Autonomy,Respect,and Arrogance in the Danish Cartoon Controversy

John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Charles Larmore, The Autonomy of Morality (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), chap. 6.

William A. Galston , Liberal Pluralism: The Implications of Value Pluralism for Political Theory and Practice (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), chap. 2.

Chandran Kukathas , "Are There Any Cultural Rights?" in The Rights of Minority Cultures, ed. Will Kymlicka ( New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 228-56, 242.

For overviews of the place of autonomy within liberalism, see Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 229ff.; Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Ethics of Identity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 36ff.; John Christman and Joel Anderson, eds., Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism: New Essays (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

When I speak of "Kantian" and "Millian" conceptions of autonomy, the understanding of these conceptions is not intended to represent the considered views of either Mill or Kant. The labels are used as a convenient way of referring to ideas that are often associated with Kant and Mill, respectively. However, while the two conceptions of autonomy do not necessarily represent the understandings of autonomy that the two philosophers would subscribe to, they are Kantian and Millian in the sense that they are present in their writings. For these two different uses of "Kantian," see Robert S. Taylor, "Kantian Personal Autonomy," Political Theory 33, no. 5 (October 2005): 602-28, 603.

The article applies a number of moral notions such as autonomy, respect, and arrogance to a concrete case, why it might be called an exercise in applied ethics. It is important to emphasize that such an exercise by no means is a matter of simple deduction giving clear-cut answers based on abstract principles applied to an unproblematic case. Cf. Anna Elisabetta Galeotti, "Relativism, Universalism, and Applied Ethics: The Case of Female Circumcision," Constellations 14, no. 1 (2007): 91-111, 105.

Avner de-Shalit , Power to the People: Teaching Political Philosophy in Skeptical Times ( Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006 ), 6.

It will be noted that I write that "some" and not "all" religious feelings should be respected based on a commitment to Kantian autonomy. In public deliberation, which is my focus, it would give religious groups an improper veto over what counts as wrongful expression if all religious feelings without qualification should be heeded. Rather, the argument is that the principle of autonomy properly understood requires that everyone, speakers and listeners, be respected as capable of contributing insights into determining what constitutes the proper limits of public deliberation. This procedural and democratic approach, of course, relies on substantive moral commitments, and these are the basis for condemning the arrogance of the defenders of the cartoons who-as we shall see-did not respect Muslims’ ability to contribute to public deliberation over the limits of freedom of expression. These moral commitments equally imply the wrongfulness of heeding the claims of listeners who demand the right to unilaterally determine the limits of freedom of expression and its proper use.

Flemming Rose, "Muhammeds ansigt" [The face of Muhammad], Jyllands-Posten, September 30, 2005, my translation.

On the different frames in the Danish news coverage of the controversy, see Peter Hervik and Clarissa Berg, "Denmark: A Political Struggle in Danish Journalism," in Reading the Mohammed Cartoons Controversy: An International Analysis of Press Discourses on Free Speech and Political Spin, ed. Risto Kunelius, et al. (Bochum, Germany: Projekt Verlag, 2007), 25-39.

Editorial, "Truslen fra mørket" [The threat from the dark], Jyllands-Posten, September 30, 2005, my translation.

On Rasmussen’s refusal to meet the ambassadors, see Klaus and Michael Rothstein , Bomben i turbanen [The bomb in the turban] (Copenhagen : Tiderne Skifter, 2006), 32ff.

Quoted from Pernille Ammitzbøll and Vidino Lorenzo , "After the Danish Cartoon Controversy," Middle East Quarterly 14, no. 1 (2007): 3-11.

John Hansen, "Jyllands-Posten havde ret til at bringe de tegninger-punktum" [Jyllands-Posten had a right to publish those cartoons-period], interview with Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Jyllands-Posten, October 1, 2006, my translation.

Karen Jespersen, "Islam har brug for en oplysningstid" [Islam needs enlightenment], Berlingske Tidende, February 4, 2006, my translation.

Karen Jespersen and Ralf Pittelkow, Islamister og naivister-et anklageskrift [Islamists and naivists-an indictment] (Copenhagen: People’s Press, 2006), 25, my translation. The authors of this book are, respectively, a former cabinet minister, also cited above, and a commentator at Jyllands-Posten.

William A. Galston , "Two Concepts of Liberalism," Ethics 105, no. 3 (April 1995): 516-34.

Anders Jerichow and Mille Rode , eds., Profet-affæren: Et PEN-dossier om 12 Muhammed-tegninger-og hvad der siden hændte [The Prophet Affair: A PEN dossier about 12 Muhammad cartoons-and what followed] (Danish PEN, n.d.), 35ff.

Galston, Liberal Pluralism, 21.

See Ulf Hedetoft, "Denmark’s Cartoon Blowback," openDemocracy, March 1, 2006, http://www.opendemocracy.net/faith-europe_islam/blowback_3315.jsp (accessed March 18, 2008).

Jyllands-Posten is Denmark’s largest newspaper and is ideologically close to the current government. The newspaper’s anti-immigrant and anti-Islam position is widely shared in the Danish population, as indicated both by the widespread support for the government’s restrictive immigration policies and in public discourse. See Jørgen Goul Andersen, et al., eds., Det nye politiske landskab: Folketingsvalget 2005 i perspektiv [The new political landscape: Perspectives on the 2005 parliamentary election] (Århus, Denmark: Academia, 2007).

Susan J. Brison , "The Autonomy Defense of Free Speech," Ethics 108, no. 2 (January 1998): 312-39, 312ff.

I here use the distinction between concept and conception, according to which the concept refers to the overall idea or the core meaning, and conceptions are rival ways of understanding, applying, and/or specifying the concept. See W. B. Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56 (1955-56): 167-98; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1999), 5.

T.M. Scanlon , "A Theory of Freedom of Expression," in The Difficulty of Tolerance: Essays in Political Philosophy ( Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 6-25.

Ibid., 15.

C. Edwin Baker, for example, justifies freedom of expression with reference to its role in fostering self-realization and self-determination. See his Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1989), 5, 59.

See Daniel Jacobson, "Mill on Liberty, Speech, and the Free Society," Philosophy and Public Affairs 29 (2000): 276-309, 294ff.

Joshua Cohen has criticized theories that justify freedom of expression on the basis of autonomy for being sectarian. See his "Freedom of Expression," Philosophy and Public Affairs 22, no. 3 (1993): 207-63, 221ff.

Joseph H. Carens, "Free Speech and Democratic Norms in the Danish Cartoons Controversy," International Migration 44, no. 5 (2006): 33-42; Christian F. Rostbøll, "Ytringsfrihed, respekt og ansvar" [Freedom of expression, respect, and responsibility], Tidsskriftet Politik 10, no. 4 (2007): 76-85; Ole Wæver, "Aviser og religioner i en globaliseret verden" [Newspapers and religions in a globalized world], in Gudebilleder-Ytringsfrihed og religion i en globaliseret verden [Images of God: Freedom of expression and religion in a globalized world], ed. Lisbet Christoffersen (Copenhagen: Tiderne Skifter, 2006), 181-208.

Below, I argue that listeners do not have a veto regarding what counts as disrespectful expression.

Later, I argue that this constraint can be grounded in the Kantian conception of autonomy, and thus autonomy as a character ideal should not be abandoned but must be constrained by this other conception of autonomy.

Flemming Rose, "Why I Published Those Cartoons," Washington Post, February 19, 2006.

It may be asked whether Jyllands-Posten and its defenders were committed to any principles at all or paid only lip service to "Enlightenment values" while they were in fact promoting a nationalist project. If that is the case, it is interesting to note how well autonomy as a character ideal serves the latter project. One can also question whether autonomy as a character ideal is an "Enlightenment value." However, my aim is not to enter an argument about how best to understand the Enlightenment but only to engage those who talk about autonomy as an Enlightenment value and who by autonomy seems to refer to something like the character ideal I have been discussing.

Below, I consider the objection that "as long as the means serves the end" is a sufficient moral constraint.

When I say that all human beings are presumed to possess autonomy, this should be understood as an absolute that implies that no one can altogether forfeit respect as an autonomous human being. I think the same holds for Kant: "Kant typically treats autonomy as an all-or-nothing trait that grounds a basic respect due to all human beings, as opposed to a variable respect earned only by the most conscientious." Thomas E. Hill, Jr., "The Kantian Conception of Autonomy," in Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant’s Moral Theory (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 76-96, 79; also see Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Respect, Pluralism, and Justice: Kantian Perspectives (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 91ff., 108. However, while Kantian autonomy sets an absolute limit on how we can treat others, it is not an absolute in the sense that it implies that one cannot further develop autonomy and approximate some ideal of the rational, independent, and reflective person. Moreover, I do not think we can reduce the Kantian notion to a universal capacity for autonomy since for practical purposes we are required to presume others not merely to be able to develop autonomy but to treat others as always already autonomous beings who can contribute reasons of their own regarding what is right and wrong, valuable and not. It is my hope that my analysis of the cartoon controversy and the discussion below can show the practical importance of this distinction.

See David A. J. Richards, Free Speech and the Politics of Identity (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999); Rostbøll, "Ytringsfrihed, respekt og ansvar."

Immanuel Kant , Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. Mary Gregor (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 37, Ak.4:428.

Immanuel Kant , The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. and ed. Mary Gregor (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 186, Ak.6:434-35.

Also see Hill, Respect, Pluralism, and Justice, 70-72; Rawls, Political Liberalism, 19ff., 81ff.

Stephen Darwall, "Two Kinds of Respect," Ethics 88 (1977): 36-49; Darwall, The Second-person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 122ff.

Darwall, The Second-person Standpoint, 123.

Ibid., 120.

Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 199, Ak. 6:449.

Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 39-42, Ak. 4:431-34.

Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 187, Ak. 6:435.

Darwall, The Second-person Standpoint, 136.

I am grateful to Peter Jones for this way of putting the point.

Some defenders of the cartoons would reply that the cartoons were criticisms of specific beliefs, for example, of the belief in religiously justified terrorism. However, the justification of the cartoons was not primarily that one should be free to mock specific (erroneous and dangerous) beliefs but that one can mock whomever and whatever one wishes no matter the purpose of doing so. It is the latter point I reject. It moves too swiftly from the principle that no beliefs should be held free of criticism to the idea that one can say or publish anything in any context. Cf. Carens, "Free Speech and Democratic Norms in the Danish Cartoons Controversy," 36ff.

Hill, Respect, Pluralism, and Justice, 84.

See Peter Jones, "Respecting Beliefs and Rebuking Rushdie," British Journal of Political Science 20, no. 4 (October 1990): 415-37, 429.

Phillipe Val, the editor of the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, which was brought to court for publishing the cartoons, thus said it was "racist" to claim that all Muslims were hurt by the cartoons because this assumed that they are "not smart enough to understand cartoons." See Jørgen Ullerup, "Muhammed-krig i retslokalet" [Muhammad war in the court room], Jyllands-Posten, February 8, 2007, my translation.

Jespersen and Pittelkow, Islamister og naivister, 178, my translation.

As Anna Elisabetta Galeotti notes, "Universalists who do not acknowledge the implications of the application of their principles can be both particularistic and dogmatic: particularistic because their views embody particular interpretations, and dogmatic because obscuring such interpretations places them beyond critical scrutiny." See "Relativism, Universalism, and Applied Ethics," 106.

I pursue this line of argument further in Christian F. Rostbøll, "The Use and Abuse of ‘Universal Values’ in the Danish Cartoon Controversy" (paper, American Political Science Association annual meeting, Boston, August 28-31, 2008).

Robert Post , "Religion and Freedom of Speech: Portraits of Muhammad," Constellations 14, no. 1 (2007): 72-90, 81.

Immanuel Kant, "An Answer to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?’" in Kant: Political Writings, 2nd ed., ed. Hans Reis (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 54-60, 57. Kant actually does not use the term autonomy in this connection.

Also see note 35 above.

Gerald F. Gaus , "The Place of Autonomy within Liberalism," in Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism: New Essays, ed. John Christman and Joel Anderson (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 272-306, 297-99.

Appiah, The Ethics of Identity, 37.

Pamela Johnston Conover, Donald D. Searing, and Ivor M. Crewe, "The Deliberative Potential of Political Discussion," British Journal of Political Science 32, no. 1 (2002): 21-62, 55.

For strong and weak conceptions of autonomy, see Appiah, The Ethics of Identity, 36ff.

Rainer Forst , "A Critical Theory of Multicultural Toleration ," in Multiculturalism and Political Theory, ed. Anthony Simon Laden and David Owen (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 292-311, 302ff.

On the point that freedom of expression should not be "placed at the mercy of others’ willingness to react in violent and disorderly ways," see Jones, "Respecting Beliefs and Rebuking Rushdie," 435.

Also see Christian F. Rostbøll, "Freedom of Expression, Deliberation, Autonomy, and Respect," European Journal of Political Theory (forthcoming).

Post, "Religion and Freedom of Speech," 76ff. Post is concerned with legal limits on freedom of expression, but this point is relevant in relation to self-restraint as well.