Abstract
In Pragmatist Egalitarianism, David Rondel presents a provocative analysis of the relationship between pragmatist political philosophy and the concept of egalitarianism. In doing so, he makes important contributions to various topics in contemporary political philosophy: he offers some original insights into the complex debates over egalitarianism, he provides creative interpretations of some of the most important pragmatists of the twentieth century, and he thoughtfully develops and defends an alternative conception of egalitarianism that is grounded in these interpretations. While you may find his pragmatist conception ultimately unpersuasive, you will still reap considerable benefits from reading his book. I strongly recommend that you do so.
As with any area of political philosophy, pragmatists disagree, even about the basic tenets of their philosophy. Rondel embraces a particular strain of pragmatism “which shifts focus away from truth and certainty . . . [a]nd turns its attention instead to questions that arise about how to responsibly inhabit and navigate a world in which uncertainty, contingency, unpredictability, and sometimes vicious disagreement are the central features” (3). He distinguishes this strain from that of those who, in the words of Cheryl Misak, “take pragmatism to promise an account of truth that preserves our aspiration to getting things right” (Misak 2013, 3). Rondel argues that this distinction has important implications for assessing how pragmatism addresses issues of equality and justice.
Rondel’s pragmatism is grounded in the basic idea that philosophical inquiry is always motivated by the real-world problems that we confront in social life. Problems challenge our settled beliefs and cause us to think anew about what we think and believe. Such a problem-centered focus for political inquiry recommends a realist approach to questions of equality and inequality. Rondel’s approach is historicist in orientation. It rejects arguments based on “ideal-theoretical” first principles and questions the value of traditional conceptual analysis. He argues instead that “if equality is indeed something worth caring about, if it really does pick out an important moral and political value, we will not understand how or why that is so by attending only to the concept itself. On the pragmatist/realist view I defend, we will do better by interpreting equality in a looser and non-arithmetical way, by remaining cognizant of its genealogy and history, and by always keeping an eye on the real world struggles carried out in its name” (11).
And, on this account, the normative task will be different. Rondel notes that many contemporary political theorists who identify as pragmatists have sought to derive conceptions of egalitarian justice from their pragmatist premises. They seek to get the moral questions “right,” in the sense that there is one uniquely correct answer to questions of justice. This is clearly not Rondel’s goal. He argues instead that pragmatism is especially well suited to make a different, and more important, contribution to contemporary debates. As he argues throughout the book, pragmatism has always been characterized by a reconciliatory tone when it comes to philosophical debates. And Rondel thinks that this reconciliatory tendency will allow him to clarify and diminish the significance of many of the ongoing conflicts that characterize egalitarian philosophy. He does not want nor does he try to produce a pragmatist defense of egalitarianism. His goal is not to persuade us that equality is an important moral and political value. Rather it is to persuade us to rethink the implications of holding equality as such a value. In doing so, he wants to persuade us that a pragmatist approach will better aid us in enhancing the egalitarian nature of social life.
Rondel begins his substantive argument with a compelling critique of the present state of the debate over egalitarianism in contemporary political philosophy. He initially presents the debate as a dispute “between those who regard equality as a fundamentally distributive ideal and those who regard it as a “moral ideal governing the relations in which people stand to one another” (1). He analyzes these different conceptions of equality in terms of the primary relationship that characterizes them: “the “vertical” relationship between state and citizen, on the one hand, and the “horizontal” relationship between or among the people of a society on the other” (24). For Rondel, vertical egalitarianism is associated with distributive concerns while horizontal egalitarianism is associated with relational ones.
Rondel highlights the fact that advocates of these two conceptions ask different questions about equality. Vertical egalitarians ask “whether political and legal institutions treat all citizens with equal concern and respect” (62). Horizontal egalitarians ask whether the extra-juridical nature of social relationships instantiate equality. Their primary disagreements center around which of these questions gets to the heart of the problem of inequality. Both sides of the debate believe that they have identified the fundamental idea about equality and that the concerns of the other side are merely “derivative or epiphenomenal.” (63) Rondel rejects this dichotomy and argues that we should be thinking simultaneously about both sets of questions. And in doing so “we should reject the central premises upon which such disagreement turns: that equality is a single idea, that it has a fundamental locus, and that there is a singular or primary route to the achievement of a genuinely egalitarian society” (63).
Rondel advocates a pluralistic approach to the analysis of equality and inequality. He emphasizes that we are better served by treating equality as a “plurality of closely related phenomena” (74). Once we acknowledge this plurality, we will realize that the problems of inequality are too complex to be resolved by traditional theories of equality derived from ideal first principles. And, thus, the pursuit of progress in resolving problems of inequality is stymied by the continuous disagreement in contemporary debates. Rondel argues that this complexity calls for an alternative approach, a pragmatist approach that will “ask different questions, consider the new arguments, entertain new positions, and propose new experiments. This means giving up on the determinacy, conclusiveness, and normative precision political philosophers have usually sought, and proceeding instead in a heterogeneous and experimentally open-minded manner” (74).
Rondel sets out the general contours of such an approach in the second half of the book through his interpretations of the philosophies of three of American pragmatism’s leading scholars—John Dewey, William James, and Richard Rorty. These three theorists represent different dimensions of the complex pragmatist conception of equality. Through Rondel’s careful analyses, he highlights the ways in which each author gives priority to one of the three “interrelated and mutually reinforcing variables” that constitute his pragmatist alternative. The institutional variable, as characterized by Dewey, addresses the egalitarian implications of the formal and informal institutions in a society. These include the political constitution as well as the primary forms of social and economic arrangements. The personal variable, as characterized by James, focuses on the egalitarian implications of our private individual selves, including our beliefs and habits. The cultural variable, as characterized by Rorty, emphasizes the egalitarian implications of “social meaning and culture” (75).
In these three interpretations, Rondel makes a persuasive case for why each of these variables captures an important aspect of our concerns about equality. He further argues that each is essential but none is sufficient to adequately address problems of inequality. Invoking Donald Davidson’s idea of triangulation, he explains that we cannot single out one of these variables without at least implicitly invoking the other two.
With this framework in mind, Rondel goes on to explain how a pragmatist approach will address these complex interrelationships. He reminds us that the task is not one of deriving a single neat and precise principle that will adequately resolve the complicated dynamic of inequality. Rather, it is to accept the complexity and to focus on the day-to-day problems of inequality that we encounter. For Rondel, this is the reality of the human predicament: “of muddling along, trying to figure out solutions to our problems, into more generally trying to improve the conditions we find ourselves having to live in. For pragmatists, every day cumulative human experience is the only guide and the only tribunal. But it is guide and tribunal enough” (80). This approach recommends that we adopt a mindset of experimentation, generating possible reforms that can be tested to see if they make our present conditions less unequal. This is how pragmatist experimentalism is associated with what Rondel advocates as a future-oriented melioristic humanism: “we actively test and experiment, not to get things right once and for all, but to come up with something better” (81).
Rondel believes that his brand of pragmatist egalitarianism does a better job of helping us to understand the implications of inequality. And that it will lead to more productive ways of diminishing the effects of inequality in modern society. By adopting his pluralistic conception, we must be prepared to “accept that institutions, individuals, and culture work together in mysterious ways, that the quest for society of equals has no fundamental center” (169). But he does not see this acceptance of complexity and uncertainty as a flaw in his account but rather as an opportunity to rethink many of the seemingly irresolvable debates in contemporary political philosophy. Like many other pragmatists, Rondel has concluded that we will not make progress in our pursuit of values like equality as long as we remain engaged in “unnecessary” debates in pursuit of answers grounded in “abstract principles or timeless moral axioms” (203). He argues that we will do better by engaging “in the real world struggles carried out in equality’s name” (203).
Rondel’s argument is quite impressive in both its breadth of understanding of a large and diverse literature and in its creative assessment and critique of the dominant arguments in the field. As I said, he makes a compelling case that many of the debates that occupy the contemporary philosophical agenda seem to obstruct progress in the pursuit of greater equality in society. And his advancement of a pragmatist alternative offers an approach that seems to me to be worthy of serious consideration. But, in the end, how should we best assess it? Here Rondel offers his own answer: “The success or failure of what I offer should ultimately be decided against a “meliorist” benchmark: on grounds of usefulness and convenience for dealing with some of the problems we’ve been exploring in this book” (83).
If we accept Rondel’s own recommendation, we must admit that it will take time to determine the ultimate success of his efforts. As a pragmatist myself, I can say that I see much in this analysis that promises to be a useful tool for the future pursuit of egalitarianism. But I can imagine that non-pragmatists will come at this book with greater skepticism, especially to the extent that Rondel explicitly rejects the request that he take a substantive position on many of the main disagreements in the field. This is a common criticism of pragmatism but, as Rondel deftly argues, it is, in many ways, beside the point.
What is not beside the point of course is the obligation, which Rondel explicitly embraces, to explain as best as he can why his alternative approach will usefully advance our understanding of inequality and our pursuit of equality. He makes considerable progress in this effort. One thing that I think would enhance his case is a fuller account of how experimentalist problem solving would work as a social process. While Rondel effectively advocates for the view that philosophers would be better served by conceptualizing egalitarianism from a realist and experimental perspective, he does not say much about how we should implement this as a collective. I suspect that pragmatists and non-pragmatists alike would like to know more of his thoughts on this and it might be helpful in persuading some skeptics, especially non-pragmatists.
This suggestion is related to a more general concern I have about contemporary political philosophy. Issues of implementation are often seen as beyond the purview of political philosophers. I question those who make this claim. At the very least, I believe that pragmatist political philosophers, by the very nature of their arguments, must necessarily accept questions of implementation as part of their agenda. In pursuing a pragmatist political agenda, we must make answers to such questions part of the basic case as we seek to instantiate ideas like those that Rondel so intelligently encourages us to embrace.