Let the People Speak

Abstract

Democracy and press freedom have a long, intertwined history. This article builds on previous research examining democratic consolidation by developing a theoretical model to explicate the multilevel relationships between the openness of national media systems and citizens’ perceptions about press freedom in emerging democracies. We combine individual-level public opinion data from the 2007 Pew Global Attitudes Survey with institutional data from Freedom House to examine institutional and individual predictors of perceived supply and citizen demand for press freedom. The results of the analyses demonstrate a relationship between characteristics of national media systems and citizen perceptions and preferences about press freedom, although individual factors such as educational attainment, reliance on print media, evaluations of media and state performance, and regime support play a more meaningful role in shaping perceptions about press freedom. Theoretical implications for understanding citizen attitudes about press freedom and their relationship with democratization are discussed.

Keywords

censorship democracy international press freedom public opinion

Introduction

An emerging perspective for understanding successful democratization is examining the relationship between citizens’ demand for democracy and the institutional supply of democracy in developing polities. Successful democratic consolidation, where democracy is stable and institutionalized, is more likely when a majority of citizens demand democracy as their preferred form of government and national institutions are capable of supplying democratic governance (Bratton, Mattes, & Gyimah-Boadi, 2005; Mattes & Bratton, 2007).

We build on this theoretical framework work by parceling out one of the most important features of democratic governance—press freedom—and examine citizens’ demand and institutional supply in this context. Understanding the role of a free press in developing countries is important as it may further democratic consolidation and act as a key accountability institution for maintaining a stable democracy. In this study, we move beyond simply examining the macro-level relationships between the supply of press freedom and political and economic outcomes that is representative of most previous scholarship on this topic. Rather, we expand our focus across levels of analysis to examine relationships between macro-level institutional assessments and micro-level citizen attitudes and discuss the consequences for press freedom and democratization in emerging democracies.

Our study begins by outlining the importance of a free press to democratic development and the concepts of supply and demand as they relate to press freedom. We then present a theoretical model predicting a set of multilevel relationships between citizen perceptions about the supply of press freedom in their countries, how much press freedom they demand, and the capacity of their media and political institutions to supply it. Next, applying our theoretical model, we use hierarchal linear modeling (HLM) to explore the multilevel relationships between the institutional supply, perceived supply, and demand for press freedom, combining data from cross-sectional survey of 34 countries conducted by the Pew Global Attitudes project and Freedom House Press Freedom indices. We conclude our article by discussing the theoretical dynamics between the supply and the demand of press freedom and implications for democratic consolidation.

Press Freedom and Democratic Consolidation

Democratic consolidation refers to the institutionalization of democracy, such that it becomes self-sustaining and secure from the threat of authoritarian regression (Mattes & Thiel, 1998; Schedler, 1998). Democracy is considered “consolidated” when democratic “rules” are institutionalized in governing bodies and a normative consensus arises among political actors and the public to abide by these rules (Bratton et al., 2005). In this sense, democratic consolidation is an outcome of both a high supply of democracy, as provided by a country’s governing institutions, coupled with a high demand for democracy by its citizens. Both are necessary for democratic consolidation, and neither alone is sufficient (Bratton et al., 2005).

Scholars and policy makers have long focused on the supply side of the democracy equation by evaluating how governing institutions have incorporated democratic practices (e.g., Fukuyama, 2005; Grindle, 2000; Huntington, 1968, 1991). However, democracy scholars have increasingly turned from merely focusing on institutional assessments to considering the role of public opinion in the democratization process (e.g., Bratton et al., 2005; Colton, 2000; Dalton, Shin, & Jou, 2007; Mattes & Bratton, 2007; Nisbet, 2008; Schmitt-Beck & Voltmer, 2007). In this view, citizen perceptions about the supply of and the demand for democracy are better indicators of democratic consolidation “than any objective scores ratings compiled by experts” (Mattes & Bratton, 2007, p. 193). We see merit in both perspectives, and the study conducted here is one of the first to examine how citizen perceptions and institutional assessments may interact to provide a more comprehensive understanding of a country’s democratic progress.

Democracy is a complex set of institutions and relationships whose definition reflects a range of dimensions, from free and fair elections to the guarantee of political and civil liberties (Dalton, Shin, & Jou, 2007; Diamond & Morlino, 2004; Logan & Mattes, 2010). By disaggregating the key definitional components of democracy, scholars are better able to evaluate the democratic qualities of regimes (Elkins, 2000; Logan & Mattes, 2010) and provide a greater level of theoretical specificity in understanding citizens’ perceptions of democracy. We have chosen to emphasize the definitional component of press freedom, as it plays an integral role in the process of democratic consolidation, influencing both the supply and the demand of democracy in several unique ways (see Bajomi-Lázár, 2008).

First, a free press functions as a reliable information resource to citizens. It provides open access to facts and debate regarding social, political, and economic issues (Schudson, 2003). Research has found that media plays an especially important role in facilitating citizen knowledge and engagement in fledgling democracies (e.g., Mattes & Bratton, 2007; Nisbet, 2008; Schmitt-Beck & Voltmer, 2007). Thus, within emerging democracies, a free press is a key factor shaping the citizen knowledge, perceptions, and behaviors that are the basic foundations for citizen demand for democracy.

Second, a free press is capable of performing a watchdog role of government officials and the bureaucratic process, acting as an accountability institution for the public (Siegle, Weinstein, & Halperin, 2004). This media watchdog leads to greater political stability and less violence, increases the independence of the judicial system and government efficiency because elected leaders are held accountable to their constituents, and decreases political corruption (Chowdhury, 2004; Norris & Inglehart, 2004, 2010). In this sense, a free press is a resource for citizens to evaluate the supply of democracy within their country as well as form opinions about how satisfied they are with how their government operates (Mattes & Bratton, 2007; Schmitt-Beck & Voltmer, 2007).

Third, a free press encourages citizen demand for democracy by socializing citizens into its norms, values, and practices and by creating spaces for open political deliberation (Hoffman, 2002; Lynch, 2005; Mattes & Bratton, 2007; Nisbet, 2008; Schmitt-Beck & Voltmer, 2007). For example, mobilization theory argues that an open media system leads to increases in political knowledge, which mobilizes citizens to engage in both cognitive and behavioral political participation (Newton, 1999). The diffusion of information via the mass media has led to increases in political interest, discussion, and ideological sophistication (Dalton, 1996). Scholars have also found that media furthers civic and political education (e.g., McLeod, Scheufele, & Moy, 1999; Norris, 2000; Scheufele, Hardy, Brossard, Waismel-Manor, & Nisbet, 2006), political participation (e.g., Lemert, Mitzman, Seither, Cook, & Hacket, 1977; McLeod et al., 1996; Norris, 2000; Scheufele, Shanahan, & Kim, 2002), and socialization into democratic values (e.g., Chaffee, Jackson-Beeck, Durall, & Wilson, 1977; Chaffee, Ward, & Tipton, 1970; Chaffee & Yang, 1990).

Despite the advantages of press freedom, only 16% of the world’s population has access to a free press, with the remainder evenly split between partly free and not-free press systems (Freedom House, 2010). Moreover, since 2002, the overall level of press freedom worldwide, as measured by Freedom House, has steadily declined, especially among emerging democracies (Freedom House, 2010). Accompanying this decline has been a lack of democratic consolidation among third-wave democracies, such that many of these countries remain stuck in long, transitory periods, often espousing democracy in name only (Diamond, 2008). We believe these two trends are not coincidental, and an important relationship exists between press freedom and democratic consolidation. Thus, we seek to understand which factors promote institutional supply, citizens’ perceptions of supply, and demand for press freedom in order to ensure press institutions are able to facilitate democratic consolidation.

Developing a multilevel model of press freedom

Like the scholarship on democratization, the majority of previous research on press freedom has focused on evaluating and assessing the institutional supply of press freedom and how it may be associated with macro political, social, or economic institutions or outcomes (e.g., Becker & Vlad, 2007; Besley & Pratt, 2001; Chowdhury, 2004; Lowenstein, 1970; Nam & Oh, 1973; Norris & Inglehart, 2010; Van Belle, 1997, 2000). Several nongovernmental organizations such as Freedom House, Reporters sans Frontiéres, and the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) have established quantitative indices to measure and assess the supply of press freedom in most countries (for a review of these indices, see Becker & Vlad, 2007) on which a great deal of this research is based.

However, we endeavor to examine press freedom at both the macro and micro levels of analysis by using both these institutional indices in combination with public opinion data. In this study, we use multilevel methods to examine (a) the relationship between contextual variables and individual attitudes and behaviors, (b) the influence of individual predictors on attitudes controlling for contextual variables, and (c) whether the relationships between contextual influences and individual attitudes/behaviors are contingent on individual factors (i.e., cross-level interactions; Snijders & Bosker, 2003; van de Vijver, van Hemert, & Poortinga, 2008). In other words, by developing a multilevel model of press freedom, we can generate specific, empirically verifiable hypotheses about how the characteristics (i.e., degree of press freedom) of national media systems in which citizens are embedded are associated with citizen evaluations and opinions about those media systems.

As a starting point for developing a multilevel model of press freedom, we built on work by Vlad and Becker (2009), who examined the correlation between the institutional supply of press freedom, as measured by organizations such as Freedom House and IREX, and citizen perceptions of supply, as measured by several cross-national public opinion polls at a country-level analysis. Echoing Mattes and Bratton’s (2007) critique, Vlad and Becker argue citizens may have more of “an understanding of its [media] role in their daily lives” than may be captured by experts’ evaluations of media institutions (p. 11). Vlad and Becker found a strong, though somewhat imperfect, correlation between several different institutional measures of press freedom and citizen perceptions as measured by public opinion surveys.

In a similar manner, we used data collected by the Freedom House organization assessing the institutional supply of press freedom¹ and the 2007 Pew Global Attitudes Survey² examining citizen perceptions about the supply for press freedom in 34 countries. At a between-country level of analysis, we standardized both sets of measures and examined the correlation between Freedom House indicators and the mean perceived supply of press freedom within our set of thirty-four countries. Our results indicate there is a positive linear relationship between institutional supply of press freedom and mean perceived supply within the sample of 34 countries (r = .501, p ≤ .001; r²= .251), consistent with Vlad and Becker’s (2009) examination.

In comparison, when examining the relationship between the institutional supply of press freedom as measured by Freedom House and mean citizen demand for press freedom, a different set of relationships emerge. Our analysis indicates no relationship (r = –.04, p = n.s.) between a country’s institutional supply of press freedom and the mean demand for press freedom across the sample. This raises the question of whether the relationship between institutional supply and demand for press freedom is contingent upon citizens’ perceived supply of press freedom. In other words, how much citizens demand press freedom may be dependent on how much press freedom they think they possess, rather than actual institutional capacity. Therefore, we examine these relationships and explicate further individual-level variables that may influence either perceived supply or citizen demand for press freedom.

Individual predictors of citizen perceptions about press freedom

At an individual level of analysis, how do citizens make evaluations about the supply of press freedom in their countries and corresponding demand? Citizens are usually conceptualized as “cognitive misers” who rely on a combination of preexisting values or ideology and available informational or affective cues when forming opinions and making political evaluations (Downs, 1957; Hastie & Park, 1986; Popkin, 1991; Zaller, 1992). In this context, we can draw upon previous studies that have examined perceptions about the supply and demand of democracy in general (e.g., Huang, Chang, & Chu, 2008; Mattes & Bratton, 2007; Muller & Seligson, 1994) or citizen perceptions about media and press freedom specifically (e.g., Andsager, Wyatt, & Martin, 2004; Moehler & Singh, 2009). For example, Bratton and his colleagues (Bratton et al., 2005; Mattes & Bratton, 2007) point to citizen evaluations of their country’s institutional performance and overall satisfaction as key cues shaping citizen perceptions about the supply and demand about democracy (see also Huang et al., 2008). They also argue that greater perceived supply of democracy furthers stronger citizen demand for democracy. Other previously explicated predictors of democratic attitudes include interpersonal trust, economic (free market) ideology, support for the governing regime, and ideological orientations about religious secularism and the role of the state (Bratton et al., 2005; Fukuyama, 1995; Huang et al., 2008; Inglehart, 2000, 2005; Mattes & Bratton, 2007; Putnam, 1995, Putnam, Leonardai, & Raffaella, 1993; Schmitt-Beck & Voltmer, 2000).

Unfortunately, previous cross-national research specifically examining predictors of citizen perceptions about the supply and demand for press freedom in emerging democracies is somewhat scant. In addition, research about attitudes toward censorship and press freedom in the United States (e.g., Hayes & Reineke, 2007; Lambe, 2002; Lambe & Reineke, 2009), both in terms of conceptualization and measurement, is highly contextualized and not generalizable cross-nationally. Nevertheless, there are a few studies that specifically address how citizens may form impressions about the supply and demand for press freedom in their countries. For example, some scholars have suggested a relationship between reliance on different forms of media use and citizen perceptions of supply. Becker (2004) and Norris and Inglehart (2010) assert emerging democracies often have “bifurcated” media systems where print media is substantially more free and pluralistic in comparison to electronic media like radio or television, which tend to be more censored and directly managed by the government. As a consequence, individuals who rely on print media for news and information more so than television or radio may perceive a greater supply of press freedom, using the greater plurality of content in their favored media source as a heuristic cue.

Other studies have examined the citizen demand side of the press freedom equation. Moehler and Singh (2009) found beliefs about political corruption and support for the governing regime were heuristic cues that shape citizen preferences for and trust in government-controlled media over private media in a study of 16 Sub-Sahara African nations. Another cross-national study commissioned by Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland identified internet access as strongly associated with citizen demand for open media (Kull, 2010).

Andsager, Wyatt, and Martin’s (2004) examination of citizen perceptions about press freedom across five nations identified education as a key predictor of citizen demand for press freedom (see also Moehler & Singh, 2009), and another cross-national study conducted by PIPA (Kull, 2009) also found education as a key predictor of citizen demand about press freedom, but not perceived supply. This association between education and a greater appetite for press freedom is consistent with previous research on the relationship between educational attainment and demand for democracy in general (e.g., Bratton et al., 2005; Mattes & Bratton, 2007; Schmitt-Beck & Voltmer, 2000).

However, the lack of relationship between education and perceived supply noted by the PIPA survey is curious, as higher-educated individuals are more likely to receive and integrate more informational cues that may allow more accurate political evaluations compared to individuals with lower levels of education (Eveland & Scheufele, 2000; Nisbet, 2008; Nisbet & Myers, 2010; Zaller, 1992). It may be the case that the relationship between education and perceived supply of press freedom is contingent upon institutional supply, with more educated citizens having more accurate evaluations of institutional supply of press freedom than lesser educated citizens. In other words, in nations with a high degree of press freedom, more educated citizens may perceive more press freedom compared to less educated citizens embedded in the same media system, whereas in nations with a low degree of press freedom the converse may be true.

Hypotheses and Research Questions

Drawing upon the relationships we explicated at a macro level of analysis and the previous research on individual predictors shaping attitudes about press freedom discussed above, we propose a set of hypotheses and research questions that form a multilevel model of press freedom that explicates a series relationships between institutions and citizens. The first set of hypotheses test the relationship between a country’s institutional supply of press freedom and citizen perceptions of supply and demand. They state:

Hypothesis 1: A country’s institutional supply of press freedom will be positively associated with citizens’ perceptions about the supply of press freedom in their country.

Hypothesis 2a: A country’s institutional supply of press freedom will be positively associated with citizens’ demand for press freedom in their country.

Furthermore, we propose the relationship between institutional supply and citizen demand is contingent upon a citizens’ perceived supply of press freedom.

Hypothesis 2b: The relationship between citizens’ demand for press freedom and country’s institutional supply of press freedom varies (moderated) by citizens’ perceived supply of press freedom.

At the individual level of analysis, we hypothesize three sets of “within-group” relationships that are consistent across countries. First, citizen perceptions about the supply of press freedom in their country will be associated with demand for press freedom. Second, citizens who rely on newspapers more so than other media sources will perceive greater press freedom compared to citizens who rely on television or radio. Last, citizen support for a country’s governing regime will be associated with greater perceived supply of press freedom. Thus, we formally state:

Hypothesis 3: Citizens’ perceived supply of press freedom will be positively associated with citizens’ demand for press freedom.

Hypothesis 4: Reliance on print media increases citizens’ perceived supply of press freedom.

Hypothesis 5: Support for the governing regime increases citizens’ perceived supply of press freedom.

In addition to our hypotheses, drawing upon the literature about democracy attitudes in general, and the role of education, we also pose a set of research questions for our analysis:

Research Question 1: How are evaluations of state and media performance associated with citizens’ perceived supply of press freedom?

Research Question 2: Does the association between educational attainment and citizens’ perceived supply of press freedom vary (moderated) by the country’s institutional supply of press freedom?

Research Question 3: How are media use, regime support, evaluations/satisfaction with the state, and media performance associated with citizens’ demand for press freedom?

Research Question 4: How are citizens’ interpersonal trust, political orientations, and economic ideology associated with citizens’ demand for press freedom?

Figure 1 combines our hypotheses and research questions into one model and illustrates the multilevel relationships we will examine in our analysis. In addition, we wish to note that the relationship between citizen demand and institutional supply is recursive (as noted with the dashed arrow), with the assumption that citizen demand over time will increase the level of institutional supply of press freedom in an emerging democracy until a stable equilibrium between supply and demand is reached (Bajomi-Lázár, 2008; Bratton et al., 2005; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Mattes & Bratton, 2007; Welzel, 2007). However, we are unable to test this hypothesis with the data available at this time.⁴

Figure 1.

Multilevel model of institutional supply and citizen perceptions of press freedom.

Method

Data Collection and Coding

To test the aforementioned hypotheses and research questions, a secondary data analysis was conducted using data from the 2007 Pew Global Attitudes Survey; Freedom House press freedom ratings for the years 2005, 2006, and 2007; and the 2007 Human Development Index (HDI), compiled by the United Nations. The Pew Global Attitudes project conducts national public opinion surveys using probability samples of the adult population.⁵

Freedom House compiles annual press freedom ratings for 195 countries that assess the freedom of the political, economic, and legal environments in which media systems operate (for detailed methodology, see http://www.freedomhouse.org). These indices capture how formal state censorship, journalistic self-censorship, media ownership concentration, affordability of media in terms of both production and consumption, and logistic and technological access to media may limit press freedom. Freedom House analysts consult with human rights and press freedom organizations, news outlets, and international experts to arrive at a rating between 0 and 100 for each country, with lower scores indicating more press freedom. Countries with scores between 0 and 30 are classified as having “free” media systems; countries between 31 and 60 are “partly free,” and scores greater than 61 are representative of “not-free” media systems (Freedom House, 2010). This study uses Freedom House ratings of press freedom as opposed to other indices, like IREX and Reporters sans Frontieres (RSF), because it provides the most well-rounded measures of the three indices.⁶

The HDI is a summary measure of human development in each country and is comprised of three dimensions of development: (1) a long, healthy life, as measured by life expectancy from birth; (2) knowledge, as measured by educational attainment; and (3) a decent standard of living, as measured by GDP per capita in U.S. dollars. The three dimensions are averaged together to arrive at a score between 0 and 1, with higher scores representative of higher human development (Human Development Report, 2007-2008). The HDI was included in the analysis as a control to ensure any significant relationships between institutional supply as measured by Freedom House and individual-level variables were independent of socioeconomic development.

The Pew Global Attitudes Survey asked press freedom supply and demand questions to respondents in 34 developing nations. Within those 34 countries, a total of 30,872 respondents provided assessments of perceived supply of and demand for press freedom, media use, and social and political attitudes.

Individual-level variables

Five sets of individual-level variables were included in our analyses, including (a) sociodemographics, (b) media use and evaluations, (c) regime support and performance, (d) political orientations, and (e) citizen perceptions about supply and demand for press freedom. Sociodemographic variables include gender, age, religion, urbanity, socioeconomic status, and education. Gender was derived from a self-report question, in which female was coded high. Respondents were asked to report their age in years since birth. Religion affiliation was dichotomized into Muslim or not, with Muslim coded high. Islam was chosen as the comparison religion because the faith poses a significant limitation on free expression and a free press: It does not allow for the criticism of Islam or the Prophet Muhammad (Mayer, 1990). Conceptualizing religion in this way was also useful because many of the developing countries included in this sample have significant Muslim populations. Urbanity was measured with a dichotomous variable that asked the respondent whether he or she lived in a rural, urban, or suburban area. Rural areas were coded high. A measure of socioeconomic status combined three dichotomous questions asking whether respondents had trouble affording food, health care, or clothing in the past year. Affirmative answers were coded 1, resulting in a 0-to-3 scale, where high scores indicated poor socioeconomic status. Educational attainment was recoded across countries into a 4-point scale, with 1 indicating no education, 2 indicating completion of elementary school, 3 indicating completion of secondary school, and 4 indicating any schooling beyond secondary (e.g., some college, 4-year college, graduate degree, etc.).

Media measures included indicators of reliance on newspapers, evaluation of media, and internet access. Newspaper use was measured by combining two measures that asked respondents which sources they turned to first and second to get news about national and international issues. Those who selected newspapers as their first choice were coded as 2, those who chose newspapers second were coded as 1, and those who did not rely on newspapers at all were coded 0. Media performance was measured with a single item that asked respondents what type of influence the media is having on their country. Response options ranged from very good to very bad on a 4-point scale and were reverse coded so positive evaluations were coded high. A dichotomous measure asking whether respondents use the internet at least occasionally was used as a supplemental media variable.

To assess citizens’ satisfaction, a single dichotomous measure asked whether respondents were satisfied or unsatisfied with the way things are going in their countries. Satisfied responses were coded high. This question was supplemented by another evaluation measure that asked citizens how problematic is corruption among political leaders in their country, with greater assessments of corruption coded high. Responses to the 4-point measure were reverse coded. Support for the governing regime was measured by combining two separate 4-point measures asking respondents what type of influence both the (a) national government and (b) the military were having in their country. The question was reverse coded so those who believed the national government and military had a positive influence were coded high and combined into one index.

Respondents’ support for free markets was used as a latent measure of their economic ideology. Liberal responses were coded high. Citizens’ political orientations about the role of the state were measured with a single 4-point measure asked the respondents to what degree they agreed with the statement: “The government controls too much of our daily lives.” Responses were reverse coded, with higher scores indicating more agreement. An additional question that asked whether religion should be kept separate from government policy assesses respondents’ religious secularism (coded high). A single measure of interpersonal trust asked respondents whether they believed most people in their society were trustworthy. Higher responses exemplified more trust.

Perceived supply of press freedom was measured by combining two 4-point scales from the 2007 Pew Global Attitudes Survey into one 7-point measure, ranging from 2 to 8. Scales were reverse coded so agreement with the following statements was coded high. The two scales asked, “How well does the statement, ‘you can openly say what you think and criticize the (state or government),’ describe our country, and how well does the statement, ‘the media can report the news without (state or government) censorship,’ describe our country?” These two scales were combined because many feel that freedom of the press is merely an extension of free expression, drafted to protect the written word in the case when free expression may be construed to protect only oral communication (Nimmer, 1974-1975) or free speech. Average citizens have also infiltrated the once clearly delineated press corps with blogs, wikis, and social networking sites, raising questions as to whether press protection rights should be extended to these individuals as well. Combining two scales that measure traditional free expression and traditional press freedom provided a perceived supply measure that is more representative of contemporary media environment (r = .49). Likewise, demand for press freedom was measured by combining two 4-point scales from the Global Attitudes Survey that inquired about the importance the respondent placed on free expression and freedom of the press into one 7-point continuous measure, whose response scores ranged from 2 to 8 (r = .30). The importance of press freedom is a key component of citizen demand because the fundamental starting point for building demand for a free and open press is whether citizens view a free press as important and worthy, both in absolute terms and in comparison to other social, economic, or political issues facing their countries. If free press and expression is not viewed as an important or valued issue, than the potential for political mobilization for this issue is limited.

Contextual-level variables

Two contextual-level variables were also included in the analysis. Institutionalized supply of press freedom was measured by reverse coding and averaging 2005, 2006, and 2007 Freedom House press freedom ratings, such that higher scores signified more press freedom. Three consecutive years were selected from Freedom House because perception of press freedom is not an instantaneous judgment; rather, it is cultivated through mediated experiences over time. Taking the average Freedom House press freedom rating for the 2 years leading up to the survey and the year in which the survey was conducted provided the most valid operationalization of recent press freedom in a country. This supply measure takes many aspects of free expression, like blogs and nontraditional media practices, into its conceptualization of press freedom as well (Freedom House, 2007). A contextual-level control variable measuring socioeconomic development was taken from the 2007 HDI. Scores ranged from 0 to 1, with higher scores indicative of greater development.

The full descriptive statistics for all criterion, including independent and control variables included in the analyses, can be found in Table 1.

Table 1.

Descriptive Statistics.

Variable	M	SD	Range	N
Level 1 criterion variables
Perceived supply	5.68	1.58	2-8	28,115
Perceived demand	6.88	1.24	2-8	28,723
Level 2 contextual variables
Freedom House	51.66	16.61	26.67-80	34
Press freedom ranking
Human Development Index	0.70	0.16	0.37-0.92	0 34
Level 1 independent variables
Newspaper use	0.49	0.64	0-2	30,872
Internet use	0.27	0.45	0-1	30,872
Media performance	2.93	0.88	0-4	28,883
Regime support	5.71	1.48	2-8	27,336
Corruption	3.50	0.74	1-4	29,192
Citizen satisfaction	0.34	0.47	0-1	30,872
Economic ideology	2.85	0.95	1-4	27,787
Social capital	2.33	1.02	1-4	28,913
Role of the state	2.33	0.98	1-4	28,869
Secularism	3.32	0.89	1-4	29,128
Socioeconomic status	1.89	1.28	0-3	30,429
Rural	0.36	0.48	0-1	30,872
Education	2.77	0.88	1-4	30,807
Age	37.90	14.94	18-97	30,734
Muslim	0.39	0.49	0-l	30,872
Gender	1.51	0.50	1-2	30,872

Results

Two sets of hierarchical linear models (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; Snijders & Bosker, 1999) using HLM 6.08 and restricted maximum likelihood were estimated to assess our hypotheses and research questions. The first analysis regressed both country-level (institutional supply, HDI) and individual-level (i.e., sociodemographic controls, media use, media performance, regime support, state performance) indicators on perceived supply of press freedom. The second set of models regressed the same set of indicators, with additional individual-level variables of perceived supply, economic ideology, role of the state, secularism, and interpersonal trust, on citizen demand for press freedom.

For the first analysis predicting perceived supply of press freedom, the first model fitted was a one-way ANOVA (analysis of variance) model that examines the distribution of the variance between and within countries. Table 2 (Model 1) displays these results. Country-level differences for perceived supply are significantly different from zero, χ²₃₃ = 3141.50, p ≤ .001, meaning that additional predictor variables can be added to this analysis to further reduce the variance between countries. Between-country variation accounted for 10% of the total variance in perceived supply, and within-country variation accounted for the remaining 90%, ICC (intraclass correlation coefficient) = .10

Table 2.

Multilevel Model Results for the One-Way ANOVA (Analysis of Variance) Model and Models 2, 3, and 4 Predicting Perceived Supply.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Between countries
Group mean	5.67*** (0.09)	5.66*** (0.09)	5.72*** (0.06)	5.69*** (0.07)
Freedom House (FH) press freedom	—	—	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02** (0.01)
HDI (Human Development Index)	—	—	0.10 (0.27)	−0.00 (0.41)
Within countries
Gender	—	−0.03 (0.02)	−0.03 (0.02)	−0.03 (0.02)
Age	—	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Rural	—	−0.02 (0.05)	−0.02 (0.04)	−0.02 (0.05)
Education	—	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.00 (0.02)
Education x FH Press freedom	—	—	—	0.003*** (0.00)
Muslim	—	−0.06 (0.05)	−0.09 (0.05)	−0.06 (0.05)
Socioeconomic status	—	0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
Regime support	—	0.15*** (0.02)	0.16*** (0.02)	0.15*** (0.02)
Newspaper use	—	0.05* (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)
Internet use	—	−0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	−0.03 (0.04)
Media performance	—	0.19*** (0.03)	0.19*** (0.04)	0.19*** (0.04)
Corruption	—	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Citizen satisfaction	—	0.21*** (0.05)	0.21*** (0.05)	0.21*** (0.05)
τ00	0.25***	0.26***	0.11***	0.19***
τRural	—	0.05***	0.04***	0.05***
τEducation	—	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***
τMuslim	—	0.03*	0.05*	0.04*
τSES	—	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***
τRegime	—	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***
τNewspaper	—	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***
τInternet	—	0.02**	0.02**	0.02**
τMedia performance	—	0.03***	0.04***	0.03***
τCorruption	—	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***
τCitizen satisfaction	—	0.05***	0.05***	0.05***
σ²	2.26	2.03	2.03	2.03

Note: Unstandardized coefficients reported with robust standard errors.

p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .001.

Level 1 predictors were then added to the empty model (see Table 2, Model 2). The independent variables—newspaper use, internet use, media performance, state evaluation, corruption, and regime support—as well as the control variables were all entered into the model group mean centered or centered within context (CWC) because they were of substantive interest to the researchers (Enders & Tofighi, 2007). In this second model, all variables except gender showed significant variation across countries, so their random effects were allowed to vary by country. Because gender did not exhibit variance between countries, its random effects were fixed at zero. Table 2 (Model 2) displays the results that include the individual-level predictor variables. Media performance (γ₁₁₀ = .19, p ≤ .001), citizens’ evaluations of the state (γ₁₃₀ = .21, p ≤ .001), and regime support (γ₈₀ = .15, p ≤ .001) were all significant predictors of perceived supply, to answer Research Question 1. Newspaper use was also significant (γ₉₀ = .05, p ≤ .05), providing support for Hypothesis 4.

When the contextual variables, institutional supply of press freedom and Human Development Index, were added grand mean centered to a model containing grand-mean-centered Level 1 predictor variables (Table 2, Model 3), institutional supply of press freedom is a positive predictor of citizens’ perceptions of free press, γ₁₁ = .02, p ≤ .001; however, the HDI was not significant. These results are displayed in Table 2 (Model 3).

A fourth model (Table 2, Model 4) was fitted to include a cross-level interaction to evaluate Research Question 2. The results indicate that institutional supply moderates the relationship between education and perceived supply (γ₅₀ = .003, p ≤ .001). As citizens’ educational attainment increases in countries with free media systems they perceive a greater supply of press freedom than citizens with a lower level of educational attainment. However, the converse is true for citizens in countries with not-free media systems. In these countries, as citizens attain more education, they perceive less press freedom in their country compared to citizens with a lower level of education. This final interaction model, including Level 2 and Level 2 predictor variables, produced a better fit than perceived supply on its own, χ²₇₇ = 15546.45, p ≤ .001, and explained 10% of the Level 1 variance in perceived supply of press freedom.

To examine the hypotheses and research questions predicting demand for press freedom, a second analysis was conducted, and four additional multilevel models were fitted again using restricted maximum likelihood. The first model was a one-way ANOVA model of demand for press freedom and is presented in Table 3 (Model 1). This empty model shows that there are significant country-level differences for demand for press freedom, χ²₃₃ = 2344.81, p ≤ .001, and 8% of the variation in citizens’ demand can be explained between countries—ICC = .08 with the remaining 92% explained by individual-level factors.

Table 3.

Multilevel Model Results for the One-Way ANOVA Model and Models 2, 3, and 4 Predicting Demand.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Between countries
Group mean	6.85*** (0.06)	6.87*** (0.07)	6.82*** (0.07)	6.88*** (0.07)
Freedom House	—	—	0.01** (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)
HDI (Human Development Index)	—	—	0.07 (0.23)	−0.39 (0.22)
Within countries
Gender	—	−0.04* (0.02)	−0.04* (0.02)	−0.04* (0.02)
Age	—	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)
Rural	—	0.06 (0.04)	0.07 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)
Education	—	0.07*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)
Muslim	—	−0.00 (0.05)	−0.00 (0.05)	−0.00 (0.05)
Socioeconomic status	—	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Regime support	—	−0.02 (0.01)	−0.02 (0.01)	−0.02 (0.01)
Newspaper use	—	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.02)
Internet use	—	0.05 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)
Media performance	—	0.08*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)
Corruption	—	0.17*** (0.02)	0.18*** (0.02)	0.18*** (0.02)
Citizen satisfaction	—	−0.00 (0.02)	−0.00 (0.02)	−0.00 (0.02)
Economic ideology	—	0.05** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)
Interpersonal trust	—	−0.02 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.02)
Role of state	—	−0.06*** (0.01)	−0.06*** (0.01)	−0.06*** (0.01)
Secularism	—	0.15*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.03)
Perceived supply	—	0.15*** (0.02)	0.16*** (0.03)	0.16*** (0.02)
Perceived Supply x
Freedom House	—	—	—	0.003* (0.00)
τ00	0.13***	0.14***	0.13***	0.16***
τGender	—	0.01*	0.01*	0.01*
τAge	—	0.00**	0.00**	0.00**
τRural	—	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***
τMuslim	—	0.05***	0.05***	0.05***
τNewspaper	—	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***
τInternet	—	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***
τMedia performance	—	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***
τCorruption	—	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***
τCitizen satisfaction	—	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***
τEconomic ideology	—	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***
τInterpersonal trust	—	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***
τRole of state	—	0.004***	0.004***	0.004***
τSecularism	—	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***
τRegime support	—	0.004***	0.004***	0.004***
τPerceived supply	—	0.02***	0.02***	0.01***
σ²	1.42	1.18	1.18	1.18

Note: Unstandardized coefficients reported with robust standard errors.

p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .001.

Level 1 predictors were added group mean centered in a second model (Table 3, Model 2). Random effects for all of the Level 1 predictors except education showed significant variation by country, so their intercepts were allowed to vary. Education’s random effects did not vary significantly by country so its intercept was fixed at zero. As predicted in Hypothesis 3, citizens’ perceived supply of press freedom is associated with demand (γ₁₇₀ = .15, p ≤ .001) such that perceptions of greater supply reinforces greater demand for it.

In response to Research Question 3, citizen satisfaction was not significantly associated with demand for press freedom (γ₁₂₀ = –.00, p > .50) or was support for the regime (γ₇₀= –.02, p > .10); however, citizens who perceived political corruption was a significant problem were more likely to demand more press freedom (γ₁₁₀ = .17, p ≤ .010). Both reliance on newspapers (γ₈₀= –.01, p > .50) and internet use (γ₉₀ = .05, p > .05) were not significant predictors, although citizens’ assessments of media performance (γ₁₀₀ = .08, p ≤ .001) was a significant predictor of demand.

Turning to Research Question 4, citizens’ economic ideology (γ₁₃₀ = .05, p ≤ .01) and views on secular governance (γ₁₆₀ = .15, p ≤ .001) were associated with greater demand; support for an interventionist state was associated with less demand for press freedom (γ₁₅₀= –.06, p ≤ .001), and interpersonal trust was not a significant predictor (γ₁₄₀ = –.02, p ≥ .30).

Similar to the previous analysis, the indices of institutional supply and human development were fitted in a third model to examine Hypothesis 2a (Table 3, Model 3). Both Level 2 measures were grand mean centered, and all individual-level predictors except education were allowed to vary by country. The institutional supply provided by Freedom House was again a significant predictor of demand (γ₁₁ = .01, p ≤ .001), whereas the economic development of a country was not.

A final, fourth model (Table 3, Model 4) was fitted to examine the cross-level interaction between perceived supply and demand, as predicted in Hypothesis 2b. Perceived supply moderated the relationship between institutional supply and citizen demand for press freedom (γ₁₈₀ = .003, p ≤ .05). The results demonstrate a positive relationship between institutional supply of press freedom and citizen demand for press freedom among citizens who perceive high supply. However, when citizens perceived a low supply of press freedom, there is no significant relationship between institutional supply and press freedom (γ₁₁ = .01, p = n.s.). This final model was a significantly better fit than perceived demand alone, χ²₁₅₂ = 22682.01, p ≤ .001, and explained approximately 17% of the Level 1 variance in perceived demand.

Discussion

Theoretical Implications

Press freedom is a key definitional component of democracy, yet within many emerging democracies, citizens’ access to a free press is fragile at best. The goal of our study was to theoretically develop and empirically evaluate a multilevel model of press freedom that would explicate the complex relationships between institutions and citizens in emerging democracies. The results of our multilevel analyses not only reaffirmed some of the previous research on the relationships between institutional capacity and citizen perceptions about press freedom but also provide a more nuanced understanding of these relationships. For example, consistent with the findings of Mattes and Bratton (2007), when considering the supply of democracy in general, and Vlad and Becker (2009), when focusing on press freedom specifically, our findings support the notion that citizens are able to assess the relative amount of freedom available in their media systems (Hypothesis 1). The correlation between expert ratings of the institutional capacity to provide press freedom and citizen perceptions of the availability of press freedom in their countries was generally strong. These findings are promising as they reveal a public who are acquainted with the supply of press freedom in their countries, a necessary condition before demand can be expected.

However, beyond examining the correlation of indices of institutional supply and mean perceived supply at a macro-level analysis, the most important theoretical contributions of our study revolve around the individual cognitive mechanisms and correlates associated with citizen perceptions about supply and demand of press freedom. Our results indicate individuals who rely on newspapers (Hypothesis 4), support the governing regime (Hypothesis 5), or have a positive evaluation of media performance (Research Question 1) are generally satisfied with the state of their country (Research Question 1) and perceive more press freedom relative to other citizens embedded in the same national media system. These individual predictors are important to explicate, as our analysis in Table 2 indicated that 90% of the variance in perceived supply is driven by between-individual, as opposed to between-country, differences.

In addition, our findings contribute to our theoretical understanding of how citizens make political judgments about press freedom or quality of democracy more generally. Referencing the results of their analyses, Mattes and Bratton (2007) argue, “All people can evaluate the state of democracy in their country regardless of their cognitive sophistication” (p. 202). Our findings demonstrate an important caveat to this assertion, as higher-educated individuals are better able to evaluate the relative capacity of their institutions to supply press freedom compared to less educated individuals (Research Question 2). Thus, our results suggest formal education does play a role in enhancing citizens’ ability to evaluate their governing institutions. However, this form of communication gap resulting from greater access to and/or flow of information (i.e., open media system) interacting with social hierarchy (i.e., educational attainment) also creates opportunities and challenges for emerging democracies by possibly reinforcing political stability at the cost of polarization and greater political inequality (see Nisbet, 2008). Furthermore, whether this gap extends to more general evaluations of democratic supply is a question that deserves further evaluation.

Turning to citizen demand, our analyses provide some valuable insights into why citizens value press freedom that cut across cultures and contexts. For example, regardless of where citizens are located, educational attainment, positive evaluations of the media, neoliberal beliefs regarding the economy and the role of the state, and religious secularism are all associated with greater citizen demand for press freedom (Research Question 3 and Research Question 4). In addition, citizens who believe corruption among their politicians is highly problematic also believe press freedom is highly important. This relationship is noteworthy as it is consistent with both Moehler and Singh’s (2009) findings and previous scholarship that argues that free press is an important accountability institution that empowers citizens vis-à-vis their government (e.g., Chowdhury, 2004; Norris & Inglehart, 2004, 2010).

Furthermore, our analyses also build on previous research examining citizen demand for press freedom by bringing perceived supply into the equation. Our results indicate that perceived supply drives citizen demand and is a key link between institutional capacity and citizen demand for press freedom. In addition, perceived supply plays an important moderating role on the direct association between institutional supply and citizen demand. When perceived supply is low, there is no significant relationship between institutional supply and citizen demand, but when perceived supply is high, institutional supply and citizen demand are positively associated (see Table 3).

This overall weak relationship between institutional supply and demand and the strong relationship between perceived supply and demand gives credence to Mattes and Bratton’s (2007) arguments about the role of citizen perceptions in processes of democratic consolidation and the important linkages between institutions and citizens. As discussed earlier, democratic consolidation occurs at both the macro and micro levels: The political environment has to be receptive to democratic institutions, and citizens must be receptive of democratic norms. It is only when perceived supply is included in the equation that the macro and micro levels are linked and democratic consolidation is complete. Citizens’ perceptions of supply drive them to demand more democratic liberties, and citizen demand facilitates the improvement of the institutional supply over the long run (e.g., Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Welzel, 2007) as illustrated in our model. Thus, from an applied perspective, more efforts aimed at informing, educating, and empowering citizens about the amount, and importance, of press freedom in their countries may be more fruitful means to promoting democratic change than expending resources on building institutional capacity alone.

Limitations and Future Research

As with any study, the analysis undertaken here does have limitations. First, this study cannot provide causal and directional evidence of the supply–demand relationships using cross-sectional data. Longitudinal data would be useful for examining the whether citizen demand leads to corresponding changes in institutional supply over time, but such data do not exist at this time.

Second, some of the individual measures used in the analysis were not ideal. For example, in addition to examining the types of media consumed by individuals, it also would have been appropriate to examine the frequency with which they consumed different types of media. Measures of attention to specific types of media content, combined with perceptions of media credibility, would also be very useful. Based on findings from previous research (e.g., Mattes & Bratton, 2007; Nisbet, 2008; Schmitt-Beck & Voltmer, 2007), including more robust measures of media consumption would potentially strengthen the role of media effects on perceived supply and demand within the models. Additional measures of state/media performance and political knowledge, participation, values, and beliefs would be valuable in explaining additional variance at the individual level of analysis. Overall, future cross-national research explicating individual-level predictors of citizen perceptions of supply and citizen demand and how individual-level variables may distort perceptions of supply is necessary.

Third, the sample of 34 countries included in the analysis was a convenience sample of emerging democracies as surveyed by the Pew Global Attitudes project. It is not necessarily a representative sample of global media systems, and because it focused on developing countries, it excluded many established democratic states in North America, Western Europe, and East Asia. However, it was a very heterogeneous sample of developing nations, with a full range of “free” to “not-free” media systems as measured by Freedom House, as well as countries representing different geographic and cultural regions of the world, including Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa, Central and South America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia.

Last, the individual measures of perceived supply and demand used in the analysis focused primarily on formal, explicit government censorship and do not acknowledge that press freedom may be limited across a range of political, economic, and legal dimensions (see Freedom House, 2010, and also Rugh, 2004, for examples in practice). However, in most emerging democracies and developing nations, government censorship remains the primary threat to press freedom and free expression (Becker, 2004; Norris & Inglehart, 2010), and thus, we assert the measures used in this study were sufficient. Nevertheless, expanding the focus beyond formal state censorship to other limitations on press freedom in emerging democracies would be worthwhile for future research. In addition, some may criticize the measures and conceptualizations used in this study as defining democracy and press freedom in Western terms. However, as exhibited in Article 19 of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, there is an international legal consensus on the fundamental rights to free speech and press freedom. Furthermore, previous research suggests there is a common definitional understanding of democracy across cultures and regions in terms of civil liberties and political rights that includes the definitional components of press freedom measured in this study (Dalton, Shin, & Jou, 2007; Logan & Mattes, 2010). Nevertheless, further research examining the cultural boundaries and determinants would further enhance our understanding of the dynamics between supply and demand of press freedom.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

Author Biographies

Erik C. Nisbet is an assistant professor in The Ohio State University School of Communication. His research interests are comparative political communication and public opinion.

Elizabeth Stoycheff is a doctoral student in The Ohio State University School of Communication. Her research interests are media freedom and the political economy of the mass media.

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