Looking Beyond Risk in Paroling Denying Prisoners

Abstract

This paper offers an additional theoretical perspective to the “Catch-22” problem as discussed in Assy and Menashe’s article, which appeared in the December 2014 issue of Criminal Justice and Behavior. It offers to look beyond risk in the discussion about parole of denying prisoners. By focusing on the retributive meaning of the problem, the paper offers an additional framework to discuss the magnitude of the problem (via proportionality analysis), and the overt and covert forces that influence a parole board’s discretion in action (via character retributivism analysis).

Keywords

parole retributivism proportionality denying prisoners sex offenders

The parole board plays a pivotal role in criminal justice and corrections (Petersilia, 2011). Widely considered as “God-like to inmates,” parole board holds enormous penal power (Palacios, 1994, p. 568). However, largely concealed from public eye, the function of parole board has been almost ignored by scholars and policy makers (Appleman, 2007). Few efforts have been directed at understanding parole board decision-making process (Medwed, 2008). This insight is especially true for legal scholarship, as, for the most part, risk discourses have been used mainly by criminologists and not by legal scholars (T. Murphy & Whitty, 2007).¹

With that said, Assy and Menashe’s (2014) article is a welcome addition to the critical parole literature. Their thought-provoking article offers an invaluable and (probably the first review in English) detailed account of the Israeli parole system. However, their article’s importance goes well beyond a review of one jurisdiction: Its central argument is relevant to almost any parole system which applies the “no-confession-no parole” rule (Assy & Menashe, 2014, p. 7). Although the authors focus their critique mainly on sex offenders, the problem is relevant to practically all prisoners. A prisoner’s willingness to take responsibility for his or her crime, express remorse, or ask the crime victim’s apology is a vital part of parole decision-making process. Such actions increase, as empirical research shows, the likelihood of a favorable parole outcome for almost any prisoner, whereas proclaiming innocence diminishes the chance for his or her future release (Medwed, 2008).

Parole, as a basic legal assumption, is defined as a privilege rather than a right. Therefore, what exactly is wrong with the rigid policy of refusing parole for prisoners who maintain their innocence? Assy and Menashe’s (2014) analysis offers two main answers for that question. First, on the grounds of risk, the authors’ empirical review shows that there is no empirically conclusive importance for confession as factor for risk prediction. Moreover, they suggest that denial should be an issue for treatment rather than a barrier to it. Such rigid policy, they argue, ignores various types and degrees of denial that may be relevant for risk prediction. Second, on the grounds of fairness, the authors’ claim that demanding confession as a rigid condition for in-prison treatment, and as a result for parole, ignores the possibility of wrongful convictions. At the same time, it also may create a powerful incentive for prisoners to confess regardless of whether they actually committed the crime. Such policy ignores the wide range of personal and social reasons why a rightly convicted person may nevertheless deny his or her actions. In conclusion, the authors call for a critical investigation based on further empirical research on recidivism among sex offenders.

The authors suggest some practical solutions such as enabling private rehabilitation and treatment plans for denying prisoners, and, in determining parole discretion, have other predictive actuarial tools without considering prisoner’s confession (Assy & Menashe, 2014). The existing literature, which is trying to solve the “innocent prisoner’s dilemma” (Medwed, 2008, p. 492), offers other solutions: namely, suggesting limitations on the subsequent use of statements from parole hearings, disentangling admission of guilt from expressions of empathy toward crime victims, and even altering the parole board’s approach to guilt issues via modifying the structure of parole hearings, enhancing its factual investigative powers, or encouraging parole boards to refer innocence cases to other investigative agencies (Medwed, 2008).

This paper aims to offer a complementary and constructive response to Assy and Menashe’s (2014) main argument. It would suggest expanding the authors’ argument from another and additional perspective. My central argument intends to broaden the understanding with regard to penal motivation to consider prisoner’s confession on the one hand, and refusing parole for prisoners who fail to do so on the other. However, in contrast to the authors’ argument, which is, naturally, mostly preventive, my response would focus on the retributive and moral meaning of the problem. Alongside the authors’ preventive focus (which is no doubt the primary issue here), the suggested response offers a complementary view that pushes the boundaries of the traditionally preventive/rehabilitative discussion in this issue. By doing so, it seeks to expand and reinforce the authors’ argument via locating the (sometimes hidden) retributive impact on refusing parole for denying prisoners. By taking into account also the retributive motivation behind the conundrum, we may better understand parole board’s discretion “in books” as well “in action” (Pound, 1910) and suggest more sensitive and comprehensive resolutions to the problem.

In short, my response argues that retributivism is important for the problem in two main ways: first, to assess the magnitude of the problem caused by refusing to release denying prisoners in different jurisdictions (determinate vs. indeterminate sentencing frameworks). Here, the classic notion of retributivism—just desert—makes a difference. Second, and more importantly, to enlighten the forces that drive parole boards’ insistence to consider prisoners’ confessions, despite lack of conclusive empirical evidence and relatively low recidivism rates (Assy & Menashe, 2014). As noted, the response would suggest that the parole process, explicitly or latently, is seen as an appropriate forum for retributive assessment. Such assessment is aimed to calibrate the prisoner’s deserved punishment by granting or denying parole, which is particularly relevant in serious crimes. Here, other notions of retributivism, such as “character retributivism” play an important role. In conclusion, I would argue that such retributive understanding of parole discretion is unwelcome. It neither fits the classic aims of parole, nor parole boards’ proper discretion and expertise (Ball, 2011). Therefore, to solve the “Catch-22” problem, we need a broader understanding of the problem as well as desired resolutions.

Retributive Analysis of the “Catch-22” Problem

The Magnitude of the Problem

To assess the magnitude of the problem, we need first to examine the exact magnitude of the “injustice” created by a “no-confession-no-parole” rigid policy (Assy & Menashe, 2014). At first, it would be valuable to assess accurately the fundamental meaning of parole denial in two different basic concepts of parole.

The first concept of parole is early release from a determinate sentencing framework (however, not flat). In the determinate sentencing framework, parole is considered largely as a different stage with different considerations from the sentencing court (see Sapir, 2008). In such a framework, there is a “clear distinction between the functions of courts, which determined the proper punishment for an offence,” and the role of parole boards (R. v. Zinck, 2003, para. 18). In the determinate sentencing regime (e.g., United Kingdom, Canada, and Israel, for most offenses), punishment should be proportionate to desert (von Hirsch, 1976). The sentences imposed by the court reflect mainly proportionality of the seriousness of the offense committed by the offender and the degree of his or her culpability (see Roberts & Gazal-Ayal, 2013). The impact of preventive or rehabilitative factors, unrelated to either the seriousness of the crime or offender culpability, is generally limited by a retributive limiting range, if there is one (American Law Institute, 2011; Morris, 1974; von Hirsch & Ashworth, 2005). Once the offender has completed the punishment “we treat him as (as if) reformed—although we know full well that this will often be a pretence” (Duff, 2013, p. 190). Hence, in such a framework, a parole board, which applies rehabilitative/preventive discretion could only reduce from the deserved punishment determined earlier by court (Ashworth, 2010). Therefore, in any case, a prisoner who denies culpability and who was refused parole unjustly would not serve more than he or she deserved in proportionate to his or her underlying criminal offense.²

In an indeterminate sentencing regime, on the other hand, punishment should be proportionate to risk (Slobogin, 2011). In such a sentencing framework (e.g., U.S. traditional parole system; Petersilia, 2003), the judge is allowed to determine a wide sentencing range anywhere within the statutory spectrum of punishments. The parole board may release an offender from prison prior to expiration of the sentence imposed. This wide range, especially in serious cases, reflects mainly preventive aims. In such a framework, the parole board may deny a prisoner’s application anytime via this wide range. Therefore, the prisoner could serve a disproportionate sentence beyond what s/he deserved for the crime of which s/he was convicted, until s/he can persuade a parole board that it is safe to release him/her back to society (Duff, 2013; Harcourt, 2007; von Hirsch & Hanrahan, 1979).

For the classic version of retributivism—just desert—the severity of the punishment connotes the amount of the blame: the sterner the punishment, the greater the implicit censure. Therefore, giving severe punishment to a lesser offense overstates the blame and the proper censure due (von Hirsch & Hanrahan, 1979). In Duff’s (2013) words “a proper respect for proportionality and for the offender as a responsible agent forbids us to extend the punishment until he is reformed” (p. 190). Considering that just desert has quite specific demands driven in large part by the demand of ordinal ranking (Robinson, 2003), the injustice created by such false positives in an indeterminate sentencing framework is grossly unjustified.³ Therefore, in an indeterminate framework the “Catch-22” problem, from a retributive point of view, is acute. The injustice in disproportionate punishment based only on preventive consideration, let alone false positive based on prisoner’s denial, or fairness issues, is substantially greater. In other words, a false positive based solely or mainly on a prisoner’s denial is not only wrong from a preventive point of view, but also unjustified.

Lastly, and for the very same reasons, it seems that the nature and extent of the state’s duty to rehabilitate denying prisoners is different in indeterminate sentencing frameworks. European jurisprudence held, for example, that for prisoners sentenced to indeterminate sentence lengths, rehabilitation is a necessary purpose of any part of the imprisonment imposed solely on grounds of future risk. Therefore, there has been a violation of the human rights for such prisoners if they are in detention following the expiry of their tariff periods—until steps were taken to progress them through their imprisonment with a focus on “providing them with access to appropriate rehabilitative courses” (James, Wells and Lee v UK, 2012, para. 250). To avoid arbitrary imprisonment, rehabilitative resources are necessary to enable such prisoners during the post-tariff portion of their punishment, to demonstrate that their risk has diminished to a level appropriate for release into society (Genders & Player, 2013).

Suggesting the Retributive Aspect for the Problem

Assy and Menashe (2014) detailed the penal motivation behind the “Catch-22” problem. The main cause of the problem, naturally, is in the preventive sphere: over-reliance on offense denial for evaluating future risk. No doubt, risk is the issue here. In relation to that point, the parole stage enables false positives more easily than other stages in criminal justice system. The false positive mistakes are not in front of the public’s eye, although it is uncertain whether these are false positives because they are prisoners (Morse, 2011). However, perhaps the issue here is not only risk. In the following section, I will argue that over-reliance on a prisoner’s offense denial (and similar factors) in the parole decision-making process is derived not only for assessing risk needs but also, explicitly or latently, for retributive assessment. As I will argue later, such latent retributive discretion is problematic in the traditional, risk-oriented, decision-making process.

From a historical perspective, admission of guilt and apology has ancient roots in the Judeo-Christian tradition in which such acts are important for atoning for sins. The modern parole process’ reliance on remorse, responsibility, and apology mirrors the classic Christian notion of penance. Indeed, historically criminals are sent to penitent-iaries, suggesting that they are expected to become penitent and repent for their crimes during their stay in prison. As a result, to be released they should display evidence of their repentance (Medwed, 2008). Interestingly, and in contrast, Jewish law differentiates atonement from the criminal process itself and banned the use of offender’s confessions entirely in the criminal process (Medwed, 2008). Foucault (1995) observed, in classic criminal law, through confession, the offender himself took part in the ritual of producing penal truth and therefore highly valued that every possible coercion would be used to obtain it. This truth/power via confession/punishment relationship may be perceived as an instrument of social control via inner atonement. Foucault (1995) also noted that in classic criminal law, confession “ . . . made the body of the condemned man the place where the vengeance of the sovereign was applied, the anchoring point for a manifestation of power, an opportunity of affirming the dissymmetry of forces” (p. 55).

In relation to parole, the desire to obtain a confession could be seen as a desire to discipline the prisoner’s character (see Harcourt, 2007; Sapir, 2008). It also could be understood as a way to affirm the dissymmetry of forces, and a way to encourage the prisoner to take part in the ritual of producing the penal truth (Foucault, 1995) at the closure of penal continuum—which holds symbolic importance. It might be particularly important in what may be seen as the most soft and lenient stage of criminal justice—releasing a convicted prisoner before his or her deserved punishment ends.

However, the meaning of confession (and similar factors) is not only a matter for historical enquiry. Modern criminal justice system weighs admission of guilt and remorse heavily in assessing offenders as persons. In many cases “. . . the presence or absence of remorse, contrition, or apology can greatly help or hurt defendants” (e.g., a remorseful plea bargain) (Bibas & Bierschbach, 2004, p. 93). Offenders’ remorse, shame, acceptance of responsibility, expressions of empathy toward crime victims, repentance, secular penance, and atonement are considered by some modern retributivists as retributive or communicative sentencing factors (Duff, 2001; Garvey, 1999). This is particularly true for a particular retributive theory known as “character retributivism” (Bibas & Bierschbach, 2004; J. Murphy, 2007). This theory argues that, to take the concept of retributive justice seriously, we should be allowed to examine an offender’s whole character in assessing his/her culpability. If punishment really is to be proportionate to the degree of the prisoner’s culpability, the decision of the exact amount of punishment to inflict would demand an assessment of the prisoner as a whole and “not simply one weak moment of criminal conduct” (Gardner, 1976, p. 805). Hence, as long as the prisoner changes his/her character, s/he necessarily changes the punishment s/he is owed (Robbins, 2001).

The parole process, as empirical research shows, focuses on, among other aspects, searching for intuitive signs for rehabilitation as repentance, remorse, and accepting of responsibility and similar factors. A parole board seldom denies that a prisoner’s acceptance of responsibility is a critical factor in its decision-making process (Medwed, 2008). Accepting responsibility, recognizing the harm done by one’s crime, showing remorse, or asking for victim’s forgiveness are relevant to culpability and as evidence for a change in a prisoner’s “inner wickedness.” They could be taken as evidence that the prisoner has a less “hardened” character in comparison with that of the moment of offense (Bierschbach, 2012) or even as a restoration of moral balance (Medwed, 2008). A parole board could consider them—beyond risk— to assess the prisoner’s moral quality and “deservedness” to be paroled (see Reitz, 2004). On the other hand, an unrepentant prisoner, refusing to take responsibility or to show empathy toward the crime victim does not deserve parole. As Cohen (2005) noted, “Denial is an act of moral regression” (p. 943, emphasis added). The parole board’s discretion, in this view, possesses, therefore, a subtly coercive power over prisoners (Hawkins, 1986). With respect to the prisoner’s post-sentencing conduct, a “good” prisoner “deserves” parole whereas “bad” prisoner “deserves” to return to prison (Nathan, 2012). In this line of thought, Reitz (2004) noted that a parole board’s discretion in practice applies moral assessment. For him, although parole board members were likely to focus on future risk when they considered release, it is hard to believe that they were able to cleanse their minds entirely of moral reactions to prisoners’ immoral conduct. Hence, almost certainly, a parole board who exercised “delayed release discretion” used its moral sensibilities in the decision-making process along with its professional expertise (p. 204).

Examining a parole board’s factors by law shows that it supplies a firm basis for applying such retributive discretion. A parole board that, as is often the case, enjoyed wide discretion can practically revisit any issue weighed by the sentencing judge (Reitz, 2012). Namely, parole legal framework explicitly requires, or tacitly allows, parole boards to reassess the seriousness of the offense (Rhine, 2012). Many of parole boards’ factors are offense factors or “mixed factors” representing both offense conduct and offender characteristics (see Berman, 2006). Therefore, they fit well not only to preventive-rehabilitative but also to retributive discretion.

For example, Assy and Menashe’s (2014) review of the Israeli Parole act of 2001 could serve as an appropriate case study. Naturally, in serious cases, the offense for which the prisoner is imprisoned may be considered not only for risk but also for proportionality under a “public interest” clause when granting parole would substantially undermine, among others, the public confidence in the law enforcement system (§ 10(a)). However, the retributive discretion may not stop here. The parole board can consider specifics of an offender’s crime—its nature, circumstances, and effects (§ 9(1)). Seriousness of the offense, as empirical findings show, stand traditionally in the heat of parole board’s factors (Medwed, 2008). Therefore, offense factors may not only provide evidence of a threat to public safety, but might also carry probative of moral culpability (Ball, 2009). The same is true, even in less magnitude, of factors such as criminal record, including the nature, the number, and severity of acts committed (§ 9(3)), which may reflect greater culpability and thus merit greater punishment (see von Hirsch, 1976). Even the basic requirement that a prisoner “deserves to be released” (§ 2-5) could be easily interpreted in character retributivism terms. It is also necessary to remember that, in some jurisdictions, the retributive aspect is inherent to the parole process. For example, the notes to U.S. parole guidelines (2010, § 2.20-01) clarify that “Determinations of just punishment are part of the parole process.”

In addition, there are three more (and partly overlapping) reasons that may foster the application of retributive discretion concerning denying prisoners—especially sex or violent offenders based on “classic” retributive grounds—intuitive demand for commensurate response between the seriousness of the offense and the seriousness of the crime (von Hirsch & Hanrahan, 1979).

First, consider the legal structure of parole. Its wide clinical discretion, which is “necessarily subjective in part” (Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal Complex, 1979, p. 13), coupled with its soft procedures and evidence rules, and the difficulty to review its discretion via administrative judicial intervention (Assy & Menashe, 2014; Reitz, 2012) harden the ability to identify the exact discretion applied in decision-making paroling process.

Second, our definitions and interpretations of what constitutes risk are contingent upon specific cultural, political, and moral evaluations of behaviors and events (Hannah-Moffat, 1999). Clinical assessment relies on the subjective judgment of experienced parole members (Monahan, 2006). There is evidence that parole boards’ subjective moral universe may be very important to decision-making processes because parole boards use subjective, intangible cues to evaluate inmates in including “magic variables” such as prisoner’s overall attitude (Meyer, 2001). Empirical research shows that a prisoner’s subjective behavior before a parole board could deleteriously affect his/her chance for release (DeLisi & Berg, 2006). A prisoner’s denial, hence, is a good example, showing an overall negative attitude toward the parole board’s authority and a poor moral identity, and is therefore undeserving of parole.

Assy and Menashe (2014) suggested that structured clinical assessment or statistical/actuarial tools should be considered seriously instead of insisting on confession-based interviews to assess whether the prisoner suffers from a psychological condition that predisposes him/her to sex crimes. As far as it is related to moral subjective latent discretion, using actuarial tools probably improves this concern. However, it is not a panacea. In practice, even actuarial prediction tools are relying on practitioners’ preconceived and non-actuarial knowledge of offenders. Those practitioners ensure that risk-assessment outcomes reflect their moral judgments and understandings of equitability and fairness (Hannah-Moffat, 2013).

Third, the deprivation of privilege of already stigmatized individuals is considered to be a lesser evil than the possible harm to innocent victims in the potential political damage of parole board members (Petrunik, 2002). Public attitude of sex of violent offenders affects the way it deals with convicted criminals which seldom receive much sympathy from the public (Morse, 2011). This is particularly true for sex offenders who are widely considered “modern day monsters” (Simon, 1998, p. 456). The mood of many communities with regard to sexual offenders became one of zero tolerance and resulted in periodic waves of moral panic (Petrunik, 2002). The public overwhelmingly support “get tough” policies and display an intense hostility toward persons labeled as sex criminals (Pickett, Mancini, & Mears, 2013). Therefore, a parole board seen as “soft on perverts” will inevitably pay a political price (Horowitz, 2007). The ancient concept of “vengeful desert” is also relevant: Refusing parole for denying sex offenders may serve as a hybrid of public and private mechanism of vengeance (Robinson, 2008; Simon, 1998).

Sex offenders’ relatively low recidivism rates, as Assy and Menashe’s (2014) review shows, is consistent with findings from other jurisdictions. However, as Ball (2011) explained, the tension between morality and risk is particularly relevant in releasing low risk prisoners who committed serious crimes:

On a pure risk basis, we might want to release the safest prisoners, but we might feel uncomfortable letting out a safe prisoner who committed a heinous crime. We might feel more sympathy towards inmates who have done the most to reduce their risks, but still release those who pose the least risk, even if they did nothing but sit on their hands while in prison. (p. 404)

Indeed, in such heinous cases, the seriousness of the offense, and other retributive relevant factors, may distract from their actual relevance for risk prediction. Sentencing is a volatile, unpredictable compound that is “vulnerable to eruptions of the primal” (Smith, 2008, p. 172). There is some empirical evidence that the retributive impulse gets some of its energy from emotional reactions (Darley & Pittman, 2003). In addition, the seriousness of the offense appears to alter the logic and the magnitude of mitigation or aggravation factors in sentencing (Robinson, Jackowitz, & Bartels, 2012). Blaming, condemnation, and punishment are a natural and necessary aspect to human interaction. The intuitive feelings are typically fast, automatic, effortless, associative, and implicit, governed by habit, and are therefore difficult to control or modify (Robinson & Darley, 2007). In parole, speedy decision-making processes (Reitz, 2012) of moral judgments are made implicitly, automatically, ubiquitously, and rapidly, before any conscious processing has taken place (Haidt, 2001). Because the emotional feelings toward sex offenders are strong, denying parole on retributive ground may satisfy the parole board or the public impulse in an era of penal populism (Pratt, 2007). We should remember, as Assy and Menashe (2014) express sharply, the very concept of parole could be seen as undermining proportionality by shortening what has been determined to be the deserved punishment. Hence, such “delayed release discretion” should not come as a surprise.

Furthermore, in many jurisdictions, crime victims play an important role in the determination of parole. Crime victims can also bring particularly punitive values to the parole process via victim impact statements. They can shift the balance of a parole board’s decision making away from supposedly objective-scientific prediction to much more emotive consideration of the harm caused. Therefore, they provide, in some cases, a more vindictive approach to parole by emotional presentation (Pratt, 2007).

To sum up, the retributive aspect of the “Catch-22” problem enlightens one more penal motive behind the problem. Considering a prisoner’s denial (and similar factors) as evidence for his unsatisfactory moral condition might explain the over-reliance on those factors in the actual parole decision-making process. Arguably, in serious cases, the question is not only risk, but also desert. Serious cases demand, intuitively, a retributive penal response. Coupled with adverse crime victim attitude, penal populist atmosphere and poor public opinion toward sex offenders are an appropriate ground for applying retributive discretion in parole decision-making process.

Concluding Thoughts: When Risk and Desert are Intertwined

Assy and Menashe’s (2014) analysis provides a firm critical argument against (unless firm empirical evidence existed) using prisoner’s denial as ground for refusing parole. Interestingly, the recent Israeli Parole Act bill (amendment admitting guilt), 2014, may listen to that critique because it was suggested to amend the current parole law and determine that a prisoner’s conviction denial would not be a factor for parole discretion. The current response aim was to offer a complementary perspective to Assy and Menashe’s (2014) work. By looking beyond the risk paradigm in paroling denying prisoners, we may better understand two things: first, the magnitude of the problem in different jurisdictions and second, the moral forces that may offer another or additional explanation to the “Catch-22” problem in serious cases.

The combination between risk and moralistic/retribution is a problematic mixture in the parole arena. Parole was historically created to promote reentry, rehabilitation, and prevention (along with managerial aims such as preserving prisoners’ good behavior and reducing prison overcrowding; Petersilia, 2003). Indeed, parole board expertise is in evaluating risk and rehabilitation prospects. However, “a parole board making up policies about desert does not have legitimacy” (Ball, 2011, p. 409). Regardless of the empirical question surrounding whether a prisoner’s denial is a good risk prediction factor, it is clear that it should not be considered a moral-retributive one. However, it seems that parole discretion may, especially in serious offenses, push the parole boundaries beyond the desired preventive-rehabilitative sphere. This problematic penal discretion is particularly relevant to serious sex offense cases where there is a gap between the risk prognosis and the retributive demand for commensurate punishment.

Needless to say, moral evaluation is not a hard science. Evaluating genuine remorse or apology and differentiating it from fake “crocodile tears” is not an easy task (Ten-Brinke, Macdonald, Porter, & O’Connor, 2012). Singer (1979) explains that “only god can impose an accurate moral judgment on any person,” whereas “some questions of morality, are too fine to leave them to the state” (p. 22). Even if it is accurate, it does not necessarily reflect a prisoner’s future risk—which is the primary legitimate aim of parole (Petersilia, 2003). In conclusion, it seems that a complex and informed solution is required to solve the challenge created by refusing parole for denying prisoners taking into account both the preventive and the retributive sides of the problem.

Lastly, Joseph Heller’s Catch-22 (1999) states that “there was only one catch and that was Catch-22, which specified that a concern for one’s own safety in the face of dangers that were real and immediate was the process of a rational mind” (p. 52). This lesson is important to the parole arena also. In general, only future public risk, should guide the parole decision-making process. We should not forget the basic parole risk assumption: “No one is more dangerous than a criminal who has no incentive to straighten himself out while in prison and who returns to society without a structured and supervised transition plan” (Petersilia, 2003, p. 18).

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Professor Ruth Kannai for her guidance and Dana Segev for her comments.

Notes

Netanel Dagan has a BA in criminology and PhD in law from Bar-Ilan University in Israel. His PhD dissertation titled “The paroling authority and its discretion over sentencing” was published in several law and criminology journals including the Law & Social Inquiry. His research focuses on sentencing, parole, and theoretical criminology. During 2015, he will be an academic visitor at the Centre for Criminology, University of Oxford.

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