Differential Effects of Capital-Enhancing and Recreational Internet Use on Citizens’ Demand for Democracy

Abstract

This study seeks to contribute to the growing body of scholarship about the Internet’s role in authoritarian and transitioning countries. Based on two original surveys of Russian and Ukrainian Internet users, online behaviors were classified as either primarily capital enhancing or recreational in terms of their democratic potential. Indirect and differential models of how these types of Internet use are associated with citizen demand for democracy were tested using serial mediation. Capital-enhancing use exhibited an indirect positive effect on demand for democratic governance by increasing critical appraisals of the incumbent regime, whereas recreational Internet was associated with satisfactory evaluations of non-democratic regimes and more entrenched authoritarian worldviews.

Keywords

democracy authoritarian Internet social media Russia Ukraine

Contemporary world events like the Arab Spring have inspired a wealth of scholarship and commentary about the role the Internet plays in the democratic process. But to date, much of this literature is anecdotal, relies on single-country case studies, or is limited by crude Internet measurement, producing conclusions about the Internet’s democratic potential that remain mired in technological determinism (e.g., Bailard, 2012a, 2014; Howard & Hussain, 2011, 2013; Lei, 2011; Nisbet, Stoycheff, & Pearce, 2012).

In an effort to further disentangle the Internet’s impact on democracy, this study follows the methodological approach of Stoycheff and Nisbet (2014), who deconstruct the operationalization of Internet penetration to achieve a more conditional understanding of its effect on citizen attitudes. Emphasizing the activities individuals choose to engage with online—rather than Internet access itself—we examine how some types of Internet activities may foster democratic attitudes, whereas other online behaviors may further isolate citizens from democratic worldviews. This study examines these effects through the use of two conceptual perspectives: mirror holding and window opening (Bailard, 2012a, 2012b, 2014). These perspectives theorize that the Internet allows citizens to view their political systems through a critical lens—both domestically and in comparison to other countries—in a way that legacy media simply cannot. But in doing, we acknowledge that mirror holding and window opening only occur under certain circumstances, namely, the use of Internet for information-seeking purposes.

Internet use that is “capital-enhancing” contains pluralistic information about a citizen’s political system and maximizes democratic potential through activities like online news consumption, engagement in political discussion, and seeking new information. But Internet use for entertainment purposes, like gaming and watching movies is “recreational” in terms of furthering democratic socialization and critical political evaluations, to such a degree that it may actually retard democratic socialization (DiMaggio, Hargittai, Celeste, & Shafer, 2004; Hargittai & Hinnant, 2008). These hypotheses are tested using a serial mediation model of original survey data collected in Russia and Ukraine during the spring of 2013. The study’s results lend evidence that all Internet use is not equal in terms of its democratic potential: Some types of online behaviors promote demand for democratic governance, whereas others dampen critical appraisals and entrench authoritarian worldviews.

Citizen Attitudes About Democratic Governance

Recent comparative scholarship has witnessed a renewed interest in political culture (Almond & Verba, 1963), in which citizen attitudes play a fundamental role in democratic development. For decades, the dominant paradigm of explaining how democracies emerge and became sustainable emphasized the actions and motivations of political elites (e.g., Acemoglu & Robinson, 2005; Brownlee, 2007). But in order for countries to meaningfully self-govern, citizens must be capable and willing to participate in the democratic process. In other words, democracies require democrats (Nisbet et al., 2012).

Thus, scholars have recognized that the consolidation of democracy necessitates the cooperation of both elites and the citizenry (Burton, Gunther, & Higley, 1992; Mattes & Bratton, 2007; Minier, 2001; Nisbet, 2008; Nisbet et al., 2012; Qi & Shin, 2011; Stoycheff & Nisbet, 2014). Political elites need to adopt and respect democratic institutions and laws, and citizens need to “demand democracy,” or prefer democracy to other types of governance and commit to playing an active role in the process. Only when both conditions are met is a political system considered fully democratic and consolidated, meaning it is secure from authoritarian threats (Bratton, Mattes, & Gyimah-Boadi, 2005). Many countries—especially those in the former Soviet bloc—remain in fragile, transitory states where either one or both conditions are jeopardized, and democracy has yet to be fully realized (Diamond, 2008).

Some recent political communication scholarship (e.g., Lei, 2011; Nisbet, 2008; Nisbet et al., 2012; Norris, 2011) has narrowed its focus to examine how reliance on various types of media—especially Internet—can help cultivate democratic demand and initiate positive political reform.

Internet’s Democratic Potential

Since its inception, the Internet has been lauded as having great democratic potential. It is thought to equalize access to information, leading to increases in political interest, knowledge, efficacy, trust, and participation (e.g., Bakker & de Vreese, 2011; Boulianne, 2009; Breuer & Groshek, 2014; Ceron, 2015; Wojcieszak & Smith, 2014); serve as an open public sphere, especially in countries that lack meaningful civil society (Lei, 2011); and reduce the citizen costs associated with participating in politics (e.g., Bailard, 2012b; Bimber, 1999, 2003; Lei, 2011). Previous country-level analyses have affirmed a positive association between a country’s Internet penetration and its level of democratization (Best & Wade, 2009; Groshek, 2009) and good governance (Khazaeli & Stockemer, 2013), wherein greater broadband penetration amplifies citizens’ support for democratic governance (Stoycheff & Nisbet, 2014).

The Internet’s inexhaustible supply of information and globalized, interactive nature is theorized to facilitate two processes: “mirror holding” and “window opening” (Bailard, 2012a, 2012b, 2014), which are premised on the global diffusion of democratic norms (Inglehart, 1997; Peffley & Rohrschneider, 2003). Foreign media, like Radio Free Europe and Voice of America, have long served as transporters of democratic principles to citizens in countries with fewer political liberties (Freyburg, 2015). Because the Internet often allows for a wider range of ideas than has previously existed in these legacy media (print and broadcast; for example, Farrell, 2012; Norris, 2003; Tang & Sampson, 2012; Vartanova, 2015), it diffuses an even broader, more diverse range of information that citizens can employ to evaluate democracy in their countries, providing a comprehensive outlook on their government’s performance. Previous research (Bailard, 2012a, 2012b; Lei, 2011; Nisbet & Stoycheff, 2013; Stoycheff & Nisbet, 2014) has shown that increased Internet use does indeed serve a mirror-holding function, wherein frequent use is associated with more critical perceptions of their country’s execution of democracy.

The globalized, interactive nature of the Internet has inspired a great deal of optimism for democratic development. Scholars have argued that the medium provides an alternative to mainstream media that allows for a wider range of political views, and in countries like Russia, Malaysia, Ukraine, Egypt, Jordan, and South Africa, the Internet offers more open, freer information than legacy media (Freedom House, 2015b; Hadland, 2011; Tapsell, 2013; Vartanova, 2015). Together, these factors are believed to facilitate a process known as “window opening” (Bailard, 2012a, 2012b). Window opening contends that the Internet opens citizens’ windows to the world, so they can view how governments operate in other countries—notably Western democracies that dominate the production of online content.

Recent research provides support for the window-opening hypothesis. Both cross-national (Nisbet & Stoycheff, 2013; Nisbet et al., 2012; Norris, 2008; Norris & Inglehart, 2009) and single-country (Bailard, 2012a; Lei, 2011) studies have shown that greater Internet use is associated with elevated support for democratic principles. In addition, the Internet’s window-opening capacity not only allows citizens a better view of democracy in other countries, but it also provides citizens with a critical lens of their governing regime, including the country’s President, Prime Minister, members of parliament, and appointed officials (Norris, 2011; Rose, Mishler, & Munro, 2011).

Internet’s Democratic Decay

But just as some citizens may use the Internet to expose themselves to diverse types of political information, others may use it to further isolate or distract themselves from political affairs. The 2011 World Internet Project, a cross-national survey initiative sponsored by the University of Southern California, revealed that citizens around the world increasingly use the Internet for entertainment-related activities, including online shopping, watching television shows and movies, and playing games. This surge in recreational Internet use is likely a result of a variety of factors, including the small fraction of online content devoted to political deliberation (Lenhart, Purcell, Smith, & Zickuhr, 2010), especially as the Internet becomes increasingly commercialized and corporate-owned (McChesney, 2013); citizens who lack the skills to effectively engage with political information (Hargittai & Hinnant, 2008); and a weak participatory culture, even in established democracies like the United States (Farina, Newhart, & Heidt, 2012).

Research shows that increased exposure to such entertainment content may have deleterious effects on citizens’ political knowledge and participatory behaviors by providing greater opportunity for citizens to “tune out” politics and reduce incidental exposure to political information (Prior, 2005). Consequently, the Internet’s democratizing opportunities for knowledge acquisition do not necessarily translate into greater citizen political knowledge and participation (Wagner & Gainous, 2013). Wolfsfeld, Segev, and Sheafer (2013) have demonstrated a negative correlation between a country’s social media use and democratic protest, a result they argue stems from limited Internet access among the world’s most disenfranchised citizens (also echoed by Morozov, 2011). But perhaps the most crippling evidence against the Internet’s democratic potential is the continuity, and even strengthening, of authoritarian states despite worldwide Internet diffusion and use (Freedom House, 2015b).

Capital-Enhancing and Recreational Internet Use

Growing evidence in support of the Internet’s democratic potential and democratic decay suggests that like legacy media, its effects are contingent on content and use. Boulianne (2009), Farrell (2012), and Neuman, Bimber, and Hindman (2011) all call for a more nuanced outlook, arguing for the need to examine the Internet’s differential and indirect effects on democratic attitudes and behaviors, shedding greater light on its underlying mechanisms. This study undertakes this call by contending that not all types of Internet behaviors are likely to contribute to the mirror-holding and window-opening processes. In other words, citizens themselves must want to hold up mirrors and open windows to engage with the medium’s democratic potential. They may do so by engaging in capital-enhancing Internet use (e.g., information seeking, news use, political deliberation), which may expose citizens to a robust online information environment of political cues and critical appraisals of the governing regime not found in their mass media environments.

Capital-enhancing online activities are those that have the potential to translate to political opportunities in the offline world (van Deursen, van Dijk, & ten Klooster, 2015), like forming evaluations and attitudes necessary for political participation. Highly educated and technology savvy citizens are more likely to engage these capital-enhancing Internet use behaviors (Hargittai & Hinnant, 2008; Robinson & Schulz, 2013), and several studies have documented their democratically favorable effects. Boulianne’s (2009) meta-analysis of U.S. democratic participation revealed that studies which distinguished online news use as a predictor of democratic behaviors were more likely to find positive effects than general Internet use alone; and Boulianne’s 2015 meta-analysis indicated evidence of a positive relationship between social media use and political participation. Not included in her 2009 review are additional studies showing how individuals who use the Internet to access news websites (Lee, 2006) and social media mobilization (Boulianne, 2015; Breuer & Groshek, 2014; de Zuniga, Jung, & Valenzuela, 2012) are more likely to exhibit greater political efficacy, interest, trust (Wang, 2007), and participatory behaviors.

Other single-country case studies (e.g., Jiang, 2010; King, Pan, & Roberts, 2013) have also begun to advance a conditional path by acknowledging that governments, even heavy-handed authoritarian regimes like China, do not perceive all online content as equally threatening. Online public spheres, or websites where citizens can engage in international deliberation and information seeking (Jiang, 2010), and behaviors that promote collective action (King et al., 2013) are viewed as some of the most pernicious to the sustainability of non-democratic governments. Internet use for these purposes allows citizens to hold up mirrors that reflect the (often faltering) supply of democracy in their countries, and open windows to better benchmark the performance of political elites in comparison with external actors.

This is in contrast to recreational Internet use, like gaming, and watching TV shows and movies that do not easily cultivate offline political potential (van Deursen et al., 2015), and may distract citizens from political affairs. The ramifications of entertainment content on individuals’ democratic beliefs and behaviors range from insignificant to potentially deleterious. On the innocuous end, accessing online entertainment content, like gaming, gambling, and music sites, produces no sizable effects on political information seeking, signing petitions (Bakker & de Vreese, 2011), and political efficacy (Lee, 2006).

But on the significantly deleterious end, many studies have shown that across cultures and geographic regions, the consumption of entertainment media can promote either authoritarian attitudes or satisfaction with non-democratic regimes (e.g., Appel, 2008; Kern & Hainmueller, 2009; Kremerman, Cohen, & Tsfati, 2012; Shanahan, 1998). For example, entertainment media may retard democratic efforts by cultivating authoritarian attitudes, which are characterized as individuals’ obedience to authority and beliefs in violence and oppression as legitimate means of conflict resolution (McBride, 1998; Shanahan, 1998).

In the United States and Argentina during the 1990s, entertainment programming accounted for the preponderance of television content, and subsequently, heavy TV viewing patterns were associated with more authoritarian worldviews (Morgan & Shanahan, 1991; Shanahan, 1998). Likewise, studies in Germany and Austria by Appel (2008) and Kremerman et al. (2012) in Israel found a similar relationship between pro-authoritarian attitudes and entertainment media consumption. In the United States, heavy entertainment consumption is associated with greater support for anti-democratic policies, including restrictions on political and civil liberties (Scheufele, Nisbet, & Ostman, 2005).

Among young adults in the Netherlands, online music Internet use was negatively associated with various forms of political participation (Bakker & de Vreese, 2011), and in open-minded citizens across Europe (Besley, 2006). Not only does entertainment media consumption promote authoritarian orientations and satisfaction with non-democratic regimes, but as Delli Carpini (2012) notes, the scholarly consensus is that entertainment and recreational uses of media generally retard political engagement and promote a less critical and less informed public (e.g. Besley, 2006; Scheufele & Nisbet, 2002; Shah, 1998; Shah, McLeod, & Yoon, 2001).

An interesting study by Kern and Hainmueller (2009) analyzed survey data collected from the late 1990s to determine how exposure to West German entertainment content had on East German political attitudes toward their authoritarian regime. They found that East Germans primarily used West German TV as a means of entertainment and escapism rather than as a source of information. The result was that the more West German TV was consumed for entertainment purposes, the more East Germans were satisfied with, and supportive of, the East German regime. Combined, the cross-national breadth of these findings suggests that high levels of entertainment media consumption, no matter the cultural context, promote authoritarian orientations over democratic ones.

From a political-economy perspective, these findings about entertainment exposure resulting in more authoritarian and less critical citizens are consistent with the arguments of scholars like McChesney (2015) who examine global entertainment media flows. McChesney argues that economic liberalization and technology diffusion has led to widespread penetration of global media and the rise of large multinational media conglomerates. He asserts these trends have increased the (conservative) ideological homogeneity of global entertainment media. The consequences of these dominant global media entertainment narratives, according to McChesney (2015), are more politically passive audiences who are more likely to hold non-democratic political attitudes.

Together, this body of work suggests that there may be important differential effects of Internet use depending on whether citizens are engaging in online content that is capital enhancing or recreational in terms of its democratic cues and pluralistic political information.

Hypotheses

Based on the reviewed literature, this study advances a serial differential model of how capital-enhancing and recreational Internet use may influence democratic attitudes in a comparative context. Within this model (depicted in Figure 1), capital-enhancing Internet use is expected to produce positive direct (H1a) and indirect effects (H2a) on demand for democracy. Capital-enhancing Internet use is hypothesized to facilitate mirror-holding, meaning citizens who spend more time with capital-enhancing online activities will perceive less democratic supply in their countries (H3a). It is also hypothesized that citizens then compare these critical perceptions of democratic supply to how democracies work in other countries, through window opening, which means that perceptions of low democratic supply should be associated with less favorable evaluations of their own political elites (H4). Dampened support for elites, in-turn, is expected to drive citizens to demand greater democracy (H5).

Figure 1.

Hypothesized OLS and serial mediation model of Internet use and democratic attitudes.

The serial mediation model also predicts negative direct (H1b) and indirect effects of recreational Internet use (H2b) on citizens’ demand for democracy. Use of the Internet for entertainment purposes will reduce demand for democracy because it will foster more authoritarian political orientations (H1b). Indirectly, greater use of the Internet for recreational purposes will lead citizens to adopt more favorable perceptions of democratic supply (H3b), because they are less engaged, less informed, and more satisfied with how politics works in their country as the scholarship discussed above suggests. Similar to the previous model, perceptions of democratic supply should also have a positive association with regime support (H4), and the attitudes citizens hold about political elites should negatively predict citizen demand for democracy (H5).

Methodology

Sampling

To empirically investigate how capital-enhancing and recreational Internet use shapes citizens’ attitudes about democratic governance, Internet users from Russian and Ukraine were sampled. Employing a most-similar comparative design, Russia and Ukraine served as culturally congruent case studies to illustrate the influence of Internet use on democratic attitudes in Russia’s consolidated autocracy and Ukraine’s partly transitioned democracy (Freedom House, 2015b). The two countries share a common history dating back to the ninth century, embarked upon paralleled economic development after the Cold War, and have developed similar political institutions in the post-Soviet era, which deviate only in the political liberties granted by these institutions (Popova, 2012).

Ukrainian and Russian adult respondents were recruited in the spring of 2013 by employing an opt-in survey panel maintained by Survey Sampling International that draws survey participants from its own international online panels, social media, and affiliate partners. A matching technique was utilized to mimic the age, gender, and education¹ distributions of the general populations of these countries, resulting in a total Ukrainian N = 593 and a Russian N = 506. The survey instruments employed an ask-the-same question technique (see Harkness et al., 2010), and prior to both the data collections, native speakers translated identical English questionnaires to Russian and Ukrainian. The surveys were then back-translated to English and edited by native-speaking communication scholars to ensure accurate and consistent interpretations across countries.

Measures

World citizens overwhelmingly claim to espouse democracy, with some public opinion surveys reporting upward of 80% support, yielding a measure void of meaningful variance. The notion of democracy is widely supported because citizens often conflate it with economic growth, civil liberties, peace and stability, and other desirable norms, rather than actual self-governance (Dalton, Shin, & Jou, 2007). Thus, the focal dependent variable, demand for democracy, was operationalized as a rejection of the most common procedures and institutional arrangements that serve as alternatives to democracy. A three-item construct adapted from Mattes and Bratton (2007) asked respondents the extent to which they approve or disapprove of the following types of governance on 7-point scales: “Only one political party is allowed to stand for election and hold office,” “The army governs the country,” and “Elections and parliament are eliminated so the president can make all decisions” (Russian M = 5.65, SD = 1.18, α = .78; Ukrainian M = 5.85, SD = 1.12, α = .70). Strong disagreement with these statements, indicating a rejection of non-democratic institutions and true preference for democratic governance, was coded with higher values.

The independent variables of interest—capital-enhancing and recreational Internet use—sought to capture respondents’ use of the Internet’s democratic potential. We measured capital-enhancing uses of the Internet by averaging five different measures of how frequently (on a 7-point scale ranging from “never” to “daily”) respondents used the Internet to (1) get news and opinions, (2) share political opinions with others, (3) visit news websites, (4) employ search engines to find information, and (5) participate in social networking sites into one index measure (Russian M = 5.55, SD = 0.99, α = .62; Ukrainian M = 5.66, SD = 0.89, α = .55). These forms of Internet use are capital enhancing because they allow for window opening and exposure to diverse political ideas and deliberation in the offline world. We measured Internet use for entertainment and recreational purposes by averaging how often (also on 7-point scales) respondents used the Internet to play video games and watch videos, movies, and TV shows (Russian M = 4.85, SD = 1.70, r = .34; Ukrainian M = 4.58, SD = 1.62, r = .26).

We hypothesized that Internet use would influence democratic demand through two mediating variables: respondents’ perceptions of democratic supply and support for the regime. Perceived supply was measured with two items that asked respondents how democratic they thought their countries are and how satisfied they are with how democracy works in their countries on 4-point scales (Russian M = 2.08, SD = 0.73, r = .65; Ukrainian r = .58). Regime support was an averaged three-item scale that asked how favorably respondents felt toward their country’s current president, prime minister, and majority party in parliament (Russian M = 3.81, SD = 1.77, α = .90; Ukrainian M = 3.34, SD = 1.75, α = .95).

To ensure Internet’s effects were indeed unique to the mirror-holding and window-opening nature of the medium, frequency of media use and media attention controls were added to the analyses as controls. Using single-item 7-point scales ranging from “never” to “daily,” respondents were asked how frequently they used newspapers (Russian M = 4.67, SD = 1.76; Ukrainian M = 4.66, SD = 1.75), television (Russian M = 5.94, SD = 1.59; Ukrainian M = 5.93, SD = 1.51), and radio (Russian M = 3.93, SD = 2.00; Ukrainian M = 3.65, SD = 1.91) to get news and opinions. Respondents also indicated how much attention they paid to political issues when consuming media, on a 7-point scale, ranging from “no attention at all” to “a great deal” (Russian M = 5.30, SD = 1.74; Ukrainian M = 5.26, SD = 1.72). More frequent media use and greater attention to political media were coded with higher values.

A set of demographic and political control variables was used to mitigate the likelihood of spurious relationships. Political control variables included respondents’ political interest, knowledge, ideology, and efficacy. Political interest was measured with a single seven-item construct ranging from “very uninterested” to “very interested,” such that greater interest was represented with higher values (Russian M = 4.80, SD = 1.31; Ukrainian M = 4.77, SD = 1.27). Respondents’ political knowledge was assessed with three additive questions inquiring about the name of each country’s foreign minister, the length of their president’s term, and the party that holds the majority of seats in their country’s parliament (Russian M = 3.79, SD = 0.90; Ukrainian M = 3.98, SD = 0.74). Political ideology was captured on a 7-point left-to-right scale, with higher scores indicative of further right—or more conservative—political views (Russian M = 4.09, SD = 0.98; Ukrainian M = 4.05, SD = 1.01). Political efficacy employed a standard, three-item scale that asked respondents their agreement with the statements, “Sometimes political issues are so complicated that people like me can’t understand what’s really going on,” “I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing my country today,” and “I think I am better informed about political issues than most people.” The first item was reverse coded and averaged with the others to create a single 7-point index, with higher scores representing more efficacious sentiments (Russian M = 3.63, SD = 1.22; Ukrainian M = 3.65, SD = 1.15).

Lastly, respondents self-reported their age (Russian M = 43.48, SD = 15.74; Ukrainian M = 44.31, SD = 13.11); gender, with female coded high (Russia 43%; Ukraine 47%); and educational attainment on a 9-point scale, ranging from no formal education to a university degree or above (Russian M = 7.45, SD = 1.80; Ukrainian M = 7.79, SD = 1.72). Socio-economic status was measured with a single standardized 9-point item that inquired about respondents’ monthly income (Russian M = 5.42, SD = 2.32; Ukrainian M = 4.83, SD = 2.38). The questionnaire also inquired about respondents’ experiences abroad, as international travel and correspondence may provide insight to governance in foreign countries, serving as another benchmark for political comparison. Two dichotomous items were used that asked whether respondents had ever lived outside their countries or regularly communicated with friends and family in another country (Russian M = 0.70, SD = 0.72, r = .25; Ukrainian M = 0.95, SD = 0.71, r = .17).

Results

To first examine the direct effects of the Internet’s effects on citizens’ demand for democracy, we fitted an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model in each country with capital-building and recreational Internet use, all the aforementioned media use, media attention, political controls, and demographics. The Russian regression model explained 14.5% of the variance in an individual’s demand for democracy, and as hypothesized, capital-enhancing Internet use had a positive significant effect on demand (β = 0.13, p = .05), whereas recreational Internet use produced a negative significant effect (β = −0.07, p < .05). The same Ukrainian regression model explained 13.7% of the variance in an individual’s demand for democracy, but neither capital-enhancing nor recreational Internet use significantly predicted demand, lending support for the direct effect hypotheses H1a and H1b in Russia, but necessitating the acceptance of the null for these hypotheses in Ukraine. These results are presented in Table 1.

Table 1.

Direct-Effect OLS Models Predicting Demand for Democracy in Russia and Ukraine.

	Russia	Ukraine
Constant	4.03 (0.51)***	3.71 (0.48)***
Sex	0.65 (1.08)	0.01 (0.09)
Age	0.01 (0.00)**	0.01 (0.00)**
SES	0.05 (0.02)*	−0.01 (0.02)
Educational attainment	0.05 (0.03)	0.09 (0.03)**
Political ideology	−0.10 (0.05)*	−0.00 (0.04)
Attention to politics	−0.09 (0.04)*	0.02 (0.03)
Political interest	0.11 (0.05)*	0.12 (0.05)**
Political efficacy	−0.02 (0.05)	0.09 (0.04)*
Political knowledge	0.22 (0.06)***	0.11 (0.06)
Newspaper use	0.01 (0.03)	−0.03 (0.03)
Television use	−0.04 (0.04)	0.01 (0.03)
Radio use	−0.01 (0.03)	−0.01 (0.02)
Capital-enhancing Internet use	0.13 (0.06)*	−0.08 (0.06)
Recreational Internet use	−0.07 (0.03)*	−0.00 (0.03)

Note. Unstandardized coefficients reported with SD in parentheses. OLS = ordinary least squares; SES = socioeconomic status.

p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Next, to test the hypothesized indirect effects, serial mediation models were fit for each country using Hayes’ (2013) PROCESS macro, Model 6 with 5,000 bootstrap samples to estimate confidence intervals for indirect effects. This technique allowed for the investigation of indirect effects of Internet use through multiple mediators, providing a more comprehensive understanding of the opinion formation process through which Internet use may influence democratic attitudes.

The first set of mediation models predicting democratic demand was fitted with capital-enhancing Internet use as the independent variable, and perceptions of democratic supply and regime support served as respective intervening variables. Recreational Internet use, all political controls, media use, media attention, and demographics were entered as covariates, as seen in Tables 2 and 3.

Table 2.

Serial Mediation Models Predicting Perceived Supply, Regime Support, and Demand for Democracy in Russia.

	Predicting perceived supply	Predicting regime support	Predicting demand for democracy
Constant	1.43 (0.33)***	0.78 (0.60)	4.48 (0.51)***
Sex	0.01 (0.07)	−0.29 (0.12)*	0.03 (0.11)
Age	−0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)**
SES	0.01 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)	0.06 (0.02)*
Educational attainment	0.01 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.04)	0.05 (0.03)^†
Political ideology	0.10 (0.03)**	0.11 (0.06)	−0.07 (0.05)
Attention to politics	0.05 (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)	−0.08 (0.04)*
Political interest	0.02 (0.03)	−0.09 (0.06)	0.11 (0.05)*
Political efficacy	0.04 (0.03)	−0.12 (0.06)*	−0.04 (0.05)
Political knowledge	−0.07 (0.04)	−0.05 (0.07)	0.20 (0.06)***
Newspaper use	0.01 (0.02)	0.04 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)
Television use	0.07 (0.02)**	0.15 (0.04)***	−0.01 (0.04)
Radio use	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.04 (0.03)	−0.02 (0.03)
Capital-enhancing Internet use	−0.13 (0.04)**	0.01 (0.07)	0.10 (0.06)
Recreational Internet use	0.05 (0.02)*	0.02 (0.04)	−0.06 (0.03)^†
Perceived democratic supply	—	1.24 (0.08)***	−0.10 (0.09)
Regime support	—	—	−0.11 (0.04)**
				LLCI	ULCI
Capital-enhancing total indirect effect	—	—	0.02 (0.01)*	0.0035	0.0442
Recreational total indirect effect	—	—	−0.01 (0.00)*	−0.0200	−0.0011

Note. Unstandardized coefficients reported with SD in parentheses. SES = socioeconomic status; LLCI = lower limit confidence interval; ULCI = upper limit confidence interval.

†

p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Table 3.

Serial Mediation Models Predicting Perceived Supply, Regime Support, and Demand for Democracy in Ukraine.

	Predicting perceived supply	Predicting regime support	Predicting demand for democracy
Constant	2.10 (0.27)***	1.20 (0.74)	4.35 (0.48)***
Sex	0.05 (0.05)	−0.35 (0.13)*	−0.06 (0.09)
Age	−0.00 (0.00)*	0.02 (0.01)***	0.01 (0.00)***
SES	0.00 (0.01)	0.03 (0.03)	−0.00 (0.02)
Educational attainment	0.00 (0.02)	−0.07 (0.04)^†	0.07 (0.03)**
Political ideology	−0.05 (0.03)^†	−0.15 (0.06)*	−0.05 (0.04)
Attention to politics	0.04 (0.02)*	−0.03 (0.05)	0.01 (0.03)
Political interest	0.04 (0.03)	−0.16 (0.07)*	0.08 (0.04)*
Political efficacy	−0.06 (0.03)*	−0.02 (0.06)	0.08 (0.04)^†
Political knowledge	0.06 (0.04)	0.00 (0.09)	0.12 (0.06)^†
Newspaper use	0.02 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.04)	−0.03 (0.03)
Television use	−0.01 (0.02)	0.10 (0.05)*	0.03 (0.03)
Radio use	0.01 (0.01)	0.03 (0.04)	−0.00 (0.02)
Capital-enhancing Internet use	−0.10 (0.03)**	0.06 (0.09)	−0.09 (0.06)
Recreational Internet use	0.03 (0.02)^†	0.06 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)
Perceived democratic supply	—	1.20 (0.11)***	0.15 (0.08)^†
Regime support	—	—	−0.24 (0.03)***
				LLCI	ULCI
Capital-enhancing total indirect effect	—	—	0.03 (0.01)*	0.0101	0.0503
Recreational total indirect effect	—	—	−0.01 (0.01)	−0.0196	0.0012

Note. Unstandardized coefficients reported with SD in parentheses. SES = socioeconomic status; LLCI = lower limit confidence interval; ULCI = upper limit confidence interval.

†

p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

The indirect pathway between capital-enhancing Internet use and demand for democratic governance was significant in both Russia and Ukraine, offering support for H2a. First, capital-enhancing Internet use negatively influenced perceptions of democratic supply, such that utilizing the Internet’s information-gathering functions was associated with more critical evaluations of the quality and quantity of democratic governance (H3a) in one’s country. Second, these critical perceptions of democratic supply negatively predicted a respondent’s support of the incumbent regime (H4). In other words, the less democratic a citizen perceived one’s country to be, the less favorably that citizen felt toward political elites. Third, the less favorable a citizen felt about the governing regime, the more democratic governance he or she demanded (H5). Total indirect effect of capital-enhancing Internet use on demand for democracy through this pathway was significant in both countries, lending support for the overall serial mediation model of capital-enhancing Internet use and democratic attitudes.

Capital-enhancing Internet use and the accompanying media use, political control variables, and demographics explained 9.1% in perceived democratic supply, 41.6% of regime support, and 18.2% of the total variance in preference for democratic governance in Russia. In Ukraine, 6.0% of perceived democratic supply, 23.8% of regime support, and 24.6% of demand for democratic governance were explained. Results from these serial mediation models are summarized and visualized in Figures 2 and 3.

Figure 2.

Resulting OLS and serial mediation model of Internet use and democratic attitudes in Russia.

Figure 3.

Resulting OLS and serial mediation model of Internet use and democratic attitudes in Ukraine.

The second serial mediation model predicting democratic demand was fitted with recreational Internet use as the independent variable, the same two mediators and all political, media, and demographic controls, including capital-enhancing Internet use. Because capital-enhancing and recreational variables were included in both models, all coefficients were identical, but this second mediation model allowed for the examination of the unique total indirect of recreational Internet use. In Russia, the total indirect effect was negatively significant, as hypothesized in H2b, but in Ukraine, the pathway was only marginally significant because the association between recreational Internet use and perceived democratic supply was weak. These total indirect effects indicate that the more a citizen reports using the Internet for entertainment or non-information-seeking purposes, the more satisfied one was with his or her country’s current democratic operations, which led to increased support for non-democratic incumbents, and alternative forms of governance.

Discussion

Limitations

As with any study, resulting conclusions are contingent upon choices in design and measurement. The first and foremost limitation of this study is the nature of its samples. The target populations were Russian and Ukrainian Internet users, and the samples employed a matching technique to mimic key distributions of each national population, but this process could not definitively rule out all spurious relationships. While our decision to sample only Internet users is externally valid—as non-users’ political attitudes are not influenced by the independent variables under investigation—the omission of an offline population precludes a baseline from which effect sizes can be assessed. Consequently, the results are only able to convey a differential effect between the capital-enhancing and recreational Internet use, but cannot definitively determine whether increases in democratic demand are uniquely attributable to more capital-enhancing activities, less recreational activities, or are equally attributable to both.

However, the selection of online-savvy, frequent panel users may have actually produced more conservative effects than those obtained through a heterogeneous online-offline sample, as frequent Internet users tend to be more critical of the political status quo than those who rely on other media (Lei, 2011). Mean demand for democracy averaged over 5.5 on 1 to 7 scales in both samples, indicating that capital-enhancing Internet use effects may have experienced ceiling effects. And in the case of Ukraine, reliability for capital-enhancing Internet use was slightly below the .60 threshold. Supplementing these samples with generalizable data would provide insight into the magnitude of the relationships delineated here, especially compared with non-Internet users, while also improving the external validity of the hypothesized model.

The two countries we employed as case studies were specifically chosen because they exemplify two types of governance where Internet has the most potential to spur democratic attitudes: an authoritarian regime and a stalled transitioning democracy that share a common geography, culture, and history. While the serial mediation model replicates across these two types of non-democratic systems, we echo the cautions of other comparative media scholars (e.g., Bratton & van de Walle, 1997; Coyne & Leeson, 2009; Hallin & Mancini, 2004) to refrain from widely extrapolating the results found here to citizens elsewhere. Future studies evaluating how capital-enhancing and recreational Internet use shape democratic attitudes should be conducted in media systems with other cultural influences before widespread generalizations are attempted.

It should also be noted that this study was comprised of cross-sectional data, meaning that the causal order of the serial mediation process can only be theorized. Although theory and previous research has indicated that media use and individual political dispositions are likely to shape individuals’ attitudes about their environments (e.g., Andsager et al., 2004; Moy, Pfau & Kahlor 1999; Nisbet & Stoycheff, 2013; Zaller, 1992), this causal order is assumed rather than empirically tested. Longitudinal studies are needed to explicitly determine the causal order between various types of Internet use and citizen attitudes.

Implications

The findings presented above provide a nuanced explanation of how capital-enhancing and recreational Internet use shape citizens’ democratic attitudes. Our study moves beyond previous comparative work that portrays a technologically deterministic relationship between general Internet use and democracy (Bailard, 2012b; Lei, 2011; Nisbet et al., 2012; Groshek, 2010) through more refined measurement. Similar to Stoycheff and Nisbet (2014) who operationalized Internet penetration along varying dimensions (broadband, users, and hardware) at the macro level, this study differentiated between types of Internet use at the individual level. In doing, this data demonstrate an indirect and differential process of mirror holding and window opening through which Internet can—but does not necessarily—amplify demand for democracy.

Among both Russian and Ukrainian Internet users, greater reliance on Internet use rich with democratic cues and pluralistic information exhibited positive direct and indirect associations with citizen demand for democracy. The direct effect replicates the positive relationship delineated in previous studies, whose measurement specifies Internet for information-seeking purposes (Lei, 2011) or relies on coarse operationalizations in secondary data (e.g., Bailard, 2012b; Nisbet et al., 2012; Stoycheff & Nisbet, 2014). But the indirect, mediated pathway of capital-enhancing Internet use through perceptions of democratic supply, and regime support is promising. It lends evidence that citizens who use the Internet to open windows to new political information become more critical of their government’s democratic institutions, their political leaders, and alternative forms of governance. These results replicate during two time periods in one of the world’s strongest authoritarian countries, as well as a country stalled in its democratic transition.

This data also show the darker side of the Internet, wherein increased choice allows citizens to further alienate themselves from political affairs. In Russia, more frequent Internet use that is poor in democratic cues was associated with citizens’ perceiving greater levels of democratic supply, and consequentially more favorable evaluations of incumbent elites. The net result was less demand for democracy among Russian citizens who frequently used the Internet in this manner. These findings align with and may provide further insight into Bailard’s (2014) experimental results, which showed that participants who were given free Internet access in Bosnia and Herzegovina became less democratically inclined. As her study did not specify how participants were to use the Internet, it would be interesting to examine whether they were opting to engage in recreational rather than capital-enhancing online activities. Regardless, the negative relationship evidenced in this study’s data may be attributable to mainstreaming of online entertainment content into a homogeneous Russian worldview (Shanahan, 1998), or of satisficing, whereby citizens are satisfied with their level of democratization because it allows them to freely engage in the recreational online activities they prefer.

This study also highlights the need for more theoretical approaches that examine the role of information technology in fostering democratic learning and socialization within emerging democracies. For instance, more research on how the motivations and interests of Internet users influence their online behaviors is needed. Another area of potential research is greater explication of the types of political lessons and values embedded in entertainment and gaming content produced in autocratic states, like Russia, that serve to cultivate authoritarian worldviews.

The Russian-Ukrainian Conflict

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine over the Crimea and Eastern Ukraine that occurred in early 2014, about 1 year after the data for this study were collected, has significant implications for how Internet use may be associated with democratization within these two countries in the short term. For instance, in Russia these findings highlight the intersections of Internet use, democratization, and public opinion in two ways. Since 2013, the Russian government has clamped down on Internet freedom and foreign media as a means to limit political dissent (Freedom House, 2015a, 2015b). It has also attempted to influence public opinion by promoting two complementary narratives about the threat of the Internet. The first is that foreign countries are using the Internet against Russia and the second is that online activists and political agitators may use a pluralistic Internet to create political instability inside Russia (Asmolov, 2015). This “psychological firewall,” as Nisbet and Mikati (2015) term it, has resulted in a plurality of the Russian public supporting the censorship of anti-regime content on the Internet (Nisbet, 2015). In turn, these efforts by the regime seriously hamper the “window opening” and “mirror holding” potential of the Internet.

However, even more so than Russian legal and political censorship of the Internet, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine that began over the Crimea region and spread to include a civil war in eastern Ukraine has greatly retarded the processes of democratization highlighted in this article. Within Russia, with the percentage of Russians approving of President Putin was close to 90% more than year after the conflict (Russian Public Opinion Research Center, 2015) despite Russia suffering from sanctions and a steep economic recession. This dramatic uptick in regime support most likely mediates any meaningful impacts of the Internet on demand for democracy within Russia in the short term as long as support for the Putin regime remains so high.

Turning to Ukraine, since the onset of the conflict a mix of outcomes has occurred. There has been regime change and fair elections for a new president which has significantly increased the institutional supply of democracy within the country (Freedom House, 2015c). However, at the same time, the civil war has increased online propaganda, disrupted Internet access, and increased government online censorship (Freedom House, 2015a), which likely hampers the contribution of Internet access to democratization within Ukraine in the short term.

It is important to acknowledge that capital-enhancing and recreational Internet use exist on a continuum, and classifications of online activities may vary by context. Some may view video game play as a political distraction, whereas others may see its potential for building civil society in societies that lack vibrant public spheres. We hope this study begins a conversation and serves to dampen path dependence surrounding the role of Internet in the democratic process. Future work should continue to advance this conditional path, moving beyond whether Internet is good for democracy to exploring how the Internet can be harnessed as an important medium for citizens in transitioning and non-democratic countries.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This study was partially funded by a grant from the Ohio State University Mershon Center for International Security Studies.

Notes

Author Biographies

Elizabeth Stoycheff is an assistant professor in the Department of Communication at Wayne State University. Her research focuses on how new media influences public opinion and its implications for democratic development and sustainability.

Erik C. Nisbet is an associate professor of Communication and Political Science at the Ohio State University. He is also a faculty associate at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and co-Principal Investigator of the Comparative National Election Project funded by Mershon. His research focuses upon the role of media in comparative democratization, public opinion, and foreign policy attitudes.

Dmitry Epstein is an assistant professor of Digital Policy at the University of Illinois at Chicago. He studies Internet governance, information technology policy, and online civic engagement in policymaking.

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