Abstract
Recent case law has considered whether a Muslim woman who wishes to appear in court should be allowed to testify wearing a veil that covers part of her face (e.g., Muhammad v. Paruk, 2008, in the United States, R. v. N.S., 2009, in Canada). The current research sought to test the influence of a victim’s wearing of a veil while testifying on juror decision making in a sexual assault trial. In addition, the study tested for effects of defendant race using Middle Eastern and Caucasian as the target races, given that there is a paucity of research comparing these races in the juror decision-making literature. Results demonstrated that contrary to hypotheses, jurors were more convinced of the defendant’s guilt when the victim was wearing a burqa or hijab to testify than when she testified wearing no veil. Defendant race did not have an effect on any of the dependent variables in this research; however, mock juror gender was found to be influential. Potential reasons for these findings and directions for future research are discussed.
A recent Canadian court case (R. v. N.S., 2009) brought forth an interesting conflict between legal and religious rights. N.S., a Muslim woman from Toronto, was asked by a judge to remove her niqab (a face-covering veil) prior to testifying in a sexual assault trial. The defense attorney maintained that the veil should be removed so that the court could observe her demeanor, but N.S., the complainant, wanted to wear the veil for religious reasons. The presiding judge in the original case eventually ruled that the complainant must remove her veil to testify, stating that “although the decision was difficult . . . [h]er religious belief was not that strong. It was open to exceptions and wearing the veil was a matter of comfort.” The judge made this conclusion after learning that N.S. had posed for a driver’s license photograph bare faced. This ruling was the subject of criticism, particularly from feminist groups, one of which wrote in a factum for the subsequent appeal that “the forced removal of her niqab as a pre-requisite to testifying in a sexual assault prosecution turns the metaphor of re-victimization at trial into a literal reality” (Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund, 2010, p. 4). The ruling was overturned on appeal, and N.S. was permitted to wear her veil during testimony.
A similar case in the United States resulted in a different determination. Ginnah Muhummad, a Muslim woman, wanted to dispute charges assigned by a rental car company in a small-claims court in Michigan. She claimed that the damage to the car that necessitated the charges was a result of an attempted break-in, and thus she should not be responsible for the charges. Muhammad wished to testify wearing her niqab and was told by the judge that she could either remove the veil or have her case dismissed. Indeed, after she refused to remove the veil, the judge dismissed her case, stating that he could not properly evaluate her testimony if he could not see her face (Gorchow, 2006). Muhammad later brought a case against the judge, claiming that her First Amendment rights (including freedom of religion) had been violated (Muhammad v. Paruk, 2008). This case was dismissed by the court.
In both Canada and the United States, the issue becomes a balancing act between a witness’s rights and certain rights within the courtroom. Those who advocate for the removal of the veil (such as the judges in both R. v. N.S., 2009, and the Michigan case mentioned above) claim that it is essential to view a witness’s face to evaluate her credibility. Many states in the United States maintain that it is important for jurors to be able to see witnesses while testifying, though it is interesting that none have established a mandatory exclusion of blind jurors (Williams, 2008). With particular regard to sexual assault cases, some courts have allowed victims to testify from behind screens, or via closed-circuit television, to avoid feeling revictimized by the experience of testifying. It is interesting that the U.S. Supreme Court in Coy v. Iowa (1988) ruled that testifying behind a screen—which the trial judge had allowed—violated the defendant’s right to confront the girls he had allegedly sexually assaulted. Shortly thereafter, however, in Maryland v. Craig (1990), the Court allowed the closed-circuit testimony of a child victim of a sexual assault, where the victim was too traumatized to testify in open court. Nonetheless, many have maintained that witnesses must testify in person, as many indicators of credibility can be found within facial expressions and other nonverbal behavior (Williams, 2008). This argument may not be supported by research (e.g., Ekman & O’Sullivan, 1991, whose findings indicate that demeanor is not an accurate indicator of credibility). Some have argued that there are insufficient data to support the Court’s argument that facial expressions are essential to evaluating witness credibility (Williams, 2008).
Aside from the religious-legal debate, it is also interesting to consider whether jurors would be influenced by a victim’s veil in and of itself as a first step toward determining whether veils have an effect in the courtroom. Jurors are often influenced by extralegal factors, and specific victim characteristics such as race (e.g., Foley, Evancic, Karnik, King, & Parks, 1995; Ugwuegbu, 1979), gender (Davies & Rogers, 2006; Rogers & Davies, 2007), age (e.g., Back & Lips, 1998; Maynard & Wiederman, 1997; McCauley & Parker, 2001; Rogers & Davies, 2007), and attractiveness (e.g., Ferguson, Duthie, & Graf, 1987; Thornton, 1977; Thornton & Ryckman, 1983) have been shown to affect juror decision making. As such, it is possible that the mere presence of a veil on the victim will influence how jurors perceive her and, thus, make trial decisions. Furthermore, does the race of the alleged perpetrator further influence these decisions? The current study seeks to investigate whether juror decision making is affected by the defendant’s race and the wearing of a veil during testimony in a sexual assault trial.
Religious Veils
Religious veils have been the subject of controversy in a number of countries. The president of France, Nicolas Sarkozy, proposed a complete ban on face-covering veils in France, which was almost unanimously supported by legislators, though it met with resistance from religious groups (“Face Veil Ban,” 2010). Belgium enacted a similar ban in 2010. In the United States, no such ban exists because of the freedom of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment of the Constitution, which specifically allows for religious preferences and dress. Canada has seen recent controversy regarding the veil, particularly in the province of Quebec. In 2010, the government of Quebec introduced a bill that would require women to remove their niqabs to participate in activities such as attending university classes or seeking care from a doctor in a hospital. In a survey of Canadians, this idea was met with a great deal of support, with 80% of Canadians surveyed indicating that they approved of the ban, 16% indicating disapproval, and 4% undecided (Angus Reid Public Opinion, 2010). Thus, Canadians may have negative attitudes toward veils and the women who wear them. The current study was designed to determine whether a veiled victim would be perceived differently than a bare-faced victim in a trial of sexual assault. This study also sought to determine how the presence of a veil may interact with defendant race.
Influence of Defendant Race in Sexual Assault Trials
A great deal of research has been conducted with regard to the influence of defendant race on juror decision making in sexual assault cases (e.g., Mitchell, Haw, Pfeifer, & Meissner, 2005; Rector, Bagby, & Nicholson, 1993). Most of this research is based in the United States and looks at Black and White defendants and victims. The current study is set in a Canadian context, with Middle Eastern and Caucasian as the target races. However, given the lack of research in the relevant context, the current study relies on the extant literature, that is, regarding Black–White, to form hypotheses.
Studies concerning sexual assault and the effect of defendant race on juror decision making have found that Black defendants are treated more harshly and found guilty more often than White defendants (Hymes, Leinart, Rowe, & Rogers, 1993; Landwehr et al., 2002). In a larger study involving a civil case of sexual assault, Wuensch, Campbell, Kesler, and Moore (2002) found that White participants tended to find greater liability if the defendant was Black, regardless of the race of the victim. However, when the results were separated based on gender, the researchers found no statistically significant bias for either victim or defendant race among female participants (Wuensch et al., 2002). This gender difference with regard to the effect of victim and defendant race on jury decision making in sexual assault trials is consistent with the findings of other researchers (George & Martinez, 2002).
The effect of defendant race on juror decision making in Black–White studies also appears to be moderated by the strength of the evidence, the presence or absence of jury instructions, and the measurement of guilt. Research suggests that the effect of defendant race on juror decision making in sexual assault cases is strongest when evidence against or in favor of the defendant is weak (Ugwuegbu, 1979). Other research has demonstrated that if jury instructions and a legal standard guilt rating (i.e., “guilty” or “not guilty” as opposed to a continuous scale of guilt) are used, defendant race effects may be eliminated (Pfeifer & Ogloff, 2003). Finally, some studies have demonstrated that although participants may appear unbiased or may even favor Black defendants when entering dichotomous guilty–not guilty verdicts, they remain significantly harsher toward Black defendants when deciding sentence length (Klein & Creech, 1982; Rector & Bagby, 1995).
These differences in treatment of Black and White defendants in sexual assault trials may stem from historical conflict between these racial groups or from the rape myths that Black men have strong sexual desires and lust after White women (George & Martinez, 2002). Since these same myths may not exist for Middle Eastern defendants and the historical context is fundamentally dissimilar, it is possible that defendant race will have a different effect in sexual assault cases than that in the Black–White studies.
Juror Gender
A number of studies have demonstrated that women and men jurors may process trial information differently, especially in cases of sexual harassment (e.g., Blumenthal, 1998; Maeder, Wiener, & Winter, 2007), sexual abuse (e.g., Gabora, Spanos, & Joab, 1993; Pozzulo, Dempsey, Maeder, & Allen, 2010), and sexual assault (see Schutte & Hosch, 1997, for a meta-analysis). Specifically, women are more likely than men to convict in rape cases (e.g., Brekke & Borgida, 1988; McNamara, Vattano, & Viney, 1993) and provide harsher sentences than men (Scroggs, 1976). In a meta-analysis examining gender differences in verdict decisions of cases involving rape and sexual abuse, Schutte and Hosch (1997) determined that women were significantly more likely to convict than men. Women also are less likely than men to assign responsibility to the victim (Quas, Bottoms, Haegerich, & Nysse-Carris, 2002). These gender differences in decision making may stem from differences in perspective taking—research has demonstrated that women are more likely to identify with the victim in sexual assault cases, whereas men are more likely to identify with the defendant (Deitz & Byrnes, 1981). Furthermore, men generally score higher on rape myth acceptance (widespread and misguided beliefs regarding how, why, and to whom rape occurs; Burt, 1980) scales than do women, which could also account for gender differences in decision making in sexual assault trials (Giacopassi & Dull, 1986; Gray, 2006; Vrij & Firmin, 2001). In this study, the effects of juror gender were examined by including participant gender as a covariate in the analyses.
Purpose and Hypotheses
The aim of the current research was to determine whether jurors are influenced by the victim’s veil in a trial of sexual assault. The researchers were also interested in whether a victim’s veil would interact with the defendant’s race. This represents a first step in determining how veils are perceived in the courtroom and whether they adversely affect the victim in terms of attributions of responsibility and determinations of credibility by jurors.
Given the negative attitude that many Canadians seem to hold regarding face-covering religious veils (Angus Reid Public Opinion, 2010), the researchers hypothesized that victims described as wearing a burqa (head-to-toe covering veil, with an opening for the eyes only) would be perceived more negatively than victims wearing a hijab (hair-and-neck covering veil, which leaves the face uncovered), who would be perceived more negatively than victims wearing no veil. These negative perceptions may then carry over into determinations of the victim’s credibility and thus verdict decisions and attributions of responsibility for the assault to both the victim and the defendant.
Given the literature discussing the effects of defendant race (e.g., Mitchell et al., 2005), we predicted that the Middle Eastern defendant would be treated more harshly than the Caucasian defendant, in that he would be attributed more responsibility for the assault, receive more guilty verdicts, and be sentenced more severely. With regard to the interaction between victim veil and defendant ethnicity, no specific hypotheses were made, given the exploratory nature of this research.
In sum, the current research was a preliminary study investigating the effects of victim veil and defendant race on juror decision making in a trial of sexual assault.
Method
Participants
Participants were 242 students at an eastern Ontario university. Ages ranged from 17 to 52 years (M = 20.82, SD = 5.05), and the sample consisted of 86 men (35.5%) and 156 women (64.5%). Just more than half of the participants (134, making up 55.4% of the sample) were Caucasian, 25 (10.3%) Black, 13 (5.4%) East Asian, 24 (9.9%) South Asian, 25 (10.3%) West Asian, 6 (2.5%) Latino/a, 1 (0.4%) Aboriginal Canadian, and 13 (5.4%) of mixed origin (1 participant did not disclose his or her race). Participants were awarded course credit in exchange for their participation.
Materials
Trial transcript
Six versions of a five-page mock-trial transcript were created, varying the victim’s veil (burqa vs. hijab vs. none) and the defendant’s race (White vs. Middle Eastern). All other details of the trial were held constant across the different transcript versions. The alleged crime took place in a bus stop shelter in the early morning. The victim claimed that the defendant approached her at the bus stop and attempted to persuade her to have sex with him. When she refused, he sexually assaulted her and then fled the scene. She later picked the defendant out of a lineup and indicated that he looked familiar. The defendant claimed that he was not the man who sexually assaulted the victim but that he jogged near the bus stop every day, which explained why the victim recognized his face. Each transcript began with an opening statement by the judge addressing the court. The judge’s instructions were followed by opening statements from the Crown and defense attorneys, presentations of the victim and defendant and their subsequent cross-examinations, and closing statements by the attorneys. At the conclusion, the judge provided the law and gave instructions to the jury members.
Defendant race was indicated in the precursor of the trial. In addition, different surnames were used for the Middle Eastern (Hassan) and White (Jones) defendant. The victim’s veil was also indicated in the precursor of the trial and mentioned at one other point in the transcript.
Juror questionnaire
Following the trial transcript, participants were asked to answer a number of questions about what they had read. Mock jurors were asked to rate the defendant’s and victim’s testimony on a number of dimensions (i.e., reliability, accuracy, credibility, truthfulness, and believability) using a 10-point scale (1 = not, 10 = absolutely). Mock jurors were also asked to place a check mark in one of two appropriate boxes to render a dichotomous verdict choice (not guilty vs. guilty) as well as rate their confidence in that choice on a 10-point scale (1 = not confident, 10 = absolutely confident). In addition, mock jurors who rendered a guilty dichotomous verdict were asked to rate the defendant’s and the victim’s responsibility, desire, and causality for the sexual assault on a 10-point scale (1 = not, 10 = absolutely). Participants who voted for guilty were also asked to provide a sentence to the defendant, rated on a scale from 0 (0–2 months) to 10 (8–10 years). Finally, in a series of manipulation checks, mock jurors were given multiple-choice questions to determine if they were cognizant of the alleged victim’s veil (i.e., burqa, hijab, none) and the defendant’s race (i.e., White, Middle Eastern). Mock jurors also answered questions relevant to their own demographic characteristics (e.g., gender, race, age, etc.).
Procedure
Participants were tested in a laboratory. On arrival, participants were randomly assigned to 1 of 6 conditions. Each participant was provided with a package containing an informed consent form and 1 of 6 versions of the mock trial transcript. On completion of the informed consent form and reading the transcript, participants returned the packages to the researcher. Mock jurors were then asked to complete a questionnaire including the dependent measures, a manipulation check, and a brief demographic inquiry (i.e., age, gender, race, and primary language). After completing the questionnaire, participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation.
Results
Manipulation Check
A total of 235 participants (97.1%) were able to correctly identify what the victim wore on her head and/or face, and 229 (94.6%) participants were able to correctly identify the defendant’s race. Those who failed one or more of these manipulation checks were eliminated from further analyses, resulting in 223 participants (82 men, 141 women).
Dichotomous Verdict
The trial transcript resulted in a somewhat balanced verdict split, with 94 participants (42%) voting guilty and 128 participants (58%) voting not guilty.
To test the influence of defendant ethnicity and victim veil on verdict, a forward stepwise binary logistic regression was conducted with dichotomous verdict decision (coded as 0 = guilty, 1 = not guilty) as the criterion and victim veil and defendant ethnicity (as well as the interaction between these variables) as predictors. This model was significant, χ2 = 20.58, p < .01, and produced an R2 of .09; however, only participant gender (β = −1.30, exp. = 0.28, p < .01) was included in the final model. The odds ratio for participant gender was 0.28, indicating that a verdict of guilty was more likely for women jurors than for men jurors. Only 24% of men voted guilty, whereas 53% of women voted guilty. However, victim veil, defendant ethnicity, and their interaction did little to explain the variance in dichotomous verdict decision.
Continuous Verdict
To further test the effect of defendant ethnicity and victim veil on verdict, a 2 × 3 analysis of covariance was performed with defendant ethnicity and victim veil as the independent variables and continuous verdict decision as the dependent variable. Continuous verdict decision (i.e., verdict confidence) ranged from −10 (very confident that the defendant was not guilty) to 10 (very confident that the defendant was guilty). This variable was the product of two vectors: verdict (−1 = not guilty and 1 = guilty) and confidence in the decision (1 = not at all confident to 10 = very confident). Given the literature demonstrating the influence of mock juror gender on decisions in sexual assault cases (i.e., Brekke & Borgida, 1988; McNamara et al., 1993; Schutte & Hosch, 1997) and the influence of participant gender in our dichotomous analyses, mock juror gender was included as a covariate in this analysis. The analysis yielded a significant main effect for victim veil, F(2, 210) = 3.16, p < .05, η2 = .03. Participants were significantly (p < .05 using Tukey’s least significant difference) more confident in the defendant’s guilt when the victim was described as wearing a burqa (M = 0.21) or a hijab (M = 0.45) as opposed to when the victim was not wearing a head covering (M = −2.11). In addition, the covariate was significant in this model, F(1, 210) = 22.79, p < .001, η2 = .10, indicating that participant gender did influence verdict confidence, such that women were more confident in the defendant’s guilt than were men. There were no main effects for defendant ethnicity, F(1, 198) = 0.27, p > .05, η2 = .001, and there were no significant interactions between the factors in this analysis.
Defendant Rating
Participants indicated how reliable, truthful, accurate, credible, and believable they found the defendant to be (see Table 1 for correlations among these variables). These items formed a reliable scale, α = .95, and so they were combined into a single measure of participants’ rating of the defendant.
Correlations Among Defendant Rating Variables
Correlation is significant if p < .01 (two-tailed test).
A 2 × 3 univariate analysis of covariance was performed with defendant ethnicity and victim veil as the independent variables and defendant rating as the dependent variable. Again, mock juror gender was included as a covariate in this analysis. Results demonstrated that the covariate was significant in this model, F(1, 216) = 11.64, p < .001, η2 = .05, indicating that participant gender did influence defendant rating, such that women rated the defendant more negatively than did men. However, no other main effects or interactions were significant.
Victim Rating
Participants also indicated how reliable, truthful, accurate, credible, and believable they found the victim to be (see Table 2 for correlations among these variables). These items formed a reliable scale (α = .90), and so they were combined into a single measure of participants’ rating of the victim.
Correlations Among Victim Rating Variables
Correlation is significant if p < .01 (two-tailed test).
A 2 × 3 univariate analysis of covariance was performed with defendant ethnicity and victim veil as the independent variables and victim rating as the dependent variable. Again, mock juror gender was included as a covariate in this analysis. Results demonstrated that the covariate was significant in this model, F(1, 216) = 4.95, p < .05, η2 = .02, indicating that participant gender did influence victim rating, such that women rated the victim more positively than did men. No other effects were significant in this analysis.
Defendant Responsibility
Participants who had provided a guilty verdict were also asked to indicate the degree to which they felt that the defendant was responsible for the sexual assault. A 2 × 3 univariate analysis of covariance was performed with defendant ethnicity and victim veil as the independent variables and defendant responsibility as the dependent variable. Again, mock juror gender was included as a covariate in this analysis. Results demonstrated that the covariate was not significant in this model, F(1, 87) = 1.55, p > .05, η2 = .02, indicating that participant gender did not influence perceptions of defendant responsibility. Victim veil and defendant ethnicity were also unrelated to perceptions of defendant responsibility.
Victim Responsibility
Participants who had provided a guilty verdict also rated the degree to which they thought the victim was responsible for the sexual assault. A 2 × 3 univariate analysis of covariance was performed with defendant ethnicity and victim veil as the independent variables and victim responsibility as the dependent variable. Again, mock juror gender was included as a covariate in this analysis. For this analysis, the covariate was significant, F(1, 87) = 10.96, p < .001, η2 = .11, indicating that participant gender did influence perceptions of victim responsibility, such that men rated the victim as significantly more responsible for the assault than did women. No other effects were significant in this analysis.
Sentence
Participants who had provided a guilty verdict also provided a sentence to be imposed on the defendant. A 2 × 3 univariate analysis of covariance was performed with defendant ethnicity and victim veil as the independent variables and sentence length as the dependent variable. Again, mock juror gender was included as a covariate in this analysis. For this analysis, the covariate was significant, F(1, 86) = 4.52, p < .05, η2 = .05, indicating that participant gender did influence allocations of sentence. It is interesting that men provided harsher sentences (i.e., longer prison terms) than did women. No other effects were significant in this analysis.
Discussion
The goal of this study was to determine the influence of a veil on juror decision making in a mock sexual assault trial and how this influence might combine with the effects of victim background and defendant race. This study is the first to investigate the influence of religious veils on juror decision making. Given the controversy over veils in the courtroom, we hoped to take the first step in discovering how jurors perceive a veiled victim versus one who testifies bare faced.
The first hypothesis, which was that victims described as wearing a burqa would be perceived more negatively than those wearing a hijab or no veil, was not confirmed. In fact, the only effect that emerged for victim veil was a significant effect in the opposite direction, with regard to continuous verdict—participants were actually more convinced of the defendant’s guilt when the victim was described as wearing either a burqa or hijab than when she testified without a veil. This effect was found after controlling for the effect of participant gender. This surprising result may indicate that Canadians’ attitudes toward veils may not transfer into their legal decision making or that attitudes toward Muslim veils may not be as negative as originally thought. More research is needed to determine the reason for this unexpected finding.
The second hypothesis predicted that Middle Eastern defendants would be treated more harshly than Caucasian defendants, based loosely on the Black–White defendant literature in the United States (e.g., Mitchell et al., 2005). There were no effects of defendant race in this study. As such, it is possible that bias against Middle Eastern individuals in Canada is incomparable to the bias against Black individuals demonstrated by the U.S. literature. As stated earlier, the historical context for the relationship between Middle Eastern and White groups in Canada is markedly different from the historical context in the United States. In addition, there are rape myths that work to explain differences in Black–White defendant treatment in sexual assault cases (George & Martinez, 2002) that are not present for Middle Eastern defendants. Alternatively, the race manipulation may need to be made more salient (e.g., photographs or videotapes as opposed to verbal descriptions) in future research to find this effect. Though the overwhelming majority of participants in this study did correctly identify the defendant’s race, it may be that a more salient manipulation will trigger bias in a way that a verbal description does not.
This research adds to the body of literature suggesting that juror gender influences decision making in sexual assault trials (e.g., Brekke & Borgida, 1988; McNamara et al., 1993; Schutte & Hosch, 1997). Participant gender influenced both the dichotomous verdict decision and participants’ certainty in that decision, such that women convicted the defendant more often than did men (and were more certain of their decision to convict than were men). Gender also played a significant role in the attribution of victim responsibility for the assault as well as perceptions of both the victim’s and defendant’s credibility as witnesses. This is related to literature demonstrating that, in general, women attribute less responsibility to victims of rape than do men (e.g., Kanekar & Nazareth, 1988; Kleinke & Meyer, 1990). It is surprising that men in this study actually assigned harsher sentences to the defendant than did women, which seems contrary to the findings with regard to attributions of responsibility and guilt. This result is not usually the case in sexual assault trials, in which research has demonstrated that women assign harsher penalties because they identify more with the victim and men assign lesser penalties because they identify more with the defendant (Scroggs, 1976). The difference with this study may be that it employed a stranger rape scenario. Recent research by Grubb and Harrower (2009) suggests that men identify less with defendants in scenarios of stranger rape. Thus, in this study, men who convicted may have seen themselves as very different from the defendant and thus punished him more harshly.
Limitations
This study is not without limitations. The current research made use of a trial transcript, as opposed to a videotape or live-action proceeding. This may be critiqued as an ecologically invalid method of testing juror decision making; however, a review of jury research comparing transcript studies to more realistic simulations found no difference among them (Bornstein, 1999). In addition, the sample in this research consisted of undergraduate students, which may be a point of contention given their unrepresentativeness of the population (Sears, 1986). However, Bornstein (1999) also demonstrated that there are few differences between student and community samples in the jury decision-making literature. This finding is bolstered by other jury research that has demonstrated a lack of contrast between student and community samples (e.g., Rose & Ogloff, 2001). A more recent investigation of the differences between student and community samples (in a civil case) demonstrated that the student sample showed a higher need for cognition than the community sample, which has important implications because of its moderating effects on a number of variables within jury decision making (McCabe, Krauss, & Lieberman, 2010). Thus, results should be interpreted with caution as a student sample was used in this study. Another potential criticism of the research is the use of verbal descriptions to manipulate defendant race and victim veil. A future study should employ photographs to determine if more salient manipulations would yield stronger, or different, results.
Future Directions
This study was not meant to address the judge’s ruling in R. v. N.S. (2009), in that the researchers were not attempting to determine whether jurors (or judges) would be able to determine credibility of a victim’s testimony when wearing a veil covering her face. This study is a first step in that particular line of research. The first question is, would a juror be influenced by the mere presence of a veil? Would the very fact that a witness is veiled affect jurors’ perceptions of her credibility in a courtroom? This preliminary research has demonstrated that mock jurors are influenced very little by the victim’s veil unto itself. Further research employing videotaped or live-action testimony is necessary to determine whether jurors’ perceptions of testimony are influenced by the witness’s veil, in terms of whether credibility can be determined when a witness’s face is covered. If this were found to be the case, then findings from this study would suggest that it is more a matter of the face being covered than one of antiveil attitudes, given that this study did not find any evidence of those attitudes in participants’ mock trial decisions.
In conclusion, this research represents preliminary findings regarding the influence of victim veil and defendant race on juror perceptions of victim and defendant credibility and, subsequently, attributions of responsibility and verdict decisions in a sexual assault trial. Future research should further explore whether a victim’s veil is a determinant of credibility in the courtroom.