Abstract
Biosocial criminology has gained acceptance from criminologists and society within the last couple of years. Studies of criminologists and of the general public show that a substantial number of individuals believe that biologically based factors, such as neuropsychological problems, may increase one’s risk for criminal behavior. For instance, a recent survey of the general public found that 60% of respondents believed that neurological problems may be linked to criminal behavior. Approximately 32% of citizens reported that genetic factors may increase the likelihood of violent offending (Gajos, Beaver, Gertz, & Bratton, 2014). Similarly, Cooper, Walsh, and Ellis (2010) found that criminologists ranked biosocial criminology as the sixth most favored explanation for crime, whereas a previous survey of criminologists showed that biosocial criminology was not even listed in the top 10 theories of crime (Walsh & Ellis, 2004). These findings suggest that biosocial criminology is garnering more interest from criminologists and that it finally has “a place at the criminological table” (Pratt, Turanovic, & Cullen, 2016).
Despite the growing acceptance of biosocial criminology within the theoretical aspect of our discipline, there are questions surrounding the practical importance of biosocial criminology to the daily workings of the criminal justice system. When asked about the implications of biosocial criminology, most scholars point to the importance of early intervention programs, the removal of toxic elements (e.g., lead), and the neurodevelopmental reasons why adolescents should not be transferred to the adult judicial system (Rocque, Welsh, & Raine, 2012; Steinberg, Cauffman, Woolard, Graham, & Banich, 2009; Vaughn, 2016). Very few scholars have considered how biosocial criminology finds its way into the courts and corrections. Of the few who have considered this question, many focus on whether the effectiveness of treatment varies by genetic makeup, and thus, genetic testing may suggest whether a treatment will be effective or not (Cleveland, Schlomer, Vandenbergh, & Wiebe, 2016; Gajos, Fagan, & Beaver, 2016). The idea of genetically testing clients may not be practical to those working in criminal justice settings such as probation officers and treatment providers, and as Vaughn (2016) highlighted, the lack of replication in this area may preclude the implementation of these methods. Instead, practitioners may want researchers to suggest more proximate endophenotypes, such as psychological tasks measuring impulsivity. In an attempt to fill this gap in the literature, the current special issue focuses on how biosocial factors may be considered in the prediction, treatment, and punishment of criminal behavior.
The first two articles address how neuropsychological measures can be integrated into the risk and needs assessment process. First, Ormachea and colleagues investigated whether tablet-based neuropsychological tasks improved the predictive validity of the Texas Risk Assessment System–Community Supervision Tool (TRAS-CST) among a sample of 240 felony probationers. Their results showed that the discriminative accuracy of the instrument was enhanced when researchers replaced TRAS-CST self-report items of impulsivity, reactive aggression, and problem-solving deficits with the tablet-based neuropsychological tasks (i.e., Go/No Go, Tower of London, Point Subtraction Aggression Paradigm). The findings from this study are exciting because (a) the results show that concepts which are sensitive to social desirability bias—evaluating one’s own level of impulsivity, aggression, and planning ability—can be measured through tablet-based applications and then integrated into risk assessment systems; (b) tablet-based neuropsychological tasks can increase the accuracy of risk and needs assessments; and (c) practitioners may welcome the use of tablet-based assessments that clients can quickly complete in their office, rather than attempting to assess these elusive concepts through lengthy interviews.
The second article within the “Biosocial Criminology and Assessment” section is from Baglivio and colleagues. The authors used data from 11,557 male juvenile offenders in residential programs in Florida to examine the role of parental risk factors and youths’ psychiatric diagnoses, effortful control, and negative emotionality in the prediction of recidivism. Their results revealed that parental risk factors did not have a direct impact on recidivism once attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), effortful control, and negative emotionality were taken into account, and that effortful control and negative emotionality were moderate predictors of readjudication at the 12-month follow-up, even after controlling for demographics, prior criminal history, substance abuse, and antisocial peers. These results may have implications for case management practices within the residential juvenile justice system, where case managers may consider prioritizing interventions targeting effortful control and negative emotionality before targeting youths’ familial risk factors.
Subsequent articles in the issue propose how biosocial criminology can be integrated into the assessment, treatment, and prevention of criminal behavior. Newsome and Cullen illustrate how the risk-need-responsivity model can be enhanced by including ideas from biosocial criminology. The authors identify specific biological factors that can be incorporated into risk and needs assessments, such as heart rate, psychological tests of impulsivity (i.e., Go/No Go task), and measures of traumatic brain injury. They also propose that clinicians may target these physiological and neurological factors through a combination of alternative therapeutic practices (e.g., mindfulness-based treatment) and traditional evidence-based interventions (e.g., cognitive-behavioral therapy).
Similarly, Vaske expands upon Newsome and Cullen’s recommendations by discussing why evidence-based programs are effective in general, and why they are effective for only a subset of individuals. First, evidence-based programs (across the life course) may affect individuals’ behavior because they change one’s biological functioning in the stress response and self-regulation systems. The author argues that understanding the depth of change resulting from interventions may help clinicians and researchers to build better interventions. Second, the article shows that evidence-based programs may not work for a number of clients because these clients exhibit abnormalities in their stress response, attention, and reward systems. As such, the article proposes that clinicians should consider supplementing treatment with a number of alternative interventions, such as mindfulness-based treatment, cognitive remediation, neurofeedback, and incentive-based programs.
Finally, the last set of articles within the special issue use vignette studies to consider whether biological risk factors influence potential jurors’ sentencing decisions, and whether jurors would perceive such risk factors as either mitigating or aggravating factors. Both articles found that biological risk did not directly affect respondents’ charging or sentencing decisions, but that biology may be related to courtroom decisions in more nuanced ways. In particular, Berryessa’s experimental study of 571 death-qualified jury-eligible adults showed that biological factors do not seem to affect respondents’ decisions to support the death penalty or their beliefs that the death penalty would be cruel and unusual punishment if imposed on defendants with biological risk factors. Her results, however, showed that biological risk factors affected respondents’ beliefs that the defendant was dangerous and that future dangerousness was related to participants’ decisions to support the death penalty in the murder case. In addition, respondents suggested that some risk factors, such as brain damage, acted as both mitigating and aggravating factors; thus, such defendants were perceived as not completely responsible for their behavior, but they were the most feared by respondents. Similarly, Costa and colleagues’ experimental vignette study found that genetic risk did not affect respondents’ decisions to charge the suspect with murder (rather than manslaughter), but that respondents were more fearful of defendants who had a genetic risk factor compared with defendants who did not. Thus, both of the studies suggest that the presentation of biological risk factors may heighten jurors’ fears of a defendant, and this in turn may affect their decisions regarding punishment.
This special issue of Criminal Justice and Behavior puts forth several ideas on how biosocial criminology can inform practices within the courtroom and in corrections. However, it is clear that this special issue is a first step in this line of inquiry rather than the destination. Very few researchers are considering the ideas put forth in this issue, and an even smaller number are using empirical data to test such research questions. Those studies that are investigating these questions may have limitations such as small sample sizes or nongeneralizable samples. Therefore, there is much work to be done in this line of research.
Before concluding, I would like to highlight what I believe are some of the next steps in this research. It is not clear whether neuropsychological tasks (e.g., Go/No Go) and biological measures such as traumatic brain injury and poor nutrition should be integrated into current risk and needs assessments, and more importantly, how they should be used into the assessment and case planning process. Second, while it appears that individuals who have problems with attention and stress management perform poorly in treatment, it remains a question whether stress reduction, nutrition, and cognitive remediation programs will increase their success in traditional treatment and ultimately reduce their recidivism. Finally, it is fascinating to consider how one’s biology affects his or her culpability; though many of the studies investigating this issue may not translate well to the actual courtroom. For instance, studies that measure one’s intention to engage in an act (i.e., mens rea) often examine an individual’s brain activity when they intentionally perform a simple act (e.g., pushing a button) and compare it with brain activity when they unintentionally perform the same act. Yet, pushing a button may not align with many of the complex criminal behaviors described in courtrooms on a daily basis. Also, many studies that examine how jurors consider biological evidence often use vignette studies. It is unclear whether these findings translate to how actual jurors make decisions when placed in the situation.
Finally, I am deeply honored that Emily Salisbury, Editor of Criminal Justice and Behavior, provided the authors and I this opportunity to share our ideas and results with the discipline. This is an area that we are passionate about and hope this issue pushes the envelope slightly forward or at least piques readers’ interest in the practical implications of biosocial criminology. I would also like to thank the reviewers for their willingness and assistance in providing very thoughtful reviews of the articles, sometimes within a very short time frame.