Examining Organizational Cronyism as an Antecedent of Workplace Deviance in Public Sector Organizations

Abstract

This study examines the relatively new phenomenon of organizational cronyism as a determinant of deviant workplace behavior in public sector organizations in Pakistan. It also examines the mediating role of psychological contract breach. Data were collected from 180 employees working in various public sector organizations in Pakistan. The results indicate that organizational cronyism is positively related with psychological contract breach, which in turn results in deviant workplace behavior in public sector organizations.

Keywords

public administration workplace attitudes and behaviors procedural justice

Introduction

An antimeritocracy activity that has attracted the attention of researchers in recent years is organizational cronyism, which is the bestowing of privileges to friends, colleagues, or relatives on the basis of relationships and association rather than on actual performance standards (Khatri & Tsang, 2003; Khatri, Tsang, & Begley, 2006; Turhan, 2014). When organizational cronyism exists, certain employees may be supported on the basis of relationships and connections, whereas others may be discriminated against. Thus, such cronyistic relationships have the potential to damage the well-being of an organization as well as its employees and promote a sense of injustice and inequality in the workplace (Yan & Bei, 2009). It has been demonstrated that if there is cronyism and nepotism inside an organization, the out-group members have low job satisfaction, low organization commitment, and low morale (Arasli, Bavik, & Ekiz, 2006; Padgett & Morris, 2005). All these negatives have a long-term negative effect on organizational performance (Khatri, 1999).

Realizing the negative impacts of organizational cronyism, public management researchers have also aired concerns about its impact on organizational functioning. For instance, Condrey (2002) raised concerns about cronyism and favoritism in the aftermath of diminished role of Georgia’s central personnel authority. Similarly, Diefenbach (2009) argued that new public management practices are encouraging organizational cronyism, moral cowardice, and sycophancy. Despite these recent concerns on organizational cronyism by public management researchers, we lack understanding of behavioral reactions to organizational cronyism. And how perceptions of organizational cronyism translate into behavioral outcomes. In the current research, we aim to address this gap to demonstrate the relationship between perceived organizational cronyism and employees’ reactions, that is, deviant workplace behavior (DWB). While testing this main relationship between organizational cronyism and DWB, we also aim to explore the underlying mechanism between organizational cronyism and DWB; thus answering the question of how organizational cronyism translates into DWB. We argue that the mechanism through which organizational cronyism results in DWB can be explained by social exchange theory (Adams, 1965; Blau, 1964). Specifically, employees perceptions of cronyism and preferential treatment result into breach of the psychological contract—employee’s perception regarding the extent to which the organization has failed to fulfill its promises or obligations (Robinson & Rousseau, 1994) and the breach feeling in turn results into DWB (Greenberg, 1990; Matthijs Bal, Chiaburu, & Jansen, 2010; Uhl-Bien & Maslyn, 2003; Zhao, Wayne, Glibkowski, & Bravo, 2007).

Our research contributes to literature in many ways. First, Previous studies have analyzed the attitudinal outcomes to organizational cronyism (Arasli et al., 2006; Padgett & Morris, 2005). According to best of our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the behavioral reactions of organizational cronyism in a public sector context. By doing so, we highlight the negative behavioral outcomes of merit violations which tend to be higher in public sector organizations (Campbell, Im, & Jeong, 2014; Nasir & Bashir, 2012). Second, by exploring the underlying mechanism between organizational cronyism and DWB, we provide a more nuanced view of how perceptions of organizational cronyism translate into employees’ reactions. This understanding is important for public managers to fully combat the detrimental effects of organizations cronyism. As absence of merit in public sector organizations results in an environment that is characterized by injustice with high turnover intentions, job stress, and negative word of mouth (Asunakutlu & Avci, 2010; Arasli & Tumer, 2008; Turhan, 2014). Third, the study of DWB has additional important implications for public sector organizations. The primary interest of the public sector organizations is based on performance and public service motives rather than economic motives (as it is of traditional private sector organizations). Failure to perform in a public sector organization could have a detrimental impact on key societal functions (i.e., police services, judicial system, and district administration). This has deleterious implications if there is a prevalence of DWB in public sector organizations (Jordan, Lindsay, & Schraeder, 2012; Quratulain & Khan, 2015a). Fourth, we conducted our research in Pakistani public organizations which are at salient contrast to the dominant Western (mainly the United States) organizations. As a relatively high-power distance culture, Pakistani society is often described as supporting high inequalities of power and wealth (Hofstede, 2003). The paternalism associated with such cultures certainly speaks to our interest of examining organizational cronyisms (Khatri & Tsang, 2003). Similarly, in developing countries, the practices such as cronyism and favoritism continue to be part of daily life ( Iles, Almhedie, & Baruch, 2012). Our study thus extends research on organizational cronyism into a new national and cultural context providing the literature with essential tests of generalizability of Western findings into the context of a developing country.

Hypotheses Development

Cronyism and DWB

The dictionary meaning of crony is a friend of long-standing or a close friend or companion (Oxford English Dictionary, 1999). In 1952, the first time cronyism was used in a political sense when Truman administration was accused of selecting employees for administration on the basis of close relationships rather than objective criteria. Afterward, cronyism started to be considered a relationship-based type of favoritism, and this conception changed the meaning of the word altogether (Turhan, 2014).

Cronyism can exist in an organization in two forms: (a) horizontal cronyism, which is defined as relationship-based favoring at the same level (e.g., friends, colleagues, classmates, social groups, and unions), or (b) vertical cronyism, which is the favoring of a subordinate on the basis of nonperformance-related factors, so the latter involves the relationship between a leader and a follower (Khatri et al., 2006). Although public sector literature lacks the verbatim definition of cronyism, it has been mostly discussed as nonmerit-based employment practice grounded in preferential treatment based on friendships (Condrey, 2002; Diefenbach, 2009). Hence, the attributes associated with organizational cronyism include antimeritocracy in pay decisions (Rynes, Gerhart, & Parks, 2005), promotions (Choi, 2011), and availability of fewer opportunities to women and minorities (Powell & Butterfield, 1997; Riccucci, 2009).

The focus of current study is on the behavioral reactions of employees in the form of DWB which are defined as intentional behavior that spoils organizational values and norms, simultaneously damaging the well-being of the organization and its members (Robinson & Bennett, 1995). There is ample evidence in literature which suggests that organizational unfairness and a lack of merit-based rewards in the workplace can result in DWB (Mingzheng, Xiaoling, Xubo, & Youshan, 2014). The unethical practices of organizational cronyism have a different impact on crony favored and nonfavored employees (Khatri & Tsang, 2003). Cronies enjoy exceptional treatment by supervisors as they are trusted, supported, and rewarded, and thus, these are the reasons they demonstrate satisfaction with and commitment to their jobs and ranks. However, noncronies are discriminated because cronies are preferred over noncronies despite having equal knowledge, skills, and abilities in matters of selection, promotion, and appraisal (Khatri & Tsang, 2003). Thus, a perception of prejudice develops among noncronies and this leads to job dissatisfaction, lowers employee morale, and has an adverse impact on employee self-worth (Khatri & Tsang, 2003). Injustice and disparity can lead to DWB (Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). According to social exchange theory and equity theory, when employees perceive unfairness and prejudice between input and output, or when they believe that they are not being treated as promised, they might engage in negative behaviors in the form of retaliation toward organization (Blau, 1964; Gouldner, 1960). Based on aforementioned arguments, we hypothesize the following:

Hypothesis 1: Organizational cronyism is positively related to DWB.

Organizational Cronyism and Psychological Contract Breach (PCB)

PCB is defined as an employee’s perception of the failure of the organization to fulfill its promises (Conway & Briner, 2002). Breach is a subjective experience of what is received compared with what was promised (Castaing, 2006). Psychological contract consists of two components, that is, transactional and relational. Transactional component consists of monetizable and tangible exchange like salary, and so on, whereas relational contract consists of socioemotional outcomes like job security, international trainings, career development, and support for personal problems (Harrington & Lee, 2015). In the context of public sector organizations where procedures and rules are formalized and well-written, the transactional part of the contract usually goes well with the employees’ expectations. However, public managers often exercise their discretion in fulfilling the relational contract, and public sector employees have more expectations for the fulfillment of relational contract (Castaing, 2006). One of the reasons for breaking relational contract is reneging. Reneging occurs when the organization knowingly breaks a promise either on purpose or because of unforeseen circumstances (Calo, 2006).

Fairness perceptions about organizational events and procedures are central to the state of the psychological contract. Employee perceptions of unfairness about organizational practices have a major impact on their PCB (O’Donnell & Shields, 2002). Janssens, Sels, and Van den Brande (2003) have also demonstrated that Belgian civil servants have strong expectations about equal treatment as a part of psychological contract. As perceptions of organizational cronyism are inherently accompanied by violation of people’s right to fair, impartial, and equitable treatment (Khatri et al., 2006), hence one may assume that it would lead to PCB. Similarly, according to Robinson and Rousseau (1994), perception of inequity, unfair procedures of allocating rewards, punishments, and unmerited treatment of leader are key indicators of emergence of PCB at work. Thus we hypothesize the following:

Hypothesis 2: Organizational cronyism is positively related to PCB.

PCB and DWB

A large number of studies in the literature have demonstrated that PCB is negatively related to work outcomes (Robinson & Morrison, 2000) such as job satisfaction (Matthijs Bal, Lange, Jansen, & Velde, 2013),organizational commitment (Zhao et al., 2007), in-role performance (Bunderson, 2001; Robinson & Morrison, 1995), and extra role behavior (Zhao et al., 2007). Social exchange theory and the norm of negative reciprocity offer strong theoretical support for establishing a positive relationship between PCB and DWB (Chao, Cheung, & Wu, 2011; Chiu & Peng, 2008). When employees feel that their employers have not fulfilled promises, the employees might wish to engage in “payback” as a response by reducing their positive behaviors and displaying more negative behaviors (Ertas, 2015; Uhl-Bien & Maslyn, 2003). Moreover, unmet and broken promises lead to anger, frustration, absenteeism, job neglect, mistrust, vandalism, gossiping, and less organizational citizenship behavior (Chiu & Peng, 2008; Ho, Weingart, & Rousseau, 2004; Lo & Aryee, 2003; Robinson & Morrison, 2000). Thus, employees might try to reinstate equity by displaying negative behavior as a response to their unfulfilled psychological contract. Mingzheng et al. (2014) found that perceptions of organizational justice were negatively correlated with DWB in a sample of Chinese civil servants. Similarly, Quratulain and Khan (2015b) demonstrated that resigned satisfaction, a psychological state somehow similar to PCB, was found to be positively related with withdrawal behavior (a type of deviant behaviors) in a sample of Pakistani public sector managers. Based on aforementioned arguments, we hypothesize the following:

Hypothesis 3: PCB is positively related to DWB.

The Mediating Role of the PCB in the Relationship Between Cronyism and DWB

Employee behaviors and attitudes have been found to be influenced by various organizational practices and leaders’ actions (Zhao et al., 2007). An employee’s response to a situation (positive or negative) is not a blatant or unintentional (Harrington & Lee, 2015; Rousseau & Tijoriwala, 1998), in most of cases, a reaction transpires as a response to an initial employers’ action (Gouldner, 1960). In the case of organizational cronyism, when employees respond in a negative fashion, there must be some underlying mechanism that caused them to behave in a negative way. When employees are first hired, they are likely to have certain expectations or demands of the organization and expect that these will be fulfilled in response to their knowledge, skills, and abilities (Robinson & Morrison, 2000; Rousseau, 1989). But when such expectations are not fulfilled in a fair manner, and when others who have similar knowledge, skills, and abilities are given privileges, a breach of the psychological contract becomes apparent, and employees may engage in revenge by displaying negative work outcomes such as DWB (Kickul, Neuman, Parker, & Finkl, 2001).

According to social exchange theory and the norm of positive reciprocity, when employees are met with a satisfactory return of their efforts and fair treatment by their leader in the allocation of rewards and punishments, a perception that the psychological contract has been fulfilled emerges. This in turn motivates employees to participate in the organization with more commitment and positive behavior (e.g., organizational citizenship behavior) (Moorman, Blakely, & Niehoff, 1998; Robinson & Morrison, 1995). Conversely, and in accordance with the idea of negative reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960; Uhl-Bien & Maslyn, 2003), when employees observe injustice and favoritism in the workplace, their expectations and ambitions are negatively affected (Cho & Poister, 2014). Thus, a breach of psychological contract transpires, and in return, employees engage in more negative and less beneficiary behaviors (e.g., DWB) for the sake of revenge and to restore equity (Festinger, 1962; Ho et al., 2004). Injustice and unfairness contribute to the emergence of employees’ breach of the psychological contract, and this causes them to behave in a negative way to reinstate equity.

Although we did not find any study in public sector context which examined the mediating role of PCB, however, we found few studies which were based on similar arguments. For instance, Quratulain and Khan (2015b) used psychological contract theory to demonstrate that resigned satisfaction, a mental state similar to PCB, mediates the relationship between red tape and DWBs in a sample of Pakistani public managers. Based on reasoning presented in preceding paragraphs, we hypothesize as the following:

Hypothesis 4: PCB mediates the relationship between organizational cronyism and DWB.

Research Methodology

Sample and Data Collection

Population of the study includes public sector employees working in various ministries located in the Federal capital, Islamabad. The public sector organizations in Pakistan follow a typical bureaucratic structure, and affairs of whole country are managed through ministries in Islamabad. There are 27 Federal Government ministries which are based in Islamabad, and around 18,000 employees are working in these ministries. The hierarchy in these ministries is defined by Basic Pay Scales (BPS) which ranges from BPS 1 to BPS 22 with BPS 1 representing the lowest and BPS 22 the highest level in this hierarchy. The official language of correspondence in these ministries is English and minimum qualification for employees who work in offices and deal with correspondence is 10 years of education with English as mandatory subject.

The sample of study was selected based on willingness of the employees to participate in the study and their ability to understand the questionnaire. As all the public sector ministries are generally located at one place called Islamabad Secretariat, the first author visited these organizations and obtained consent of the employees to participate in the study.

Around 300 questionnaires were distributed in these organizations. As respondents were apprehensive to fill the questionnaires, the purpose was explained so that the respondents could fill the questionnaires without any fear of data being misused. They were ensured that data will be kept confidential and will be used for academic purposes only. The questionnaire was comprised of two sections. The first section included items about the respondents’ demographics (i.e., qualification, tenure, gender, age). The items for measuring the dependent variable (DWB), the mediator (PCB), and independent variable (organizational cronyism) were included in the second section of the questionnaire.

To reduce the common method bias (Podsakoff, Mackenzie, Lee, &Podsakoff, 2003), the data were collected at different time points. At Time 1, the data were collected from the employees on organizational cronyism. After 6 weeks at Time 2, the employees completed the questionnaire items on PCB and DWB. A total of 180 complete questionnaires were received, resulting in a response rate of 60%. Among the respondents, 26% had 10 years of education, 45% held a bachelor’s degree, and 29% had a master’s degree. The job tenure of 11.1% of the respondents was less than 1 year, 26.7% had 1 to 2 years, 17.8% had between 2 and 3 years, and 44.4 % had more than 3 years tenure. A total of 28.3% female and 71.7% male were presented in our sample. For age, 47.8 % of the respondents were younger than 30 years, 38.9 % were between 30 and 40 years, and 13.3 % were older than 40 years.

Measures

The questionnaire was administered in English language. Data were collected on 5-point Likert-type scales that ranged from 1= strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree. At first stage, the questionnaires were distributed among 40 employees for pilot testing. The reliability and validity was tested using Cronbach’s alpha technique. All the measures showed a score in acceptable range, that is, greater than .7. After establishment of reliability and validity, the questionnaires were distributed among the sample.

Organizational cronyism

To measure organizational cronyism, we used a 15-item scale that was developed by Turhan (2014). Sample organizational cronyism items are as follows: “Our manager treats employees with whom he has a closer personal connection with more tolerance,” “In our institution, individuals’ performance rather than their personal relations with the manager are taken into account when employees are rewarded,” or “When resolving conflicts, our manager protects employees with whom he has a closer personal connection.” Cronbach’s alpha reliability for organizational cronyism was .84.

PCB

We used Robinson and Morrison’s (2000) five-item scale to measure respondents’ perception of PCB. This measure has been further validated by other studies (e.g., Bashir & Nasir, 2013; Restubog, Bordia, & Tang, 2007; Restubog, Bordia, Tang, & Krebs, 2010; Sayers, Sears, Kelly, & Harbke, 2011). Sample items from the scale are “Almost all the promises made to me by my employer during recruitment have been kept so far,” “I feel that my employer has come through in fulfilling the promises made to me when I was hired,” and “So far my employer has done an excellent job of fulfilling his/her promises to me.” Cronbach’s alpha reliability for PCB was .67.

DWB

DWB was measured using Bennett and Robinson’s (2000) 28-item scale. This measure was further validated by Christian and Ellis (2011) and Mitchell and Ambrose (2007). DWB was measured with self-reports as it is believed by the majority of researchers that DWB is often performed personally by the employee and most of the time not in the presence of an employer or supervisor (Bennett & Robinson, 2000; Fox & Spector, 1999; Spector, 1992). Due to the reason stated above, employees should be able to give a more accurate account of their behavior than their supervisor could. Also in most previous studies, self-reports were used to measure DWB. Cronbach’s alpha reliability for DWB measure was .86.

Results

We used one-way ANOVA to determine whether there were significant differences in outcome variables across demographics. The one-way ANOVA showed insignificant difference in DWB across gender (F = 2.20, p > .05), education (F = 1.3, p > .05), tenure (F = 1.0, p > .05), and significant difference across age (F = 5.31, p < .05), hence we controlled age in the present study. Studies also suggest that employees belonging to different age groups are likely to respond differently to PCB and DWB. For example, younger employees might be more likely to behave aggressively in contrast to mature and senior employees (Berry, Ones, & Sackett, 2007).

Correlation Analyses

Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics as well as the zero-order correlations of all variables. Organizational cronyism was positively correlated with PCB (r = .62, p < .01) and DWB (r = .32, p < .01). PCB was also correlated with DWB (r = .31, p < .01)

Table 1.

Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Among Study Variables (N = 180).

Variables	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Gender	1.28	.45	—
2. Age	1.91	.89	−.04	—
3. Education	3.44	.92	.05	.16*	—
4. Tenure	1.79	1.00	−.09	.81**	.07	—
5. Cronyism	3.67	.63	.14*	.03	.18*	.03	(.84)
6. PCB	3.47	.63	.08	.03	.12	−.01	.62**	(.67)
7. DWB	3.41	.53	.11	−.19**	−.12	−.14	.32**	.31**	(.86)

Note. Correlation is significant at .01 levels (two-tailed); correlation is significant at .05 levels (two-tailed); alpha reliabilities are given in parentheses. (Gender: male = 1, female = 2; age: 1 = 18-25, 2 = 26-33, 3 = 34-41, 4 = 42-49, 5 = >50; education: 1 = matric, 2 = intermediate, 3 = bachelor’s, 4 = master’s, 5 = any other degree or diploma; tenure; 1 = <1 year, 2 = 1-2 years, 3 = 2-3 years, 4 = more than 3 years). PCB = psychological contract breach; DWB = deviant workplace behavior.

p < .05. ** p < .01.

Regression Analyses

The results of the regression analyses are shown in Table 2. The direct effect showed a positive relationship between organizational cronyism and DWB as indicated by regression coefficients (β = .33, p < .001). Organizational cronyism was positively related with PCB (β = .62, p < .001). The results indicated that PCB was also related to DWB as indicated by regression coefficients (β = .30, p < .001). Thus, Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 were supported.

Table 2.

Regression Results for Study Hypotheses (N = 180).

Predictors	PCB			DWB
Predictors	β	R ²	ΔR²	β	R ²	ΔR²
Direct effects
Step 1
Control variable	.05	.01	.00	.20**	.03	.03**
Step 2
Organizational cronyism	.62***	.38	.37***	.33***	.14	.10***
Indirect effect
Step 1
Control variable					.03
Step 2
PCB				.30***	.13	.10**
Step 3
Organizational cronyism				.22*	.16	.03*

Note. Control variable is age. PCB = psychological contract breach; DWB = deviant workplace behavior.

p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Hypothesis 4 stated that PCB mediates the relationship between organizational cronyism and DWB. Three conditions need to be fulfilled, in order to support Hypothesis 4. First, organizational cronyism should be positively related with DWB; second, organizational cronyism should be positively related with PCB; third, when we regress DWB on both organizational cronyism and PCB, the PCB should be positively related with DWB and previously significant relationship between organizational cronyism and DWB should turn insignificant. Our results demonstrated that organizational cronyism was positively related with DWB (β = 0.33, p < .001), organizational cronyism was positively related with PCB (β = 0.30, p < .001). When DWB was regressed on both organizational cronyism and PCB, the previous regression coefficient between organizational cronyism and DWB reduced in size (β = 0.22, p < .05). This showed that PCB partially mediates the relationship between organizational cronyism and DWB (confidence interval [CI] = [.03, .41]). Hence Hypothesis 4 was partially supported.

Discussion

In recent years, organizational cronyism started receiving attention by organizational scholars (Khatri & Tsang, 2003; Khatri et al., 2006; Turhan, 2014). Building on this body of research, we examined DWB as a behavioral outcome of organizational cronyism in this study. We also studied the mediating role of PCB between organizational cronyism and DWB. We found good empirical support for all four study hypotheses. Our findings suggest that organizational cronyism is positively related to PCB and DWB, and PCB also partially mediates the relationship between organizational cronyism and DWB. Our findings support the notion that noncrony employees react to organizational cronyism in the form of DWB. These findings are in line with earlier studies which argued that employees are prone to showing deviance in such environments which promote cronyism (Kelloway, Francis, Prosser, & Cameron, 2010).

The practice of cronyism poses great challenges for those employees who are committed to their organization and have put in lot of energy to carry out organizational tasks, yet they are denied of promotions, respectful treatment and advancement opportunities due to organizational cronyism. These circumstances lead to unfairness perceptions, which further generate the feeling of PCB. In response to PCB, the employees often engage in DWB to restore equity in their organizational relationship (Adams, 1965). The DWB can affect organizational performance by resulting in decreased standards of public service delivery (Quratulain & Khan, 2015a; Shaw, Gupta, & Delery, 2005). Our findings about mediating role, albeit partially, of PCB are in line with previous studies (Hershcovis et al., 2007; Marcus & Schuler, 2004).

Our study also offers a conservative test of the argument that organizational cronyism is more prevalent in collectivist cultures. The Collectivist cultures value in-group relationships which are frequently based on kinships and friendships. In such cultures, people feel obliged to take more care of in-group members as compared with out-group members (Leung & Bond, 1984). That is why we see preference-based employment practices like “Guanxi” (Zhai, Lindorff, & Cooper, 2013) and “wasta” (Iles et al., 2012) in collectivist societies of China and United Arab Emirates, respectively. The practice of cronyism resemble closely to the norms for in-group exchange in collectivist cultures (Khatri et al., 2006). Pakistan, being a collectivist society, was more suitable to test these propositions. Our findings also support anecdotal views which we came across while interviewing different Pakistani public sector employees. They raised their concerns about allocation of organizational rewards, and most of them felt that rewards were not allocated on the basis of merit rather those who are close friends or family members of decision makers get benefits. This idea can be substantiated by the fact that each day, the courts in Pakistan receive a number of cases related to merit violations in public sector organizations.

The incidents of cronyism are so rampant in public sector organizations that the majority of employees feel that breaches of psychological contract occur frequently, and thus, employees exhibit workplace deviance. Inefficiency and corruption are common in the majority of the public sector organizations in developing countries due to weak accountability framework. There is a common voice around the world that claims that an ethical environment should be promoted in public sector organizations, but studies are restricted to multinational organizations and developed countries. This study not only highlighted the presence of cronyism in public sector organizations in the developing country of Pakistan but also showed how it can be considered a cause of deviant practices in public sector organizations.

Implications, Limitations, and Future Research Directions

Our findings have implications for public sector organizations, which we discuss below. We demonstrated that organizational cronyism motivates employees to indulge in DWB. The DWB is a costly phenomenon as it hampers the organizational productivity and public service delivery. One way to reduce DWB is to establish merit-based practices in public organizations. The public sector managers must be apprised and trained that in today’s public sector workforce, tolerance for inequity is very low and they must be ready to face detrimental consequences, if they continue with antimeritocracy policies which are prevalent in public sector organizations of developing countries. Another way to reduce organizational cronyism is support from top management for merit-based practices. Garson and Vasu (1994) argued that individuals higher in the organizational hierarchy were more likely to believe in unethicality of discriminatory practices. Umphress, Simmons, Boswell, and Triana (2008) demonstrated that hiring managers who receive explicit messages from top management would not discriminate in hiring decisions against lower status applicants.

The underlying cause for employees to indulge in DWB is perceived unfairness. The public organizations can also work on increasing the fairness perceptions of their workforce. It can be achieved by adopting fair procedures in allocation of resources as people are even willing to accept unfavorable outcomes if they perceive the underlying allocation procedure to be fair (Folger, Rosenfield, Grove, & Corkran, 1979). Another way to reduce perceptions of organizational cronyism is through manager’s behaviors (Hoy & Tarter, 2004). A manager who is equitable, sensitive, ethical, and honest will be perceived as more fair. The fair treatment is not limited to rewards, performance assessment, or promotions, rather it is also related to matters like providing better working conditions, inclusion in decision-making process, granting leaves, public recognition, and so on. Hence, public managers should also focus on these workplace aspects to increase the fairness perceptions of their workforce.

Our findings and associated implications may be interpreted in light of following limitations. First, while we assessed only one outcome of organizational cronyism, there may be other outcomes associated with it. The future studies may examine a broader set of attitudinal and behavioral outcomes like job stress, intention to quit, and organizational citizenship behavior. Second, future studies with a larger sample size would provide support for generalizability of our findings. Third, we believe our findings will be generalizable to collectivist countries. However, replications studies are needed to assess the validity of our findings in individualistic countries like the United States, France, and so on. Fourth, though we used time-lagged design to collect our data, we cannot completely rule out common method bias. The future studies may use two-source data and randomization of measures to help safeguard against common method bias (Khan, Quratulain, & Bell, 2014).

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Author Biographies

Sadia Shaheen is a PhD candidate at the Capital University of Science and Technology. She received her Masters degree in Human Resource Management from the same institution. Her research interests include employee attitudes with specific focus on public sector organizations.

Sajid Bashir, PhD, is an associate professor and head of the department at Capital University of Science and Technology, Islamabad, Paksiatn. His research interests include personality, employee attitudes, and application of Human Resource Management in various sectors like Public Administration, Project Management, Health Care Management and Hospitality Management. He has published in the American Review of Public Administration, Learning and Individual Differences, International Journal of Hospitality Management and the Project Management Journal amongst others.

Abdul Karim Khan, PhD, is an assistant professor at United Arab Emirates University. His research interests include organizational justice, emotion of envy, counterproductive work behaviours, and abusive supervision. His research work has appeared in Review of Public Personnel Administration, Journal of Management, Journal of Organizational Behavior and International Journal of HRM amongst others.

References

Adams

J. S.

(1965). Inequity in social exchange. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 2, 267-299.

Arasli

Bavik

Ekiz

E. H.

(2006). The effects of nepotism on human resource management: The case of three, four and five star hotels in Northern Cyprus. International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, 26, 295-308.

Arasli

Tumer

(2008). Nepotism, favoritism and cronyism: A study of their effects on job stress and job satisfaction in the banking industry of North Cyprus. Social Behavior and Personality, 36, 1237-1250.

Asunakutlu

Avci

(2010). An investigation of the relationship between nepotism and job satisfaction in family business. The Journal of Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, 15, 93-109.

Bashir

Nasir

(2013). Breach of psychological contract, organizational cynicism and union commitment: A study of hospitality industry in Pakistan. International Journal of Hospitality Management, 34, 61-65.

Bennett

R. J.

Robinson

S. L.

(2000). Development of a measure of workplace deviance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 85, 349-360.

Berry

C. M.

Ones

D. S.

Sackett

P. R.

(2007). Interpersonal deviance, organizational deviance, and their common correlates: A review and meta-analysis. Journal of Applied Psychology, 92, 410-424.

Blau

P. M.

(1964). Exchange and power in social life. New York, NY: Transaction Publishers.

Bunderson

J. S.

(2001). How work ideologies shape the psychological contracts of professional employees: Doctors’ responses to perceived breach. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 22, 717-741.

10.

Calo

T. J.

(2006). The psychological contract and the union contract: A paradigm shift in public sector employee relations. Public Personnel Management, 35, 331-342.

11.

Campbell

J. W.

Jeong

(2014). Internal efficiency and turnover intention: Evidence from local government in South Korea. Public Personnel Management, 43, 259-282.

12.

Castaing

(2006). The effects of psychological contract fulfilment and public service motivation on organizational commitment in the French civil service. Public Policy and Administration, 21, 84-98.

13.

Chao

J. M.

Cheung

F. Y.

A. M.

(2011). Psychological contract breach and counterproductive workplace behaviors: Testing moderating effect of attribution style and power distance. The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 22, 763-777.

14.

Chiu

S. F.

Peng

J. C.

(2008). The relationship between psychological contract breach and employee deviance: The moderating role of hostile attributional style. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 73, 426-433.

15.

Cho

Y. J.

Poister

T. H.

(2014). Managerial practices, trust in leadership, and performance: Case of the Georgia Department of Transportation. Public Personnel Management, 43, 179-196.

16.

Choi

(2011). Organizational justice and employee work attitudes: The federal case. The American Review of Public Administration, 41, 185-204.

17.

Christian

M. S.

Ellis

A. P.

(2011). Examining the effects of sleep deprivation on workplace deviance: A self-regulatory perspective. Academy of Management Journal, 54, 913-934.

18.

Condrey

S. E.

(2002). Reinventing state civil service systems: The Georgia experience. Review of Public Personnel Administration, 22, 114-124.

19.

Conway

Briner

R. B.

(2002). A daily diary study of affective responses to psychological contract breach and exceeded promises. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 23, 287-302.

20.

Diefenbach

(2009). New public management in public sector organizations: The dark sides of managerialistic “enlightenment.” Public Administration, 87, 892-909.

21.

Ertas

(2015). Turnover intentions and work motivations of millennial employees in federal service. Public Personnel Management, 44, 401-423.

22.

Festinger

(1962). A theory of cognitive dissonance (Vol. 2). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

23.

Folger

Rosenfield

Grove

Corkran

(1979). Effects of “voice” and peer opinions on responses to inequity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 2253-2261.

24.

Fox

Spector

P. E.

(1999). A model of work frustration-aggression. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 20, 915-931.

25.

Garson

G. D.

Vasu

M. L.

(1994). Professional notes: Analysis of ethical dynamics in public personnel administration. Review of Public Personnel Administration, 14(3), 75-92.

26.

Gouldner

A. W.

(1960). The norm of reciprocity: A preliminary statement. American Sociological Review, 25, 161-178.

27.

Greenberg

(1990). Organizational justice: Yesterday, today, and tomorrow. Journal of Management, 16, 399-432.

28.

Harrington

J. R.

Lee

J. H.

(2015). What drives perceived fairness of performance appraisal? Exploring the effects of psychological contract fulfillment on employees’ perceived fairness of performance appraisal in US federal agencies. Public Personnel Management, 44, 214-238.

29.

Hershcovis

M. S.

Turner

Barling

Arnold

K. A.

Dupré

K. E.

Inness

. . . Sivanathan

(2007). Predicting workplace aggression: A meta-analysis. Journal of Applied Psychology, 92, 228-238.

30.

V. T.

Weingart

L. R.

Rousseau

D. M.

(2004). Responses to broken promises: Does personality matter? Journal of Vocational Behavior, 65, 276-293.

31.

Hofstede

G. H.

(2003). Culture’s consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions and organizations across nations. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.

32.

Hoy

W. K.

Tarter

C. J.

(2004). Organizational justice in schools: No justice without trust. International Journal of Educational Management, 18, 250-259.

33.

Iles

Almhedie

Baruch

(2012). Managing HR in the Middle East: Challenges in the public sector. Public Personnel Management, 41, 465-492.

34.

Janssens

Sels

Van Den Brande

(2003). Multiple types of psychological contracts: A six-cluster solution. Human Relations, 56, 1349-1378.

35.

Jordan

M. H.

Lindsay

D. R.

Schraeder

(2012). An examination of salient, non-monetary, factors influencing performance in public sector organizations: A conceptual model. Public Personnel Management, 41, 661-684.

36.

Kelloway

E. K.

Francis

Prosser

Cameron

J. E.

(2010). Counterproductive work behavior as protest. Human Resource Management Review, 20, 18-25.

37.

Khan

A. K.

Quratulain

S. M.

Bell

(2014). Episodic envy and counterproductive work behaviors: Is more justice always good? Journal of Organizational Behavior, 35, 128-144.

38.

Khatri

(1999). Emerging issues in strategic HRM in Singapore. International Journal of Manpower, 20, 516-529.

39.

Khatri

Tsang

E. W.

(2003). Antecedents and consequences of cronyism in organizations. Journal of Business Ethics, 43, 289-303.

40.

Khatri

Tsang

E. W.

Begley

T. M.

(2006). Cronyism: A cross-cultural analysis. Journal of International Business Studies, 37, 61-75.

41.

Kickul

J. R.

Neuman

Parker

Finkl

(2001). Settling the score: The role of organizational justice in the relationship between psychological contract breach and anticitizenship behavior. Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal, 13(2), 77-93.

42.

Leung

Bond

M. H.

(1984). The impact of cultural collectivism on reward allocation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 47, 793-804.

43.

Aryee

(2003). Psychological contract breach in a Chinese context: An integrative approach. Journal of Management Studies, 40, 1005-1020.

44.

Marcus

Schuler

(2004). Antecedents of counterproductive behavior at work: A general perspective. Journal of Applied Psychology, 89, 647-660.

45.

Matthijs Bal

P. M.

Chiaburu

D. S.

Jansen

P. G

. (2010). Psychological contract breach and work performance: Is social exchange a buffer or an intensifier? Journal of Managerial Psychology, 25, 252-273.

46.

Matthijs Bal

P. M.

Lange

A. H.

Jansen

P. G.

Velde

M. E

. (2013). A longitudinal study of age-related differences in reactions to psychological contract breach. Applied Psychology, 62, 157-181.

47.

Mingzheng

Xiaoling

Xubo

Youshan

(2014). Moral identity as a moderator of the effects of organizational injustice on counterproductive work behavior among Chinese public servants. Public Personnel Management, 43, 314-324.

48.

Mitchell

M. S.

Ambrose

M. L.

(2007). Abusive supervision and workplace deviance and the moderating effects of negative reciprocity beliefs. Journal of Applied Psychology, 92, 1159-1168.

49.

Moorman

R. H.

Blakely

G. L.

Niehoff

B. P.

(1998). Does perceived organizational support mediate the relationship between procedural justice and organizational citizenship behavior? Academy of Management Journal, 41, 351-357.

50.

Nasir

Bashir

(2012). Examining workplace deviance in public sector organizations of Pakistan. International Journal of Social Economics, 39, 240-253.

51.

O’Donnell

Shields

(2002). Performance management and the psychological contract in the Australian federal public sector. Journal of Industrial Relations, 44, 435-457.

52.

Oxford English Dictionary. (1999). The Oxford dictionary and thesaurus. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

53.

Padgett

M. Y.

Morris

K. A.

(2005). Keeping it “all in the family”: Does nepotism in the hiring process really benefit the beneficiary? Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies, 11(2), 34-45.

54.

Podsakoff

P. M.

MacKenzie

S. B.

Lee

J. Y.

Podsakoff

N. P.

(2003). Common method biases in behavioral research: A critical review of the literature and recommended remedies. Journal of Applied Psychology, 88, 879-903.

55.

Powell

G. N.

Butterfield

D. A.

(1997). Effect of race on promotions to top management in a federal department. Academy of Management Journal, 40, 112-128.

56.

Quratulain

Khan

A. K.

(2015a). How does employees’ public service motivation get affected? A conditional process analysis of the effects of person–job fit and work pressure. Public Personnel Management, 44, 266-289.

57.

Quratulain

Khan

A. K.

(2015b). Red tape, resigned satisfaction, public service motivation, and negative employee attitudes and behaviors: Testing a model of moderated mediation. Review of Public Personnel Administration, 35, 307-332.

58.

Restubog

S. L. D.

Bordia

Tang

R. L.

(2007). Behavioural outcomes of psychological contract breach in a non-western culture: The moderating role of equity sensitivity. British Journal of Management, 18, 376-386.

59.

Restubog

S. L. D.

Bordia

Tang

R. L.

Krebs

S. A.

(2010). Investigating the moderating effects of leader–member exchange in the psychological contract breach–employee performance relationship: A test of two competing perspectives. British Journal of Management, 21, 422-437.

60.

Riccucci

N. M.

(2009). The pursuit of social equity in the federal government: A road less traveled? Public Administration Review, 69, 373-382.

61.

Robinson

S. L.

Bennett

R. J.

(1995). A typology of deviant workplace behaviors: A multidimensional scaling study. Academy of Management Journal, 38, 555-572.

62.

Robinson

S. L.

Morrison

E. W.

(1995). Psychological contracts and OCB: The effect of unfulfilled obligations on civic virtue behavior. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 16, 289-298.

63.

Robinson

S. L.

Morrison

E. W.

(2000). The development of psychological contract breach and violation: A longitudinal study. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 21, 525-546.

64.

Robinson

S. L.

Rousseau

D. M.

(1994). Violating the psychological contract: Not the exception but the norm. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 15, 245-259.

65.

Rousseau

D. M.

(1989). Psychological and implied contracts in organizations. Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal, 2, 121-139.

66.

Rousseau

D. M.

Tijoriwala

S. A.

(1998). Assessing psychological contracts: Issues, alternatives and measures. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 19(Suppl. 1), 679-695.

67.

Rynes

S. L.

Gerhart

Parks

(2005). Personnel psychology: Performance evaluation and pay for performance. Annual Review of Psychology, 56, 571-600.

68.

Sayers

J. K.

Sears

K. L.

Kelly

K. M.

Harbke

C. R.

(2011). When employees engage in workplace incivility: The interactive effect of psychological contract violation and organizational justice. Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal, 23, 269-283.

69.

Shaw

J. D.

Gupta

Delery

J. E.

(2005). Alternative conceptualizations of the relationship between voluntary turnover and organizational performance. Academy of Management Journal, 48, 50-68.

70.

Skarlicki

D. P.

Folger

(1997). Retaliation in the workplace: The roles of distributive, procedural, and interactional justice. Journal of Applied Psychology, 82, 434-443.

71.

Spector

P. E.

(1992). A consideration of the validity and meaning of self-report measures of job conditions. In International review of industrial and organizational psychology (p. 123). Chichester, UK: John Wiley.

72.

Turhan

(2014). Organizational cronyism: A scale development and validation from the perspective of teachers. Journal of Business Ethics, 123, 295-308.

73.

Uhl-Bien

Maslyn

J. M.

(2003). Reciprocity in manager-subordinate relationships: Components, configurations, and outcomes. Journal of Management, 29, 511-532.

74.

Umphress

E. E.

Simmons

A. L.

Boswell

W. R.

Triana Mdel

(2008). Managing discrimination in selection: The influence of directives from an authority and social dominance orientation. Journal of Applied Psychology, 93, 982-993.

75.

Yan

Bei

. (2009). Notice of retraction the antecedents of organizational cronyism. In International Conference on Management and Service Science (MASS 2009) (pp. 1-4). Beijing, China: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers.

76.

Zhai

Lindorff

Cooper

(2013). Workplace Guanxi: Its dispositional antecedents and mediating role in the affectivity–job satisfaction relationship. Journal of Business Ethics, 117, 541-551.

77.

Zhao

H. A. O.

Wayne

S. J.

Glibkowski

B. C.

Bravo

(2007). The impact of psychological contract breach on work-related outcomes: A meta-analysis. Personnel Psychology, 60, 647-680.