The Quagmire that is an Unwillingness to Report: Situating the Code of Silence Within the Chinese Police Context

Abstract

This study examines the individual, organizational, and ecological factors influencing police officers’ adherence to the code of silence, while accounting for their evaluation of the seriousness of each identified behavior. This study collected 353 responses from a sample of police officers receiving in-service training at a national police university in China. Results show salient influences for several individual and ecological factors contributing to the extent of the code of silence and those influences varied based on the type of behavior. In addition, this study lends further support to an emerging body of research suggesting Chinese police display a strong code of silence, although the existence and perpetuation of that code must take into consideration unique cultural practices within China.

Keywords

police integrity the code of silence willingness to report perceptions of seriousness China

Introduction

In the reform era (starting from late 1970s), policing in China has made substantial progress in professionalization and modernization (Wong, 2012). However, paralleling this trend is an increase of claims of police misconduct, abuse of power, and corruption (Sun & Wu, 2010). As scholars have suggested, the increase in police misconduct and corruption in China can be attributed to the corrupting effect of materialism arising from the modern-day economy, and the lack of proper checks and balances of police power (Lai, Cao, & Zhao, 2010). As a result of this increasing police misconduct and corruption, trust in the police has declined, and the police–public relationship has become more fragile and shows signs of deteriorating (Cao & Hou, 2001).

In response to this state of concern, in recent years the Chinese government has made efforts to tighten its control of the police force, as reflected by the enactment of the Police Law of 1995, which legislatively introduced policy to improve police accountability through the creation of a citizen complaint process and requirements to investigate allegations of police misconduct. However, the extent to which these efforts have improved policing still is unclear, as concerns remain over what appears to be an unwillingness to report other officers (G. Wu, Makin, Li, Boateng, & Abess, 2018). In fact, as G. Wu and colleagues (2018) suggest, it appears that like its Western counterparts, police officers in China show similar tendencies to the “blue wall of silence.” However, as the authors discuss, why this wall exists, in part, is a combination of organizational culture and national culture inhibiting reporting.

In 2012, the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces released the Toolkit for Police Integrity including several recommendations designed to improve police integrity in practice and through research (Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces [DCAF], 2012). Of the lessons learned, two prominent recommendations emphasized the need for more nuanced analyses into the factors associated with ethical decision making. If a dominant factor contributing to corruption and misconduct is silence, reformers must broaden their analysis beyond organizational factors (e.g., Ivković & Sauerman, 2016; Klockars, Ivković, Harver, & Haberfeld, 2000), by recognizing that individual officers are influenced by a myriad of different factors including those individual and ecological (Ivković, 2012; Lim & Sloan, 2016; Lobnikar, Prislan, Čuvan, & Meško, 2016; Vallmüür, 2016).

This assessment of the state of research is particularly salient within studies documenting the state of integrity within police agencies and increasingly so among those studies replicating the integrity scale created by Klockars and his colleagues (2000). In fact, much of this body of research has provided tremendous insight into observed differences across organizational ranks (Ivković, 2012; Ivković, Peacock, & Haberfeld, 2016; Lim & Sloan, 2016), although absent from these studies were an emphasis on the salient individual and contextual factors associated with different decisions. For instance, officers’ age, marital status, community assignment, and agency location (regional difference) are factors that have been rarely examined about their potential influence on police integrity, as reflected by such outcome measures as officers’ evaluation of misconduct seriousness and their adherence to the code of silence. If examined, scholars explored their effects on police misconduct, a concept that shows the opposite to police integrity, rather than directly focusing on police integrity itself (e.g., Bergeron, Archbold, Justice, & Hassell, 2008; Wolfe & Piquero, 2011). The inclusion of these added factors becomes increasingly important, as research continues to show the need to better understand the factors contributing to and inhibiting unethical decision making.

Recognizing the state of research on police integrity, and the considerably large body of research documenting police integrity within agencies, this research explores the contours of police integrity via a deconstruction of the individual, organizational, and contextual factors associated with officers’ adherence to the code of silence, while accounting for the level of seriousness ascribed to particular behaviors. As each of the integrity scenarios stand for gradations of unethical behavior, ranging from ethical dilemmas to the clearly criminal, this approach aligns with recommendations within the Toolkit for Police Integrity report (DCAF, 2012). By undertaking this level of analysis, we aim to find relevant factors that may guide future research and, through broader collaborative research efforts, help inform the development of policy and interventions. Recognizing corruption in China is still a prominent issue and the considerable reform efforts taking place, we believe situating this study within China, in concert with the existing body of research on corruption and misconduct, will contribute to ongoing efforts to reduce corruption and misconduct among police officers.

Policing in China

Policing System in China

In recent years, there has been an increase of studies exploring policing issues in China. These studies covered a wide ranges of topics, including the historical development of Chinese policing (Wong, 2012), the organization and administration of policing in China (Ma, 1997), police roles and functions (Chen, 2016), policing strategies and police reform (Jiao, 1995; Wong, 2012), police–public relations (Cao & Hou, 2001; G. Wu, Boateng, & Yuan, 2016), and police discretion and abuse of power (Lai et al., 2010). These studies have furthered our understanding of policing in China, the largest developing country with a culture uniquely distinct from Western societies.

Specific to the policing system, the “people’s police system” consists of public security police (PSP), state security police, prison police, and judicial police (Ma, 1997). Among these four types of the police, the PSP is the police force in traditional sense, and similar to their counterparts in Western countries, they perform the functions of crime fighting, order maintenance, and service provision. As the PSP perform these multiple functions, it is also the police force interacting daily with the public. As Huang (2009) explains, the PSP has as many as 1.8 million sworn officers, which makes it the largest police force in China. However, taking the population of China into consideration, the police-population ratio is one of the lowest among developed nations at a ratio of 13.8 per 10,000 (see Huang, 2009), although this rate is slightly disingenuous, as China employs approximately 3 million auxiliary police who assist the public security police to undertake a variety of tasks including patrol, traffic guidance, and public order maintenance (Zhang, 2012).

Traditionally, police systems are generally categorized into three models, namely centralized, decentralized, and integrated models (Bayley, 1985). While centralized and decentralized models are easy to understand, the characteristics of the integrated model is that the organization of the police is subject to the influence from both the central and local government (Ma, 1997). What is unique about China is that it cannot be simply described as a centralized, decentralized, or even an integrated model (Ma, 1997). Although the laws and rules governing policing are supposed to be applied to police agencies across China, and all police officers wear the same uniform, all of which are in line with the characteristics of the centralized system, local governments in effect exert substantial influence on the police force operating in their jurisdictions through personnel management and budget allocation (Wong, 2012). Therefore, as Ma (1997) has noted, the police system in China “falls somewhere between the centralized and the integrated model” (p. 114).

Police Reform and Police Misconduct

Since China began its economic reform and embraced globalization in 1978, policing in China has made substantial progress in professionalization and modernization (Wong, 2012). The enactment of the Police Law of 1995 was a milestone representing a concerted effort from the government to regulate the police (Ma, 1997). This period also witnessed the importation of dominant Western policing strategies, with a specific adoption of the principles of community policing, which have been widely adopted across China (G. Wu et al., 2016). In addition, this reform era is marked with improvements in regulation of police tasks and policy governing, improving transparency and accountability (Dai, 2008), including a revised process facilitating citizen complaints against officers. By broadening the functions of the 110 policing (similar to 911 policing in the United States, with a major function of receiving and responding to citizens’ calls for police service), citizens could file complaints against officers by dialing 110. Most recently, the Ministry of Public Security (the commanding police agency at the highest level of the police system in China, governing the police work in the nation) introduced an additional platform called the “12389 citizen complaints platform” to facilitate complaints against police officers who engage in misconduct while on duty.

These police reforms notwithstanding, it is still largely unknown about how these reforms influence policing in China, especially their impact on police (mis)behavior and accountability. Scholars have observed an increase in police misconduct, abuse of power, and corruption in recent years, leading to deteriorating police–public relations (Y. Wu & Sun, 2009). For instance, Zhou (1999) noted that in the 5 years from 1993 to 1997, the public security police agencies in the nation had investigated 33,295 cases of police misconduct that violated law or administrative disciplines. It was also reported that in the single year of 2017, the public security police agencies nationwide investigated 10,390 cases of police misconduct involving the violation of law or administrative disciplines (Dai, 2018). Explanations for this vary, with some scholars (e.g., G. Wu et al., 2018) suggesting some portion of this increase is a greater willingness to use the system, suggesting that police misconduct may not have necessarily increased. Rather, these new systems of accountability are better able to identify cases of misconduct. In many ways, improvements in the process are illuminating more of the behavior. Still other scholars (e.g., Wong, 2012) offer that the increase of corruption in the reform era may be attributable to the corrupting effect of materialism that is prevalent throughout the society. The impact of neoliberalism in China has produced a cultural artifact wherein money is the best indicator of ability and is critical for peer respect and social status. Recognizing the limited pay earned by police officers in China, Wong (2012) reasoned that the police have been increasingly influenced by values of materialism and hedonism that are widespread in the larger society and thus tend to misuse their power for private gain. This is potentially more problematic of an explanation, when considering the ample discretion that Chinese officers have and the lack of effective internal and external accountability mechanisms (Lai et al., 2010).

Taking this body of research into consideration, there are clearly organizational, environmental, and individual factors influencing the rates of police misconduct in China. However, while this research articulates the growing concern and legislative responses, limited research explores how a range of factors influence individual officers. Recognizing, one of the most commonly recommended policy changes to reduce misconduct is raising awareness and curtailing the code of silence among police officers, a lack of research exploring barriers to reporting misconduct by coworkers places research in China significantly behind other developed nations.

Determinants of Police Integrity: A Literature Review

To allow for a direct measurement of police integrity, Klockars, Ivković, and Haberfeld (2004) conceptualized police integrity as the “normative inclination among police to resist temptations to abuse the rights and privileges of their occupation” (p. 2). This definition, as is used in this study, has provided a basis for a number of police integrity studies in recent years. However, recognizing that extant studies specifically examining factors shaping police integrity are still limited, this literature review expands its scope to include not only police integrity studies (with a focus on factors influencing the code of silence) but also the ones exploring the correlates of police misconduct.

In the last two decades, there has been a growing body of research examining police integrity across countries. Scholars have explored police integrity in both developed (Huberts, Lamboo, & Punch, 2003; Klockars et al., 2000) and developing countries (Ivković, 2012; Ivković & Khechumyan, 2014; Vallmüür, 2016) and in both centralized (Ivković, 2012; Ivković & Kang, 2012; Ivković & Khechumyan, 2014) and decentralized (Klockars et al., 2000) police systems. Many of these studies used the integrity scale (involving 11 scenarios) developed by Klockars et al. (2000). As scholars have noted, while previous research has documented some common patterns regarding police integrity across nations, for instance, the existence of the code of silence among officers in both developed and developing nations, studies also suggest that police officers from different countries vary in their perceptions of police integrity scenarios (G. Wu et al., 2018). Most notably, there are distinct patterns concerning excessive force, with research suggesting that officers from transitional or developing countries, such as South Korea and China, viewed excessive force as less serious than their counterparts in Western developed countries (Ivković & Kang, 2012; G. Wu et al., 2018).

Despite this considerable body of international and comparative research examining police integrity, most of these studies are descriptive in nature. Few studies examine the intersectional nature of organizational, environmental, and individual factors and how each shape police integrity. In fact, across the dozens of studies on police integrity, only a small sample examine these factors through a more nuanced analytical approach (see Ivković, 2012; Ivković, Mraović, & Borovec, 2016b; Ivković, Peacock, & Haberfeld, 2016; Ivković & Sauerman, 2016; Kane & White, 2009; Lobnikar et al., 2016; Pagon, Lobnikar, & Anelj, 2004; Torstensson-Levander & Ekenvall, 2003; Vallmüür, 2016; Wolfe & Piquero, 2011). What follows is a brief overview of the state of research concerning the individual, organizational, and environmental factors.

Individual Dynamics

Age

At the micro level, scholars have found that age is a factor affecting police misconduct. Specifically, research suggests that an increase in age is associated with a decrease in misconduct. Torstensson-Levander and Ekenvall (2003), in a study on police officers in Sweden, found that older police officers were more likely to report fellow officers engaging in misconduct. Similarly, using a sample of 483 police officers in Philadelphia, Wolfe and Piquero (2011) found that an increase in officers’ age was associated with decrease in citizen complaints and internal affairs investigations. In explaining why older officers show reduced likelihood of engaging in misconduct, Wolfe and Piquero (2011) offered that older officers have higher stake in conformity than their younger counterparts do, as reflected by promotion potential and pension, and as a result refrain from engaging in misconduct. The narrower code of silence among older police officers may also be explained by power theories. As Lee, Heilmann, and Near (2004) reasoned, older employees hold more powerful positions in their organization, which increases their likelihood to blow the whistle as they have less to fear than do less powerful employees.

Gender

Concerning the relationship between gender and police integrity, results remain mixed. While there are studies finding a direct relationship between gender and police integrity (see Chappell & Piquero, 2004), other studies remain mixed or find minimal effects. Torstensson-Levander and Ekenvall (2003) found that while female officers do not differ in their willingness to report misconduct by fellow officers from their male counterparts, there is a small gender difference in the perceptions of seriousness of misconduct. Concerning the state of mixed findings, consider the following two studies. Using a sample of 408 front line Slovenian police officers, Lobnikar and his colleagues (2016) found that female officers were less likely to report fellow officers engaging in misconduct than their male counterparts. However, in an earlier study, the researchers reported that female officers have a higher likelihood of reporting misconduct by fellow officers than their male counterparts (Pagon et al., 2004). These inconsistent findings regarding the gender effect also reflect the competing psychological perspectives about the gender difference in whistle-blowing. As Vadera, Aguilera, and Caza (2009) noted, while some scholars (e.g., Rothschild & Miethe, 1999) hold that females are more likely to report unethical behaviors than males as females typically feel a greater personal responsibility to end the wrongdoing, other scholars (e.g., Miceli & Near, 1984) believe that females are less likely than males to engage in whistle-blowing as females “tend to conform to a majority opinion more than men, and the majority opinion may be to not report” (Vadera et al., 2009, p. 557).

More nuanced studies on integrity find that when deconstructed, these gender differences are best explained through contextual or situational analysis. For instance, Vallmüür (2016) found that while female officers were more willing to report misconduct, when the behavior related to inappropriate use of force, male officers were more willing to report misconduct involving the misuse of the position for personal gain. Specific to perceptions of seriousness, there is evidence suggesting that female officers tend to view the misconduct described in the scenarios as more serious than male officers (Ivković et al., 2016b; Vallmüür, 2016).

Rank

With respect to the relationship between rank and police integrity, Ivković (2012) noted there are two similar, but distinct codes of silence among police supervisors and line officers. Specifically, the code of silence for supervisors is narrower than that of line officers. In a more recent study, Ivković, Peacock, and Haberfeld (2016) detected a similar pattern concerning the variation in secrecy codes between police supervisors and line officers, although they found that rank could not predict the code of silence related to reporting the most serious forms of misconduct.

Education

Research has yielded mixed results related to the relationship between education and integrity (see Kane & White, 2009). For instance, using a sample of 553 officers from police agencies in Texas, Lim and Sloan (2016) found a negative association between education attainment and the code of silence for police supervisors. Specifically, finding suggests that police supervisors with a college degree were more likely to report misconduct than those with lower educational attainments. Similarly, by examining the personal and career histories of 1,543 officers being involuntarily separated from the New York Police Department (NYPD) for various causes from 1975 to 1996, Kane and White (2009) found that officers with associate or bachelor’s degrees were less likely to be fired for misconduct than officers with lower educational levels. As demonstrated in the prior individual and organizational research, a series of studies exist finding no relationship. For example, in a longitudinal study by Truxillo, Bennett, and Collins (1998), the researchers found that a college degree did not reduce the likelihood of disciplinary problems among police officers.

Marital Status

Although there is a considerable body of criminological research suggesting that people who are married are less likely to conduct criminal behavior (Laub & Sampson, 2001; Sampson, Laub, & Wimer, 2006), few studies have specifically examined how marital status influences police integrity or police misconduct. The available limited studies focusing on police officers demonstrated that married police officers do not differ from their unmarried counterparts in police integrity and likelihood of engaging in misconduct (Bergeron et al., 2008; Chappell & Piquero, 2004). Using a sample of 109 patrol officers from a Midwestern municipal police agency in the United States, Bergeron et al. (2008) detected no significant association between marital status and complaints of police misconduct. Similarly, by including marital status as a control variable in their model, Chappell and Piquero (2004) found that marital status was not a significant predictor of citizen complaints of police misconduct.

Years of Service

The relationship between years of service and integrity reveals a positive relationship between years of service and police integrity. More recently, Ivković et al. (2016b), surveying 945 Croatian police officers from 10 police administrations, found that officers who have served longer in the police force tend to view misbehaviors as more serious than those with lesser years of experience. In another study examining police integrity among Québec’s police officers, Alain (2004) found that more experienced officers were more likely to report minor misconduct than less experienced officers, although they do not differ in reporting relatively more serious misconduct.

In an attempt to explain these variations on findings, scholars suggest the link may be between income and police integrity (Edelbacher & Ivković, 2004; Guclu, 2013). Specifically, police officers with low income may be more inclined to seek extra income through unethical means, such as accepting gifts and taking bribes to meet their economic needs (Edelbacher & Ivković, 2004) or may be more sensitive to not reporting because of fears of reprisals. Concerning the former explanation, Kucukuysal (2008) found that police officers who earned less show higher tolerance to integrity violations than their counterparts who earned more. Similarly, Guclu (2013) also found that officers’ perceptions of integrity violations vary across different levels of family income.

Organizational Dynamics

Scholars have also noted that police integrity is shaped by organizational dynamics, suggesting that assignment type may affect police officers’ ethical behavior. Results of this research remain mixed (see Kucukuysal, 2008; H. Lee, Lim, Moore, & Kim, 2013; G. Wu, 2018). Specifically, using integrity scale created by Klockars et al. (2000), Kucukuysal (2008) found no significant association between the type of assignment and officers’ evaluation of misconduct seriousness. This is contrary to the research of H. Lee et al. (2013) finding that patrol officers tend to view “police crime” case scenarios as more serious than nonpatrol officers, although this finding does not apply to case scenarios related to “police gratuity.” Using a sample of 871 officers from several types of police agencies in South Africa, Ivković and Sauerman (2016) find that while officers from different types of agencies generally have similar perceptions of seriousness and willingness to report, traffic police officers view certain misbehaviors as more serious than other police types. More recently, surveying over 600 police officers in China, G. Wu (2018) found that criminal investigation police have a stronger code of silence than other types of police in China. G. Wu (2018) further reasoned that this might be the function of the higher solidarity developed among criminal investigation police.

Environmental Dynamics

Social ecologists argue that while individual and organizational factors relate to police behavior, it would be remiss to ignore the influence of environmental factors. Police behavior, or in the case of this research integrity, is also a function of the larger social and political environment in which the police operate (Klockars et al., 2004). However, in the body of research on police integrity, much like those studies on police behavior, little attention seems to be given to the influence of environment on decision making. As noted by Ivković et al. (2016b), most studies focusing on centralized police systems treat police integrity as monolithic across different units of the systems and pay no attention to the potential variations in police integrity among “different territorial or formation units” (p. 305).

Despite a limited number of studies examining the relationship between ecological factors and police integrity, those studies examining variations across territorial units or between urban and rural areas within a country provide interesting results. More recently, based on a sample of 945 Croatian police officers from 10 police administrations, Ivković et al. (2016b) found that officers from metropolitan police agencies tend to evaluate scenarios of misconduct as less serious than officers from rural police agencies, although the effect of territorial type decreases when organizational predictors are involved. In contrast, in examining police integrity in Armenia, Ivković and Khechumyan (2014) detected that police officers from the capital expected harsher punishment on those engaging in misconduct than their rural counterparts. Research documenting significant territorial effects notwithstanding, there are studies finding no relationship (see Kucukuysal, 2008).

It should be noted that police officers’ engagement with the community was rarely studied as to its influence on police integrity, although scholars have noted that the intensity of police interacting with the public may affect the opposite side of police integrity—police corruption (Wycoff, 1988). One study by Ivković, Mraović, and Borovec (2016a) examining the relationship between community policing and police integrity deserves notice. Using a sample of 1,315 Croatian police officers, Ivković and her colleagues found that officers employed in community policing did not differ in their evaluation of misconduct seriousness from their counterparts in more traditional police roles. However, this study did not explore if community assignment influences the code of silence among police officers.

In addition, prior research has also documented the substantial influence of officers’ perceptions of seriousness of the misconduct on their adherence to the code of silence (Huberts et al., 2003; Ivković, 2012; Ivković & Kang, 2012; Pagon & Lobnikar, 2004; G. Wu et al., 2018). For instance, based on a sample of 1,130 Croatian police officers and using perceptions of seriousness as a control variable, Ivković (2012) found that officers’ assessment of misconduct seriousness was a significant predictor of the code of silence across several hypothetical scenarios. Several studies using bivariate analysis also consistently suggested a significant association between perceptions of seriousness and adherence to the secrecy code (Huberts et al., 2003; Ivković & Kang, 2012; G. Wu et al., 2018). For example, in a study exploring police integrity in the Netherlands, Huberts and his colleagues (2003) found that officers who viewed the misbehaviors described in the scenarios as more serious were more likely to report these misbehaviors.

Research Question

A review of the literature reveals that although police integrity has received considerable scholarly attention in the last three decades, this body of research needs to further deconstruct the observed variations. If one of the key recommendations for improving police integrity necessitates understanding the individual, organizational, and ecological factors informing decision making, specifically the extent to which officers adhere to the code of silence, it seems both relevant and timely to examine these factors. In addition, as China continues to revise policy and implement programs to improve police integrity and curtail police misconduct, this study is a concerted effort to provide insight to help guide and inform those decisions.

Using the existing body of research as a foundational guide, we examine to what extent individual, organizational, and ecological factors contribute to police integrity. Specifically, we are interested in determining to what extent these factors contribute to officers’ adherence to the code of silence, as reflected by the likelihood an officer would report another officer engaging in unethical or illegal behavior, while including the officer’s assessment of the level of seriousness of the behavior. By including the level of seriousness within the assessment, we are better able to identify the relevant individual, organizational, and ecological factors contributing to the code of silence. In addition, we are also interested in exploring the potential mediating effect of seriousness perceptions on the relation between individual/organizational/ecological factors and adherence to the secrecy code. This effort is worthwhile in that some explanatory factors may influence officers’ adherence to the secrecy code indirectly, that is, through their prior effects on perceptions of seriousness.

Research Site

Data for this project originate within a national police university in China and were collected in 2015 during a series of in-service training programs. In total, 400 officers participated in the study, with a response rate of 88%. The participants of this study were from police agencies across the country and represent those receiving in-service training within the police academy. China has two national police universities, both of which are under the direct leadership of the Ministry of Public Security. The police university where the data were collected offers many programs related to criminal investigation, forensic science, and forensic medicine. In 2014, this university had approximately 7,000 enrolled undergraduate and graduate students and provided varying training programs to approximately 5,000 commissioned police officers. Table 1 presents the demographic characteristics of the sample.

Table 1:

Univariate Descriptive Statistics ( N = 353)

Item	%/M (SD)	% Missing
Age (minimum = 18; maximum = 46)	29 (4.6)	4.8
Male	92	1.1
Married	58	.8
Education		.8
Some college or below	19.7
College graduate	74.6
Master’s degree or higher	5.7
Experience (minimum = 1; maximum = 28)	6.4 (4.8)	4.2
Work in community	28.8	1.7
Rank		4.2
Superintendent Class III or below	44.1
Superintendent Class I or II	46.4
Supervisor Class III or higher	9.5
Criminal Investigation Police	58.4	9.3
Leader position	4.9	2.5
Agency location		16.4
East of China	37.3
Middle of China	21.7
West of China	34.6
Northeast	6.4
Annual personal income (RMB)
Up to 39,999 (US$6,060)	42
40,000-59,999 (US$9,100)	36
60,000 (US$9,100) or above	22

The collection instrument used in this study is the integrity instrument developed by Klockars et al. (2000). This instrument involves 11 hypothetical scenarios describing different forms of behaviors. Following each scenario, respondents are asked about their views about the seriousness of the behavior (responses ranging from 1 [not at all serious] to 5 [very serious] and how likely they would report it (responses ranging from 1 [definitely not] to 5 [definitely yes]). As each scenario is culturally relevant to China, the instrument was not altered. However, the original English questionnaire was translated into Chinese by the research team and then back-translated to verify the integrity of the instrument. To ensure the Chinese version of the questionnaire was equivalent to the English version, the research team asked five police scholars and 10 commissioned officers to read the Chinese version of the questionnaire and give feedback about their understanding of the scenarios and questions. In this process, issues of confusion and vagueness in the wording of questions were addressed with no significant changes occurring to the instrument.

Measures

The dependent variable is an ordinal variable measuring the likelihood the respondent would report a fellow police officer who engaged in the behavior. It is measured on a 5-point Likert-type scale from 1 (definitely not) to 5 (definitely yes). The independent variables include individual factors (i.e., the age of the officer, gender, marital status, personal income, and level of education); organizational factors, including police type; and ecological factors relating to the primary assignment location (region) and time spent in the community. Finally, recognizing the influence prior research has documented on beliefs of seriousness influencing the willingness to report, it is included as a control variable within the present study.

Analytical Strategy

Given the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, and our interest in understanding to what extent the assessment of seriousness influences adherence to the code of silence, we use ordinal logistic regression. When encountering cell size issues and overfitting, we collapse the dependent variable into a dichotomous variable in which “definitely not (would not report)” was coded as 1 and variations of other responses on the scale with an upper end of “definitely yes (would report)” was coded as 0. Results of this deconstruction are substantively similar to the ordered logistic regressions. For ease of presentation and consistency, we present the logistic regressions. In developing the models, we detected multicollinearity issues between the variables of age and years of service and rank. Therefore, we removed years of service and rank from the final models. In addition, three of the individual scenarios yielded chi-square statistic exceeding .05. This is of interest as these models all reflect criminal actions for personal economic gain, reflecting accepting a bribe from a speeding motorist, stealing a watch from a crime scene, and stealing from a found wallet. Moreover, for the first two models, the reduced models only including the level of seriousness and the code of silence did not reach significance. However, theft from a found wallet did reach significance with the reduced model, showing that as perceptions of seriousness increase, adherence to the code of silence is reduced. We present the results in Table 4 and discuss each below.

Findings

Tables 2 and 3 present the results of officers’ assessment of the seriousness of the scenarios and their willingness to report them. As it shows, there is a substantial proportion of officers in the sample that view the (mis)behaviors described in the scenarios of 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, and 10 as not serious. These scenarios are also those that officers tend not to report, as suggested by the low mean scores for willingness to report. Notably, only for four scenarios (3, 5, 6, and 11), the average score of willingness to report is higher than the mid-point of the scale (using 5-point Likert-type scale, the mid-point is 3), further supporting prior research suggesting the existence of the code of silence in Chinese policing.

Table 2:

Assessment of Seriousness by Scenario ( N = 353)

Scenario	1 (%)	2(%)	3(%)	4(%)	5 (%)	M (SD)
1. Off-duty security system business	33.1	15.3	19.0	7.1	25.5	2.8 (1.5)
2. Free meals, discounts on beat	22.2	24.1	21.6	16.2	15.9	2.8 (1.3)
3. Bribe from speeding motorist	2.0	1.4	4.0	10.9	81.7	4.7 (.7)
4. Holiday gifts from merchants	29.6	26.8	19.7	10.8	13.1	2.5 (1.3)
5. Crime scene theft of watch	1.4	2.0	2.6	2.0	92.0	4.8 (.7)
6. Auto repair shop 5% kickback	5.7	7.7	22.2	21.9	42.6	3.9 (1.2)
7. Supervisor: holiday for tune-up	23.4	15.7	22.3	13.1	24.9	3.1 (1.8)
8. Cover-up of police DUI accident	30.2	21.1	17.4	10.3	21.1	2.7 (1.5)
9. Drinks to ignore loud music from a bar	14.8	17.6	23.6	16.2	27.8	3.3 (1.4)
10. Excessive force on car thief	40.6	18.8	17.6	9.4	13.6	2.4 (1.4)
11. Theft from found wallet	4.3	6.5	13.4	13.1	62.8	4.2 (1.1)

Note. 1 = not at all serious, 5 = very serious. DUI = driving under the influence.

Table 3:

Assessment of Willingness to Report by Scenario ( N = 353)

Scenario	1 (%)	2(%)	3(%)	4(%)	5 (%)	M (SD)
1. Off-duty security system business	68.3	13.6	12.2	2.3	3.7	1.6 (1.0)
2. Free meals, discounts on beat	62.8	17.9	10.2	4.3	4.8	1.7 (1.1)
3. Bribe from speeding motorist	33.5	17.0	19.6	9.9	19.9	2.7 (1.5)
4. Holiday gifts from merchants	58.1	19.1	14.5	3.7	4.6	1.8 (1.1)
5. Crime scene theft of watch	17.3	12.5	17.6	14.8	37.8	3.6 (2.9)
6. Auto repair shop 5% kickback	31.5	18.8	21.6	14.2	13.9	2.6 (1.4)
7. Supervisor: holiday for tune-up	50.1	19.9	17.4	4.8	7.7	2.0 (1.2)
8. Cover-up of police DUI accident	54.3	19.3	14.8	4.3	7.4	1.9 (1.2)
9. Drinks to ignore loud music from a bar	43.2	22.4	19.6	6.5	8.2	2.1 (1.2)
10. Excessive force on car thief	65.5	15.1	13.1	2.3	4.0	1.6 (1.0)
11. Theft from found wallet	30.7	19.3	20.2	9.4	20.5	2.7 (1.4)

Note. 1 = definitely not, 5 = definitely yes. DUI = driving under the influence.

Table 4 shows the results of the multivariate analysis on the adherence to the code of silence. Recognizing the prominence of perceptions of seriousness on the willingness to report, we perform a decomposition and mediation analysis using the method developed by Breen, Karlson, and Holm (2013). This analysis is performed using Stata 13. Briefly, mediation analysis allows for the estimation of the direct and indirect effects of selected variables. As Table 5 shows, we detected no significant mediating effects of perceptions of seriousness on the relationship between explanatory variables and officers’ adherence to the code of silence across all the eight scenarios. Interestingly, age, education, police type, and agency location were found to be significant predictors of the outcome variable for certain scenarios. As such, perceptions of seriousness have a strong effect on the willingness to report.

Table 4:

Regression Results for Each Scenario

Variable	Off-duty security system business(OR)	Free meals, discounts on beat(OR)	Holiday gifts from merchants(OR)	Auto repair shop 5% kickback(OR)	Supervisor: Holiday for tune-up(OR)	Cover-up of police DUI accident(OR)	Drinks to ignore loud music from a bar(OR)	Excessive force on car thief(OR)
Seriousness
Seriousness (2)	.46	.13***	.11***	.50	.14***	.14***	.35***	.28**
Seriousness (3)	.22***	.09***	.03***	.07**	.07***	.04***	.19***	.18***
Seriousness (4)	.02***	.04***	.21***	.05***	.01***	.01***	.07***	.05***
Seriousness (5)	.12***	.04***	.03***	.03***	.06***	.03***	.17***	.15***
Demographics
Age
25-29	1.38	1.50	3.55*	1.53	3.31*	.73	2.72	1.64
30-39	2.43	1.79	1.87	2.06	3.28	1.34	1.84	2.28
40 or older	2.50	.76	2.7	4.42	6.7*	1.22	2.21	1.77
Male	1.09	1.39	.87	.49	1.13	1.25	.57	1.27
Single	.66	.69	.71	2.17	1.24	.51	.65	.77
College Degree or above	2.27*	2.13*	2.73**	1.82	1.03	1.36	1.80	.77
Income: RMB 40,000 or below	.69	1.21	.79	.86	.93	.85	.96	1.03
Organizational/environmental factors
Criminal police	2.26*	1.07	.77	.60	.78	.82	.53	1.16
Work in community	.74	.91	.97	.80	1.08	.99	.83	.83
Agency location
Middle of China	.81	.61	.76	.84	1.21	.50	.71	.86
West of China	.91	.63	.99	.61	.855	.36*	.47*	.69
Northeast	.49	.38	.59	1.14	.70	.35	.71	1.52
Model fit
Pseudo R²	.18	.18	.27	.17	.22	.30	.15	.13

Note. For age, the reference category is “18-24”; for agency location, the reference category is “East China”; for seriousness, the reference category is “not at all serious.” For willingness to report, 1 = definitely not; 0 = variations 2-3-4-5. DUI = driving under the influence.

p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Table 5:

Results of Mediation Analysis for Each Scenario

Variable	Off-duty security system business	Free meals, discounts on beat	Holiday gifts from merchants	Auto repair shop 5% kickback	Supervisor: Holiday for tune-up	Cover-up of police DUI accident	Drinks to ignore loud music from a Bar	Excessive force on car thief
Seriousness
Total effect	−0.54***	−0.69***	−0.8***	−.71	−0.66***	−0.84***	−0.51***	−0.45***
Direct effect	−0.56***	−0.67***	−0.82***	−.71	−0.63***	−0.86***	−0.50***	−0.46***
Mediating effects	0.02	−0.02	0.02	0.00	−0.03	0.02	−0.01	0.01
Mediation percentage	−3.70	2.90	−2.5	0.00	4.54	−2.38	1.96	−2.22

Note. DUI = driving under the influence.

p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Age

As depicted in Table 4, results of this analysis suggest an interesting relationship between the age of the respondent and embracement of the code of silence. Specifically, treating officers between 18 and 24 as the reference category, respondents between the ages of 25 and 29 were more likely to embrace the code of silence for the scenario of receiving holiday gifts. In addition, our results show a synergistic relationship as it pertains to the scenario of supervisory quid pro quo (holiday for tune-up), where officers between the ages of 25 to 29 and 40 or older were more likely to embrace the code of silence. This is likely an artifact of the respondents’ position in the agency—that is, older officers are more likely to be in supervisory positions or interact with those at this level.

College Degree

Officers with a college degree or above were significantly more likely to embrace the code of silence than their counterparts whose educational levels were some college or below. Interestingly, these results were consistent across three scenarios with officers being more than twice as likely to embrace the code of silence for scenarios involving running an off-duty security business, receiving (not asking) for free meals and discounts, and receiving holiday gifts, again not asking. This is of particular interest as each of these scenarios is on the lower end of the integrity scale spectrum.

Criminal Police

Prior research indicated that criminal investigation police display a higher code of silence (G. Wu et al., 2018). When controlling for level of seriousness, our results suggest that criminal investigation police in our study were only more likely to embrace the code of silence in situations reflecting the off-duty security system business.

Agency Location

Agencies in the East of China are used as the reference category because of the unique socioeconomic context. Findings show that in comparison to agencies in the East, officers from agencies in the West were significantly less likely to embrace the code of silence for two of the higher level misconduct scenarios. Specifically, covering up a DUI incident involving a fellow officer and accepting drinks to ignore a noise ordinance violation for a bar establishment.

Discussion

This research examined the extent to which officers’ adherence to the code of silence are influenced by individual, organizational, and environmental dynamics, as well as officers’ perceptions of seriousness of misconduct. Replicating the integrity scale and using a mixture of binary logistic regressions and mediation analysis (see Table 5), we find some support that there is a significant relationship among several of the individual and ecological factors, although their influences on officers’ adherence to the code of silence are dependent on the types of the misbehaviors presented to officers. Recognizing the prominence of seriousness to report on the likelihood that officers would report other officers, we begin our discussion by detailing how these results align with prior studies and then discuss the unique findings associated with the individual and ecological findings.

Perceptions of Seriousness

Compared with other individual, organizational, and ecological factors, perceptions of seriousness have a more salient effect and substantially shape officers’ adherence to the code of silence. These findings are consistent with the dominant explanation within the literature, suggesting people tend to report misbehaviors if they view them as serious (Huberts et al., 2003; Ivković & Kang, 2012). While these results are consistent, there are several scenarios where the models were not significant. As highlighted in Table 2, consider Scenario 3 (bribe from speeding motorist), where over 80% of the respondents reported the behavior very serious (the mean of seriousness for this scenario was as high as 4.7 based on a 5-point Likert-type scale), the average for willingness to report was 2.7, indicating that while officers viewed this as nearly universally serious, their likelihood of reporting remained low. In addition, scenarios 3 and 5 (crime scene theft of watch), did not reach a level of significance in the chi-square test when using only perceptions of seriousness as the independent variable.

Individual, Organizational, and Ecological Factors

While perceptions of seriousness clearly relate to the adherence to the code of silence, the results of this study also suggest that adherence to the code of silence is subject to individual and ecological factors. Specifically, we find significant influences among age, educational attainment, and agency location. Indeed, this study suggests the effects of these factors vary based on the scenario further supporting prior recommendations and calls for research to deconstruct each of the scenarios. Each of the scenarios included within the integrity scale displays considerable variability. Stealing from a crime scene and covering up a DUI are clearly different from running an off-duty security business or accepting, not asking, for a discount on a meal. Our results further support the need for an emphasis on specific scenarios and as we would argue the need for more relevant scenarios depicting new ethical dilemmas facing police officers in this technological era. Clearly, officers view accepting a bribe as serious, although why most respondents are unlikely to report a fellow officer still is unclear.

Concerning our finding for age, results suggest that officers belonging to the relatively older groups show higher odds of adhering to the code of silence in two scenarios (scenario 4—holiday gifts from merchants, and scenario 7—supervisor: holiday for tune-up). This is a unique finding, as prior research conducted in Western and non-Western countries generally suggests a negative relationship between age and police misconduct (McElvain & Kposowa, 2004; Torstensson-Levander & Ekenvall, 2003; Wolfe & Piquero, 2011). It appears that in China, a stronger code of silence exists among older officers, which may be likely amplified by Chinese culture.

Wolfe and Piquero (2011) reasoned that older officers refrain from engaging in misconduct as they have higher stake in conformity, in forms of promotion potential and pension, than their younger counterparts. Put simply, older officers do not want to risk losing financial benefits by engaging in misconduct. This is even more salient, considering that in China, older officers are most often the primary source of income, providing financial support for both their parents and children (Lin & Yi, 2011). The increasing pressure placed upon older officers, likely amplified by the cultural importance placed on conformity in China, may be a contributing factor as to why for certain scenarios, older officers were more likely to adhere to the code of silence.

In addition, as noted by G. Wu et al. (2018), the code of silence does exist in Chinese policing, and whistle-blowing in China is more discouraged, as it is against the Chinese traditional culture that values interpersonal harmony. Reporting a fellow officer is not merely a risk-taking behavior because of potential ramifications from other officers. Rather, whistle-blowing can have profound ramifications on the agency, and thus stability within the organization. While we do not include measures of fear of retaliation, notable police scholars have highlighted the existence of both a blue wall of silence, existing between individual officers (Westley, 1970), and an organizational wall of silence, intending to protect the organization from scrutiny or increased oversight (Crank, 2004). Given all these circumstances, it seems reasonable for older officers in China to hold a stronger code of silence than their younger counterparts, as they may have more to lose if they “blow the whistle” for these two specific scenarios.

Educational attainment is another individual factor displaying influence adherence to the code of silence (scenario 1—off-duty security system business; scenario 2—free meals, discounts on beat; and scenario 4—holiday gifts from merchants), which is inconsistent with prior studies that have generally revealed a negative impact of educational attainment on the code of silence and police misconduct (Kane & White, 2009; Lim & Sloan, 2016). However, this finding is not surprising when taking into consideration the social context in China and that each of the scenarios in which education reached significant are those where embracement of the code of silence can be more easily rationalized.

Concerning culture, the stronger code of silence among officers with a college degree or above might be the result of their longer exposure to the traditional culture education. Confucianism, as it values interpersonal harmony (Li, 2008), is one critical part of the traditional culture education. Officers with a college degree or above typically have experienced extended years of such education and may be more influenced by the traditional values like international harmony. As such, they are likely to have a stronger secrecy code, as reporting other officers may be viewed as working against their pursuit of building a harmonious relationship with others and within the police agency.

Specific to agency location, we do detect an influence for two of the scenarios, suggesting that officers from the West were less likely to embrace the code of silence for two of the criminal conduct scenarios than their counterparts from the East. This finding is not surprising if we consider the special social context in the coastal region (the East) in China. Recognizing that China has experienced a substantial increase in both violent and property crime rates since it started economic reform in the late 1970s, it has been argued there are different expectations and job demands being placed on these officers (Cheong & Wu, 2015). Indeed, as Cheong and Wu (2015) noted, in the reform era, while the East has achieved the fastest economic growth among all regions in China, it also has the fastest growing crime rates. In contrast, the West, a region that is the least developed in the country, has much lower crime rates and has different organizational priorities in comparison to the agencies in the East—experiencing tremendous economic and population growths. The juxtaposition of East/West significance, and not for the Middle or Northeast, seems to suggest environmental context has an influence, although why for only these two specific scenarios remains elusive. If, as prior research suggests, officers from the East are facing operational and organizational stressors, it is plausible this increased strain is associated with a stronger adherence to the code of silence (Maner & Schmidt, 2006).

Policy Implications

This study further confirms that officers’ perceptions of seriousness have salient effects on their embracement of the code of silence. This finding has important policy implications. As aforementioned, if the legislature and police administrators in China are determined to reduce the code of silence among officers, they should emphasize changing their employees’ attitudes toward a range of behaviors with an emphasis on why this is detrimental to the officer, organization, and community. As Huberts et al. (2003) argue, to improve officers’ alertness (reporting fellow officers’ misconduct), police administrators should first focus on the improvement of their awareness (perceiving the misconduct to be serious).

Scholars have noted that one reason concerning why officers do not think specific misbehaviors are serious is that they do not know the rules (Ivković et al., 2016b). In effect, studies have consistently revealed that officers’ evaluation of the seriousness of the misconduct was influenced by their views about whether it was a violation of official rule or policy (Ivković & Kang, 2012; Ivković et al., 2016b; G. Wu et al., 2018). Therefore, reformers in China should check if the rules and policies governing police behavior are known to their officers and be open to a dialog with officers concerning unfamiliarity or misunderstanding regarding these rules and policies across a range of scenarios (Klockars et al., 2004).

As Ivković et al. (2016b) have pointed out, police managers also need to “make sure that the official rules are clear, that unofficial rules do not undermine the official rules, and that the official rules are actually enforced consistently” (p. 314). Indeed, how officers evaluate the seriousness of various misconduct is largely shaped by their observation of what their departments have done in detecting and disciplining it (Klockars, Ivković, & Haberfeld, 2007). Hence, to improve the perceptions of seriousness, police managers in China are also suggested to create an agency environment featured by effective detection, investigation, and discipline of misconduct. To that end, police mangers in China may need to focus on the ethical training of supervisors, as police supervisors are essentially the first line of defense in detecting and responding to misconduct (Ivković, 2012), and play a central role in fostering and sustaining a good ethical climate within the police agency (Wimbush & Shepard, 1994).

It should be noted that this study did not detect a considerable influence of organizational dynamics on willingness to report. However, we would remiss if we argue that organizational factors do not matter in shaping the code of silence among Chinese police officers, as we have only one organization factor—police type included in the models. This was an unfortunate, although necessary, decision to ensure that we were able to field the instrument at our research site. Certainly, future research needs to involve other theoretically relevant variables at the organizational level. Also, given this is one of first attempts in examining police integrity in China, more replication studies are needed to consolidate evidence as to the relative influence of individual, organizational, and environmental factors.

Limitations

This study advanced our understanding of the influence of individual, organizational, and environmental dynamics on police integrity. However, this study is not without limitations. First, although the sample size is relatively large, it is based on a convenience sampling approach. Therefore, we caution generalizing from these results. Second, as scholars have noted, the involvement of demographic questions in the questionnaire may raise concerns of untruthful responses from the participating officers (Klockars et al., 2000). That is, officers may tend to provide socially desirable answers to the integrity questions. As a best practice, demographics were included as the last page of the survey. Third, as previously discussed, some variables including misconduct control within the agency and rural/urban variations that are theoretically related to integrity were not included in the models of this study, which may prevent us from detecting the potential influence of these variables on perceptions and willingness to report.

Conclusion

There is an ongoing effort in China to reduce officer misconduct, through both legal (changes to policy) and organizational (expanded training) strategies. However, as our results reveal, there is considerable variability in the likelihood an officer would report a fellow officer, and potentially more critical, a clear code of silence among Chinese police officers in our sample. Clearly, perceptions of seriousness matter in improving the likelihood that an officer would report a fellow officer, as the KHB mediation analysis (Table 5), reveal that it is the most powerful influencer of an officers’ willingness to report a fellow officer. However, the order of size varies based on the behavior with some scenarios showing no influence of the perception of seriousness on the willingness to report.

In concluding this research, we believe this variability is of critical importance. In the Toolkit for Police Integrity, the authors write that while training must explicably detail what is acceptable and unacceptable behavior, that training must also take into consideration the ecological context of the area and individual experiences of officers. While we agree that training should be culturally relevant, we also argue that training should take into consideration the factors contributing to assessments of seriousness and willingness to report. In many ways, police integrity research and refinements of training may benefit from qualitative research. For decades, we, as integrity scholars, have surveyed officers and reported these results. It may be an opportune time to speak to these officers and understand their thought processes. Only then will we be better capable of understanding the factors informing their decision making for each of these different scenarios.

Footnotes

ORCID iD

Guangzhen Wu

Guangzhen Wu is an assistant professor of criminology and criminal justice in the Department of Sociology at the University of Utah. His research interests include comparative criminal justice/criminology, police behavior and decision making, and the impact of marijuana legalization.

David A. Makin is an assistant professor in the Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology at Washington State University. His research interests include the impact of technology on public safety, body-worn cameras, sustainable technology integration, evidence-based policing, and refinement of and evaluation of public safety training.

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