Empowered by Persuasive Deception

Abstract

This paper examines how power differences and deception jointly influence interactional dominance, credibility, and the outcomes of decision-making. Two theories, interpersonal deception theory and dyadic power theory, were merged to produce hypotheses about the effects of power and deception. A 3 (power: unequal-high, unequal-low, equal) × 3 (deception: truth-truth, truthful with deceptive partner, deceptive with truthful partner) experiment (N = 120) was conducted in which participants were asked to make a series of mock hiring decisions. Actor-partner analyses revealed that participants in the deception condition reported a significant increase in perceptions of their own power whereas their truthful partners reported a significant decrease in perceptions of their own power. Further, interactional dominance fostered credibility and goal attainment (i.e., making the best hiring decision in the truthful condition and hiring a friend in the deceptive condition) for both truth-tellers and deceivers.

Keywords

deception power persuasion credibility interpersonal deception theory dyadic power theory

Deception is a fundamental part of social life and can be used for both self- and other-serving motivations (Anderson, Ansfield, & DePaulo, 1999; Schweitzer & Croson, 1999). Although truthful interpersonal interactions are already complex endeavors, the introduction of deception adds another layer of intricacy. Interaction partners who are deceiving or detecting deception must dynamically adapt their messages to accomplish potentially competing communication goals. Thus, interactants in deceptive encounters typically experience greater cognitive demands than those in truthful ones (Buller, Burgoon, Afifi, White, & Buslig, 1997; Vrij, Fisher, Mann, & Leal, 2008).

The existence of a power differential between participants adds further complexity to deceptive interactions. In virtually every social setting, including close relationships, families, work groups, organizations, friendship networks, and most other human relationships, power determines how decisions are made and implemented even if open conflict does not surface (McDonald, 1980). The power relationship of two individuals also determines whether they use deception, whether or not they view the use of deception as acceptable, and on what topics they choose to lie. Those in a position of power may lie to their subordinates because they need to hide information, they want to motivate the subordinates, or because they feel they have the right to lie. Those in low-power positions may also use deception to assert their own agency or evade aversive consequences stemming from their powerless status (Lindsey, Dunbar, & Russell, 2011). Although Lindsey et al. offered some insights into various motivations for and forms of deceit depending on one’s power role, the theoretical mechanism by which power and deception affect the decision-making and credibility of the deceiver remains unclear. One common strategy for behaving deceptively is a defensive or “flight” strategy in which the deceiver becomes more submissive and obsequious, but when power differentials are in force, deceivers may opt for a more assertive or “fight” strategy. Thus, to the extent that deception is conceived as a communicative act in which perpetrators select among alternative strategies to fit the prevailing conditions, this investigation provides evidence of how power differentials alter strategy selection.

The current investigation addresses this question through a two-phase dyadic interaction experiment that examines the joint influences of deception and power on the expression and perception of dominance and the consequent impact on credibility and decision-making. During the first phase of a mock hiring task, power is experimentally induced; during the second phase, one member of each dyad is induced to behave deceptively. Predictions for these interpersonal effects are shaped by two interpersonal interaction theories, interpersonal deception theory (IDT; Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Burgoon & Buller, 2008) and dyadic power theory (DPT; Dunbar, 2004). Before reviewing the two theories, we first briefly define the constructs of deception, power, and dominance that are central to this investigation. We then derive hypotheses to test the joint effects of power and deception on perceived and enacted dominance and the consequent effects on interaction outcomes, in this case, credibility and goal attainment.

Deception, Interpersonal Power, and Interactional Dominance

Deception occurs when one individual conveys information to another with the purposeful intent to mislead and may take many forms, ranging from outright falsification to equivocation and evasion (Buller & Burgoon, 1994). We focus on a form of deception that may occur when interactants have conflicting goals and one individual is attempting to persuade a partner to adopt his or her perspective. Deception in persuasive contexts differs from deception in other contexts, where concealment or equivocation may be the preferred tactic (see Buller, Burgoon, White, & Ebesu, 1994). Deceivers who are attempting to persuade others face the intertwined tasks of appearing credible and making convincing arguments in favor of the position they are advocating while simultaneously attempting to avoid detection. We label this type of lying persuasive deception. Although deceivers may appear more submissive than truth-tellers when their primary goal is to evade detection (e.g., Burgoon & Dunbar, 2000), when the deceiver’s goal is to be persuasive and appear credible, the deceiver may display more dominance, using verbal and nonverbal communication to seem confident and poised (Burgoon & Qin, 2006). Aside from a few studies investigating deception as a negotiating strategy (e.g., Boles, Croson, & Murnighan, 2000; Lount, Zhong, Sivanathan, & Murnighan, 2008), research on persuasive deception is scant.

Power is a critical factor in how people relate to one another and thus may be influential during attempts at deception. Power, which refers to one’s ability to influence others, is often derived from certain “bases” such as the ability to reward or coerce others, access to and control of resources or information, expertise, and legitimate authority (French & Raven, 1959; Pfeffer, 1992). Power is often manifested through dyadic communication patterns known as interactional dominance (Burgoon & Dunbar, 2000). In contrast to power, which may be latent (Komter, 1989), dominance is observable in an interaction whereby control attempts by one person, referred to here as the actor, are intended to change the behavior of an interlocutor, referred to as the partner (Rollins & Bahr, 1976). Whether or not individuals choose to enact dominance in their messages depends on their attributions of their own power as compared to their partner. Although power and dominance are related constructs, we differentiate between them to demonstrate that one’s role or status in a relationship (power) has an effect on one’s behavior (dominance) during interpersonal negotiations.

Theoretical Perspectives

Interpersonal deception theory (IDT) conceptualizes deception as a dynamic, interactive process, an iterative series of (largely subconscious) moves and counter moves, within which deceivers monitor their own behavior, attune to receivers’ signals of suspicion (if suspicion exists), and adapt their communication to allay suspicions. Buller and Burgoon (1996) theorized that in deceptive dyadic interactions, both the deceiver and receiver come with their own prior histories, goals, attributes, and skills that are termed pre-interaction factors. These factors influence how the deception is carried out. Once interaction begins, both the deceiver and receiver display strategic and nonstrategic behaviors. Strategic behaviors are purposeful attempts to manipulate the interaction in pursuit of personal goals. For deceivers, strategic behavior may involve evading a probing question or justifying their deceptive stance. Nonstrategic behaviors (e.g., those associated with fear or anxiety) are unintentional and may reveal true feelings or intentions because they operate outside the conscious awareness of the deceiver (Ekman & Friesen, 1969; Zuckerman, Koestner, Colella, & Alton, 1984). Such behaviors may cast doubt on the deceiver’s sincerity or credibility. Throughout the interaction, deceivers monitor receivers (albeit often implicitly and subconsciously) for signs of suspicion, and receivers monitor deceivers for signs of possible deceit if they have reason to be suspicious. Deceivers and receivers continually update their perceptions of deception success and suspicion, and, as a result, may alter their strategies. Although some contexts may lend themselves to a “duck and run” strategy of meek demeanor and verbal reticence, other contexts may lend themselves to a strategy of “going on the offense” (Burgoon, 2005). IDT assumes that the dynamic nature of interpersonal exchange allows not only for alternative options for enacting deceit but also an adjustment of deceiver and receiver tactics as an interaction unfolds.

Although IDT prompts attention to the dynamics of interpersonal deception and situates deception within the nexus of contextual and relationship factors, it does not expressly address how the relationship factor of power moderates a deceptive episode. This is where DPT offers unique insight and potential theoretical elaboration of a model of interpersonal deception.

Similar to IDT, DPT assumes a dynamic, interpersonal view of interaction and postulates that individuals approach an interaction with pre-interaction factors such as their authority and access to resources that form the basis of social power (Dunbar, 2004). Status, knowledge, the prior relationship history, as well as the actor’s ability to make demands and control outcomes, can influence interpersonal interactions (Dunbar & Abra, 2010; Dunbar & Burgoon, 2005). DPT’s dynamic approach to power implies that both perceptions of power and the communicative expressions of power (i.e., interactional dominance) may change over the course of an interaction. Although individuals may use a variety of means to attempt to influence others, our focus is on manifestations of dominance (e.g., influence attempts by one individual) that have been tied closely to attributions of power (Dunbar & Burgoon, 2005) and capture the influence tactics deceivers may employ during persuasive deception.

DPT explicates the expression of interactional dominance under different power conditions. When power is unequal and understood by both interactional partners, expressions of dominance will be infrequent, although those with high power may still appear more dominant than those with low power because of their subtle nonverbal displays (Dunbar & Burgoon, 2005). Powerful individuals do not need to enact influence because they can maintain control without displaying overt dominance. Powerless individuals are reticent to display dominance because they may fear adverse consequences from more powerful people, and thus they may suppress any appearance of overt dominance and also lack the subtle dominance that highly powerful people may possess. Only when power is ambiguous or perceived to be equal does DPT predict that dominance becomes manifest (Dunbar & Burgoon, 2005). Thus, when power is roughly equivalent, individuals will attempt to exert influence through use of a dominance strategy.

Generally, dominant communicators are more dynamic, energetic, and expressive, yet also appear relaxed and confident (Burgoon, Birk, & Pfau, 1990; Burgoon, Le Poire, & Rosenthal, 1995). Verbally, expressiveness, assertiveness, and confidence may be manifested through linguistic choices (e.g., quantity of words, lexical and syntactic complexity, the diversity and specificity of language use, absence of uncertainty terms, and a lexicon high in activation and affect) (Burgoon & Qin, 2006) and through conversational moves intended to take control or “one up” an interlocutor (Rogers, Castleton, & Lloyd, 1996; Rogers & Farace, 1975). As a result, dominance displays project an impression of poise, ability, and control (Burgoon, Johnson, & Koch, 1998). Beyond self-reported impressions, dominance should be displayed behaviorally through the quantity and diversity of arguments and linguistic choices indicative of dominance.

In the absence of deception, DPT predicts that dominance displays should be governed primarily by perceptions of power. For example, Dunbar and Abra (2010) found that in experimental interactions with a confederate, participants in unequal power positions (low and high power relative to one’s partner) expressed less dominance than those in the equal power positions, but those holding high power appeared more dominant than those with low power. We replicate this prediction of DPT in a task-oriented context:

Hypothesis 1 (H1): There is a nonlinear relationship between power and dominance displays such that actors in equal-power dyads (a) perceive themselves to be more dominant, (b) are judged as more dominant by their partners and (c) exhibit more interactional dominance (proffer more and more diverse arguments and use more linguistic dominance) than actors in unequal-power dyads.

However, based on previous work testing IDT, we should also expect that deceiving in a persuasive context is also likely to enhance the dominance behavior and perceptions of dominance of the actor. For example, deceivers attempting to persuade another of their credibility may flood the interaction with numerous false reasons for a certain course of action or they may seek to control the topics under discussion and actively avoid any areas that may lead an interlocutor to question them (Jensen, Bessarabova, Adame, Burgoon, & Slowik, 2011). Thus, we posit that, through active advocacy and argumentation, deceivers not only will behave more dominantly, but they will be perceived to be more dominant by both themselves and their partners. Thus, we predict:

Hypothesis 2 (H2): Persuasive deception is positively related to dominance displays such that compared to truthful actors, deceptive actors (a) perceive themselves as more dominant than their partner, (b) are judged as more dominant by their partners, and (c) exhibit more interactional dominance.

The enactment of persuasive deception may also have a salutary effect on one’s self-perceived power. Just as Bem (1972) argued that one comes to know one’s own attitudes by observing one’s own behavior, enacting a dominant communication strategy may reinforce one’s sense of power. Low-power individuals have been shown to use deception to preserve some level of power in situations where they are relatively powerless (Fainzang, 2002; Robinson, Shepherd, & Heywood, 1998). This preservation of power may occur by virtue of deceivers possessing information that another person does not have; possessing information unavailable to others has been shown to be a source of power (Baldwin, Kiviniemi, & Snyder, 2009). In other words, deceivers leverage power through access to and knowledge of accurate information. By perpetuating misinformation, deceivers may perceive that they are more powerful than their partners because they know the truth and believe that others do not. Feeling powerful may be also induced by the positive arousal created through successful deception, known as duping delight (Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981; Zuckerman & Driver, 1985), which is strongest when the target is known to be difficult to fool, the lie itself is a challenge, or others are watching (Ekman, 2001). In sum, deception itself may create a sense of empowerment.

Thus, the sheer act of adopting an assertive deception strategy may foster perceptions of power. DPT posits that equal-power partners will behave the most dominantly (as H1 predicts) but deceptive equal-power partners in a persuasive context that requires advocacy should display even more dominance than their high- or low-power counterparts and more than truth-tellers regardless of their power position. This possibility is addressed in the following hypothesis, which reflects the conceptual merger of the two theories that guided this research:

Hypothesis 3 (H3): Persuasive deception influences power and dominance such that, relative to truth-tellers and to deceivers in high- and low-power positions, deceivers in equal-power positions (a) perceive themselves as more powerful and (b) dominant than their partner, (c) are judged as more dominant by their partners, and (d) exhibit more interactional dominance.

Dominance displays also affect interaction outcomes (Dunbar, 2004). Actors who are perceived to be confident are talkative and those who provide many arguments for their opinions are perceived to be more credible. However, the introduction of deception conceivably sabotages that impression, especially if a deceiver advocates for an option that is recognized by the interlocutor as deficient, or disagreements arise between the deceptive actor and truthful partner concerning the best course of action. In such cases, the truthful partner may begin questioning the expertise and trustworthiness of the deceiver. However, IDT posits that deceivers, being concerned with their self-presentation and success in deception, actively monitor partner feedback and may purposefully adapt their communication to regain any loss in credibility (Burgoon & Buller, 2008). To the extent that such repair efforts take the form of interpersonal dominance displays through justification and argumentation, they should lead to post-interaction judgments of greater credibility.

In addition to affecting credibility, dominant behavior may also help goal attainment. With an increase in credibility, dominant actors (both truthful and deceptive) should be perceived as highly credible and in turn bolster the persuasiveness of their argumentation and advocacy (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953). As a result, partners may adopt the actor’s perspective more frequently. Thus, the actor’s dominance determines the outcome of the interaction (even when participants have competing goals). Hence,

Hypothesis 4 (H4): Enacted and perceived dominance displays are positively related to credibility such that greater actor dominance results in (a) more favorable credibility judgments by interlocutors and (b) greater actor goal achievement.

Method

Overview

A 3 (power: unequal-high, unequal-low, equal) × 3 (deception: truth-truth, truthful with deceptive partner, deceptive with truthful partner) factorial experiment was conducted.¹ Participants were randomly assigned to experimental conditions and communicated with each other via online chat. This study follows others (Dunbar & Abra, 2010; Guinote, 2008; Schmid Mast & Hall, 2003, 2004) that used role-play scenarios and availability of power bases to manipulate power.

Chat as a communication medium was selected for a number of reasons. First, mediated forms of communication (e.g., email, chat, and texting) are becoming pervasive in a variety of social settings, and are considered analogous to interactions that are occurring through the Internet (Boles et al., 2000). Second, the chat medium allowed for quick and precise capture and analysis of all messages that were exchanged, as well as identification of problematic interactions (e.g., misunderstood instructions and failed manipulations). Finally, the medium allowed for greater experimental control by limiting potential power cues external to the experiment that would have been difficult to control in a face-to-face setting (e.g., charisma or referent power). For example, Huang et al. (2011) found that adopting a powerful body posture (expansive vs. constrained) influenced participants’ power perceptions more than the role assigned by the experimenter. We follow others (e.g., Boles et al., 2000; Molm, Takahashi, & Peterson, 2000) who limited visual cues to increase experimental control.

Participants

Participants (N = 120) were recruited from a mass-mailing to upper-division students at a large south-central university in the U.S., as well as from online classified advertisements.² Participants were invited to take part in a study examining communication in decision-making. The data from 14 participants were excluded from the analyses because they either did not finish the task, or did not follow instructions, or failed the power manipulation check. Of the remaining 106 participants, 62 were women and 44 were men. The average age of the participants was 22.85 (SD = 5.28), ranging from 18 to 47 years of age. Seventy-four participants were Caucasian, 10 were African-American, 9 were Asian-American, 3 were Native-American, 2 were Latin-American, and 8 participants did not fit into provided categories. The participants listed 54 different majors and only one participant indicated she was not a student.

Procedures

All participants were required to sign up for an appointment online using a scheduling tool. After arriving at the laboratory and signing an informed consent form, participants were paired with a same-sex partner, were introduced face-to-face, and were led to different rooms to complete pre-interaction questionnaires. Following condition assignment, participants reviewed resumes for two positions in a fictitious bookstore. Task 1 involved selecting a candidate resume for a bookkeeper position, and Task 2 involved selecting a candidate resume for a sales associate position. The primary purpose of Task 1 was to acquaint the participants with their roles and allow them time to establish their power relationship based on the scenario. Deception was not introduced until Task 2. To ensure that gender would not play a role in the selection, the candidate names on the three Task 1 resumes were all female, and the candidate names on the three Task 2 resumes were all male. Participants were told that they would be awarded a minimum of $10 for their participation.

Prior to interactions, an experimenter entered each room and asked each member of the dyad questions to ensure they understood their task and their role. The dyads then used an online chat window to correspond with their partner to determine the best resume out of three candidates for each task. The resumes were designed by the research team and varied in their apparent strength.³ Once the participants had selected a resume together, they were directed to answer the post-interaction questions on their computer and were debriefed.

Experimental Manipulations

Power manipulation

The participants first completed a set of pre-interaction items that they were told measured their leadership skills. After completing these items, participants were informed that they had been assigned the role of store owner (high power), store co-owner (equal power) or sales associate (low power) based on their purported leadership skills scores. In fact, the participants were randomly assigned to one of the three power conditions. Our manipulation of power follows the work of others who layer many different forms of power (such as reward, expertise, or legitimate power) in order to instill in participants the sense that the power difference between them is real and legitimate (Dunbar & Abra, 2010; Gonzaga, Keltner, & Ward, 2008; Guinote, 2007). Consistent with this approach, participants assigned to the owner and co-owner condition were given resume evaluation criteria and a list of needs of the fictional bookstore to use when making their hiring decisions; those in the sales associate condition were not provided with this information. In addition, participants were also told that the owners and co-owners were to evaluate their partners following the interaction and could award their partner with a $10 bonus if they performed well on the task. The owners’ performance was not evaluated by their partners but was based on whether they chose the best resume. All participants who were owners awarded their partner the bonus. Those in the equal-power condition had all the same power bases as those in the high-power condition.

Deception manipulation

During Task 1, all participants were truthful. During Task 2, some participants were randomly assigned to deceive their partners so that half of the dyads contained a deceiver. In the truth condition, the instructions were the same as in Task 1. In the deception condition, participants were told that they were to assume the weakest resume belonged to their friend, and they were to advocate for that resume without telling their partner about the friendship. They were told that if they convinced their partner to choose the weak resume, they would earn an additional $10 bonus.

Instrumentation

Following the interactions, the participants’ perceptions of their power relative to their partner were assessed using a four-item, 7-point Likert-type scale derived from Dunbar and Burgoon (2005). It contained the items “In general, who had more power in your relationship?”, “Who made most of the decisions about how to rank the items?”, “Who influenced the decisions of the other person more?”, and “Who could more easily persuade the other to change his/her mind?” The scale ranged from “me” to “my partner” with the midpoint identified as “both equally” (α = .83).

Participants then rated the overall interpersonal dominance of both themselves and their partner using a series of 7-point semantic-differential scales (Burgoon & Dunbar, 2000; Dunbar & Burgoon, 2005). The directions specifically asked participants to think about their (or their partner’s) behavior during the interaction. The items included dominant—submissive, confident—unconfident, low status—high status, sluggish—energetic, hesitant—decisive, dynamic—passive, poised—awkward, outgoing—withdrawn, silent—talkative (α = .82 for self-rated dominance; α = .88 for partner-rated dominance). In addition to participant ratings, dominance was also captured via argument coding and automated linguistic analysis (described below). Correlations of all dominance measures are shown in Table 1.

Table 1.

Pearson Correlations of Measures of Dominance and Partner-Rated Credibility During Task 2.

Variables	1	2	3	4
1. Partner-rated dominance	—
2. Partner-rated credibility	.35**	—
3. Argument count	.28**	.07	—
4. Argument diversity	.09	.02	.77**	—
5. Linguistic dominance	.02	−.10	.48**	.51**

Note: For all correlations, N = 106.

p < .001, two-tailed.

After Task 2, participants rated partner credibility using a scale adapted from Flanagin and Metzger (2000). The scale included four 7-point Likert-type items ranging from “do not trust at all” to “trust completely,” “not at all factual” to “completely factual,” “not at all accurate” to “completely accurate,” and “did not believe at all” to “completely believed” (α = .83).

Argument Coding

Two coders read through all Task 2 transcripts together and identified different argument types used by partners to influence resume choice. As a result of this coding, 274 separate arguments were identified, although some types were used infrequently. Those 274 arguments were collapsed to nine different categories based on similarities among the types. Then, coders read each transcript again and coded which types of arguments each partner used in that session. Both coders discussed the arguments until 100% agreement was reached. The coders recorded the number of arguments, the type of arguments, and the diversity of arguments used by each partner (i.e., how many different types of arguments were used). The resulting arguments and their frequency of use are reported in Table 2. To verify the coding, a third coder read through 10% of the chat transcripts and reached 100% agreement with the other two coders when assigning arguments to one of the nine categories. Based on the coding results, the total number of arguments (argument count) and how many different types of arguments (argument diversity) that were made by each person were also recorded.

Table 2.

Typology of Persuasive Arguments Used in Chat Sessions.

Argument	Description	Frequency
1. Put down other candidates	Disparaging resumes of candidates other than the one participant wants chosen (i.e., calling them over- or underqualified).	62
2. Discuss strengths of favored candidate	Commenting on the strengths of candidates (i.e., stating that they are the best qualified).	141
3. Making an apparent weakness into a strength	Stating an apparent weakness (e.g., not having experience working in a bookstore) is really a strength (because they will be eager to learn a new skill).	17
4. Commitment to store long term	Speculating about whether or not a candidate will be willing to stay at the bookstore in the short (just the academic year) or long term (until they complete their degrees).	14
5. Interest in sports	Discussing whether or not a candidate’s expressed interest in sports would be a positive (because they would be knowledgeable about the store’s merchandise) or a negative (because they would be reluctant to work on the busy game days).	12
6. Candidate’s altruism	Discussing that the candidate’s personality (i.e., commitment to community service) is admirable.	6
7. Resume quality	Discussing the aesthetic qualities of the resume itself (including typographical errors).	7
8. Taking a risk	Making the argument that a weaker candidate “deserves a shot” without really giving a reason.	8
9. Deferring to partner’s power role	Referring explicitly to one’s power role (i.e., “You’re the boss”).	7
Total		274

Automated Linguistic Analysis

To measure linguistic dominance, separate text files were prepared that contained the messages from each participant during Task 2. These text files were then automatically parsed and tagged using the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC; Pennebaker, Francis, & Booth, 2001) by querying extensive dictionaries that categorize affective and functional meanings of individual words. For example, a single word such as love or nice can be tagged with a label indicating positive affect. Tagging results were normalized according to the length of the messages. Based on verbal dominance research (Anolli, Balconi, & Ciceri, 2003; Burgoon & Qin, 2006; Zhou, Burgoon, Zhang, & Nunamaker, 2004), indicators of dominance were selected from the linguistic features LIWC provides. These dominance indicators are higher verbal quantity, reduced positive affect, refusals or negations, fewer agreements, and taking absolute positions (e.g., exclusionary terms such as without and exclude).⁴ The features included in each category and their descriptions are presented in Table 3. A confirmatory factor analysis revealed a single factor (eigenvalue = 2.69; all factor loadings > .60, see Table 3 for details; 53.73% of the variance was explained), indicating that a unidimensional solution was warranted. The five features were summed to create the linguistic dominance composite measure (α = .70) used in the analyses.

Table 3.

Description of LIWC Features Forming Linguistic Dominance Scale.

Linguistic Dominance Category	LIWC Feature	Description	Factor Loadings
Verbal quantity	Word count	Normalized word count	.82
Negativity	Negations	“No, not, never”	.65
Affect	Positive emotions^a	“Love, nice, sweet”	.79
Refusals	Assent^a	“Agree, OK, yes”	.78
Absolute positions	Exclusionary terms	“But, without, exclude”	.60

This feature was reverse-coded.

Results

Overview

As the data used in this study were gathered from pairs of participants, there was interdependence between the individuals, which violates the independence-of-observations assumption required by many statistical tests. To remedy the lack of independence, the Actor-Partner Interdependence Model (APIM) was used. APIM is a statistical method for analyzing dyadic data by using multilevel modeling with restricted maximum likelihood estimation (Kashy & Kenny, 2000; Kenny, Kashy, & Cook, 2006). In actor-partner analyses, actor and partner data can sometimes be distinguished from one another (such as husbands and wives) but sometimes cannot (such as when studying same-sex friends). In our case, some of the dyads were distinguishable (e.g., unequal power dyads), but others were indistinguishable (e.g., equal power dyads). Therefore, we used the method proposed by Kenny et al. (2006) for indistinguishable dyads, which is a more conservative approach.⁵ Degrees of freedom were calculated using the Satterwaithe method (Kenny et al., 2006), which considers the intraclass correlation (ICC) between actors and partners and can yield fractional degrees of freedom (West, Pearson, Dovidio, Shelton, & Trail, 2009). Our method of determining the amount of variance explained was to hand-calculate a pseudo R2 using the formula suggested by Kenny et al. (2006, p. 94-95).

Manipulation Checks

To verify that the three groups created by our power manipulation were significantly different from one another, we conducted a mixed-model linear regression following the APIM, with self-rated perceived power as the criterion variable and the assigned power role as the predictor variable. Following Kenny et al.’s (2006) method, to control for the non-independence of partners, partner role (actor or partner) was included as a repeated factor. The results from Task 1, before deception was introduced, revealed a main effect for power role, F(1, 52) = 16.50, p < .001, η² = .18. Participants saw themselves as least powerful in the unequal-low-power condition (n = 32; M = 3.70, SD = 1.04), followed by the equal-power condition (n = 42; M = 4.08, SD = 0.32), and most powerful in the unequal-high-power condition (n = 32; M = 4.60, SD = 0.88). Post hoc comparisons revealed these means were significantly different from one another: t(72) = -3.52, p < .01 for the low- to equal-power comparison, and t(72) = 2.31, p < .05 for the high- to equal-power comparison. Thus, the manipulation of power was successful.

Prior to the analyses, all Task 2 interactions involving deception were examined to ensure that deceivers advocated for the weakest resume as instructed. To perform this manipulation check, two experimenters read all chats involving deception. The results indicated that all deceivers at least mentioned the weakest resume as a possible candidate, and virtually all continued to advocate for it in the face of criticism from their truthful partners. After Task 2, only 4.8% of the truth-truth dyads and 78% of the truth-deception dyads chose the weakest resume as the candidate to hire, which was a significant difference: χ²(4, N = 106) = 53.77, p < .01. Thus, the deception manipulation was deemed successful.

Finally, since deception during Task 2 was incentivized monetarily, the motivations of deceivers compared to truth-tellers were examined to ensure that deceivers were not disproportionately motivated. Participants were instructed to record their goals for the task and their level of commitment to those goals (rated on a 1 to 7 scale ranging from “not committed at all” to “very committed”). The reported goals of all truthful participants were to select the best candidate for the job, whereas all deceptive candidates who recorded goals reported that they intended to advocate for the weakest candidate. Four participants did not record their goals. Goals associated with selecting the best candidate (e.g., “Select the best sales associate for my store”) were coded as 1, and goals associated with persuading their partner to hire the least qualified candidate (e.g., “Persuade my partner to agree on hiring my friend” or “Make sure that Franklin Johnson will get the job”) were coded as 2. To test whether the level of goal commitment differed based on the goal that individuals pursued, a univariate ANOVA was performed with the goal type (hire the best qualified candidate vs. hire the least qualified candidate) as the independent variable and goal commitment as the dependent variable. The results indicated that goal commitment did not differ significantly, F(1, 100) = 1.29, ns, regardless of whether the goal was to hire the best candidate (M = 6.76, SD = 0.49) or the least qualified candidate (M = 6.63, SD = 0.61), suggesting that participants in different conditions were not disproportionally motivated based on this study’s incentive structure.

The Task 1 chats were relatively short (M = 126.96 words per person, SD = 98.01) and virtually all dyads (96.2%) chose the strongest resume for the position. In Task 2, chats where both partners were truthful were shorter than in Task 1 (M = 70.21 words per person, SD = 39.76), but again, most dyads (85.7%) chose the strongest resume. The dyads in which one partner was deceptive had longer chats (M = 222.64 words per person, SD = 166.40), and the majority chose the weakest resume (78.1%). These results suggest that after truthful participants established rapport in Task 1, decision-making in Task 2 took less time; but for individuals using persuasive deception in Task 2, more verbiage was necessary to convince conversational partners that a weak choice was warranted.

Hypotheses

H1 predicted a nonlinear relationship between power and (a) self-reported dominance, (b) partner-rated dominance, and (c) interactional dominance. H1 was tested for Task 1 because it allowed a test of the relationship between power and dominance before deception was introduced. As Kenny et al. (2006) do not specify how to test nonlinear relationships using the APIM, H1was tested with polynomial equation trend analysis following the dyadic method used by Dunbar and Burgoon (2005). A separate multiple regression analysis was conducted for each of the dominance variables (self-reported dominance and partner-rated dominance) as the criterion measures. The predictor variables were the individual’s own self-reported power and their partner’s self-reported power each raised to the first and second power. The polynomial terms tested for nonlinearity.

For self-reported dominance (H1a), the omnibus ANOVA was significant, F(4, 101) = 2.88, p < .05, R2 = .10 (pseudo R2 = .25), but none of the individual predictors emerged as significant. The ICCs (which indicate the degree of interdependence between actor and partner) for each dependent variable are provided in Table 4.

Table 4.

Intraclass Correlations Between Actor and Partner.

Self-reported dominance	.01
Partner-reported dominance	.25*
Argument count	.47*
Argument diversity	.16
Linguistic dominance	.02
Self-reported power	−.46

For partner-rated dominance (H1b), the omnibus ANOVA was not significant, F(4, 101) = 1.58, p = .19, R² = .06, but two of the individual predictors emerged as significant: Actor’s self-reported power, β = .86, t(104) = 2.12, p < .05, and actor’s self-reported power squared, β = -.10, t(104) = -1.97, p < .05 (pseudo R² = .19); the latter indicates a curvilinear effect. When we reparameterized the model to include only the significant terms and the omnibus ANOVA approached significance, F(2, 105) = 2.94, p = .057, R² = .05 and the two individual predictors remained significant: Actor’s self-reported power, β = .90, t(102.72) = 2.31, p < .05, and actor’s self-reported power squared, β = -.10, t(102.32) = -2.02, p < .05.

For interactional dominance (H1c), we examined the effects of power role on argument count, argument diversity, and linguistic dominance. For argument count, the omnibus ANOVA was significant, F(4, 101) = 4.63, p <.01, R² = .15. One individual predictor emerged as significant: Actor’s self-reported power squared, β = .27, t(104) = 2.38, p < .05, producing an inverted-U shaped curvilinear effect (pseudo R² = .15). For argument diversity, the omnibus ANOVA was significant, F(4, 99) = 4.02, p <.01, R2 = .14. Actor’s self-reported power β = -1.20, t(102) = -2.12, p < .05 and actor’s self-reported power squared, β = .15, t(102) = 2.71, p < .01, were both significant (pseudo R² = .21), indicating linear and quadratic (inverted-U shape) effects. For linguistic dominance, the omnibus ANOVA was significant, F(4, 101) = 6.54, p <.001, R² = .21, and actor’s self-reported power squared, β = 1.34, t(104) = 2.38, p < .05, and partner’s self-reported power squared β = 1.22, t(102) = 2.16, p < .05 were both significant (pseudo R² = .25). The results from the H1 tests generally provide support for our prediction, based on DPT, that dominance was most evident with equal degrees of power.

H2 posited a positive relationship between the use of persuasive deception and (a) self-reported dominance, (b) partner-rated dominance, and (c) interactional dominance. H2 was tested with a mixed-model linear regression for Task 2 similar to that reported above, with deception as the independent variable and partner role (i.e., actor or partner) as a repeated measure. Because power was also manipulated during the experiment, the power role was also included in the analysis as an independent variable. For self-reported dominance (H2a), the results revealed a significant main effect for the deception condition, F(1, 83.91) = 4.84, p < .05, but not for the power role, F(1, 51.60) = 1.48, ns (pseudo R² = .25). Deceivers perceived themselves to be the most dominant (n = 32; M = 5.91, SD = 0.83). Truthful actors with truthful partners (n = 42; M = 5.70, SD = 0.85) saw themselves as second most dominant and significantly more so than truthful actors with deceptive partners (n = 32; M = 5.19, SD = 0.90), t(72) = 2.47, p < .05. Truth-tellers did not differ significantly from deceivers, t(72) = -1.06, ns. For partner-rated dominance (H2b), there were no significant effects for power role, F(1, 50.14) = 0.20, ns, or deception, F(1, 85.67) = 0.04, ns (pseudo R² = .18).

For interactional dominance (H2c), the effects of deception on the argument count, the diversity of the arguments, and linguistic dominance were examined. For argument count, the results revealed a significant main effect for deception, F(1, 99.11) = 3.72, p < .001, but not for power role, F(1, 50.85) = 0.24, ns (pseudo R2 = .13). Overall, deceivers made significantly, t(60) = -1.80, p = .04 (one-tailed), more arguments (M = 4.39, SD = 2.33) than their truthful partners (M = 3.29, SD = 2.45). Those in the truth-truth condition made the fewest arguments (M = 2.50, SD = 1.74) and were significantly different from deceivers, t(71) = -3.96, p < .001 (one-tailed). For diversity of arguments, the results revealed a significant main effect for deception, F(1, 83.69) = 22.07, p < .001, but not for power role, F(1, 50.76) = 1.09, ns (pseudo R² = .20). The difference between deceivers and their truthful partners on argument diversity was not significant t(60) = -1.52, ns. Those in the truth-truth condition made the fewest types of arguments (M = 1.50, SD = 0.80); their argument diversity was significantly different from both deceivers, t(71) = -5.43, p < .001, and deceivers’ truthful partners, t(71) = -3.17, p < .01. Similarly, the test of deception on linguistic dominance revealed a significant main effect for deception, F(1, 80.24) = 28.25, p < .001, but not power role, F(1, 50.53) = 0.50, ns (pseudo R² = .26). Deceivers (M = 200.27, SD = 4.81) did not differ significantly from their truthful partners (M = 198.62, SD = 7.17) in terms of linguistic dominance, t(62) = 1.08, p = .28. However, those in the truth-truth condition exhibited the least linguistic dominance (M = 190.73, SD = 9.18), less than the amount of linguistic dominance displayed by both deceivers, t(72) = -5.34, p < .001, and deceivers’ truthful partners, t(72) = -4.01, p < .001.

Taken together, the results provide strong support for H2 because deceivers were generally the most dominant verbally, linguistically, and perceptively, as evidenced in their self-reports.

H3 predicted a relationship between power and deception such that equal-power deceivers would appear more dominant than truth-tellers or deceivers in high- or low-power. We examined (a) self-reported power, (b) self-reported dominance, (c) partner-rated dominance, and (d) interactional dominance first with a mixed-model linear regression following the APIM. Self-rated perceived power after Task 2 was the criterion variable and assigned power role and deception were the predictor variables, with partner role (actor or partner) as a repeated factor. The main effect for self-reported power (H3a) approached significance, F(1, 50.19) = 3.04, p = .08, and there was a significant main effect for deception, F(1, 56.36) = 3.55, p < .01 (pseudo R2 = .12). Deceivers across all power conditions expressed feeling more powerful than their truthful partners or participants in the truth-truth condition (see means in Table 5). Paired-samples t tests revealed no significant change, t(41) = -.05, ns, in perceived power from Task 1 to Task 2 for those in the truth-truth condition; but deceivers’ perceived power increased significantly, t(31) = -5.34, p < .001, from Task 1 to Task 2; whereas the self-reported power of their truthful partners decreased significantly, t(31) = 3.09, p < .01. These results indicate that the deception manipulation had a greater effect on participants’ perceived power than the power role manipulation, and that deceivers felt more powerful when moving from truth to deception, whereas their truthful partners felt a corresponding decrease in their power when their partners became deceptive.

Table 5.

Means and Standard Deviations for Self-Perceived Power.

	Task 1		Task 2
Condition	M	SD	M	SD
Truth-truth	4.14	0.55	4.15	0.59
Truth with deceptive partner	4.35	0.96	3.16	1.13
Deceptive with truthful partner	3.88	1.01	5.34	1.43

The remaining tests for H3b, c, and d tested the joint effects of deception and power on the various measures of dominance. As the H2 tests reported above revealed, once deception was introduced in Task 2, all main effects for deception were significant, but the power role manipulation no longer exerted a significant influence on perceived or interactional dominance. A MANCOVA was performed with argument count, argument diversity, and linguistic dominance in Task 2 as the dependent variables and assigned power role, deception, and power by deception as the predictor variables, with partner role (actor or partner) as a repeated factor. The omnibus test for the deception by power interaction effect was not significant, Wilks’ Λ = .91, F (20, 372) = .42, p = ns, and none of the dominance variables emerged as significant predictors.

H4 predicted that dominant individuals would (a) be perceived as the most credible and (b) the most likely to attain their goals. We conducted a mixed model linear analysis using the APIM method described above. Partner-rated credibility (H4a) was the criterion variable, and self-reported dominance, partner-rated dominance, argument count and diversity, and linguistic dominance were the predictor variables. A significant main effect emerged for partner-rated dominance, F(1, 96.84) = 14.50, p < .001 (pseudo R² = .10). Those who rated their partners as dominant also rated them as more credible, t(105) = .35, p < .01.

H4b predicted that dominant individuals would be more successful in achieving their goals than submissive individuals. We conducted a binary logistic regression where the desired outcome (achieved or not achieved) was the dependent variable and the four dominance variables (self-reported dominance, partner-rated dominance, argument count, and argument diversity) were the predictor variables. The omnibus test was significant, χ²(5, N = 106) = 17.90, p < .01, with self-reported dominance as the sole significant predictor of achieving the desired goal (see Table 6). Those who thought they demonstrated more dominance were indeed more successful at persuading their partners. These data provide modest support for H4.

Table 6.

Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Goal Attainment.

Predictor	B	SE B	e^B
Self-reported dominance	.69*	.28	1.97
Partner-reported dominance	.38	.26	1.46
Argument count	.09	.18	1.09
Argument diversity	−.19	.32	.83
Linguistic dominance	−.04	.03	.96
Constant	6.35
χ²	17.90**
df	5

Note: e^B = exponentiated B.

p < .05. **p < .01.

Given that deceivers received an incentive to choose a weaker candidate, we conducted a follow-up analysis to H4 to determine if truth-tellers were more likely to succeed in selecting the stronger candidate and overruled their deceptive low-power partners when they were in a position of authority. We found that the high-power participants were no more likely than those in the other power conditions to choose the better resume when interacting with a deceptive partner. The vast majority (84%) of deceivers across the three power conditions were successful in convincing their partner to choose the weakest resume. To test whether the number of participants who made the best quality decision (i.e., chose the strongest resume) differed by power role or deception condition, we conducted a binary logistic regression with power role and deception as the predictors of decision quality (i.e., selection of the best resume). The results indicated that decision quality was affected by deception but not by power role. Dyads with deceivers were more likely to make a poorer decision (i.e., choose the weakest resume) than those where both partners were truthful (see Table 7).

Table 7.

Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Decision Quality.

Predictor	B	SE B	e^B
Power Role	−.06	.30	.94
Deception	−1.61**	.32	.20
Constant	3.06
χ²	35.20**
df	2

Note: e^B = exponentiated B.

p < .01.

Discussion

This study investigated the joint role of power and deception on the decision-making processes in a task setting. Guided by both IDT and DPT, we predicted that deception would empower actors to engage in more dominant communication, which in turn would enhance their credibility, thereby enabling them to accomplish their goals. This study is the first one, to our knowledge, that experimentally manipulated both power and deception. The results provided support for the majority of our hypotheses.

Our study follows the work of many other scholars who experimentally manipulated power (Guinote, 2008; Hall, Rosip, Smith LeBeau, Horgan, & Carter, 2006; Molm et al., 2000), and our Task 1 manipulation check revealed that power roles were well established prior to deception. The introduction of deception affected our power manipulation because persuasive deceivers became more dominant, and the introduction of deception overrode the power relationship established in Task 1. In other words, our participants felt empowered by the act of deception itself. Deception seems to grant the deceiver informational power because the deceiver knows and understands reality and yet misrepresents it to others. This finding has strong implications for sequencing effects in interactive deception: the opportunity to gain one’s bearings while speaking the truth before launching into deception can greatly enhance an actor’s sense of power, which affects both the actor’s subsequent communication and the outcomes of task-oriented interactions. Although this phenomenon should not be limited to the laboratory, more study of the relationship between power and deception in dyads with pre-existing relationships is needed before generalizations are made.

Further, it is striking how successful the deceivers were in misleading their partners. Deceptive partners easily deceived truthful individuals in all power categories. Of particular interest is the success of the low-power deceivers. In all but one case, the low-power deceivers were successful in misleading their more powerful partner who not only was responsible for the dyad’s decision and expected to be compensated for making a good hire, but who also held reward power over the low-power partner. Even in these experimental conditions, the deceivers across all power conditions successfully subverted a hiring decision.

These results also highlight the critical role that interpersonal dominance plays in the relationship between deception and power and their effects on task outcomes and credibility. Through their persuasive deception, deceivers were not only perceived as more dominant but also offered more arguments and more diverse arguments than their partners or than those in truthful dyads. This occurred despite the fact that both deceivers and truth-tellers were equally committed to their goals. Because deceivers were tasked with promoting a weaker resume, they likely felt compelled to be more persuasive and thus were more dominant in an attempt to convince their partner to choose a less qualified individual. The findings suggest that they appeared more dominant and persuasive by essentially overwhelming their truthful partner with arguments.

The reasons why the advocacy for the weakest candidate were successful are consistent with McGuire’s (1964) work on inoculation and cultural truisms, which argues that people are ill-equipped to defend themselves against counter-attitudinal advocacy targeting beliefs that are widely accepted or obvious. Since the weakest resume was clearly inferior to the other two, the truthful partners of deceivers may not have even considered the weak candidate as a legitimate contender for the position and may have spent their time evaluating the strengths of the other two candidates. When the deceptive partner began by advocating the weakest candidate, the truthful partners may have been unprepared to refute the deceiver’s choice because they had already dismissed that candidate as a viable option. In fact, reading through the chat transcripts involving deception revealed that many deceivers immediately began with a list of reasons in favor of the weakest resume. When their partners objected, pointing out the obvious superior qualifications of the other candidates, the deceivers dismissed the objections by calling the other candidates “overqualified.” The dominance of the deceivers may have taken their partners by surprise, but they were ill-equipped to defend against it.

If an individual chooses to adopt a persuasive deception tactic in an attempt to influence a decision or course of action, the deceiver may manifest many desirable social qualities. For example, when both deceptive and truthful actors displayed dominance, their partners viewed them as more credible. Consistent with IDT, as the interaction progressed, deceivers were able to recover from any initial suspicion or criticism of their position by becoming more dominant. This dominance, in turn, elevated the deceivers’ credibility and facilitated successful deception. This finding implies that deceivers displaying dominance may become more believable in the eyes of their partners than less dominant truth-tellers; thus, separating truth from deceit becomes extremely onerous as the very act of persuasive deception can paradoxically make the actor seem more credible.

The connections among deception, dominance, and credibility must, however, be interpreted with caution. Based on the results of this experiment, the first instance of persuasive deception is very likely to be successful, but the effects of the deception may have ramifications for future actions. For example, if an actor strongly advocates for the least qualified candidate, and the hiring decision leads to negative consequences, the actor may suffer a loss of credibility and/or social capital. Thus, increases in credibility due to dominance displays may be transitory and may fade as the outcomes of the actor’s advocacy emerge. This reasoning is consistent with the view that deception detection most frequently occurs in hindsight, and is exceptionally difficult to identify in the moment of deceit (Park, Levine, McCornack, Morrison, & Ferrera, 2002). Despite this caveat, the possibility remains that individuals engaging in persuasive deception may be viewed as more credible, not less, as a result of their deception.

Finally, dominance also influenced goal achievement. Those who rated themselves as the most dominant were more likely to achieve their goals. Further, dominance was a better predictor of goal attainment than power. This finding is consistent with DPT and other research that has found that persistent dominant behavior can lead to successful compliance-gaining outcomes (Boster, Levine, & Kazoleas, 1993). Contrary to the credibility results, where partner-rated dominance played a critical role, only self-rated dominance affected goal attainment. This implies that for dominance to be effective in facilitating goal attainment, dominance may only need to be recognized by actors attempting to influence their partners because they project a more confident demeanor. If these attempts are successful, the outcomes will reflect more favorably the views of the actor who acknowledges his or her need to control the interaction. Thus, dominance can be an effective compliance-gaining strategy, especially for deceivers operating from an objectively weaker position who need to convince their partners of something that is against their partner’s own interest.

Limitations and Future Research Directions

The present study involved implicit sanctioning of the deceiver’s deception. In a previous study comparing experimenter sanctioned lies to unsanctioned lies, Feeley and deTurck (1998) argued that participants who are told to lie by an experimenter view the opportunity to lie without consequences as a challenge and thus may find it arousing and exciting. Similar to Feeley and deTurck’s study, no participants terminated the experiment before its conclusion or refused to lie in our experiment, and most did so enthusiastically and convincingly. The effect of experimenter lie sanctioning should be considered in future work regarding power and deception.

Certain elements of dominance are communicated nonverbally. However, the nonverbal communication channel was not available to participants in our study because they interacted via a chat client that limited nonverbal exchanges. Using chat provided many benefits, including greater experimental control and easier analysis of transcripts but some components of dominance could not be examined. A future replication of these findings in a face-to-face context is suggested as a natural follow-on investigation.

Finally, any laboratory study involving zero-history interactions cannot fully recreate the power disparity between high- and low-power individuals. However, using real power hierarchies (such as organizational co-workers) and manipulating deception is also not feasible, thus we attempted to mitigate this weakness through introducing financial incentives and granting power bases to high-power individuals (e.g., ability to reward others, access to evaluation resources, knowledge of store needs). However, the true nature of the supervisor-subordinate relationship cannot be adequately captured without formal authority (i.e., the ability to dismiss the subordinate) and without an on-going relationship between partners. The experimental setting did permit control over other potential moderators (e.g., gender, appearance, personality, personal attributes) through random assignment to conditions. The benefit from this control was sufficient to warrant a laboratory-based experiment. To extend our findings a replication in actual organizations within preexisting power structures over extended periods is required. However, extracting information about deceptive interactions where power plays a role will likely be met with reluctance.

Conclusion

Individuals may be susceptible to deception regardless of their degree of power relative to their partner. Through deceiver’s dominance, persuasive deception can be enacted and accepted. When persuasive deception is present, a priori power is circumscribed, as the deception induces individuals to step out of their expected power-based behavioral patterns. Actors who successfully display dominance will likely be seen as more credible and obtain their desired goals. By utilizing two complementary theories, IDT and DPT, we were able to explore the intersection of deception and power in interpersonal negotiations.

Footnotes

Authors’ Note

A previous version of this research was presented at the 43rd Hawaiian International Conference on System Sciences, Koloa, HI in 2010.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

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