Abstract
Rawlsianism has faced increasing challenges in recent years. One criticism is that it does not provide adequate resources to address pressing injustices in the non-ideal world. 1 Some theorists even argue that Rawls’s theory is difficult to apply in the present because it assumes an ideology of social liberalism that was prevalent after WWII but collapsed during the 1970s. 2 One response is to demonstrate how Rawlsianism can help address urgent issues we face today. This is precisely the goal of two recently published books: Gabriele Badano and Alasia Nuti’s Politicizing Political Liberalism and Alexandre Lefebvre’s Liberalism as a Way of Life. 3
A common feature of these two books is that the authors take non-ideal political contexts seriously and explore the implications of Rawlsianism within these contexts. Badano and Nuti argue that Rawlsians should not merely consider how a government and citizens should act in an ideal well-ordered society. Rather, they should also explore the requirements of justice in “minimally liberal societies,” which are “societies that have (at least by and large) protected civil and political liberties for a prolonged period but fall short of well-ordered society” (30). Similarly, Lefebvre discusses how people should act in liberaldom, a term adapted from theologian Soren Kierkegaard’s idea of Christendom. Liberaldom means “a world, such as our own, where liberal values are publicly and personally professed, yet that is manifestly illiberal in so many ways (that is, unfree, unfair, and ungenerous)” (104). Kierkegaard uses Christendom to describe a society where many profess Christianity but are, in fact, drawn to pleasure and indulgence. A true Christian, therefore, should exemplify the Christian way of living and how it can be achieved. Accordingly, Lefebvre believes that many liberal democratic societies today are “liberaldom.” They apparently uphold values like freedom and equality but are tainted by populism, materialism, racism, and patriarchy (117). Lefebvre aims to show how a true liberal should live in such a non-ideal world.
The two books are also complementary. Badano and Nuti focus on how Rawlsians should respond to changes in the external political landscape. With the rise of right-wing populism in the United States and Europe, more and more citizens are becoming skeptical of liberal democracy and turning toward authoritarianism. 4 How should Rawlsians counter this trend and persuade more people to support liberal democracy? Lefebvre, by contrast, examines how Rawlsians should cultivate their character internally and restore their faith in liberalism. Given the current challenges faced by liberals, they inevitably have to invest significant time and energy in campaigning, political debates, and convincing others to defend liberal democracy. This can be exhausting, leading many liberals to question their commitment: What is the point of being a liberal? Why should they do this? How can they persist? These external challenges and internal doubts are issues many Rawlsians face today. Together, Lefebvre and Badano and Nuti’s books offer a timely response to these pressing problems, illustrating that Rawlsianism remains highly relevant to our political lives today.
In what follows, I will explain Badano and Nuti’s solution to addressing right-wing populism before introducing Lefebvre’s account of liberalism as a good way of life and of spiritual practices that help individuals cultivate and sustain a liberal character. I will conclude by raising an issue that has not been covered in these two books—namely, how Rawlsians should live in authoritarian states.
In Political Liberalism, Rawls offers a political theory that explains how citizens, despite their disagreements on metaphysical and ethical issues, agree on some basic political values, such as freedom, equality, and fairness. 5 These political values demonstrate how liberal democracy can be publicly justifiable among “reasonable citizens.” However, Rawls acknowledges that there will inevitably be “unreasonable citizens” who reject these fundamental political values and, consequently, oppose liberal democracy. How should unreasonable citizens be addressed to reduce the threat they pose to liberal democracy? In the past, Rawlsians showed relatively little interest in this question. Burton Dreben’s response is particularly notable: “[W]hat do you say to Adolf Hitler? The answer is [nothing]. You shoot him. You do not try to reason with him.” 6 However, in recent years, right-wing populism has been on the rise in many democratic societies, leading to an increasing number of people who are skeptical of core liberal values and even become anti-democratic. There is, it seems, a growing number of unreasonable citizens. The foundation of liberal democracy has become shaky.
Badano and Nuti argue that political liberals should not merely consider how liberal democracy can be publicly justified to reasonable citizens while neglecting the urgent need to engage with unreasonable citizens. 7 Political liberals “cannot shy away from the fact that institutions and actors loyal to liberal democratic values need to work hard to create citizens who are reasonable and therefore supportive of liberal democracy itself” (9). In their view, political liberalism should become “politicized,” taking political disagreements more seriously and demonstrating how the threats posed by unreasonable citizens can be contained.
Badano and Nuti propose a three-tiered framework of containment strategies that political liberals can use to address the rise of unreasonable citizens. In the most severe cases, involving genuine threats to the stability of liberal democratic institutions, they advocate for militant state measures restricting hate speech (110). While Badano and Nuti consider these measures justifiable, they acknowledge their limitation, as “[t]hese threats are likely to exacerbate the problem of instability because they risk making the unreasonable even more alienated from and resentful towards liberal institutions” (112). Accordingly, they also advocate for soft state interventions. These include educational policies designed to instill political values of liberty, equality, and fairness; 8 thoughtful curation of national holidays and public monuments to celebrate the core values of political liberalism; 9 and government efforts to ensure a fairer distribution of wealth to mitigate the rise of unreasonable groups.
However, Badano and Nuti admit that militant state measures and soft state interventions may still be insufficient. This leads to their most novel contribution: containment strategies performed by nonstate actors. While other political liberals have addressed such strategies, Badano and Nuti provide an impressively thorough analysis, exploring the responsibilities of three types of nonstate actors. 10 First, they argue that ordinary reasonable citizens have a “duty of pressure,” which is “a moral duty requiring that ordinary reasonable citizens press the unreasonable they know (e.g., relatives, friends, and colleagues) on their political views to change their minds and push them towards greater reasonableness” (117). This duty should be exercised in “non-public forums,” such as “physical meeting places like pubs, family get-togethers, and workplace gatherings.” Badano and Nuti also include virtual spaces like Facebook, where a citizen can see comments supporting right-wing populist ideas that her friends have posted on their pages (124). The effort to transform unreasonable citizens into reasonable ones is not the sole responsibility of state actors. Citizens should also strive to engage with and persuade unreasonable individuals whenever and wherever possible.
Second, Badano and Nuti suggest that political parties and partisans have a “duty to transform” public reason. Partisans are those “local activists, think-tankers, journalists, and others who might lack any formal affiliation to a party but pursue largely its same agenda and are interested in influencing its future direction” (142). The duty to transform public reason requires that, when citizens increasingly reject the concept of reasonableness, political parties and partisans adapt the content of public reason. This adaptation aims to demonstrate to skeptical citizens that there are fresh and compelling reasons to embrace reasonableness. An example is the Green New Deal proposed by Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Ed Markey (147). To provide an alternative solution to the supporters of right-wing populism who feel disadvantaged by globalization, these politicians present a transformed conception of justice that integrates concerns for the environment with a socialist commitment to economic redistribution.
Third, Badano and Nuti argue that municipalities—that is, “any subnational administrative unit with some powers of self-government or jurisdiction”—have to address the rise of unreasonableness (158). Municipalities encompass districts, towns, and cities, as well as provinces, regions, and other larger subnational jurisdictions. They have the size, influence, and resources necessary to effectively counteract unreasonable actors when they seize power at the central government level. To Badano and Nuti, these municipalities have two duties. The first is “the duty of reasonable non-cooperation,” which means “reasonable public officials governing municipalities . . . refuse to cooperate with the central government when it is (at least partially) run by parties and leaders pursuing an unreasonable agenda” (163). The municipal government might choose not to implement a new directive from the central government or exercise its discretion to promote reasonableness without explicitly defying a request from the central government. The second is “the duty of political liberal prefiguration,” which means that municipalities should “establish and foster in the present those social relations that are characteristic of a well-ordered future society” (172). For instance, the local government of Barcelona implemented a sophisticated plan for inclusion and interculturality, enabling more people to embrace the idea of reasonableness. In brief, the municipalities have a duty to counteract the negative impact of an unreasonable central government and to do their utmost within their power to promote the concept of reasonableness.
While Badano and Nuti outline the duties that reasonable citizens should perform to protect liberal democracy in a non-ideal context, they leave unanswered a crucial question: Why should citizens invest so much time and effort in these duties? What motivates reasonable citizens to persist?
Writing in a humorous and engaging tone, Lefebvre offers an answer by highlighting the value of living as a liberal. To Lefebvre, after hundreds of years of practice, liberalism has become the “background culture” of many democratic societies. Its influence extends beyond political institutions, permeating “civil society (including the workplace, media, social media, and clubs and associations of all kinds) and the private sphere (including personal and romantic relationships, along with the family)” (15). It has influenced us deeply and become a source of our identities. Liberalism is like the water in which we swim. Lefebvre’s project is to make people in democratic societies see the water, encouraging them to “dive deeper” to grasp the genuine requirements of their moral commitments (14). 11 If more people come to appreciate the liberal way of living, it is possible to eliminate liberaldom and move closer to a just society.
But even if I understand the liberal way of living, why should I choose to be liberal, considering its costs and sacrifices? For instance, a liberal way of life requires practices of self-discipline to curb one’s biases and prejudices to maintain respect for fellow citizens. It also requires a robust taxation system that taxes a substantial portion of one’s income. As Lefebvre acknowledges, “[b]eing liberal is hard work” (120). However, Lefebvre suggests that we should look at Rawls from another perspective. While most people focus on Rawls’s political philosophy and his principles of justice, he also offers a “moral psychology and existential analytic of what it means to be a liberal” (23). 12 Rawls’ liberal way of life is characterized by the value of reciprocity and the two virtues of freedom and fairness (146–147). It is a way of life that cherishes equal respect and mutual care, emphasizes the importance of honoring others’ freedom, and treats everyone fairly. Lefebvre also argues that this way of life is highly desirable. A liberal can get rid of many destructive emotions, such as envy, jealousy, hostility, and pride. By shedding these negative feelings, a person can have a more harmonious and balanced life. Moreover, a liberal way of life facilitates the enjoyment of great goods. It enables people to be self-coherent, cheerful, independent, and grateful, while also offering redemption in everyday life. Altogether, Lefebvre enumerates 17 reasons to endorse a liberal way of life (169–178). Accordingly, if one decides not to live in this way, one is “irrational (in the sense of imprudent and heedless) and missing the advantages of a liberal way of life” (172).
How can a liberal way of life be achieved? Borrowing from the French philosopher Pierre Hadot, Lefebvre recommends spiritual exercises, by which he means “practices that an individual voluntarily undertakes to bring about a comprehensive change in their way of living” (31). 13 These exercises can be physical (diet, sleeping regimens), discursive (diary writing, dialogue), or intuitive (meditation). While philosophers have traditionally focused on the spiritual exercises of Greek, Roman, and Christian traditions, Lefebvre innovatively suggests three liberal spiritual exercises:
Original Position: The original position has long been seen as a thought experiment that justifies how principles of justice would be chosen under fair conditions. Lefebvre argues that the original position can also serve as a meditative exercise. By imagining oneself behind the veil of ignorance, people can eliminate biases related to talent, gender, and social class. Entering the original position enables us to be autonomous and impartial. This helps cultivate “purity of heart,” encourages viewing the world from an unbiased perspective, and reduces the influence of vices like pride and snobbery (183).
Reflective Equilibrium: While people intellectually understand principles of justice, such understanding rarely influences their subconscious experiences and daily interactions. This gap means that, despite their understanding, their habits may remain unjust. To address this, people can use reflective equilibrium as a spiritual exercise that aims at “promoting self-knowledge and moral coherence at all levels—from the loftiest of principles to the humblest of habits” (197). By analyzing our considered judgments and reflecting on our emotions and behaviors in light of these judgments, we can discover inconsistencies in our lives and develop a more coherent moral character.
Public Reason: Unlike the former two spiritual exercises, public reason directly concerns how we interact and engage with other people. Public reason involves engaging with citizens as fellow citizens and presenting our views in terms of reasons that we believe are accessible to others. 14 While most Rawlsians agree that public reason should be used in political discussions, Lefebvre argues that citizens can also adapt public reason to various aspects of everyday life. Public reason involves “a way of listening” (228) that can help translate others’ views to facilitate mutual understanding.
Through these spiritual exercises, people can gradually live like liberals in every aspect of their lives, thereby achieving the intrinsically valuable ideal that many have long upheld but failed to realize.
These two books provide valuable guidance for Rawlsians confronting democratic backsliding. However, neither of the books offers advice to Rawlsians who are sympathetic to liberal democracy but reside in authoritarian states. An authoritarian state is characterized by an executive that comes to power not by free and fair elections but through undemocratic means or by an executive that alters the rules to restrict future electoral competition after assuming power through free and fair elections. 15 In 2024, Freedom House reported a decline in political rights and civil liberties worldwide for the eighteenth consecutive year. 16 Over the past two decades, authoritarianism has been steadily increasing, accompanied by a global decline in liberal democracy. Today, roughly 40 percent of the world’s population lives under some form of authoritarian rule. By conservative estimates, about a third of the world’s countries are governed by authoritarian regimes. 17 Moreover, established democracies face growing internal threats from illiberal forces. The United States, for example, is arguably on “the path toward American Authoritarianism,” as evidenced by its freedom index decreasing from 92 (tied with France) to 83 (below Argentina and tied with Panama and Romania). 18 Consequently, the implications of Rawls’s political philosophy within authoritarian contexts are a crucial, yet often overlooked, area for Rawlsians.
In authoritarian societies, the duties outlined by Badano and Nuti have far-reaching and radical implications. Recall their proposal that municipalities have an obligation of reasonable noncooperation, meaning they should refuse to collaborate with a central government led by unreasonable politicians. Such politicians might increasingly violate democratic norms, using the law to intimidate dissenters and allowing supporters to threaten opponents with violence. At what point, then, do municipalities have a duty not only not to cooperate but also to resist and potentially incite civil war? Although this idea seems extreme, it appears unavoidable to acknowledge that if local governments should not cooperate with an unreasonable central government and should use their discretion to defend the prevalence of reasonableness, then, in situations where the central government becomes excessively unreasonable, local governments may indeed have the duty to take up arms against an unreasonable government and possibly seek its overthrow.
Similarly, we might wonder if political parties in authoritarian states have duties that are more radical than the transformation of public reason. According to Badano and Nuti, political parties have a duty to transform public reason to persuade more people to support reasonableness. But what if they cannot fulfill this role? Political parties are undoubtedly a crucial component of representative democracy. However, as numerous scholars suggest, many contemporary authoritarian states are now “hybrid,” meaning that while popular elections occur regularly and opposition parties exist, elections are often unfair. 19 For instance, the incumbent might restrict opposition parties’ access to the media and use legal means to arrest and harass party leaders. The ruling party holds significant advantages, and other parties do not compete on a level playing field. In such a setting, the role of opposition parties is considerably limited. At worst, they merely serve as cover for governments to claim to both domestic and international audiences that the regime is based on popular will. 20 If a government promotes unreasonable political views and coopts opposition parties to legitimize its rule, when should such parties withdraw to avoid being used as a tool to legitimize an authoritarian state? Or should they continue to promote reasonableness despite the prospect of failure?
Authoritarianism also poses a significant challenge to the liberal way of life as described by Lefebvre. First, how can Rawlsians in an authoritarian society help more people understand the value of a liberal way of life? To Lefebvre, liberalism has been the background culture of many democratic societies and has influenced the value systems and emotions of many citizens. But what about citizens in societies without this cultural background, or societies in which people may be shaped by illiberal and inegalitarian ways of life that give rise to a lack of familiarity with liberal values? 21 How should Rawlsians introduce liberal values to the populace?
Second, why should Rawlsians try to maintain a liberal way of life in an authoritarian society? Lefebvre argues that a liberal way of life is intrinsically valuable, to the point where it is “irrational” not to be a liberal (172). But in an authoritarian state, it is dangerous to be a liberal. Liberals may form associations to discuss public affairs and criticize government policies or establish opposition parties to challenge the ruling parties, striving to secure seats in rigged elections. In response, authoritarian states often deploy propaganda to vilify liberals, damaging their reputations and eroding public trust in them. They may harass friends and family to deter political involvement. Liberals might even be criminalized and imprisoned to strip them of their political rights, effectively silencing their voices. In the most extreme scenarios, liberals might face assassination, as the example of Aleksey Navalny in Russia demonstrates. Being a devoted liberal in an authoritarian state may harm one’s career, reputation, family, friends, safety, and even life. Compared to these risks, the benefits suggested by Lefebvre appear negligible.
Consequently, do liberals need to draw strength from religious faith? In Lefebvre’s description, liberalism is akin to religion, including spiritual exercises. Nevertheless, one might ask whether religious faith could strengthen liberal commitments in authoritarian societies. Religions like Christianity sometimes provide followers with a powerful motivation to pursue justice. Some liberals with Christian beliefs might thus come to view liberal values as integral to natural law, perceiving protests for democracy and resistance against injustice as fulfilling divine obligations. This profound religious significance offers liberals strong spiritual support, enabling them to endure suffering and persecution. An example is Kim Dae-jung, a Christian and prominent Korean democratic leader during the authoritarian era, who was imprisoned and tortured by the government in 1977–78. 22 Despite experiencing significant losses as a result of his activism, he believed it was worthwhile because it allowed him to serve others and liberate the oppressed, much like Jesus did. His deep religious faith enabled him to maintain his beliefs while in prison, even leading him to undertake a six-day hunger strike. Rawlsians might thus explore the mutually beneficial relationships between their doctrines and religion in a non-ideal context, as well as consider how certain religious practices might aid in cultivating liberal virtues, if Rawlsianism alone may not be sufficient to serve as the spiritual foundation for liberals in authoritarian contexts. 23
Given the rise of authoritarianism and widespread democratic backsliding, the world is likely to become increasingly non-ideal. This troubling shift renders non-ideal contexts not just peripheral concerns but central challenges for Rawlsianism. While recent scholarship has rightly examined Rawlsianism’s implications for democracies threatened by populism, Rawlsians would do well to expand their focus to authoritarian societies: What duties do people have under illiberal regimes? What is the value of a liberal way of life under such conditions? And how can people cultivate liberal virtues within these restrictive environments? Exploring these questions is crucial for the ongoing development and continued relevance of Rawlsianism.