Sociopolitical obstacles to Christian unity in Myanmar: A missiological appraisal

Abstract

In addition to the challenges of competing religious and secular worldviews in Myanmar, there are also a number of inherent social and political realities, which hinder intertribal Christian unity, that must be addressed missiologically. This article considers, first, the theme of isolation in Myanmar’s social construct: specifically, the reality of the “plural society”; the way in which tribes are identified independently of one another (ethnonyms); and the way in which the tribes (as in-groups) view outgroups (“image theory”). Then, it considers the mistrust that has developed in the wake of political destabilization and human rights concerns, while recognizing the political fluidity presently on display in Myanmar’s apparent climate of rapprochement.

Keywords

Myanmar missions social issues political issues human rights image theory ethnonyms

Introduction

Division is almost as common to the global Christian community as the core convictions that define it, as even denominationalism attests. This division is undergirded, of course, by divergent theological convictions, as well as a variety of other potential divisors. For instance, there are historical occasions of disunity in the church because of theologies of race (Engdahl, 2012; Goodwin, 1984; Harvey, 2012), economics (McConnell, 2000), and even political ideologies (Patterson and Lenerville, 2011). While much can be learned from these discussions, which bears directly upon the issue of unity in the churches of Myanmar,¹ there remains a lacuna with regard to the disunifying effect of tribal identity, particularly as it is expressed in that nation. Within Myanmar’s unique sociopolitical construct, the church must confront a host of potentially divisive influences. Some of these will be considered in this article: tribal leadership, the plural society, ethnonyms, and image theory.

These are critical issues for missiology. In the history of Christian missions in Burma, there is even evidence that Western missionaries, at times, exacerbated the divisions between tribes, even if only by tacitly overlooking the reality of intertribal conflict (Curtis, 2018). This author has been directly involved in this dilemma: working in Myanmar with Christian leaders from different tribes, who were unwilling to study and/or serve together, due to suspicions and concerns brought about solely by their tribal differences. Further, while there has been a dearth of literature supporting this reality, recent research (Curtis, 2016) has demonstrated the reality of intertribal disunity in churches among a sampling of pastors and laypeople in three representative tribes (Chin, Kachin, and Karen). The missiological challenge presented by these divisors can only be addressed through holistic theological education, as this article will conclude.

Isolationism in the social construct of Myanmar

It is perhaps best to begin with the “official” view of intertribal and cross-religious harmony, as described by the government of Myanmar, and then seek to deconstruct this view in light of the reality presented by the opposing views of the people of Myanmar. An article entitled “Freedom of Religion in the Republic of the Union of Myanmar” in the Global New Light of Myanmar (Sein, 2016) declared,

It is known that there has already been freedom of religion in the Republic of the Union of Myanmar since a thousand years ago. Altogether 135 national races have been living harmoniously and peacefully in the Republic of the Union of Myanmar since [the] dawn of ancient history …

The Myanmar national races live harmoniously and peacefully and always pay respect and loving-kindness to each other in spite of their different religious faiths, and any problems, difficulties and conflicts never arise among them relating to their belief in different religions … financial grants and other necessary materials for the communities of religions are supported and provided by the Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar in order to promote and flourish their religions.

While such declarations describe a harmonious situation indeed, it bears little reflection upon the state of Myanmar in fact, for as prominent sociologist Jürgen Habermas writes, “Hidden behind any fade of cultural homogeneity lurks, at best, the oppressive maintenance of a hegemonic majority culture” (cited in Rosenberg, 2001: 4). Such is the case in Myanmar, as shall be demonstrated in the following discussion.

First, the article itself must be viewed warily, as it may be shown that, in Myanmar, the press has long been heavily censored by the ruling junta. In 2006, World Audit wrote of Myanmar,

The ruling military junta zealously implements a 1996 decree banning speech or statements that “undermine national stability,” and those who publicly express or disseminate views that are critical of the regime are subject to strict penalties, including lengthy prison terms. A number of journalists and writers continued to serve lengthy sentences as a result of expressing dissident views.

While there have been indications of a freeing of the press (Associated Press, 2013), the Committee to Protect Journalists (2015) still listed Myanmar as one of the top-ten, most-censored nations as recently as April of 2015 (as well as one of the top-ten nations for jailing journalists whose reports are considered “anti-state”) and the problem persists (Hogan, 2017).

Despite the addition of non-government controlled media outlets, the most widely disseminated ones remain the organs of the former State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). The national newspaper, Global New Light of Myanmar, quoted above, is one such organ. Also, the Global New Light is hardly an unbiased source, as it is known to be a vehicle for government propaganda, and, consistent with the practice of “saving face,” common to Asian cultures, to present the most auspicious perspective. The idea that there is (or has ever been) such a state of bliss in Myanmar (religious or otherwise) defies the nation’s very history, which is replete with evidence of division (South, 2008; Curtis, 2016), as perpetuated by the culture itself, as well as by traditions and even the leaders of each tribe (Kipgen, 2010: 163–173; Kuhn, 2013; Wong and Kessel, 2012).

The authority of these tribal leaders cannot be overstated. In a discussion of tribal leadership within Islamic traditions, Zaidi (2010: 134) makes an assessment that is equally relevant in all tribal cultures, writing that tribal barriers serve to protect “the familiar cocoons of cultural identity” and that, when these barriers are threatened, the tribe experiences a “weakening of [the] central genealogical principle of common descent, which again engenders a loss of identity.” This identity vis-à-vis tribalism is an ancient reality in Myanmar, as well. Further, each tribe is subdivided—first into clans and then into family groups (which can extend quite broadly, as well as deeply). Each tribe, just as with each clan and family, is subject to a hierarchy of leadership and authority. One of the principle functions of this hierarchy is to maintain the status quo or, the “cocoons of cultural identity.” Thus, when anyone from the tribe (such as Christian pastors) seeks to tear at this genealogical fabric (by, for instance, seeking education in another tribe’s theological institution), the tribal leaders may feel compelled to intervene. This intervention perpetuates the sense of tribal factionalism and further inhibits the potential for a trans-tribal unity of the Christian community. In part, because of the influence of these tribal leaders (as well as other factors discussed below), Myanmar remains an uncomfortably and unnaturally cobbled together plural society.

Myanmar as a plural society

In his seminal work, Colonial Policy and Practice, Fabian socialist² and pro-Burmese activist J.S. Furnivall (1948) developed the idea of the “plural society” to describe those cultures, such as exist in Myanmar, where different peoples interact in commerce, strictly for economic reasons, but were “so atomized that they had lost the ability to form a common social will, thereby weakening the social demand necessary to organize activities to improve social welfare” (Pham, 2005: 322). In other words, they mix but they do not combine. Furnivall was uniquely focused on Myanmar when he developed his thesis, as he spent fifty-eight years of his life in the country as a representative of the Indian Civil Service until he was expelled by the isolationist government of President Ne Win in 1960. Although Furnivall’s emphasis was on the theme of colonialism as a detriment to social welfare, his conclusions are applicable to the issue at hand, as well. Specifically, the tribal interactions in Myanmar, limited as they are to the “necessities” of the marketplace, must engage on a broader level if there is to be deeper unity.

Furnivall (1931: ix) saw the solution to this fracturing in an increased, postcolonial nationalism, writing, “Nationalism in Myanmar is morally right, and economically sound and may be made economically attractive.” For the purpose of this study, the answer (as least as regards the fracturing among believers) lies not in any form of nationalism, of course, but rather in a fuller understanding of Christian unity.

Drawing on the social theory of Ferdinand Tönnies, Furnivall saw colonialism as causal in “rupturing the Burmese Gemeinschaft” (Pham, 2005: 322). However, it is the goal of this study to discern what ruptured (or even, in some relationships, prevented) the Christian Gemeinschaft and, further, to discern what prompted the development of a variant Gesellschaft in its place (“variant” in that it is not the interests of the individual that are being promoted, as is the case in classic expressions of Gesellschaft, but rather the interests of the subgroups of the society: the tribes, or even the clans within the tribes).

Commenting upon Tönnies’s theory, Bauman (2001: 10) notes both the importance of Gemeinschaft in a community and the difference between a true and an imposed Gemeinschaft (the latter of which is really no Gemeinschaft at all). He writes,

[Tönnies] suggested that what distinguished the bygone community from the rising (modern) society (Gesellschaft) … was an understanding shared by all its members. Not a consensus, mind you: consensus is but an agreement reached by essentially differently minded people, a product of hard negotiation and compromise, of a lot of bickering, much contrariness, and occasional fisticuffs. The community-style, matter-of-factly (zuhanden, as Martin Heidegger would say) understanding does not need to be sought, let alone laboriously built or fought for: that understanding “is there,” ready-made and ready to use—so that we understand each other “without words” and never need to ask, apprehensively, “what do you mean?”

This, then, is what underlies the issue in Myanmar: the government has sought to cobble together a harmony amongst the various people groups. To the extent that there is an appearance of success, it is quickly revealed to be but a surface harmony, as the workaday interactions between dissimilar peoples belie any deep or meaningful unity. This extends, unfortunately, into the Christian communities, as well, as recent research has shown (Curtis, 2016: 241–276).

In a similar vein as Tönnies’s Gemeinschaft, Rosenberg (2001: 3) speaks of a “warm circle”—that is, an environment of community where the people in the circle “won’t have to prove anything, and whatever they do they may expect sympathy and help.” He goes on to explain, “Nation-state democracy is thereby inherently split, between the warm circle of belonging, identity and emotional loyalties on one hand, and the cold sphere of citizenship, political institutions and constitutional loyalties (justice) on the other.” This, then, represents the reality of the plural society in Myanmar: these “warm circles,” or this Gemeinschaft, do exist; however, they are strictly defined in terms of ethnic and/or tribal identity and not, with regard to Christians in Myanmar, preeminently by their identity in Christ, irrespective of other identifiers. Where there is interaction amongst Christians of different tribal backgrounds, it is more likely to reflect Rosenberg’s idea of a “cold sphere” than of a “warm circle” (Curtis, 2016: 241ff.). Thus, the plural society in Myanmar has exacerbated the problem of disunity in the church.

The social impact of ethnonyms in Myanmar

Behind the plural society in Myanmar lies the simple differentiation of tribal identities by name; that is, each person claims for his identity an ethnonym, which serves to classify him, both to others claiming the same name as well as to those claiming a different name. While there is a rich history of a number of diverse people groups migrating into Myanmar from as early as the ninth century (Khai, 1984; Sakhong, 2007), there are legitimate questions surrounding the lingering effects of those historical traditions. Nevertheless, despite the changes that may have been wrought by coexistence in a plural society for centuries, the ethnonyms persist. Thus, the tribal moniker itself is a powerful divider, irrespective of whether any significant differences actually undergird the name(s).

There has been an academic debate as to the legitimacy of ethic identities, particularly as they relate in Myanmar. For instance, Leach (cited by Aung-Thwin, 2008: 693) argues that there may be only “myth” connecting the tribes historically. Other authors suggest that the tribal divisions in Myanmar are “imaginary” (Sakhong, 2007: 208), exogenous, and/or political (Michio, 2007; Sadan, 2007). The Kachin, for instance, were originally called such in derision by Tibetans who viewed the tribal people as inferior “savages” (Hanson, 1907: 382)—though Sadan (2007: 43ff.) argues for colonial origination of the ethnonym—yet now they claim the name as their own identifier. Similarly, as Lieberman (1978: 469) notes, “The very category ‘Karen’ was a derogatory invention of the Burmese which was only given respectability by Christian missionaries in the nineteenth century.” Sakhong (2007: 200) argues that the ethnic identity “Chin” may have originated with the missionaries who arrived in the eighteenth century. Aung-Thwin (2008: 694) pushes back, however, noting that because

[B]oth exonyms and ethnonyms of these ethnic groups under discussion can be found centuries earlier during the Pagan and Ava periods, when such relationships obviously also existed, the role played by colonialism and the nation-state in [the] classificatory process of reifying ethnicity is only part of the story.

Elsewhere, Aung-Thwin (1998: 147) draws from the historical record to minimize the degree to which ethnicity played a part in power struggles in Myanmar, stating, “[E]thnicity was neither implied nor explicitly stated to have been a major causal factor” in such struggles. This is a naïve assumption, however, for, as De la Perrière (2009: 287) replies, “to sustain this position by arguing that [it is found] in the Burmese sources is to forget that the Burmese chronicles being the emanation of Burmese power, written to legitimate it, it could hardly have recognized ethnic difference as a causal factor.”

Finally, Lehman (cited in Aung-Thwin, 2008: 693) suggests that ethnic identity is always relational and, to the extent that this is true, the ethnonyms in Myanmar continue to matter because of the relationships within each tribal identity. Mon (2010: 56) expounds on this idea, noting that ethnic identities are formed “by sharing common myths, ancestors, language, culture, historical memories, and territory.” It is unquestionable that generations spent in close relationship creates a deep bond, and this is certainly the case among those identified in Myanmar by their various ethnonyms. Thus, while it is not the purpose of this study to attempt to prove unequivocally that genuine ethnic divisions exist in Myanmar, it is germane to the discussion to argue that ethnic divisions are believed to exist, irrespective of the justification(s) for such beliefs.

Perhaps a more familiar situation will demonstrate this conceptual influence of ethnic identities. For instance, while the European Union (EU) may strive to create a unified identity among the various member states, it is unlikely that many will ever identify solely as “European,” as opposed to French, German, and so forth. Renard (1987: 286) recalls, “Romantics and nationalists like Lord Byron and Giuseppi Mazzini believed that nations possessed a mythical individuality based on a shared heritage and a common culture.” This, he says, led to the move away from empires (such as the Austro-Hungarian) and toward the creation of new nations (such as Italy and Germany) around their respective, shared heritages. Regardless of the extent to which such Romantic notions of common cultures were legitimate, the reality remains that, after successive generations adopt an ethnonym, such beliefs are embedded into one’s identity.

It may be argued that this is not a valid comparison, as the ethnic divisions (real or not) in Europe were (and are) at least demarcated by national boundaries, whereas those in Myanmar coexist within the same nation. However, the geopolitical boundaries in Myanmar (as in many other places) are, at least to some degree, purely the product of colonial cartography: lands and people partitioned for the political and/or economic benefit of the colonizers. Hlaing (2008: 239–240) observes, “the history of Myanmar does not imply more than the history of a sequence of sociopolitical entities that have ‘evolved’ into what we now call Myanmar, a product in many ways of British colonial construction.” He goes on to argue that the predecessors of the modern nation-state were, in fact, not “Burma” or “Myanmar,” but the several tribal kingdoms in the ancient past. Thus, in Myanmar as in Europe, the attachment to ethnonyms (whether French, German, or British or Chin, Kachin, or Karen) predate any broader, unifying identity (whether European or Burmese).

As yet another example, in the United States, each of the principle regions (and many of the subdivisions within those regions) possesses a lingering identity with different cultural/ethnic heritages, as attested to by the regional identifiers or hyphenated expressions used to define them: Southerner, Midwesterner, African American, Italian-American, and so forth. These ethnonyms are often worn as badges of honor and, conversely, even employed as terms of derogation by others. It could be argued that in the United States, as in Europe and even in Myanmar, the modern world has brought about a lessening of the real distinctions between the historically disparate groups. Though plural societies may combine but not mix, that combining, in and of itself, results in some measure of overlapping and blurring of cultural differences. Still, the ethnonyms persist and, perhaps in reaction to the loss of real cultural distinction, take on even greater vitality and thus become the distinction. Therefore, regardless of whether there are any real cultural distinctions between different tribes, the ethnonyms themselves suggest that there are.

The challenge, then, is whether it is reasonable to expect people who hold tightly to their ethnonyms to discard them in favor of assimilation into a broader identity (whether national, e.g. “Burmese,” or religious, e.g. “Christian”). This latter consideration is a missiological concern throughout the world. In many nations, for instance, it is a persistent challenge to cultivate a “multi-ethic” congregation. The missiological (and ecclesiological) questions remain: How can the church move past this inherent sense of separatism—even if it is merely subconscious—that results from an attraction to others like us (race, language, etc.)? Even as a missionary, this writer has to resist the urge to spend time exclusively with other missionaries and expatriates from the West! Ethonyms in and of themselves are not necessarily divisors; however, they demarcate the boundaries of “in-groups,” which then exacerbates the distinctions between groups: even among Christians within those groups. Research (Curtis, 2016: 264–267) has demonstrated that Christians in Myanmar identify themselves, chiefly, by their ethnonym and only secondarily by their faith. This problem is compounded when people are not only attracted to those like them but are wary of—or even hostile to—those not like them, as the following section will discuss.

Image theory as a contributing factor in intertribal relations

Not only is it important to consider how the various tribes view themselves (in-groups), it is equally important to consider how these tribes view others (out-groups): that is, how they understand the distinctions that separate them (and those like them) from those not like them. Ethnonyms not only lead people to feel that they belong together but also to sense that they are “different” in some way(s) from “other types of human group[s] and social bond[s]” (Smith, 1999: 127). Image theory may help to ascertain critical elements of this difference in perception.

In 1959, Boulding (1959: 120–121) introduced the idea of image as “the total cognitive, affective, and evaluative structure of the behavioural unit, or its internal view of itself and its universe.” In 1977, Richard Cottam (1977: 62) developed image theory as a way of acknowledging that “man behaves in perceptually patterned way[s].” Originally conceived as a method for understanding international relations (Bilali, 2011: 1), this theory promoted the idea that nation-states both project an image of themselves and visualize an image of the other nation-state(s). The theory developed largely around the “mirror perceptions” held by the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In 1986, Martha Cottam expanded the theory to the “cognitive process of categorization and specifically the assignment of characteristics to external entities (as opposed to internal motivation)” (Young and Schafer, 1998: 80). In so doing, she described image as a way to provide “the perceiver with a body of knowledge about the perceived” (Cottam and Cottam, 2001: 88).

Image theory is closely related to “stereotypes,” and as such, has been applied to relationships other than political. For instance, Michael Infranco (2005) studied genocide in Rwanda and Bosnia using image theory. Also, Alexander, Brewer, and Livingston (2005: 1) used image theory to study race relations in the United States, in an attempt “to better understand divergent interethnic images and to highlight the important role of intergroup context and perceived intergroup relations in shaping the content of social stereotypes.” In so doing, they demonstrated that it can prove helpful as a general model of intergroup relations and, thus for present purposes, as a particular model when analyzing the way in which the various tribes in Myanmar perceive other tribes.

Cottam and Cottam (2001: 96) suggest that image theory may also be defined as “in-groups and out-groups.” As such, images provide information (whether factual or not) about out-groups, which offers “an automatic screen that helps us to determine what is correct or important and what is false or irrelevant” (Cottam, 1994: 18). Mon (2010: 25) adds that, “When compared to beliefs and attitudes, an image is considered to be more difficult to change. Once it is formed, image is hard to change.” He goes further to note, “If it changes, most of the time, it changes only in intensity.” Finally, as Lehman (2007: 115) summarizes, “it is a common ethnographic fact that each ethnic ‘group’ sees itself always in contrast with neighbouring groups.” Research has shown (Curtis, 2016: 264–267) that, among Christians in Chin, Kachin, and Karen tribes, 70% of those interviewed identify themselves, first, by their ethnonym and, only secondarily, as “Christian.” Further, a significant number of subjects (48%) believe that their “in-group” is viewed negatively by those in other tribes. This leads many (32%) to value relationships with those who share their ethnonym over those who do not. Consequently, they are more inclined to seek tribal relationships than intertribal Christian relationships. For instance, 45% of subjects—and fully 25% of pastors interviewed—from these three tribes believe that it is more important that their children marry within the tribe than marry a Christian. To the extent that there are differences between the perceptions of the Christians and the non-Christians, these are most often merely differences of degree (or “intensity”). It is clear, then, that the way in which the tribes view out-groups remains a challenging obstacle for Christian unity among believers from different tribes and, thus, of concern to missions, as these perceptions and their impact upon unity must be addressed missiologically.

Politics and human rights

Political destabilization and mistrust

As has already been suggested, the extremely fluid nature of the political situation in Myanmar at present renders improbable a durable analysis. However, current events in the political situation at the time of this writing are legitimate considerations when discussing obstacles to the unity of the church. For instance, in the weeks leading up to the November 2015 elections, President Thein Sein orchestrated the ouster of Shwe Mann, his chief rival within the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), in an apparent effort to minimize his political risks, as Mann had recently aligned himself with the popular leader of the opposition, Aung San Suu Kyi (Radio Free Asia, August 13, 2015). This tension within the ruling party seemed, at the time, to belie Sein’s repeated gestures toward honest political discourse, fair elections, and a vigorous pursuit of acceptance by the international community. The hope (and, in fact, the promise) was that the military junta was gradually stepping aside in favor of a government elected by, and representative of, the people. After Sein’s crafty dismissal of his chief adversary, however, one commentator opined, “Don’t be fooled by the display of colourful logos and slogans from various political parties: The army is back in force” (Zin, 2015). Nevertheless, the National League for Democracy (NLD), the party of Aung San Suu Kyi, posted an overwhelming victory. However, with the Constitution mandating that the military retain 25% of the seats—and with any significant legislative or constitutional changes requiring 76% of the Hluttaw (parliament), it seems unlikely that the new government will be able to institute any sweeping changes (at least not without the cooperation of the military). Further, the military also retains control of the important ministries of defense, home affairs, and border affairs.

Thus, even though the elections defied conventional wisdom and gave the people of Myanmar much hope, many insiders remain convinced that, to some extent at least, Myanmar will continue to operate as, what one local terms, a “military monopolistic capitalism” (BBC, 2015). That is, while the military continues to exert control (even if it is only in the form of ensuring that they maintain a sufficient number of seats to veto any legislation with which they disagree), they also continue to present themselves as a viable market for, and participant in, international commerce. This has the net effect of lessening global tensions and removing some of the stain of controversy related to Myanmar in the eyes of the world while, at the same time, doing little to dispel the concerns of its own citizens, who well remember the despotic rule of the junta. At that time, the government would employ countless citizens to spy on their neighbors, reporting back with any evidence of “anti-state” activities. The active practice and propagation of evangelical Christianity was numbered among such activities, with one persecuted but optimistic pastor putting it this way: “Nothing is legal but everything is possible, when it comes to church work” (Seymour, 2015). Even as recently as 2015, the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF, 2015) declared, “Discrimination against non-Buddhists through law, regulation, and practice … is pervasive in Myanmar.”

The challenge remains, therefore, for the Christians in Myanmar to discern between the soaring rhetoric about freedom and a “new era,” on the one hand, and their lingering and painful memories, coupled with ongoing experiences that conflict with the rhetoric, on the other. Additionally, the Christians in Myanmar, as those in other nations, have taken various stances with regard to the political situation in their country. Some are more active participants in the political process (protesting, attending rallies, and so forth) while others watch more cautiously from the perimeter. Some back the party of Suu Kyi (the National League for Democracy) while others continue to encourage reform from within the USDP. Those on opposite sides of the political discourse—even if they are Christians—are increasingly finding themselves likely to be ridiculed by those on the other side, whose positions are held with equal fervor—even when those on the opposite side are fellow believers. In this climate of sociopolitical confusion then, the church in Myanmar finds solace in varying degrees of isolation. Confining interaction (other than the economic interaction of the plural society) to one’s own local church or tribe is simply seen as safer than traversing church or tribal boundaries where one might encounter social persecution or even political prosecution.

A climate of human rights violations

The struggle for growth and maturity among the Christian churches in Myanmar must occur within the confines of the larger human rights issues that continue to plague the nation. While the pursuit of social, economic, and/or political justice does not by itself represent the historic definition of the gospel (Glasser and McGavran, 1985: 156), it is nevertheless true that any activity—whether of a Christian or non-Christian nature—must confront the reality of the social structure in which it exists. In Myanmar, where there have long been concerns about human rights violations, this is especially the case—even in light of the progress that appears to have been made.

It has been said by a Burmese national that “human rights are anathema to the Burmese military generals” (Win, 2000: 170). Whether this is still the case remains to be seen. Rampant drug manufacturing, distribution, and use; human trafficking and child slavery; widespread abuse and diminution of women—all are endemic to the Burmese culture and all, to varying degrees, have been sanctioned or even perpetrated by the nation’s rulers (Winn, 2016).³ The drug trade is, in fact, an integral component of the Burmese economy, as Myanmar is second only to Afghanistan in heroin production (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2014: 15). The drug trade is also closely connected with much of the country’s problems, historically. One author summarizes the matter this way: “Political crisis, civil war and human rights violations in Myanmar are always related with the notorious golden triangle drug trade” (Sakhong, 2001: 526). Yet the local churches in Myanmar have a long history of attempting to interject, in the name of Christ, benevolence and charity into a culture where such qualities are “officially” lacking. However, research has revealed (Curtis, 2016) that even in such benevolence, there is little interaction between Christians of different tribes. On the contrary, this author has personal knowledge of several instances (related to the tragedy of Cyclone Nargis in 2008) where churches refused to work together in relief efforts—simply because they were from different tribes. Such intentional acts of grace and love must continue to be practiced, yet across tribal divisors—among the Buddhists, the tribal people, and among the churches themselves, through intertribal dialogue and reciprocal service.

Missionaries called to serve among the Burmese must never forget that this is a nation with a uniquely painful past—a past that haunts most of the older generation and not a few of the children. These are not ancient memories, but they are deep. Thus, the local churches in Myanmar are in particular need of training and resources that will provide guidance as they seek to heal themselves, each other, and their countrymen.

Conclusion

It has been shown that isolationism is endemic to the tribal culture in Myanmar, beginning with the often-divisive role of tribal leaders. This isolation is further evident in the nation’s plural society—both in how the tribes self-identify (ethnonyms) and in how they view those outside of their respective tribes (image theory). This isolationistic tendency is not limited to the non-Christian population, but extends to the churches, as well. It has also been demonstrated that the political environment in Myanmar has long created an atmosphere of mistrust—both in the government and in others (outside of the “warm circle” of one’s own tribe or clan) who are seen as sympathetic to the government. This, too, has been counter-productive to the development of intertribal relationships, even within the church. Finally, it has been shown that there are a number of human rights issues in Myanmar, which define the social structure in which the church exists. The mature response of intertribal Christian unity will likely not be fully realized until either this structure is fundamentally corrected or the churches themselves are adequately instructed in how to relate to one another on a higher plane, which reflects their common bond in Christ. The former is not likely (in the near term) or reasonable to expect (given Myanmar’s history), so the latter must prevail. Any successful missiological response, therefore, must incorporate holistic theological education, through all available channels (institutional/programmatic instruction, TEE, etc.).

Properly conveyed, the message of holistic theological education would encompass every aspect of the lives of the Christians in Burma, as well as equipping them to be effective instruments of the gospel in the world around them. In particular, it could provide to pastors, both present and prospective, the knowledge and discipleship necessary to teach new Christians the true antidote for tribal disunity. They will begin to better understand who they are in Christ, elevating that identity above even their tribal or cultural identities. They will begin to better understand their calling in Christ, both in how they are to conduct their own lives and how they are to interact with others—both believers and non-believers. Finally, they will begin to better understand God’s will for them and for all the people of Burma, irrespective of tribal identity. As Wright (2006: 358) has said, “[Christians] are called to be a light to the nations. But there can be no light to the nations that is not shining already in transformed lives of a holy people.” Therefore, the goal of holistic theological education in Burma must be to transform the lives of succeeding generations of pastors so that they can transform their communities and their cultures to reflect the Kingdom of God.

Footnotes

Funding

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

Notes

ORCID iD

Steve Curtis

Author biography

Steve Curtis (DMin, PhD) is Extraordinary Researcher (Missiology) for North-West University (Potchefstroom) and the International Director of Timothy Two Project, International (). In this capacity, he has worked since 2011 to nurture theological maturity among indigenous pastors in the Majority World, serving in dozens of countries throughout Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

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