I’m Not Rude,I’m Just Moody

Abstract

A growing body of research on the role played by affect within interpersonal interaction has shown it to be a critical element in communication choices. Comparatively little attention has been paid to the specific impact of moods in this context, and as of yet no data have been published on the role of mood in shaping responses to a very common interaction event: goal interruption. This investigation relies on several theoretical frameworks to examine the impact that mood has on politeness, both in initial communication attempts and in following goal interruption. An experiment was conducted in which 99 participants attempted to persuade a confederate on a specific topic. Results show that positive-mood individuals begin persuasive attempts with less verbal politeness and less immediacy than their negative-mood counterparts. Furthermore, both positive and negative-mood individuals exhibited reductions in immediacy but increases in verbal politeness following partner interference. The findings are discussed and future directions are suggested.

Keywords

mood politeness immediacy partner interference

Within the social science literature, the concept of affect (mood and emotion) is an area that has garnered much attention. Research has shown that affect plays a role in cognition by influencing how we process messages (Nabi, 2002), how we categorize and store information (Lazarus, 1991), and how we retrieve it (Ruder & Bless, 2003). It influences the persuasiveness of messages (Bless, Bohner, Schwartz, & Strack, 1990) as well as our beliefs about the world in which we live (Frijda & Mesquita, 2000). Furthermore, it has been the focus of several theories, including cognitive emotion theory (Lazarus, 1991) and appraisal theory (Scherer, 1999), and has influenced many others (e.g., social exchange theories, dialectical theories, and stage theories (for review, see Planalp, 2003).

Another construct that experienced dramatic growth decades prior to that seen in the affect literature but that remains an important part of scholarly inquiry is politeness (e.g., Brown & Levinson, 1987). Research in the domain of politeness, and its sister identity management constructs (e.g., facework; Goffman, 1955), has become a staple of our understanding about interaction processes. Indeed, the notion that concerns over own and others’ identity shape choices in interaction, with particular implications for communicative directness, has become a shibboleth within interpersonal communication scholarship. This investigation combines insights from the domains of affect and politeness and utilizes an experimental design intended to elucidate moods’ impact on interaction-based politeness norms.

Affect

An important distinction that has emerged in research on affect is that between emotion and mood (Lazarus, 1991; Planalp, 1999). While the research involving emotion, including its impact on interactions, has been growing, attention to the role played by moods has lagged. The nature of moods suggests that scholars’ relative failure to attend to its role within interactions is misplaced. Whereas emotions are event-based and specific (Forgas, 2006), moods tend to be abstract, lack a focus (object, cause, or event), and reflect a general state (Planalp, 1999). They tend to be less intense and involve lower levels of cognition than emotions (Forgas, 2001a). Furthermore, since individuals are not as effective at monitoring or controlling moods, as opposed to emotions, they tend to be pervasive and subtle in their effects on social thinking and judgments (Forgas, 2001a). In general, emotions follow a cause-action pattern; thus, they tend to be more of an episodic event rather than an enduring state (Planalp, 1999, 2003). Conversely, since moods do not require a specific agent and are less intense, they tend to be more enduring (Forgas, 2001a).

Two affect models seem particularly useful for understanding the impact of mood on politeness norms: Fiedler’s (1991, 2001a) accommodation-assimilation model and Forgas’ (1995) affect infusion model (AIM). Each will be briefly reviewed.

Affect Models

Fiedler and colleagues (see Bless & Fiedler, 2006; Fiedler, 2001b; Fiedler & Bless, 2000; Fiedler, Nickel, Asbeck, & Pagel, 2003) introduced an affect model that is centrally based within the literature on cognitive and behavioral regulation. The framework relies on the premise that all regulatory system are shaped by two competing functions (see, Piaget, 1954): assimilation (internally driven adaptation) and accommodation (externally/environmentally driven adaptation). Assimilation reflects the easy transposing of our own knowledge structures onto the external world, the “assimilation” of the external world into our internal models. It is part of the organism’s “appetitive set” (Fiedler, 2001a, p. 179). In contrast, accommodation involves the careful adaptation of internal structures by creating allowances for external realities, the “accommodation” of external stimuli into internal visions. It is part of the organism’s “aversive set.”

These contrasting regulatory functions also come with differential information processing tendencies. Assimilation’s appetitive motivations encourages spontaneity and rapid processing, while the protective drive associated with accommodation promotes careful and detailed processing (Fiedler, 2001a, 2001b). More important, Fiedler and colleagues consistently link the application of these functions to mood. Specifically, Fiedler and Bless (2000) propose that their framework “revolves around one basic assumption, namely, that positive mood states foster assimilation while negative-mood states foster an accommodation function” (p. 147).

The data in support of that proposition are quite strong. For example, studies have shown that positive-mood individuals, compared to their negative-mood counterparts, are more likely to engage in stereotyping (Bless, 2000), experience heightened mood-selective recall (Fiedler, Nickel, Asbeck, & Pagel, 2003), are less able to process persuasive messages (Mackie & Worth, 1989), and utilize smaller samples in decision making (Fiedler, Renn, & Kareev, 2010). Negative-mood individuals, on the other hand, have been found to be more sensitive to argument quality (Fiedler, 2001b), and stimulus assessment (Sinclair & Marks, 1992). Negative-mood individuals are also more critical when it comes to interpretation of behaviors (Forgas, Bower, & Moylan, 1990), more evaluative of requests (Forgas, 2001a), and have increased levels of resistance to compliance (Forgas, 1998a).

Fiedler’s work is closely affiliated with another model—Forgas’s (1995) affect infusion model (AIM; see Bless & Fiedler, 2006, for discussion of the overlap between the two models). The AIM is premised on the notion that affect’s impact on cognition and information processing depends on two aspects: (a) cognitive effort (i.e., quantity of processing), and (b) the extent to which information search is an open process (i.e., quality of processing). Somewhat counterintuitively, Forgas (1995, 1998a, 2008) argues that mood is most likely to infuse into cognitive processing when the quality of processing is high. Specifically, the cognitive load required by open (as opposed to closed) processing increases the likelihood that mood states are relied upon heuristically to form judgments and/or reach conclusions. Under such conditions, mood becomes infused into the processing either by serving as an informative cue—whereby the individual makes an assessment on the basis of “how they currently feel” regardless of the source for that feeling (Forgas, 1998a, 2008; the “inferential account”)—or an informational cue, allowing mood to become a framework which influences perception, information recall, and judgments (Forgas, 2001b, 2008; “the affective priming principle”).

In either case, mood infusion generally results in mood congruency, a pattern that has received considerable empirical support (for reviews, see Forgas, 2008; Nasby, 1996; Sedikides & Green, 2001). Essentially, individuals’ perceptions, responses, and memories are generally shaped in mood-consistent ways: Positive people process the world more positively and remember more happy events, while negative people show opposite tendencies. More important, the AIM adopts Fiedler’s assumptions surrounding the assimilation-accommodation functions (and related variance in cognitive efforts) by proposing that negative moods infuse into decision making by producing more careful information processing (for review, see Forgas, 2008). Indeed, the evidence that mood affects the outcome of interpersonal encounters is wide ranging and includes data showing that mood influences the evaluative techniques used for persuasive arguments (Bless, Mackie, & Schwarz, 1992), the reactions to strong versus weak arguments (Bless et al., 1990), the types of cues that are most effective (Mackie & Worth, 1989), and the quality and effectiveness of specific persuasive messages (Forgas, 2006), among other outcomes. Moods have also been shown to influence social judgments, specifically trust (Lount, 2010), friendliness (Wyland & Forgas, 2010), appropriateness of individuals making requests (Forgas, 1998b), and even the manner in which social context influences the perceptions of others (Avramova, Stapel, & Lerouge, 2010). Particularly germane to concerns with identity is Baron’s (1990) argument that mood and emotion affects an individuals’ desire to make concessions and avoid negative tactics in negotiations as well as Forgas and Cromer’s (2004) evidence that mood affected the level of equivocation, message elaboration, and evasiveness during conflict episodes. Together, the existing theoretical and empirical work on moods implicates a central feature of interactions: politeness norms. A review of that literature helps elucidate the form in which such a politeness-focused mood effect might take.

Politeness

Work originating from Goffman (1967), and then later extended by Brown and Levinson, has argued that individuals desire acceptance and approval from others with regard to one’s self-image (positive face) as well as freedom to be unimpeded by others in the selection of action (negative face). Individuals seek both aspects of face met, yet must rely on others to do so. As a result, both parties in an interaction typically engage in cooperative face-management efforts intended to promote both their own face and that of their interaction partner and to avoid actions that threaten either’s face needs (Brown & Levinson, 1987). Interestingly, while the theory argues overall for an individual’s concern surrounding the minimization of face threats, it also suggests that as intimacy between the interactants increases (reduction in social distance) this concern can become relaxed (Brown & Levinson, 1987).

More important, several scholars have argued that speakers sometimes make use of strategies that are not encompassed by the original framework of politeness theory (e.g., Craig, Tracy, & Spisak, 1986; Culpeper, 1996; Culpeper, Bousfield, & Wichmann, 2003). These strategies include face attacks (aggravation) and efforts at maintaining the speaker’s face needs without concern for the face needs of the interaction partner (speaker-oriented facework), among others. To better understand the conditions under which politeness norms wane, we examine research at the intersection of mood and politeness.

Mood and Politeness

Forgas (1999a, 1999b) recognized the likely impact of affect on politeness relatively early in his development of AIM. Indeed, mood was consistently found to affect the politeness levels of individuals’ requests. Positive-mood individuals were more direct and less polite in their requests, while negative-mood individuals exhibited the inverse relationship. Unfortunately, this work was generally based on a rudimentary definition of politeness, essentially defining it as being synonymous with directness, a conceptualization that ignores the complex relationship between the two constructs. Indeed, Leech (1983) argued that indirect utterances are sometimes associated with politeness and other times a reflection of impoliteness (see also, Culpeper et al., 2003). In addition, while this initial work by Forgas (1999a, 1999b) coded for politeness, it did so based exclusively on the verbal channel.

A large area of literature has shown nonverbal messages to be an important component of politeness expressions. Specifically, studies have consistently found a set of nonverbal cues—dubbed “nonverbal immediacy”—to be associated with perceptions of politeness (for review, see Jones & Guerrero, 2001; Manusov, 1991; Trees & Manusov, 1998). Nonverbal immediacy cues include facial pleasantness, gestural expressivity, eye contact, and direct body orientation, among other cues of conversational involvement (see Burgoon, Le Poire, Beutler, Bergan, & Engle, 1992). Attention to the nonverbal channel for expressions of both politeness (through immediacy) and impoliteness (through nonimmediacy) is essential to a fuller understanding of the expression of these messages within interpersonal interactions.

In sum, Forgas’ work (1999a, 1999b) has shown that negative moods create a heightened sense of environmental threat, thereby increasing behavioral awareness and emphasizing goal-related processing depth. In contrast, the environmental security perceived by positive-mood individuals drops behavioral monitoring, reduces goal-related scrutiny, and decreases processing depth. These differences could have significant ramifications when applied to the context of interpersonal interactions, which can vary greatly in type and composition. Of particular interest to this study are interactions driven by persuasion goals. Successful interpersonal persuasion relies on competent use of argument as well as attention to both personal face needs and that of the interaction partner (O’Keefe & Shepherd, 1987). The situation is difficult since it often places actors in a position whereby justifying one’s own position on the issue (i.e., protecting their own face) comes at the cost of challenging that of the interaction partner. The complexities surrounding the negotiation of identity needs undoubtedly interact with mood to ultimately shape actor responses in these types of interactions. This, together with recognition of (a) the role of politeness as a strategic, goal-oriented behavior and (b) the role of nonverbal immediacy as an expression of politeness the following hypotheses are posited:

Hypothesis 1a (H1a): Individuals in a positive mood utilize lower levels of verbal politeness and lower levels of nonverbal immediacy behaviors compared to individuals in other mood conditions (negative and control).

Hypothesis 1b (H1b): Individuals in a negative mood utilize higher levels of verbal politeness and higher levels of nonverbal immediacy compared to individuals in other mood conditions (positive and control).

More important, the literature on nonverbal behavior implies a different set of behavioral patterns accompanying mood than that suggested by AIM. Specifically, that literature proposes that positive moods promote greater use of nonverbal immediacy, not lesser as advanced in H1a. Our reliance on the AIM framework, and its strong theoretical justification for the mood-politeness expectation, together with the empirical and conceptual links between politeness and the expression of nonverbal immediacy, directed us toward predictions (in H1a and H1b) that reflect the AIM approach, but we also note the apparent conflict with the nonverbal literature with some intrigue.

Besides the restricted operationalization of politeness, past studies of mood effects in conversation have also generally been limited to single turns at talk. As such, they have ignored the typical, sequential nature of conversation and also overlooked the effects of a common occurrence: goal interruption.

Goal Interruption

Consistent with the framework adopted in this investigation, scholars have long shown that individuals are goal-striving creatures and that these motivations shape communicative decisions (e.g., Berger, 1997; Bogdan, 1994; Dillard, Segrin, & Harden, 1989). There are several approaches (Berger, 1997; Berscheid, 1983; Knobloch & Schmelzer, 2008) that argue that interactional partners sometimes interrupt goals and that this goal interference (also known as “partner interference”) typically motivates individuals to alter their previously constructed action sequences to attend to the interruption. Goal/partner interference takes many forms within a communicative interaction. In the specific context of persuasive episodes, an interaction partner may engage in goal interference through a lack of attention, an expressed lack of understanding, verbal interruption, or the display of negative affect, among many other forms of expressing plan failure.

Mood scholars have mostly overlooked change in sequential strategies within conversations. This investigation explores this issue by advancing two research questions:

Research Question 1 (RQ1): Does partner interference alter the level of actor politeness (i.e., verbal politeness and nonverbal immediacy) in positive- and negative-mood conditions?

Research Question 2 (RQ2): Is rate of change in politeness (i.e., verbal politeness and nonverbal immediacy) prior to and following partner interference a function of mood?

Method

Participants

Ninety nine participants were recruited from a required general education course at a large northeastern university and received course credit for their participation. The age of sample participants averaged approximately 20 years (M = 20.14, SD = 3.41), and the sample population included more women (59%, n = 58) than men and was predominantly White/non-Hispanic (85%), with Asian/Pacific Islanders making up the second largest ethnicity (4%).

Procedure and Design

Participants were randomly assigned to mood conditions (i.e., positive: n = 33, negative: n = 33, and control [no mood induction]: n = 33) and reported individually to the Communication Research Lab. Upon arrival, they were told that the second participant (in fact, the female confederate) had not arrived yet and were asked to wait in the room until her arrival. A television was set up in the room and was either playing a video (for those in the experimental condition; more details about the content will follow) or shut off (for those in the control). Those in the experimental condition were encouraged to watch television while they waited for the “other participant” to arrive. After 7 minutes (as the relevant portion of the movie clip was ending), the confederate entered the room under the guise of the participant who had just arrived, and both the participant and the confederate were introduced to each other, given a consent form, and asked to complete a questionnaire.

Upon completion of the pretest questionnaire, both the participant and the confederate were informed that they would engage in a debate about a specific topic (whether the school should remove 8:00 a.m. classes) with the goal to successfully argue their point of view. At the time, the topic of 8:00 a.m. classes was becoming a debated topic around campus and in the school newspaper. It was believed that utilizing this topic would maximize the chances that participants had sufficient issue knowledge to engage in persuasive argumentation. Participants were informed that since they had “arrived first,” they would be allowed to choose which side of the argument they wished to represent. Giving the participants choice of advocacy positions was expected to increase the likelihood of elevated issue involvement and strengthen consistency effects, thereby increasing participant motivation in achieving the persuasion goal. The other interaction partner (the confederate) was informed that she would be representing the opposite view and should respond as they normally would in conversation (of course, they knew to follow trained procedures). The participants were instructed to start the conversation as soon as the researcher left the room.

Prior to the interaction, the confederates were trained to maintain eye contact with the participant but otherwise remain silent during the participants’ initial turn at talk. Furthermore, the confederates were trained to remain unexpressive nonverbally to the best of their ability. When participants completed their persuasive turn at talk, the confederate enacted the goal interference manipulation by responding, “I don’t get what you mean.” This response was selected because it reflected goal interference (i.e., evidence that the interaction partner was not yet persuaded) without producing a new set of emotions that may have come from more direct resistance or objection.

Following the goal interference induction, confederates returned to their preinterference level of expressiveness. The participant, in all cases, followed the goal interference induction with a follow-up persuasive effort. Because our interest in this investigation was limited to assessing participant response to a single-goal interference and then capturing self-assessments of the interaction as soon after that exchange as possible, the interaction was stopped when the participant either stopped talking or asked the confederate another question. On average, the conversational task was stopped after 3 to 4 minutes. Upon completion of the task, both interactants were told that they would be completing another survey and that confidentiality required that they be separated.

Experimental Manipulation

Mood induction

Participants were randomly assigned to one of two mood induction conditions (positive vs. negative) or to the control (no mood induction) group. Consistent with mood inductions used by Forgas and colleagues (Forgas, 2007; Forgas & Cromer, 2004), participants in one of the two mood conditions watched a 7-minute excerpt from one of two movies. In the positive-mood condition, participants were shown a 7-minute clip from the movie Wedding Crashers while those in the negative-mood condition were administered a clip from the movie Saving Private Ryan. Both were familiar movies to the target population. The former involved a humorous look at the exploits of two men as they attend strangers’ weddings uninvited while the latter focused on a mother discovering that three of her sons had died in combat during World War II. The specific segments of each movie were selected based on their status as particularly strong representations of the target emotion and results from focus group testing confirming their success in inducing those emotions.

Instrumentation

Pretest

The preinteraction survey consisted of only one measure, the Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), which served as a manipulation check for the mood induction. This scale entails 20 items that require participants to indicate “. . . to what extent you feel this way right now, that is, at the present moment.” Participants responded using a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely). Consistent with previous iterations of the scale, the items were divided into two factors. Ten items (e.g., “Excited,” “Enthusiastic,” “Inspired”) constituted positive mood (Cronbach’s α = .83; M = 2.27, SD = 0.68). Similarly, 10 items resulted in a factor labeled negative mood (e.g. “Sad,” “Irritable,” and “Guilty”; Cronbach’s α = .74; M = 1.57, SD = 0.42).

Coding

Following completion of all interactions, two undergraduate research assistants, blind to the hypotheses, were trained for 2 weeks to code verbal impoliteness and nonverbal immediacy. Sample clips from the videotaped interactions were used during training. Using a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree), coders were asked to assess the degree to which participants’ responses were verbally impolite and the degree to which they reflected elevated nonverbal immediacy. Given our interests in holistic judgments of nonverbal immediacy and of impoliteness, we used single-item, and general, observer measures for each construct, rather than more behavior-specific coding.

As part of coder training, coders became familiar with particular aspects of each of the two general constructs. Because verbal impoliteness is more clearly identifiable than its opposite (politeness), coders were trained to listen for instances of the former. Specifically, verbal impoliteness would be reflected in the presence of verbal aggressiveness, which threatened an individual’s positive face ( e.g. “Only an idiot would want . . .,” “No sane or normal college student would take . . .”), or threats to negative face via declarative statements as to how the other person thinks/feels or (e.g., “I doubt either of us really wants 8:00 a.m. classes”) or statements that prevented the other person from having a choice (e.g., “You should agree with me that . . .”). During training, coders were instructed that instances that contained verbal aggressiveness would represent the higher end of the scale while the presence of only negative face threats would represent the middle and the complete absence of all face threats would represent the lower end of the scale. For example, a “5” in this coding scheme would be represented as an interaction in which the participant had utilized multiple examples of verbal aggressiveness or used at least one instance of verbal aggressiveness in conjunction with multiple negative face threats. A “3” was represented by the presence of two or more negative face threats, and a “1” rating represented an absence of all of these behaviors. Coders were informed that nonverbal immediacy behaviors are reflected through eye contact (i.e., focusing on the confederate while speaking), forward body lean (i.e., leaning in toward the confederate while speaking), body orientation (i.e., facing the confederate), and positive affect displays (i.e., smiling). Higher ratings represented use of multiple nonverbal behaviors (with a “5” representing the use of all the nonverbal behaviors listed above).

Coders made two judgments of participants’ immediacy and impoliteness: one at the end of the first persuasion attempt (which captured a gestalt rating of participants’ behavior between the first utterance of the participant’s first persuasive attempt until the confederate uttered the sentence, “I don’t get what you mean”) and the other at the end of the interaction (which captured behaviors between the participant’s first utterance following the response by the confederate until the participant stopped talking for an extended period of time or asked the confederate another question). After training was completed, both coders were given roughly 10% of the sample to assess intercoder reliability. After discussing potential differences regarding coding of the data and finding that agreement among coders was relatively high, coders were given the rest of the data to complete. In order to capture a more stable estimate of the coded assessments, both coders completed all dyads and their average ratings were used for analytic purposes. Coder reliability was high for impoliteness (intraclass r = .85, prepartner interference; r = .89, postpartner interference) and immediacy (intraclass r = .88, prepartner interference; r = .89, postpartner interference). The impoliteness measure was reverse coded to create a politeness measure for subsequent analyses.

Prior to testing the hypotheses and research questions, analyses were run to test for main effect differences (if any) by confederates or for interaction between confederates and condition. Results indicated that there were no significant differences across any of the dependent variables of interest.

Results

Manipulation Checks

Mood induction

An analysis was conducted to determine whether the mood manipulation was effective. Independent-sample t tests were performed comparing the scores on the positive-mood dimension of the PANAS scale for participants in the positive and negative conditions as well as the positive condition and control group. As expected, participants in the positive condition (M = 2.49, SD = 0.73) reported being in a significantly more positive mood than those in the negative-mood condition (M = 2.05, SD = 0.46), t(64) = 2.91, p < .01; Cohen’s d = 0.72. Interestingly however, there was no significant difference between the positive condition and the control condition (M = 2.28, SD = 0.74), t(64) = 1.18, p > .05; Cohen’s d = 0.30. It is worth noting that the average mood level for the positive condition remained somewhat low, most likely reflecting the fact that the positive-mood factor consisted of high-intensity emotions, operationally (i.e., excited, enthusiastic, strong).

Analysis of the negative-mood scores revealed success. Participants in both the positive condition (M = 1.41, SD = 0.31) group, t(64) = −5.44, p < .001 (Cohen’s d = −1.36), and the control group (M = 1.41, SD = 0.41), t(64) = 4.74, p < .001 (Cohen’s d = 1.19), reported less negative mood than those in the negative-mood condition (M = 1.87, SD = 0.38). Again, though, the mean level in the target condition remained somewhat low and likely reflected the particulars of the items used to assess negative mood (i.e., distressed, irritable, and upset). Overall, the results suggest that the mood manipulation was successful.

Impact of Mood on Politeness

The hypothesis predicted that individuals in a positive mood exhibit lower levels of verbal politeness and lower levels of nonverbal immediacy as compared to their negative-mood counterparts and the control group (H1a). Furthermore, negative-mood individuals were argued to exhibit higher levels of verbal politeness and higher levels of nonverbal immediacy, compared to individuals in the positive-mood condition and the control group (H1b). For each of these, two separate one-way ANOVAs (analyses of variance) were used, one with verbal politeness as the dependent variable and the other using the dependent variable of nonverbal immediacy. In all cases, single-df contrasts were used to compare the positive-mood condition (H1a) or the negative-mood condition (H1b) to all other conditions.

The first set of analyses, with ratings associated only with the initial message, indicated that those in a positive mood displayed significant differences in both levels of verbal politeness, F(1, 96) = 12.60, p = .001, and levels of nonverbal immediacy, F(1, 96) = 13.40, p < .001, compared to negative-mood individuals and the control group. Follow-up tests using LSD (least significant difference) adjustments indicated that as predicted, positive-mood individuals utilized lower levels of both verbal politeness and nonverbal immediacy than those in each of the other conditions (see Table 1).

Table 1.

Between-Subjects Results for the Hypothesis.

	Positive	Negative	Control
Verbal politeness	1.86 (0.65)^a	2.55 (0.91)^b	2.27 (0.55)^b
Nonverbal immediacy	3.35 (1.07)^a	4.06 (0.46)^b	3.82 (0.60)^b

Note: Within each variable, values with different subscripts indicate significant differences.

The second part of the hypothesis received only partial support. As predicted, contrasts comparing negative-mood individuals to those in the other conditions were significant for both verbal politeness, F(1, 96) = 9.65, p = .002, and nonverbal immediacy, F(1, 96) = 8.74, p = .004. However, post hocs (LSD) indicated that while negative-mood individuals did display higher levels of politeness and immediacy compared to all other conditions, it was only significant between negative- and positive-mood participants (see Table 1).

Impact of Partner Interference

In an effort to examine the effects of partner interference on the mood-politeness relationship, two research questions were proposed. Both research questions examined whether partner interference differentially influenced the verbal politeness and nonverbal immediacy variables across mood conditions.

Two repeated-measure ANOVAs were conducted to examine the impact that mood had on participants’ verbal politeness and nonverbal immediacy respectively across two time periods (pre- and post-partner interference). In both cases, time was utilized as the within-subject variable and mood condition was used as the between-subjects variable. Results for the analysis involving politeness indicated a significant main effect for time, F(1, 96) = 74.66, p < .001 (Partial η² = .44); however, the interaction effect was not significant, F(2, 96) = 1.80, p > .05 (Partial η² = .04). The analysis involving the dependent variable of nonverbal immediacy again indicated a significant main effect for time, F(1, 96) = 51.08, p < .001 (Partial η² = .35). However, in contrast to verbal politeness, nonverbal immediacy also displayed a significant interaction effect, F(2, 96) = 8.02, p < .01 (Partial η² = .14).

Follow-up analyses, involving several paired-samples t tests to test for simple effects (see Table 2), suggest that in general there are significant differences between pre- and post-partner interference with regard to levels of politeness (verbal politeness and nonverbal immediacy) across all mood conditions. In the case of verbal politeness, the rate of change was relatively constant across all three conditions. In contrast, with regard to immediacy, there was a lack of significant change (pre- to post-partner interference) for those in the positive-mood condition, yet change was significant for those in the control and negative-mood conditions. Furthermore, the change in immediacy levels for individuals in the negative-mood condition was far more than those in the other two conditions. By examining the means (see Table 2) we see that the general trend was for individuals to become more verbally polite and less immediate following partner interference.

Table 2.

Follow-up Test of Simple Effects for Research Questions.

	Prenterference M (SD)	Postinterference M (SD)	t	P	Eta²
Positive mood
Politeness	1.86 (0.65)	3.17 (1.16)	−5.610	<.001	.50
Immediacy	3.33 (1.07)	2.92 (1.01)	1.78	=.09	.09
Control
Politeness	2.27 (0.55)	3.09 (0.96)	−4.61	<.001	.40
Immediacy	3.82 (0.60)	3.24 (0.98)	8.32	<.001	.68
Negative mood
Politeness	2.55 (0.91)	3.41 (1.09)	−4.71	<.001	.41
Immediacy	4.06 (0.46)	2.59 (1.00)	3.25	<.01	.25

Note: df = 32 for all cells.

Discussion

The primary goals of this investigation were to examine the impact of mood on politeness norms and test whether partner interference differentially influences that effect. The results extend our understanding of both mood and politeness by suggesting that an individual’s mood alters message quality and influences the response to goal interruption.

Affect and Politeness

Based on Forgas’ (1995, 2008) affect infusion model, among other works, a prediction was advanced that expected mood to affect levels of verbal politeness and nonverbal immediacy in interactions with persuasion goals. Consistent with expectations, positive-mood individuals began these interactions with lower levels of politeness (lower verbal politeness and reduced nonverbal immediacy) compared to negative-mood individuals or those in the control group.

This finding is best understood within with past evidence showing that individuals with positive affect use more superficial processing strategies, make quicker decisions, are more optimistic about their decisions, and use less information in making decisions (Schwarz, 1990). In contrast, negative-mood individuals incorporate a more systematic, detail-specific, and analytic processing style (Fiedler, 2001a, 2001b; Schwarz, 1990). As a result, individuals in a positive mood perceive their surroundings as being less threatening or dangerous (Fiedler, 1996; Schwarz & Bohner, 1996). This “overestimation” of safety can cause positive individuals to avoid attention to details and rules within the interaction. The result is the use of less formal, more impolite, interaction styles (Forgas, 1999a, 1999b). Conversely, negative-mood individuals tend to view their surroundings as potentially dangerous and thus are much more cautious, paying attention to rules, details, and social appropriateness in their interactions (Schwarz & Bohner, 1996).

Within the confines of this study, mood appears to have affected the interaction process by influencing participants’ estimations of the social connection (or social distance) they share with their interactional partners. In the cases of negative mood, participants may have perceived the context of the interaction as potentially dangerous or unfamiliar. Thus, they were more aware of the context and nature of the interaction as well as their connection (or lack thereof) to the other person. This perception may have caused them to rely more heavily on social norms and scripts, thus engaging in higher levels of politeness in the interaction. Conversely, we suggest that positive-mood individuals perceived the environment as “safe” and/or overestimated their connection to the other person. This error in estimation caused them to be more informal, less reliant on social norms between strangers, and thus, more impolite. Research on politeness argues that social distance plays an important role in determining politeness levels. As the social distance between individuals increases, so too does the level of politeness utilized by the individual (Brown & Levinson, 1987; Culpeper, 1996).

Affect and Politeness Following Partner Interference

The research questions queried whether partner interference has an impact on the levels of politeness and whether that impact was influenced by participant mood. Results indicated that partner interference resulted in a significant increase in politeness across both positive- and negative-mood individuals. Consistent with our earlier “social distance” explanation, it may be that interruptions to compliance-gaining goals may have increased perceptions of social distance, leading participants to resort to more “formal” social scripts. Thus, for both positive- and negative-mood individuals, the “social distance” between themselves and their partners may have increased, causing their levels of verbal politeness to also increase as argued by politeness theory (Brown & Levinson, 1987).

These results are interesting considering the large amount of literature that seems to run contrary to our findings. Research has suggested that partner interference is linked to decreases in perceptions of affiliation and increases in negative emotions (Knobloch, 2007, 2008). Furthermore, literature addressing the “rebuff” phenomenon suggests that individuals are less polite following a rebuff of their persuasive messages (Hample & Dallinger, 1998). Our contradictory results might be explained by examining the nature of the interference that was induced. A rebuff has been defined as a refusal to comply, while an obstacle is a reason for resistance (Hample & Dallinger, 1998). In cases where an individual’s persuasive attempt is met with a rebuff, lower levels of politeness follow. However, cases where individuals’ persuasive attempts are met with an obstacle tend to result in more indirect and polite responses (Hample & Dallinger, 1998). In this study, statements indicating a lack of understanding by the confederate may have been perceived by the participant as an obstacle (the person they were interacting with was confused, did not have the intelligence to process the message, got lost, etc.) rather than a rebuff (the person they were interacting with thought their persuasive attempt was wrong, the person was trying to be difficult, or they were unmotivated to engage).

It is interesting to note, however, that while the increase in verbal politeness occurred across mood valence conditions, negative-mood individuals still possessed higher levels of politeness compared to positive-mood individuals following partner interference. This may suggest that the differences concerning the effects of mood valence (positive vs. negative) on processing and perception remain intact even following the potential interference and subsequent restructure of one’s goals.

The relationship between mood, partner interference, and nonverbal immediacy was more complicated. Overall, participants across both positive- and negative-mood conditions decreased their levels of nonverbal immediacy following partner interference. However, only negative-mood individuals produced significant change. Again this may be tied to the nature of partner interference. As stated previously, the occurrence of partner interference has been linked to increased perceptions of “self threat,” disaffiliation, and decreases in mutuality (Knobloch, 2007, 2008; Knobloch & Schmelzer, 2008; Knobloch & Solomon, 2003). While partner interference increases the perception in social distance, it also accentuates the differences and potential incompatibility between individuals. Given that the use of nonverbal immediacy behaviors are often a sign of relational intimacy and/or positive affect (Burgoon & Hoobler, 2002), it may be that partner interference causes individuals to withdraw nonverbally. In other words, while they engage in social politeness through increases in verbal politeness, they simultaneously engage in distance behavior through a reduction in nonverbal immediacy.

It is interesting to note that unlike verbal politeness, the valenced effect for nonverbal immediacy was not maintained. During their initial message, negative-mood individuals represented the highest value for nonverbal immediacy (M = 4.06). However, after they were interrupted by their partners, negative-mood individuals were the least immediate (M = 2.59). This finding may be explainable based on the nature of partner interference and the role that mood plays in perception. As previously stated, individuals in a negative mood are very systematic and cautious in their evaluations of a situation (Schwarz & Bohner, 1996). They are more likely to pay attention to social appropriateness when dealing with others in an interaction (Schwarz & Bohner, 1996). Thus, in initial interactions, negative-mood individuals may have been more likely to follow social conventions and act friendly and courteous to the strangers (confederates). However, upon the occurrence of partner interference, this same approach to the interaction may have influenced the magnitude of the interference, and thus, its implications. Negative-mood individuals, being more systematic and rule focused, may be more aware of the values of social distance, power, and ranking; thus, they perceived the interference by their partner as more severe, compared to positive-mood individuals. This increased severity may have resulted in a larger reduction in nonverbal immediacy.

Communication of Affect

This picture of the positive-mood individuals seems to be in contrast to the findings in the nonverbal communication literature, which suggests that positive affect produces heightened conversational involvement and friendliness (e.g., Burgoon, Kelley, Newton, & Keeley-Dyreson, 1989). As we note, our data are relatively unequivocal in supporting Forgas’ predictions: Positive-mood participants responded to a persuasion task with less social politeness, compared to negative-mood individuals.

The explanation for this difference between what we might expect from the literature on nonverbal messages and our findings in this investigation may reflect the methodological particulars in this investigation. Previous investigations into nonverbal communication and affect (Burgoon, Buller, Hale, & deTurck, 1984; Burgoon et al., 1989; Burgoon, Birk, & Pfau, 1990; Burgoon et al., 1992) have been focused mostly on situations in which affiliation was likely the primary goal. In fact, with such goals in mind, evidence that positive affect is linked to involvement and friendliness is consistent with an AIM approach. Specifically, the framework would argue that positive-mood individuals, through their positive assessment of the environment (and the other individuals in that environment), would be less hesitant at affiliating with their partner. In contrast, negative-mood individuals, given their pessimistic view of the environment, would be more hesitant to express affiliation cues until justification for such actions had been established. Of course, it is important to remember this holds true as long as the goal is affiliation.

Within the current study, the primary goal was not affiliation, but persuasion. In that context, though, the perception of a “safe” relational environment that accompanies positive moods (Fiedler, 1996; Forgas, 1999a; Schwarz & Bohner, 1996) encourages individuals to focus resources toward the instrumental task: persuasion. In that vein, individuals likely enact directness (e.g., a feature of impoliteness) and informality (e.g., a cue associated with an overestimation of affiliation) as a persuasive strategy, as we found. In contrast, the perception of environmental threat that accompanies negative moods (Fiedler, 1996; Forgas, 1999a; Schwarz & Bohner, 1996) forces individuals to attend to both the relational and the persuasive tasks. In so doing, they enact indirectness and encode a more welcoming set of nonverbal cues, as we found. In other words, the difference between our findings vis-à-vis affect and nonverbal cues likely reflects differential interaction tasks.

This line of inquiry would seem to coincide with work by Dillard, Solomon, and Palmer (1999), who argued of the importance of relational framing (affiliation vs. dominance) with regard to relational communication. Furthermore, their research promotes another interesting avenue for study. What happens when the situation is ambiguous? In the case of our study, what is the impact of mood, when it is not clear if the primary goal is one of affiliation or of persuasion? How would individuals’ perceptions of a situation (with regard to the goal) affect the potential influence of mood on their communication? Future studies should more carefully examine the ways in which contexts and goal pursuits shape behavior-mood congruency in conversations.

Methodological Limitations

While the study provided several insights into the impact of mood on sequential message selection within a persuasive interaction, there are three issues that deserve special attention in future investigations. First, while this study has examined the impact that mood has on politeness, it has also suggested several key processes that may account for that association. The roles played by perceptions of issue severity and of social distance, along with the relative salience of primary versus secondary goals, may play important roles as moderators of the influence that mood plays on interaction behavior. As such, they deserve additional scrutiny.

Second, if the act of communication and, by proxy, politeness is truly interactive, then the potential for dyadic mood interaction may be important. This investigation focused exclusively on the impact of one person’s mood state on their own behavior, overlooking interaction effects that may be found in a dyadic analysis of mood states. How does the mood of one’s interaction partner affect the level of politeness that an individual exhibits? Research on affect contagion (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994) suggests that the mood or emotions that one person is experiencing can have an impact on those of another within an interaction (see also Morse & Volkman, 2010). Future research should more closely examine interaction outcomes from a framework that accounts for mood-based interdependence in conversation.

Finally, although the theoretical frameworks used to develop our predictions would not predict sex differences, per se, the decision to keep confederate sex constant (female) is worth noting. More important, that decision was made based on evidence that female targets elicit more interaction comfort than male targets (Burleson, Holmstrom, & Gilstrap, 2005), thereby limiting the effects of apprehension in shaping the nature of the persuasive attempt or the responses to interference.

Conclusion

The purpose of this investigation was to examine the role that affect, specifically mood, played in the levels of politeness displayed by individuals in an interaction. While previous research had begun to examine this issue, there were several questions identified that had not yet been answered. Results indicated that mood valence plays an important part in determining the degree to which politeness is expressed within an initial interaction between strangers. Second, this study set forth to incorporate the interactive and temporal aspects of communication in the literature on mood. Interactions occur over time; thus, the presence or absence of certain communicative events may alter the messages that individuals convey. Results from this study suggest that the presence of partner interference increases initial levels of verbal politeness and decreases nonverbal immediacy yet does not fully eliminate the valenced effects of mood.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Author Biographies

Chris R. Morse (PhD, Pennsylvania State University, 2006) is an assistant professor in the Department of Communication at Bryant University.

Walid A. Afifi (PhD, University of Arizona, 1996) is an associate professor in the Department of Communication at the University of California, Santa Barbara.

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