Abstract
Michael Tomasello’s latest book, Becoming Human: A Theory of Ontogeny, represents a lifetime of experimental work conducted at the leading edge of evolutionary anthropology and psychology. But it also stands as a testament to the ways in which evolutionary psychology might contribute something substantive and, indeed, constructive to the development of a robust theological anthropology. As such, this review offers a critical read of Tomasello’s work, but with an eye toward the implications of his proposal for those either studying and teaching in theological contexts or simply interested in the ways in which evolutionary theory informs, challenges, and constrains theological reflection.
To understand how Tomasello’s evolutionary-developmental (evo-devo) approach might be informative for theology, a brief account of his argument is in order. His primary goal is to describe and explain the ontogeny of uniquely human psychology by locating it within the theoretical frameworks of modern evolutionary theory and comparative psychology. Tomasello suggests that human culture, as a form of social organization that emerged under biological and environmental pressures, is the very thing that makes humans unique. Indeed, “humans are not only a species of unprecedented cognitive and social achievements but also, at the same time, one that displays a novel kind of socially created, group-level diversity” (p. 3).
Tomasello thus proposes (along with others working in evolutionary developmental biology) a complimentary theoretical framework to traditional evolutionary accounts. Namely, he claims that, on the level of the individual, the emergence of a uniquely human psychology cannot be understood apart from the particular forms of sociocultural activity that humans encounter in the first years of life. In other words, the “the target of natural selection is not adult ‘traits,’ as in classical accounts, but rather ontogenetic pathways . . . [i.e.], the construction process that brings them into existence” (p. 22).
These ontogenetic pathways, which give rise to distinctly human cognition, are structured by (1) the maturation of children’s capacity for shared intentionality, (2) the individual’s experience interacting with a rich cultural ecology, and (3) various forms of executive self-regulation, including importantly, collaborative self-regulation. From an evolutionary perspective, the life history (i.e., the ontogeny) of human psychology cannot be separated from its biological origins (hence the value of comparative psychology). But according to Tomasello, what is perhaps even more important is that neither can this life history be separated from the unique cultural niche in which humans develop. In other words, Tomasello’s causal model is transactional. That is, human cognitive capacities that have evolved under adaptive pressures remain inert until they are used (and reorganized) in various transactions with a uniquely human sociocultural environment.
Given his methodological commitments, Tomasello’s starting point is always great ape ontogeny, followed by a descriptive explanation of a related, species-typical ontogenetic pathway, which comprises two interrelated pathways for humans: “joint intentionality” and “collective intentionality.” According to Tomasello, joint intentionality gives rise to collective intentionality, which draws upon a complex network of recursive social structures that create shared experiences and serve as a kind of cultural common ground. Indeed, “cultural common ground of this type is . . . almost definitional of culture, as a culture is constituted by those practices, norms, and institutions that we all know that we all know together collectively” (p. 61).
There is indeed much to affirm about Tomasello’s theory of human ontogeny as it relates to the nexus of psychological science, cultural anthropology, and constructive theology. Perhaps the most consequential aspect of his argument for practitioners of psychology, which sets up all the others, is the basic notion taken from evolutionary developmental biology that natural selection may be operating on ontogeny itself, and not just on certain adaptive traits. Not only does this approach problematize other evolutionary accounts that conceive of individuals as nothing more than vehicles designed to replicate genetic code (e.g., the “survival machines” of Dawkins, 1989), but it also suggests that both the pace of development and the timing of those changes have significant effects at later developmental stages. That which is at one stage an adaptive form of cognition may, at another stage, function as a non-adaptive byproduct, while still at another stage it may be a capacity that, while presently dormant, is a necessary precursor to a developmental future that is yet-to-come.
Another aspect of Tomasello’s account that psychological practitioners may find interesting concerns the ways in which the development of uniquely human cognition gives rise to moral norms. Given the hyper-social, cooperatively collaborative cultural context in which social cognition develops, humans are able to construct entirely new concepts that are otherwise inaccessible for great apes—concepts like an objective (perspectiveless) view of reality and a shared “we” that leads to normative self-regulation (of the individual and the group). At some point along the way, these cultural conditions “ratchet up” human cognition in such a way that “the decision-making agent gives weight to the goals, values, and expectations of others, and normatively expects them to do the same” (p. 190). Thus are born new dimensions of human social relatedness, including collaboration, prosociality, social norms, and moral identity.
One does not have to be a psychologist, however, to benefit from Tomasello’s work. Although not written with a theological audience in mind, Tomasello’s evo-devo approach toward human cognition and the cultural niche(s) in which humans are implicated is also helpful theologically insofar as it offers a coherent picture of how anthropology and cultural development are integrally related. For instance, a hyper-social account of what distinguishes humans from great apes is a notion that social trinitarians (e.g., Grenz, 2000; Johnson, 2014) have long advanced regarding not merely the Godhead, but the creatures who bear the image of that hyper-social God. But in Tomasello’s account, uniquely human sociality extends beyond individuals and includes other personal agents and the surrounding environs to which they actively attend (and intend). Much more work needs to be done theologically concerning the ways in which this kind of cultural niche-making is part and parcel of what makes us uniquely human and, by extension, image bearers of the trinitarian God.
For instance, what are the theological implications for understanding cultural production, transmission, and development (i.e., cultural evolution) in terms of the imago Dei? On the one hand, it would mean that a robust theological anthropology must account in some way for humanity’s basic cultural embeddedness—for the various recursive social structures that constitute the human qua human. On the other hand, it would also mean (or at least imply) that God too is caught up in this web of sociality, not only within the inner trinitarian life, but also as the second person of the Trinity becomes enfleshed in the human condition. Is a fully human Jesus, for example, subject to these same ontogenetic pathways and, thus, not quite fully human at certain stages of development? Or is it better to say that Jesus is always already fully human just as the theological tradition has long suggested, but that our conception of being “fully human” must now include stages of development in which certain cognitive capacities that we would describe as “uniquely human” remain inert?
These potential upsides notwithstanding, there are at least two aspects of Tomasello’s evo-devo account that seem to be somewhat under-developed and, as such, are prime areas of opportunity for theology (and theologically informed psychology) to make a significant contribution. In both cases, the issue is less about Tomasello’s work per se, and more about the limits of evolutionary theory in general. The first has to do with what is meant by ultimate. Whether it concerns moral norms, prosociality, justice, or even something as low-level as in-group bias, the purely functional descriptions and explanations of evolutionary theory are, at best, thin, and at worst, question begging. Tomasello’s project assumes that ultimate explanations are those that are about fitness and nothing more. But something important, indeed, something fundamental to what it means to be a human is missing in this construal of “ultimacy.” The theological tradition has something critical to say at this juncture—something about the origin of moral norms, yes, but also something about the very notion of an “objective” view that underwrites moral self-governance.
Along similar lines, a central component of Tomasello’s theory is the idea that maturational capacities develop over time as they adapt to species-unique environments. Yet, as important as these environmental conditions are for the development of uniquely human cognition, the given-ness of these conditions is never really addressed. The question remains: whither the environment? Tomasello provides a compelling description of the hyper-social cultural context that has, over time, come to constitute what it means to be human. But it remains a description, not an explanation, at least not an exhaustive or ultimate explanation. Here, Christian theology is uniquely equipped to provide the theoretical apparatus necessary for broaching the topic of the conditions in which human life unfolds. It of course will only ever be one option among a host of other viable candidates, but at the very least, the doctrine of Creation provides some intellectual resources for constructing a truly explanatory account of the uniquely human environment that gives rise to uniquely human cognition.
That being said, Tomasello’s work is to be lauded, embraced even, not only by psychologists, but also by theologians, especially those working in the field of theological anthropology. Becoming Human would make a fine contribution to any course in evolutionary psychology or evolutionary or biological anthropology, but also in graduate courses exploring theological engagements with culture. There is simply no substitute for the wealth of experimental studies that Tomasello brings to the table, and theologians would do well to find ways to incorporate his findings into their own research, teaching, and scholarship.
