Buddhijibi Sammelan’ (Intellectuals’ Summit) during 06–07 May 1978 at Bethesda College, Ranchi. Abdul Qaym Abdali in his article titled ‘Alag Jharkhand Rajya Andolan Ke Majboot Stambh Rahe Musalman’ (Muslims have been a strong pillar for the movement for the separate state of Jharkhand) ²² argues that this meeting was arranged by a regional cultural periodical, Salpatra. Both Shibu Soren and N. E. Horo, the two major leaders of the main Jharkhandi outfits at that time attended the summit and called for a ‘Janvadi Dharmanirapekhsha Andolan’ ²³ . This call preceded the formation of the Jharkhand Samnvaya Samiti or the JCC in September 1987 under the presidentship of Ram Dayal Munda and B. P. Keshari. Abdali rightly argues, ‘This is not a movement of a specific religion or community; it is a struggle of all those who live in this region, who suffer colonial coercion and oppression. This is a movement for Jharkhand Nationality’. ²⁴ This mentality is what Mohd. Faizi, currently a garment seller and a former active Coordination Committee member of the JMM called the Jharkhandi manasikata (Jharkhandi mentality) that led him and thousands like him to invest their youth in the cause of separate statehood.

The formation of the AJSU on 22 June 1986 can be viewed as a turning point for both the movement and the participation of Muslims. While Prabhakar Tirkey became the president and Suraj Singh Besra was made the secretary of the organisation, several Muslim youth joined it holding significant political positions. Under the leadership of Prof. Khalik Ahmed, Nazm Ansari, Farooq Azam, Zubair Ahmed, Imran Ansari, Mohd. Faizi, to name a few, joined the AJSU at the very moment of foundation. AJSU’s formation was preceded by a sort of petition-based politics that was gradually becoming demotivating for the youth. As Zubair Ahmed, former CC member, JMM and former Town Secretary, AJSU, Ranchi (1987–89) and currently an egg-seller, put it, ‘The politics of JP and JMM lost momentum when the youth were no longer attracted to it. It was only with the formation of the AJSU that the youth started joining the movement in numbers’.

After becoming the Ranchi Town Secretary of AJSU, Zubair devoted his time to strengthening Adivasi–Moolvasi unity. In 1987, he worked for chatra samnvay (students’ unity) at the ward level to unite Adivasi, Hindu, Muslim, Sikh and Christian students under the umbrella of AJSU. For him the AJSU was like a guldasta (a bouquet of different flowers) which brought together people from different communities. AJSU’s slogan, ‘Hume Bhid Nahi, Bhidnewale Chahiye’ (We do not want the crowd, we want participants) reverberated among the youth. In reference to AJSU’s militant character, Zubair was very clear, ‘The earlier parties were submitting memorandums, petitions, calling dharnas [sit-in protests] but they were unable to force Delhi to look into their plight’. Their militancy was reflected in Zubair’s reference to a 72-hour Jharkhand Bandh in the late 1980s when even the Mohalla ka dukan (the neighbourhood shop) did not ‘dare’ to open. Police arrests and detentions were frequent but though Zubair never got arrested, he was detained more than 200 times during this period.

Inter-community solidarity was the major driving force of AJSU and the reason for its popularity among the youth. It was only after AJSU’s vociferous protests, rallies and bandhs that a new hope for statehood was kindled and consolidated. It resulted in the formation of the JCC that led to the CoJM (Munda and Keshari 1992). Evidently, to talk about the formation of AJSU and its effects on the demand and accord of statehood for Jharkhand without referring to the participation of Muslims and their leadership, is nothing less than ‘testimonial quieting’ (Dotson 2011) since it did not consider the voices of Muslims worthy of being published.

On the one hand, the AJSU was working toward becoming a centre of unity for different voices in the Jharkhand movement; on the other, the first Muslim political front of the movement was about to be formed. Majid (2013) notes the circumstances that led to the planning of the Jharkhand Muslim Front (JMF). In March 1988, there was a rally of the JP in Midnapore where Majid accompanied the JP supremo, N. E. Horo. The huge presence of Muslims in the meeting made Horo realise that the time had come for Muslims of Jharkhand to mobilise under an umbrella organisation. A meeting was held between N. E. Horo, Liaqat Ali, Joba Chowdhury and Ilyas Majid regarding this issue and Majid was given the responsibility to contact Muslims in the JP to come up with a Muslim front. After several rounds of discussions with the leaders and stakeholders, including Yasin Qasmi, Ram Dayal Munda, B. P. Keshari, Mohd. Moin Ansari, Mohd. Tako bhai, Javed Pasha, Mirza Ansari and Hakim Khan Warsi, a decision was reached to found the Jharkhand Muslim Front on 25 May 1988.

While placing the working paper and objectives of the Jharkhand Muslim Front, Ilyas Majid emphasised that despite the presence of Muslims in the movement for long, they were not given their political dues. Addressing the gathering he said, ‘Muslim utna hi chhipa hua hai, jitna Jharkhand Andolan ubhra hua hai’ (Muslims are eclipsed as much as the Jharkhand movement is made visible).

In reference to the indispensability of Muslims, JMF spokesperson noted that without the support of Muslims, the party could have never achieved the electoral victories in 1952 and 1957 consecutively. Since the birth of the JP (Horo faction) in 1963, there have been thousands of Muslims who invested their lives for the movement. Among them, Islamudiin Ansari from Orissa, Liaqat Ali, West Bengal, Shri Habibullah, Bihar, Dr Yasin Qasmi, Ranchi, Sri Warsi, Javed Pasha, Sri Mirza and Sri Eliyas Majid were notable figures. Citing the martyrdom of Marhoom Qutubuddin of Midnapore (JP member), JMF promised to not let his sacrifice go in vain.

While showing me the manifesto of JMF, Dr Majid pointed out the major issues that Muslims of the region were confronting. The foremost issue noted was regarding education. ‘Historical distortion and unawareness’, he continued, ‘made us forget our culture. Although Muslims in this region have similarities with their brethren in the other states, they have their unique regional identity’. The second hindrance for Muslims was the lack of infrastructure to promote the Urdu language. ‘Despite several promises, the Bihar Government until then did not act on their decision to make Urdu a second language. No other community in Jharkhand was as much affected as Muslims due to the absence of their language in the administrative sphere’, Majid said.

Recalling the days of mobilisation—with memories bringing on tears, Majid narrated, ‘Jharkhand humara Andolan hai, Jharkhand humara wajood se juda sawal hai’ ²⁵ . Whenever the existence of Muslims in the movement is not spoken of, Majid feels that justice is not done. The motive of the JMF was to both strengthen the Jharkhand Movement and make the Jharkhandi Muslims visible.

The JMF working paper also addressed the issues of lack of presence of Muslims in the decision-making bodies of the Jharkhand parties. Majid’s statement makes it clear that they were well aware of the fact that their presence was being undermined. Even after holding significant positions in different political outfits, they were not given adequate importance in decision-making.

While the JMF was gaining ground, another organisation which had participated in huge numbers in the movement, the Jharkhand Quami Tehrique (JQT), made its appearance. Prabhakar Tirkey, Founder President of AJSU in his article in Prabhat Khabar titled, ‘Jharkhandi Pehchaan ke Liye Sanjida Rahe Musalman’ (Muslims have always been vocal about Jharkhandi identity) ²⁶ talked about its formation and significance. In his article he clearly mentioned that though there has been huge participation by Muslims in the Jharkhand Andolan, efforts have been made to eliminate them from the pages of history. The JQT was founded on 23 July 1989 at Ranchi University Sabha Hall as the Muslim political wing of AJSU. They had sent their memorandum to the JCC through Ram Dayal Munda on 23 November 1989 and made several demands. They categorically made the following demands (Ali ²⁷ ; Tirkey ²⁸ ):

Jharkhand will be a secular state where there will be no discrimination against minorities.

Tirkey also points out that JQT was supported by National-level Muslim leader like Syed Shahabuddin. ²⁹ In words of Tirkey,

Muslims under the leadership of JQT were ready to even sacrifice their lives. I can recall in Chaibasa’s Pillai Hall there was a seminar organized by Nazm Ansari, Izaz Ahmed, Mohd. Ziqrul, Samiullah Ansari, Iqbal Khan. It gave a call to all Muslims to join the struggle and consequently most of the Muslim organizations agreed to support the statehood struggle. ³⁰ (translation mine)

Their demands spoke to the anxiety of Moolvasi Muslims of being excluded from the fruits of the newly proposed state. On one hand, there were demands for equal status as Adivasi, on the other there were concerns about losing their religious identity and hence the demands for a Minority Commission, Haj Committee and Waqf board. The mainstream literature on the Jharkhand movement neither mentioned the presence of JQT leaders, nor did it elaborate on their demands and their legitimacy.

Xalxo (2003), while writing about the achievements of JMM between 1973–2000, mentioned all the non-Adivasi communities except Muslims. In his words:

Apart from the Santhals, there was also the involvement of non-Adivasi belonging to Mandai, Kudmi Mahto and scheduled caste communities. Kudmi Mahto alliance with the Santhals gave the movement an extra dimension…. The Santhals of Hazaribagh, Gridih and Dhanbad formed a common front…the movement became broad based covering a major territory inhabited by the Santhals in the Jharkhand region of Bihar. The coming in of non-tribals into the movement strengthened the demand for a territorial identity resting on both tribal and non-tribal identities. It was likely to change the character of the Jharkhand movement and sustained by the tribals. (Xalxo 2003: 1095)

Here one detects a rather deliberate omission of the Muslim contribution. Such instances were so rife that Mohd. Faizi’s reasons for why a separate Muslim organisation was necessary demands to be heard:

We know the role that Muslims played in attaining Indian Independence. Even after that today Muslims are called ‘Gaddar’ ³¹ . Our histories have been deliberately eliminated. If we don’t create our own identity in this statehood struggle, people in the coming days will definitely say that we had no role in the movement. We apprehended that at a very early stage. ³²

This is why Faizi said, ‘We kept the documents as evidence to prove that Muslims played no less a role than any other community in this movement; we made barabar ki qurbani [equivalent sacrifices] like other communities’. Referring to shahadat (martyrdom) of several Muslim leaders who died for the movement including Abdul Wahab Ansari, Qutubuddin Ansari, Murtuza Ansari, Mohd Zubair, Mohd Sayeed and Ashraf Khan, he implied, ‘It must be written in pages of history. People must know what Muslims have done for the attainment of a separate state’.

This fear of cultural elimination actually drove the Jharkhandi Muslims to come up with their own organisations. It was in early 1995 that the decision regarding the formation of Jharkhand Area Autonomous Council (JAAC) was taken. It was then that Muslims of different Jharkhand parties came together to plan the formation of a specifically Jharkhandi Muslim platform that would talk about the conditions of Muslims and would ensure the constitutional rights of the community in the newly proposed state.

During this period, Qazi Mujahidul Islam, a Muslim scholar-cum-leader from Bihar was about to come to Ranchi. Hussain Qasim Kacchi, who used to be a keen patron of the movement, asked Mohd. Faizi and his friends to meet Qazi Mujahidul. They planned a seminar on 11 June 1995 at Anjuman Plaza Hall, Ranchi Main Road to welcome Qazi Mujahidul. As there was no proper Muslim front in existence here, they decided to use the banner of Qazi Mujahidul’s organisation—the All India Milli Council (AIMC).

In Faizi’s words, ‘The banner did not matter to us, we had to do something to bring Jharkhandi Muslims together’. The title of the seminar was ‘Jharkhand Andolan aur Musalman’ (Jharkhand Movement and Muslims). Qazi Sahab while was the chief guest at the seminar, Prof. Abu Talib Ansari presided over it. It was for the first time in the history of the Jharkhand Andolan that discussions happened in a public forum on the participation of Muslims. Qazi Mujahidul Islam referred to the anti-racist movement in South Africa where Muslims stood by the coloured people. This anecdote further worked as a spark as it not only echoes the ideals of Jharkhandi Muslims, but speaks directly to the fundamental tenets of Islam that command its followers to join hands with the oppressed people of the world. He also called for an umbrella organisation that would accommodate all Jharkhandi Muslims.

Following Qazi Mujahidul’s advice, Muslim leaders of different Jharkhandi Parties called for a meeting on 27 June 1995 at Mohd. Faizi’s place. Around 252 representatives of different panchayats, social organisations and political parties attended the meeting and formed the Jharkhand Milli Council (JMC). According to reports in Prabhat Khabar (28 June 1995) ³⁴ , most leaders agreed that despite the huge presence of Muslims in different Jharkhandi parties, they were not given due importance in decision-making amounting to a political silencing of the Jharkhandi Muslims. So, the major objectives of the JMC were to gain the recognition of Jharkhandi Muslim identity along with claiming their legitimate political, economic, social and educational rights.

As I mentioned earlier, one of the final stages in the foundation of Jharkhand state was the formation of the JAAC under the chairmanship of Shibu Soren. The almost negligible representations of Muslims in the JAAC validated their fears of elimination. Protesting against the deliberate omissions of both Muslims and their causes, Prof. Abu Talib Ansari wrote a press release on 09 August 1995. ³⁵ This release, however, could not see the light of day as Mohd. Faizi and other comrades restrained him from sending it to the press. According to Faizi, this declaration would have been considered tantamount to Prof. Ansari’s resignation from the JAAC leaving it without even one member in the Council to voice the concerns of the Muslims. In the press release, what was stated was the acute disgruntlement of Jharkhandi Muslims regarding the formation of the JAAC. Prof. Ansari (then the Central Committee Secretary, JMM and Chief of Presidential Council, JMC) in the release said, ‘JAAC has played with the emotions of Jharkhandi Muslims by not giving them proportionate representation but there are a few people in the Council who never even held the party flag’.

Contending that the Muslim leaders of JMM are not ‘kisi ka bandhua mazdoor’ (someone’s bonded labourers), he continued:

Jharkhand is nobody’s paternal property. There are leaders in JMM who have used the slogans of secularism to undermine the cause of Muslims. JAAC is the by-product of the martyrdom of leaders like Ashraf Khan, Wahab Ansari, Zubair Ahmed, Mohd. Sayeed and Qutubuddin. These ‘shahadat’ (martyrs) should not be forgotten if an inclusive Jharkhand state is to be imagined.

Though there were references to Silk, Animal Husbandry and other Departments in the JAAC Bill, there was no mention of Muslims. He noted, ‘Yahan pe Muslim naam ka janwar ka koi zikr nahin hai’ (There is no mention of an animal called Muslim here). Prof. Ansari categorically warned that if the Minority Welfare and Development Council, Minority Commission, Waqf Board, Haj Committee, Madrassa Board, Urdu Academy and the implementation of the 15-point program are not considered in the Council, there would be a parallel movement by Jharkhandi Muslims across the territories of JAAC. The lack of representation of Muslims in JAAC actually showed how Muslims had been sidelined during the movement as well. The unequal power of historical narrative production made Muslims less visible in JP, JMM, AJSU, JCC or JAAC. The realisation that they would be excluded from the historical accounts made them maintain documents necessary to show posterity that the Muslims were never silent in the Andolan.

While JMC’s movements, processions and meetings across the territory of the proposed state continued vigorously, the major step of claiming the separate identity of Jharkhandi Muslims came on 24 October 1998 when the party leaders reached Delhi to submit a petition to the then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. They submitted a petition highlighting their demands which included that Moolvasi Muslims of Jharkhand must be given Adivasi status and rights as available in Lakshadweep (As per Article 342 of Indian Constitution); Urdu must be retained as the second language of the state, minority welfare commissions should be formed and that Jharkhand should be free from the coercion of non-Jharkhandis.

VI Conclusion

Analysing the participation and engagement of Muslims in the Jharkhand Andolan, it becomes quite clear that the mainstream literature in several ways silenced their voices. Echoing Trouillot (1990, 1995, 1997), we can see how in the whole process Muslim voices had been suppressed through the various stages of production of history/histories—from fact creation to retrieval.

The literature on the Jharkhand Movement that focussed on the early days of organisations and emphasised on the Chotanagpur Unnati Samaj and its activities certainly maintained absolute silence on Asmat Ali and other Muslim leaders, who, during the same time, were equally vocal about the necessity of a separate state. The presence of Muslims in the Chotanagpur Separation League, that also submitted a memorandum to the Simon Commission, was not mentioned in most of the accounts. The Momin Conference in Jharkhand and its support for the statehood movement was scarcely recorded. The notable victory of R. Ali against the Muslim League candidate in the 1937 Assembly Elections, the Momin Conference’s resolution of separate statehood which was passed in the 1936 conference and its call to Adivasis to disassociate themselves from Jaipal Singh Munda on the ground of his alleged support from the Muslim League played a huge role in the Adivasi Mahasabha’s transition to the JP.

The ideological shift toward a broader ethno-regional identity was not possible without the visible presence of Muslims in the movement. Jaipal Singh Munda knew it as well. Majid (2013) maintains that without the support of Muslims, achieving statehood for Jharkhand would have been an impossible task. One should have interrogated the significance of ‘Jolah–Kolah bhai bhai’ slogan in a context when Muslims were excluded from leadership positions in the region.

It was in the late 1980s that Muslims grasped that their presence in the JP was being undermined. While the Jharkhand Quami Tehrique submitted its petition through Ram Dayal Munda to the JCC, it was somehow sidelined in his writings. During the JAAC’s formation, through the press release of Prof. Abu Talib Ansari, it was becoming apparent that the actors within the JAAC were subduing Muslim voices. When we talk about the JCC, we barely know that there were Muslim organisations submitting their demands to the united committee since this news was scarcely reported.

Discrimination against Muslims within the movement through their lack of representation, denial of decision-making powers to their leadership coupled with the omissions by researchers and journalists made the Muslims invisible in accounts of the Jharkhand Andolan. It was only by delving deep into the vernacular and personal archives that it was possible to visibilise the network of information (Burgher 2019) pertaining to the Muslim contribution to the Jharkhand Andolan and counter this epistemic violence perpetrated against the Muslims of Jharkhand. The forging of Muslim organisations, then, has to be seen as acts of the gradual articulation of resistance to their continued silencing.