Do New Chiefs Mean Fresh Perspectives? The Institutionalization of the Police Executive Environment

Abstract

Research suggests policing is a highly institutionalized field. Limited attention has been paid, however, to the institutionalization of leaders’ views. Assessing turnover in 71 Texas police organizations between October, 2011, and July, 2015, this research evaluates whether there is consistency (i.e., institutional homogenization) after turnover in chiefs’ perceptions of their environments and agency priorities. The research is unique in that it assesses two chiefs’ perceptions that have both led the same law enforcement agency in successive time periods. Assessments of environment and priorities from former chiefs and those replacing them are evaluated utilizing descriptive, bivariate, and multivariate methods. These assessments are also compared with a control group of chiefs from agencies not experiencing turnover. Bivariate results suggest little variation across current and former chiefs, whereas ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models suggest differing relationships across chiefs groups between environmental perceptions and agency priorities. Discussion of the findings is framed by institutional theory.

Keywords

legitimacy theory police criminal justice law enforcement police chiefs institutional theory

Policing in the United States has been described as a highly institutionalized field due to the commonality of roles and responsibilities of law enforcement officers as well as visual symbols associated with the field (Crank, 2003; Crank & Langworthy, 1992). Although considerable attention has been paid to police culture, less consideration has been directed specifically to the socialization and institutionalization of chief executives’ perceptions. Prior research has identified the ability of police chiefs to influence their organizations (Hunt & Magenau, 1993), but it is less clear how those individuals make sense of and lead their organizations. Based on individual experiences of former chiefs and new chiefs during their careers, perceptions of the environment surrounding their organizations may differ. Differences are likely due to the iterative process of legitimacy building within the institutional environment. Therefore, due to the change in rank and role, new chiefs are experiencing a new phase in their interactions with the environment, which differ from the experiences and perceptions of their predecessors.

The current research compares new chiefs and those that they replaced in their perceptions of their institutional environment, as well as a control group, to identify similarities and differences in environmental perceptions. These changes in leadership represent changes in the link between police organizations and their broader environment. According to Hunt and Magenau (1993),

A police chief is the instrumental actor at the nexus of police tradition and antagonistic external interests. More or less influential individually, the chief is, in any case, a reference point for organizing the complex processes by which the principles of police legitimacy and modes of their expression are socially constructed. (p. 84)

Little variation between chiefs groups and their perceptions of the institutional environment may suggest that chiefs’ assessments of their environment are institutionalized. If institutionalized, the next issue to address is whether consistent perceptions across agencies lead to similar relationships across agency priorities. Consistency of environmental perceptions and agency priorities would suggest that chiefs adhere to similar rules and expectations to maintain legitimacy. Below the theoretical framework of organizational institutional theory is outlined as are its applications to policing. Because chiefs interpret their environment and plot the direction of their organizations, concepts serving as the lens for interpretation (sensemaking and police culture) are also discussed.

Literature Review

While mapping institutional theory to policing, Crank and Langworthy (1992) noted the highly institutionalized nature of the field is based in ceremony, symbolism, and structure. Although researchers have spent roughly 30 years exploring these constructs, the influence of the institutional environment channeled through chief executives and their assessments of it have received limited attention. If the environment of policing and executives’ roles has become institutionalized, it would be expected that differing groups of chiefs perceive their environments and organizational priorities similarly.

Accumulating Legitimacy

Institutional theory suggests that organizations are social systems influenced by their surrounding environment (Donaldson, 1995). As organizational structures or practices become the established way of organizing or completing a task, they become institutionalized. Those things that are institutionalized become the standard by which the environment assesses an organization, meaning that they confer legitimacy upon the organization that meets expectations. Accumulating and maintaining legitimacy is a core element of organizational survival, according to institutional theory (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Legitimacy can be distilled down to the perceptions of those within the institutional environment that an organization is doing what is right and expected (Suchman, 1995). This branch of legitimacy research is drawn from the perspective of organizational institutionalism, not to be confused with the conceptualization of legitimacy associated with procedural justice that focuses on individual citizen perceptions and their willingness to defer to police authority (see Worden & McLean, 2017). Although Worden and McLean (2017) address both legitimacy literatures, they note its evaluation related to policing more frequently encompasses procedural justice (see Murphy & Tyler, 2017). The issue that remains is whether both literatures addressing individual citizens’ experiences and overall police reputation intersect and if so where.

Legitimacy, according to both literatures, is built over time through an iterative process (Aldrich, 1999; Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012). According to institutional legitimacy, this process occurs between organizations and stakeholders (i.e., institutional sovereigns) in the organization’s institutional environment (Meyer & Scott, 1983). Institutional sovereigns have the ability to influence the decisions of organizations within their environment (Meyer & Scott, 1983); and in the field of policing, they include legislatures, courts, public protection organizations, and professional bodies (e.g., International Association of Chiefs of Police) to name a few. By balancing and meeting the needs of stakeholders throughout their environment, organizations build greater levels of legitimacy, which is the primary goal of the organization rather than technical effectiveness, or performance (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Meyer & Scott, 1983). Maintaining legitimacy leads to organizational survival, but it also allows organizations to operate with greater autonomy within their environment (Maguire, 2014). The importance of autonomy is demonstrated in policing through discussions of organizational oversight (Walker & Bumphus, 1992) and being able to dictate the direction for the organization (Maguire, 2014). Threats to that legitimacy and autonomy can have negative consequences. The severity of those consequences may range from public scolding of the department through ceremonial removal of a chief (Crank & Langworthy, 1992). The chief’s removal is ceremonial because they likely had little or no direct control over the situation that resulted in a crisis of legitimacy (Crank & Langworthy, 1992). This iterative process suggests that, as legitimacy is accumulated by an organization, it is abstract and based in the perceptions of stakeholders. When agencies experience a crisis, however, legitimacy takes on a much more tactile quality. Following the loss of legitimacy, those stakeholders that were previously relied on for resources or support may no longer provide either.

Institutional Theory

Myth and Ceremony

One of the ways that organizations pursue legitimacy is through adherence to myth and ceremony (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Myths are institutionalized rules and expectations of the environment; they are an organization’s criteria for evaluation. Policing myths include the necessity of random routine patrol and the crime fighter image. Due to the multiple and competing interests of stakeholders, however, sometimes organizations are forced to simultaneously address multiple but unrelated myths (i.e., evaluation criteria). Ceremonial acceptance (i.e., publicly agreeing to external demands for change, while privately maintaining the status quo) of myths through loose-coupling allows organizations to maintain legitimacy in spite of competing interests. Organizations participate in loose-coupling when they outwardly present their activities as aligning with the expectations of stakeholders, but they actually maintain their technical core of production, meaning that while policy may change practice does not. For instance, Zhao et al. (2001) considered whether police organizations’ core functions changed after adopting community-oriented policing. Although a large portion of agencies accepted community-oriented policing funding, the core functions—emphasis on crime control over order maintenance and service—did not change from the professional model.

Institutional Isomorphism

The second way that organizations attain legitimacy is through institutional isomorphism or change. Institutional isomorphism occurs when organizations modify structure or practice to more closely align with other organizations in their organizational field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Organizational fields are made up of the same types of organizations (e.g., hospitals, schools, police) sharing similar inputs and outputs. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) explain that as organizational fields become more institutionalized, organizations begin to more closely resemble each other. This uniformity within a field is institutional homogenization. Examples of uniformity in policing include use of badges, uniforms, firearms, and hierarchical rank structures (Crank & Langworthy, 1992). Institutional homogenization occurs through three isomorphic processes: mimetic, coercive, and normative (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). When organizations are uncertain how to proceed in a given situation, they seek out organizations they identify as legitimate. The organization then copies the approach of the legitimate organization to mimic their legitimacy (mimetic isomorphism). Coercive isomorphism impacts organizations when they are directed by a stakeholder to modify their structure or practices. Finally, normative isomorphism is change through professionalization based on the diffusion of ideas or best practices in a field. An example of professionalization based in normative isomorphism is a specific educational degree requirement (e.g., Juris Doctor or Masters of Public Administration) for entry into a field. By modifying organizational structures or practices to reflect those of legitimate organizations, organizations are communicating to stakeholders that they deserve the same legitimacy attributed to other organizations in their field.

Although DiMaggio and Powell (1983) were silent on whether or not these processes of change were mutually exclusive, J. R. Phillips and Jiao (2016) have traced the functioning of multiple processes in their explanation of the Los Angeles Police Department’s (LAPD) response to a Department of Justice (DOJ) consent decree. J. R. Phillips and Jiao (2016) explained that upon entering into the consent decree (coercive isomorphism), LAPD sought out other agencies on which to model their newly required auditing division but found none (failed mimetic isomorphism). LAPD then independently built the skills and knowledge necessary to staff the auditing division (normative isomorphism). After building and maintaining an auditing division perceived as successful by other agencies, LAPD found itself the model (mimetic isomorphism) to other agencies (J. R. Phillips & Jiao, 2016).

Policing and Institutional Theory

Researchers have applied institutional concepts to multiple areas in policing. Frequently institutional theory served as a lens through which behavior was evaluated rather than being tested empirically. Mastrofski and Ritti (2000) identified the appeal of framing police organizations’ behaviors in institutional theory in that police are held to account by demonstrating that something is being done rather than by providing objective results related to an issue. Demonstrating that something is being done is a powerful way for police to communicate to stakeholders that their concerns are taken seriously (Crank, 2003), which supports Suchman’s (1995) discussion of organizations earning legitimacy. The importance of meeting stakeholder expectations has led researchers to explore the legitimacy implications of a variety of policing activities. For example, Katz (2001) highlighted the pressures experienced by a Midwestern police chief to establish a gang unit. The national and local media, Chamber of Commerce, political officials, community groups, and an officer association (i.e., institutional sovereigns) became focused on the prevalence of gang crime. Although the chief could not identify a gang problem in the jurisdiction, stakeholders influenced the decision to create the gang unit (Katz, 2001). King (2014) suggested that when police organizations are unable to meet the demands of stakeholders, they are more likely to disband, especially smaller organizations that cannot buffer themselves from their environment. Risk of disbanding or other negative consequences reaffirms the importance of meeting stakeholders’ demands.

Similar to Katz’s (2001) discussion of gang units, Todak et al. (2018) noted that diffusion of body-worn cameras through policing may be attributed to external pressures. Smith (2019) presented a theoretical framework considering the application of structural contingency and institutional theories to body-worn camera adoption. According to Smith (2019, p. 369), it is important to understand “. . . the rational for adoption and diffusion of this technology,” but the newness limits the ability to evaluate the effectiveness (i.e., technical environment) of body-worn cameras. Therefore, it is likely that the diffusion of body-worn cameras is related to efforts to maintain legitimacy (i.e., institutional environment).

Researchers have attempted to map DiMaggio and Powell’s isomorphisms to policing. Employing confirmatory factor analysis, Giblin and Burruss (2009) evaluated whether coercive, mimetic, and normative isomorphisms were three unique pressures. Although three pressures were identified, coercive isomorphism, measured as the availability of funding, was not a significant pressure on police. The measurement model for these processes in police organizations was made of mimesis and two normative pressures, publications and professionalization (Giblin & Burruss, 2009). Employing this model, researchers have evaluated the influence of institutional pressures in responding to homeland security concerns (Burruss et al., 2010), community policing (Burruss & Giblin, 2014), and intelligence-led policing (Carter, 2016). Findings from all three studies support change in police organizations due to institutional pressures, excluding available funding. Researchers have also evaluated the coercive effect of COPS hiring grants but did not find support for diffusion of community-oriented policing (S. W. Phillips & Gayadeen, 2014). They did speculate, however, that federal support of community-oriented policing contributed to assessments of legitimacy. Beginning to assess institutional homogeneity in policing requires an understanding of the police in their environment and how they navigate that environment.

Dating back to the seminal work of J. Q. Wilson (1968), researchers have acknowledged that police chiefs are cognizant of their environment and understanding their environment influences priorities of their organizations. Although research has considered the impact of the environment on law enforcement executives, limited research has specifically addressed chiefs’ assessments of their institutional environments. Matusiak (2016) empirically demonstrated that chiefs view the environment surrounding their organizations as multidimensional, and they attributed differing levels of importance to those dimensions. The importance attributed to those stakeholders also affects organizational priorities (Matusiak et al., 2017). Brinser and King (2016) and Matusiak (2019) compared the influence of the technical environment (e.g., agency size, population, median income, racial heterogeneity) and assessments of the institutional environment on environmental threats and organizational priorities, respectively. Both studies found greater support for institutional factors. Although the research discussed above found the institutional environment significantly influences police organizations, the degree of uniformity in chiefs’ perceptions of their environments is not clear.

Executive Importance in the Institutional Environment

An important question remains, why do individual leaders matter in the context of organizations theory? The microfoundations, or individual interpretations of social situations, are the connection (Powell & Colyvas, 2008). As Powell and Colyvas (2008) note, “[i]nstitutions are reproduced through the everyday activities of individuals” (p. 3). In this conceptual vein, Weick’s (1995) sensemaking suggested individuals understand their environment through reciprocal interpretation of uncertain and ambiguous situations. Therefore, individual leader’s interpretations and interactions with stakeholders may differentially influence decisions. One element within policing that likely contributed to sensemaking and these microfoundations is police culture. Police culture is frequently identified as a set of core values held by police; these values include but are not limited to “loyalty among members, the crime fighter image, ‘us versus them’ orientation toward citizens, [and] organizational tensions with punitive supervisors” (Paoline, 2003, p. 199). Limited research explores chief executive culture, but an extensive body of literature is available related to officer culture (see Paoline, 2003, for an overview). Socialization into police culture likely influences an individual’s career in law enforcement in similar ways to Stinchcombe’s (1965) discussion of founding effects—characteristics that are resistant to change over time—during the creation and early history of an organization. These founding effects experienced by police recruits during the academy and field training become the lens through which law enforcement officers, supervisors, and, eventually, chief executives view their environment.

As Reuss-Ianni (1983) noted the distinction between “street cops” and “management cops,” and future research must focus on the management cop group. Although not directly addressing chief executives, researchers are beginning to explore police supervisors’ attitudes toward (Schafer et al., 2020) and experiences with organizational change (Schafer & Varano, 2017), which highlights the complexity of context surrounding change and the potential for variation in responses. For example, Schafer and colleagues (2020) found that positive experiences with change had a positive effect on perceptions of change in the future, but negative experiences did not result in lingering negative effects. Also, service-oriented supervisors and those with a positive perception of their organizational culture were more supportive of change (Schafer et al., 2020). These findings suggest differing outcomes for supervisors’ sensemaking processes. Researchers must further explore chiefs’ sensemaking and how experiences filter assessments of environment as well as agency priorities.

The current research evaluates uniformity in chiefs’ perceptions of their environment and agency priorities by comparing ratings of chiefs that left their positions to those that replaced them. Institutionalization of the field would be suggested by uniformity across groups of chiefs, which may suggest that the role of chief executive is symbolic in that qualified individuals would approach the position largely in the same manner. Variation in perceptions of the environment and priorities, however, may suggest that new chiefs have not yet experienced the iterative process of sensemaking and legitimacy building in their current positions. Differences between chiefs’ ratings may suggest individuals bring new and differing views to the role of chief executive, which in turn may lead to differing influence on agency priorities.

Method

Data

This research drew from four data sources: 2011-2015 Texas Chiefs of Police Panel Project (TCPPP), 2008 Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies (CSLLEA), 2010 U.S. Census, and 2010 American Communities Survey (ACS). These data sources were utilized to describe chiefs, agencies, communities, and the environments (institutional and technical) that surround chiefs’ organizations. The data sources are described below, as are the dependent and independent variables. Contextual variables are included to describe chiefs and their technical environments as well.

The Texas Commission on Law Enforcement (TCOLE) mandates a 40 hr continuing education training program for all chiefs on a rotating 2-year cycle beginning in September and ending in August. For example, data collection for this research began during the 2011-2013 TCOLE cycle. The Law Enforcement Management Institute of Texas (LEMIT) is the sole provider of this training. All sample participants served jurisdictions with populations less than 100,000 and participated in the Texas Police Chief Leadership Series (TPCLS), whose curriculum focuses on leadership skills and developments that impact law enforcement organizations. TPCLS participants were solicited for participation in the TCPPP, a longitudinal panel design data collection effort, on the first day of their program.

Researchers and/or LEMIT personnel introduced the TCPPP, its purpose, and informed consent process to TPCLS participants as the first activity during the week-long program. The TCPPP is a self-administered paper-and-pencil survey that utilizes a modular survey design to capture chiefs’ assessments of multiple elements related to their role as leaders of police organizations (e.g., disaster planning, working environment, officer well-being). Data for this research were drawn from the working environment module of the TCPPP and were collected during 2011-2013 (Wave 1) and 2013-2015 (Wave 2) TCOLE cycles. Participation in the TCPPP was voluntary, and no steps were taken to incentivize participants, but appeals were made to their sense of responsibility in informing topical areas for future TPCLS training programs.

The process of soliciting participants was the same during Waves 1 and 2. The project was introduced, and surveys were distributed to all possible participants in the classroom on Monday morning. During Wave 1, chiefs then had approximately 1 hr of free time before their first educational program began. Completion of the survey took approximately 30 min and 926 (93.16%) completed surveys were returned to researchers or LEMIT personnel. During Wave 2, after the TCPPP was described to chiefs, the hour before the first education program was not dedicated to survey completion. Instead, participants were instructed to return their completed surveys in the provided security envelop to LEMIT personnel by the end of their program on Friday afternoon. Participants (N = 613, 59.69%) completed and returned their surveys individually as time allowed. The differing formats of survey administration likely contributed to the difference in response rates. Because all chiefs must attend the TPCLS every 2 years, it is also unknown how many chiefs declined to participate in Wave 2, due to their participation in Wave 1.

The focus of this research is organizations that experienced turnover between Wave 1 and Wave 2. Turnover was identified in 73 agencies that participated in both Waves 1 and 2 of the TCPPP. During data cleaning, two chiefs were identified as multivariate outliers, employing Mahalanobis distance, and were removed from the sample. This resulted in a sample of 71 agencies and 142 chiefs involved in a turnover event. Chiefs that left their positions between Wave 1 and Wave 2 will be referred to as Chiefs T[urnover], and the chiefs replacing them will be referred to as Chiefs R[eplacement]. Propensity score matching was employed based on community and agency characteristics to identify a comparison sample of agencies not experiencing turnover between Waves 1 and 2. Due to missing data for three agencies in the Chiefs T and R groups, matching agencies could not be identified resulting in a comparison group of 68 chiefs. The comparison group will be referred to as Chiefs C[ontrol].

Data were drawn from three national sources to provide context for assessments of the institutional environment. It is important to note that these data are not included in the final multivariate analyses. Data from the 2008 CSLLEA provided demographic information for agencies, and community data (population, demographics, and median income) were drawn from the 2010 U.S. Census and 2010 ACS (5-year estimates).

Dependent Variables

Three dependent variables were drawn from TCPPP data to assess chiefs’ perceptions of their agencies’ priorities. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics (summated scales) for the agency priorities variables for the full sample and by group. Chiefs were asked to rate the importance of agency priorities on a Likert-type scale that ranged from 0 to 5. Chiefs rating an agency priority 0 indicated that it was “not important at all,” 1 = “minimal importance,” 2 = “some importance,” 3 = “moderate importance,” 4 = “substantial importance,” and 5 = “extreme importance.” Three composite measures were employed to assess the importance that chiefs attributed to agency priorities: Maintain Law and Order, Maintain Relationships with Constituents, and Adopt Innovations.

Table 1:

Agency Priority and Stakeholder Descriptive Statistics

Variable	N/n	Minimum	Maximum	M	SD	Cronbach’s α
Agency priority
Maintain Law and Order	210	3.00	5.00	4.547	0.515	.818
Chief T[urnover]	71	3.00	5.00	4.518	0.538
Chief R[eplacement]	71	3.25	5.00	4.599	0.479
Chief C[ontrol]	68	3.00	5.00	4.526	0.531
Maintain Relationships with Constituents	210	2.33	5.00	4.396	0.569	.853
Chief T	71	2.33	5.00	4.359	0.633
Chief R	71	3.17	5.00	4.455	0.516
Chief C	68	3.00	5.00	4.375	0.553
Adopt Innovations	209	0.67	5.00	3.466	0.991	.813
Chief T	70	0.67	5.00	3.448	1.049
Chief R	71	1.33	5.00	3.596	0.884
Chief C	68	1.00	5.00	3.348	1.034
Stakeholder
Federal/State Law Enforcement Agencies	210	0.50	5.00	3.521	0.969	.903
Chief T	71	1.33	5.00	3.601	0.938
Chief R	71	1.17	5.00	3.533	1.009
Chief C	68	0.50	5.00	3.424	0.966
National Media	210	0.00	5.00	1.652	1.387	.930
Chief T	71	0.00	5.00	1.504	1.303
Chief R	71	0.00	5.00	1.665	1.322
Chief C	68	0.00	5.00	1.794	1.534
Local Media	210	1.00	5.00	3.842	0.915	.669
Chief T	71	1.50	5.00	3.775	0.937
Chief R	71	1.50	5.00	4.035	0.825
Chief C	68	1.00	5.00	3.743	0.964
Police Employee Associations	210	0.00	5.00	2.033	1.185	.805
Chief T	71	0.00	5.00	1.873	1.123
Chief R	71	0.50	5.00	2.225	1.235
Chief C	68	0.00	5.00	2.000	1.184
Elected Officials	210	0.00	5.00	3.435	1.076	.884
Chief T	71	0.00	5.00	3.418	1.128
Chief R	71	0.00	5.00	3.500	1.005
Chief C	68	0.00	5.00	3.387	1.104
Local Criminal Justice Organizations	210	1.60	5.00	3.975	0.819	.861
Chief T	71	2.20	5.00	3.961	0.755
Chief R	71	2.00	5.00	4.149	0.771
Chief C	68	1.60	5.00	3.809	0.903
Local Emergency Medical Organizations	209	1.00	5.00	3.957	1.030	.892
Chief T	71	1.00	5.00	4.056	0.928
Chief R	71	1.00	5.00	3.859	1.103
Chief C	68	1.50	5.00	3.955	1.058

The priority, Maintain Law and Order, is made up of four items related to enforcing laws and local ordinances, controlling violent and nonviolent crime, and maintaining order. Cronbach’s alpha was used to evaluate the internal consistency of this variable achieving a score of .818. Maintain Law and Order was conceptualized to focus on the law enforcement priorities of the organization. The second agency priority, Maintain Relationships with Constituents (α = .853), included those groups internal and external to the organization that were believed to influence police legitimacy. This agency priority was made up of six survey items related to the working relationships and satisfaction of employees, organizational image in the local media, and organizational relationships with local politicians and residents. It is important to note that the survey instrument was created and disseminated prior to the 2014 death of Michael Brown in Ferguson, MO. Although maintaining general relationships with community residents was included in the original instrument, the prioritization of differing community groups and causes was not included as part of the data collection effort. The final agency priority, Adopt Innovations (α = .813), drew on three survey items rating the importance of adopting innovations, programs, or tactics because other agencies had adopted them, state or federal agencies identified them, or the innovation could be funded by grant money. Individual survey items making up this priority focused on the diffusion of innovation and sources of isomorphism.

Independent Variables

Seven independent variables were drawn from the TCPPP data assessing chiefs’ institutional environment and are highlighted in Table 1. The institutional environment is made up of stakeholders that have the ability to influence the norms and expectations of the organization. The relationship between the organizations and stakeholders can be described as political in nature rather than being based in efficiency and effectiveness. Chiefs were asked to rate the importance of a number of stakeholders on the same Likert-type scale as applied to agency priorities (0 = “not important at all” through 5 = “extreme importance”). Chiefs rated the importance of these stakeholders based on the potential benefits and rewards or harm that the stakeholder could bring upon their agency. This resulted in composite scores for seven stakeholders: Federal/State Law Enforcement Agencies (six items, α = .903), National Media (four items, α = .930), Local Media (two items, α = .669), Police Employee Associations (four items, α = .805), Elected Officials (three items, α = .884), Local Criminal Justice Organizations (five items, α = .861), and Local Emergency Medical Organizations (two items, α = .892). Individual survey items contributing to each stakeholder are identified in the Supplemental Appendix (see the online version of this article).

Contextual Variables

Chiefs’ individual, agency, and community characteristics describe all groups of chiefs and their surroundings providing context for the discussion of the results. Table 2 identifies descriptives for all chiefs and by group, and Table 3 provides agency as well as community characteristics. Individual demographics were drawn from TCPPP data to include years in law enforcement, education (0 = “Less than an Associate’s,” 1 = “Associate’s,” 2 = “Bachelor’s,” 3 = “Graduate”), race/ethnicity (0 = “White,” 1 = “Black,” 2 = “Hispanic,” 3 = “Other”), gender (0 = “female,” 1 = “male”), hired (0 = “externally,” 1 = “internally”), chief in a prior agency (0 = “No,” 1 = “Yes”), prior military experience (0 = “No,” 1 = “Yes”), and marital status (0 = “single,” 1 = “married”).

Table 2:

Chiefs’ Demographic Information

Variable	N/n	Minimum	Maximum	M	SD
Years in law enforcement	209	5.00	46.25	26.05	9.77
Chief T	70	5.00	46.25	27.09	11.41
Chief R	71	5.17	45.83	24.46	9.10
Chief C	68	7.17	45.83	26.65	8.45
	N/n	Less than an Associate’s	Associate’s	Bachelor’s	Graduate
Education	210	90 (42.9%)	25 (11.9%)	47 (22.4%)	48 (22.9%)
Chief T	71	30 (42.3%)	10 (14.1%)	14 (19.7%)	17 (23.9%)
Chief R	71	30 (42.2%)	8 (11.3%)	16 (22.5%)	16 (22.5%)
Chief C	68	30 (44.1%)	7 (10.3%)	17 (25.0%)	14 (20.6%)
	N/n	White	Black	Hispanic	Other
Race/ethnicity	208	165 (79.3%)	13 (6.3%)	22 (10.6%)	8 (3.9%)
Chief T	71	53 (74.6%)	6 (8.5%)	10 (14.1%)	2 (2.8%)
Chief R	70	56 (80.0%)	3 (4.3%)	8 (11.4%)	3 (4.3%)
Chief C	67	56 (83.5%)	4 (6.0%)	4 (6.0%)	3 (4.5%)
	N/n	Female	Male
Gender	210	6 (2.9%)	204 (97.1%)
Chief T	71	3 (4.2%)	68 (95.8%)
Chief R	71	2 (2.8%)	69 (97.2%)
Chief C	68	1 (1.5%)	67 (98.5%)
	N/n	Externally	Internally
Hired	209	104 (49.8%)	105 (50.2%)
Chief T	71	33 (46.5%)	38 (53.5%)
Chief R	71	37 (52.1%)	34 (47.9%)
Chief C	67	35 (52.2%)	32 (47.8%)
	N/n	No	Yes
Chief in a prior agency	210	161 (76.7%)	49 (23.3%)
Chief T	71	54 (76.1%)	17 (23.9%)
Chief R	71	53 (74.6%)	18 (25.4%)
Chief C	68	54 (79.4%)	14 (20.6%)
	N/n	No	Yes
Prior military experience	195	141 (72.3%)	54 (27.7%)
Chief T	64	45 (70.3%)	19 (29.7%)
Chief R	68	49 (72.1%)	19 (27.9%)
Chief C	63	47 (74.6%)	16 (25.4%)
	N/n	Single	Married
Marital status	210	43 (20.5%)	167 (79.5%)
Chief T	71	16 (22.5%)	55 (77.5%)
Chief R	71	14 (19.7%)	57 (80.3%)
Chief C	68	13 (19.1%)	55 (80.9%)

Table 3:

Agency and Community Descriptive Statistics

Variable	N/n	Minimum	Maximum	M	SD
Agency size	208	1.0	238.0	29.38	40.84
Chiefs T & R	70	1.0	188.0	28.51	37.98
Chiefs C	68	1.0	238.0	31.16	46.65
Civilianization (%)	207	0.0	44.54	15.24	13.70
Chiefs T & R	70	0.0	41.18	15.16	13.82
Chiefs C^a	67	0.0	44.54	15.41	13.65
Task scope (0–39)	208	7.0	30.0	20.52	4.59
Chiefs T & R	70	7.0	30.0	20.54	4.91
Chiefs C	68	11.0	29.0	20.47	3.91
Interagency collaboration (0–6)	208	0.0	5.0	1.11	1.53
Chiefs T & R	70	0.0	5.0	1.13	1.53
Chiefs C	68	0.0	5.0	1.07	1.56
Population	208	482.0	99,887.0	12,075.52	19,544.82
Chiefs T & R	70	713.0	99,887.0	11,801.00	19,015.67
Chiefs C	68	482.0	99,223.0	12,640.71	20,855.40
Racial heterogeneity	208	0.010	0.672	0.279	0.159
Chiefs T & R	70	0.022	0.672	0.280	0.161
Chiefs C	68	0.010	0.576	0.277	0.158
Percentage juvenile	208	8.52	37.34	26.96	5.22
Chiefs T & R	70	8.52	37.34	27.09	5.39
Chiefs C	68	10.58	35.41	26.70	4.93
Percentage Hispanic	208	1.40	97.10	27.68	23.99
Chiefs T & R	70	1.40	97.10	28.52	23.69
Chiefs C	68	3.80	97.00	25.95	24.85
Median income	208	19,925	160,976	52,341.27	26,028.50
Chiefs T & R	70	21,208	143,140	51,197.40	22,540.99
Chiefs C	68	19,925	160,976	54,696.31	32,221.55

One agency’s civilian to agency size ratio was 1.0. Due to having only one full-time employee, the agency was removed from these calculations.

There is an important distinction to be made between the institutional environment and community characteristics. Community characteristics are frequently conceptualized as elements that influence the output of an organization (i.e., technical environment) rather than the political, or institutional, environment. These characteristics, however, are most frequently explored through the lens of structural contingency theory, which emphasizes the alignment of organizational structures with environmental factors to maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of an organization’s production (Donaldson, 1995). The U.S. Census and ACS from 2010 were the sources of community characteristics for all agencies. Those characteristics include measures of population, racial heterogeneity, percentage juvenile, percentage Hispanic, and median income for each jurisdiction. Racial heterogeneity was calculated using a Gibbs–Martin Diversification Index where larger scores represent greater racial diversity throughout the community (Gibbs & Martin, 1962). Lower scores indicate greater concentration of the community’s population in one racial group but not which group. Limited data availability (e.g., collection of the U.S. Census every 10 years) rendered community characteristics constant for Chiefs T and R preventing them from being included in these analyses. Chiefs’ agencies were described utilizing data from the CSLLEA for agency size, civilianization, task scope, and interagency collaboration. Agency size is calculated as the sum of full-time sworn and full-time civilian employees. Civilianization is the ratio of an agency’s full-time employees that are nonsworn, which is calculated by dividing the number of full-time civilian employees by agency size. For ease of discussion, civilianization will be presented as a percentage (ratio × 100). The number of functions that an agency could have primary reasonability for in the CSLLEA ranged from 0 to 39 and is frequently referred to as task scope (Maguire, 2003). The CSLLEA also captures community partnerships in which agencies participated, which ranged from 0 to 6. Agency data from the CSLLEA also suffered from limitations rendering the agency characteristics of Chiefs T and Chiefs R constant. Therefore, agency characteristics are provided for descriptive purposes only.

Analytic Strategy

Descriptive, bivariate, and multivariate analyses were employed in this research. First, demographic information for chiefs, agencies, and the communities that they served was reviewed. Second, chi-square tests and multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with Tukey’s post hoc test were utilized to compare Chiefs T, R, and C. Chi-square tests were employed to compare chiefs’ education, race/ethnicity, gender, hired (external/internal), prior experience as a chief, prior military experience, and marital status. Utilizing MANOVA with Tukey’s post hoc test, chiefs were compared on a number of variables to include ratings of agency’s priorities (Maintain Law and Order, Maintain Relationships with Constituents, and Adopt Innovations) and ratings of stakeholders (Federal/State Law Enforcement Agencies, National Media, Local Media, Police Employee Associations, Elected Officials, Local Criminal Justice Organizations, and Local Emergency Medical Organizations). MANOVA with Tukey’s post hoc test was repeated comparing Chiefs T, Chiefs R (internal hire), and Chiefs R (external hire) on ratings of agency’s priorities and stakeholders. As propensity score matching using community and agency characteristics was employed to identify the control group (Chiefs C), these characteristics were not compared across groups. Finally, three series of ordinary least squares (OLS) models were regressed for each group of chiefs (nine total models). These OLS models estimated the relationships between chiefs’ ratings of stakeholders and ratings of agency priorities. Chiefs, agencies, and communities are described below along with the results of bivariate and multivariate analyses; OLS regression results are presented in Table 4.

Table 4:

Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results for Stakeholders on Agency Priorities by Chiefs Group

		Maintain Law and Order			Maintain Relationships with Constituents			Adopt Innovations
Stakeholder	Chiefs Group	β	p	SE	β	p	SE	β	p	SE
Federal/State Law Enforcement Agencies	Chiefs T	.166	.335	.098	−.124	.445	.109	.304	.054	.172
	Chiefs R	.070	.699	.085	.047	.779	.086	.264	.107	.141
	Chiefs C	.049	.771	.094	−.018	.908	.093	.288	.056	.162
National Media	Chiefs T	−.057	.660	.053	−.067	.584	.059	−.160	.174	.093
	Chiefs R	.017	.914	.057	.022	.879	.057	−.015	.913	.094
	Chiefs C	−.084	.587	.053	−.037	.800	.053	.172	.212	.092
Local Media	Chiefs T	.111	.454	.085	.207	.141	.094	.117	.384	.149
	Chiefs R	−.005	.971	.082	−.119	.368	.082	−.245	.056	.135
	Chiefs C	.178	.250	.083	−.021	.883	.082	−.008	.954	.143
Police Employee Associations	Chiefs T	.039	.756	.060	.218	.072	.067	.258	.027*	.107
	Chiefs R	.125	.438	.062	.292	.056	.063	.285	.052	.103
	Chiefs C	.024	.878	.069	.372	.012*	.068	.328	.018*	.118
Elected Officials	Chiefs T	−.082	.600	.074	.000	.999	.083	−.140	.325	.132
	Chiefs R	−.020	.893	.070	−.003	.981	.071	.175	.189	.116
	Chiefs C	−.261	.088	.072	.108	.451	.071	−.258	.058	.124
Local Criminal Justice Organizations	Chiefs T	.309	.063	.116	.382	.016*	.129	.228	.127	.204
	Chiefs R	.307	.113	.119	.198	.271	.119	.212	.221	.196
	Chiefs C	.073	.684	.108	.162	.336	.107	−.119	.452	.187
Local Emergency Medical Organizations	Chiefs T	.039	.753	.072	.105	.375	.080	−.009	.940	.127
	Chiefs R	.028	.059	.069	.203	.175	.069	−.085	.553	.114
	Chiefs C	.199	.248	.085	.121	.451	.084	.272	.076	.146
Model p	Chiefs T	.032*	—	—	.002*	—	—	.000*	—	—
	Chiefs R	—	.066	—	—	.003*	—	—	.000*	—
	Chiefs C	—	—	.104	—	—	.007*	—	—	.000*
Adjusted R²	Chiefs T	.120	—	—	.216	—	—	.289	—	—
	Chiefs R	—	.093	—	—	.207	—	—	.269	—
	Chiefs C	—	—	.078	—	—	.183	—	—	.278

p ≤ .05.

Results

Descriptive Analyses

Chiefs

The sample is made up of municipal police chiefs whose experience in law enforcement ranged from 5 to 46.25 years with similar patterns identified in all three groups (see Table 2). Chiefs in the sample are predominantly married (79.5%), White (79.3%), males (97.1%) who are taking on the role of chief for the first time (76.7%). Approximately half of chiefs were selected from outside of the agency they currently lead. Chiefs’ educational background was similar across groups as well. Almost half (45.3%) of chiefs had earned a bachelor’s or graduate degree (master’s or PhD), whereas 42.9% did not hold a college-level degree.

Chiefs’ Agencies

Chiefs in the sample led small to mid-sized agencies with 44.2% leading agencies of fewer than 10 full-time sworn officers and 93.8% having fewer than 100 full-time sworn officers. The sample is similar to local police agencies across the United States where 49.5% have fewer than 10 full-time sworn officers and 88.3% have fewer than 100 (Reaves, 2010). Approximately two thirds of the sample employ at least one full-time civilian with a mean of 15.2% of employees across all agencies. No agencies in the sample had primary responsibility for all functions used to calculate task scope, but the mean number of functions completed by agencies was about half of those available (20.5). Finally, these agencies participated in few interagency collaborations. The mean was 1.1 with approximately 55% of the sample participating in no identified collaborations. Table 3 provides additional information related to chiefs’ agencies and communities.

Chiefs’ Communities

Communities served by these agencies demonstrated a broad range on all community characteristics that were reviewed. This should be expected based on the diverse sample targeted by the TPCLS—chiefs serving jurisdictions up to 100,000 in population. The sample included small rural communities with populations of approximately 500 residents through densely populated urban areas (99,887 residents). The range of median income (US$19,925–US$160,976) demonstrated similar breadth, as did measures of racial heterogeneity, percentage of juvenile, and percentage of Hispanic residents.

Chiefs’ Ratings of Agency Priorities

Chiefs’ mean ratings of agency priorities were largely consistent within priorities (see Table 1), though mean ratings across the three priorities did vary. Chiefs’ mean ratings of agency priorities are described on the same Likert-type scale as individual survey items (0 = “not important at all” through 5 = “extreme importance”). Overall, chiefs rated Maintain Law and Order and Maintain Relationships with Constituents as highly important with means of 4.55 and 4.40, respectively. Adopt Innovations was of moderate importance to chiefs with a mean rating of 3.47. Adopt Innovations also had the greatest range with minimum mean ratings from 0.67 through a max of 5.0. Also, of note, Chiefs R, who were new to their positions, held the highest mean rating across all priorities and groups.

Chiefs’ Ratings of Stakeholders

Chiefs’ mean ratings of stakeholders followed a pattern similar to their mean ratings of priorities with consistency between groups but not across stakeholders (see Table 1). Most stakeholders (Federal/State Law Enforcement, Local Media, Local Criminal Justice Organizations, and Local Emergency Medical Organizations) were rated as being of moderate to high importance. Across all groups, National Media (x_ = 1.65) and Police Employee Associations (x_ = 2.03) possessed lower mean ratings of importance. Chiefs R attributed the greatest mean importance to Local Media, Police Employee Associations, Elected Officials, and Local Criminal Justice Organizations, and their mean ratings of Federal/State Law Enforcement and National Media exceeded the overall mean chiefs’ ratings. New chiefs had the lowest mean rating for one stakeholder, Local Emergency Medical Organizations.

Bivariate Analyses

Chi-square tests were employed to compare chiefs’ individual characteristics though no significant differences were identified between groups. To assess uniformity (i.e., institutional homogenization) in chiefs’ perceptions of their stakeholders and agency priorities, comparisons of chiefs’ mean ratings of stakeholders and priorities were employed utilizing MANOVA. In addition, Cohen’s f was calculated to evaluate the magnitude of potential differences. The MANOVA did not identify significant group differences, F(20, 392) = 1.350, p = .144, Wilks’ Λ = .875, η² = .064, f = .26, across stakeholder or priority mean ratings. As shown in Table 2, approximately half of Chiefs R were hired from outside their organizations, so a second MANOVA comparing chiefs’ ratings of stakeholders and agency priorities for Chiefs T, Chiefs R (internal hire), and Chiefs R (external hire) was conducted. The purpose was to identify whether assessments of the environment by chiefs with experience in the jurisdiction they now lead differed from chiefs hired from outside. No significant group differences were identified between these three groups, F(20, 258) = 1.421, p = .112, Wilks’ Λ = .811, η² = .099, and Cohen’s f is not reported due to differences in sample sizes. Because no between-group differences were identified in either MANOVA, Tukey’s post hoc test results are not reported.

Multivariate Analyses

Three series of three OLS models estimated the relationships between stakeholders and agency priorities according to each chiefs group. Seven of the nine models were statistically significant (p ≤ .05). Effect size was also calculated using Cohen’s f to describe the magnitude of relationships identified in the OLS models.

The first series of OLS models regressed stakeholders on the agency priority, Maintain Law and Order. Overall, the model for Chiefs T was significant, F(7, 63) = 2.369, R²_adj = .120, p = .032, f = .51. No significant relationships were identified, however, between individual stakeholders and Maintain Law and Order.

Maintain Relationships with Constituents was assessed in the second series of OLS models. Overall, the models for all three groups of chiefs were significant: Chiefs T—F(7, 63) = 3.759, R²_adj = .216, p = .002, f = .65, Chiefs R—F(7, 63) = 3.605, R²_adj = .207, p = .003, f = .63, and Chiefs C—F(7, 59) = 3.112, R²_adj = .183, p = .007, f = .61. In addition to all models being significant, the stakeholder, Police Employee Associations had a significant relationship with Chiefs C (β = .372, p = .012, f = .30). Chiefs Ts’ assessments of Maintain Relationships with Constituents was associated with their ratings of Local Criminal Justice Organizations (β = .382, p = .016, f = .27).

The final series of models assessed the relationship between chiefs’ evaluations of Adopt Innovations and their institutional environment. The models for all groups were significant for this priority: Chiefs T—F(7, 62) = 5.009, R²_adj = .289, p < .001, f = .75, Chiefs R—F(7, 63) = 4.687, R²_adj = .269, p < .001, f = .72, and Chiefs C—F(7, 59) = 4.631, R²_adj = .278, p < .001, f = .74. As Chiefs Ts’ perceptions of Police Employee Associations increased (β = .258, p = .027, f = .24) so too did their assessments of Adopt Innovations. The relationship with Police Employee Associations was significant (β = .283, p = .018, f = .26) for Chiefs C as well.

Discussion and Conclusion

The current research sought to assess the institutionalization of chiefs’ perceptions of their institutional environment and agency priorities. This was accomplished utilizing a small sample of Texas police agencies that experienced turnover during a 4-year period. It is important to note that the reasons for turnover (e.g., termination, retirement, resignation for another opportunity) are unknown as is the date their replacement was hired. Although the results did not all achieve traditional significance (p < .05), which could be due to small sample sizes, some patterns emerged in the data that warrant discussion and further investigation. The conflicting findings of the bivariate and multivariate analyses are discussed in four primary areas. The uniformity of chiefs’ assessments of stakeholders and agency priorities is framed by police culture when discussing bivariate findings, and discussion of multivariate findings focuses on Maintain Law and Order, Police Employee Associations, and jurisdictional and experiential differences across groups.

Descriptive and bivariate analyses identified no significant differences in all chiefs’ (Chiefs T, Chiefs R, and Chiefs C) ratings of stakeholders or agency priorities. This suggests that chiefs’ perceptions of the identified elements in their environment and the basic goals of their organizations have become institutionalized. Although Chiefs R attributed the greatest mean importance to all agency priorities and four of seven stakeholders, differences were not significant and may be influenced by anticipation for and limited experience in their new roles.

It is plausible that all chiefs, regardless of tenure, would view their environment and agency priorities similarly as they share comparable socialization experiences into the profession. Policing is a field of scripted career milestones, so all chiefs have likely participated in a police academy, field training, entry-level patrol assignment, and promotion through supervisory ranks to chief executive. All those experiences and events contribute to the socialization of an individual into the field. Although focused on line-level officers, Van Maanen (1974) described the four stages of the police socialization process, from the choice to attend the police academy through officers’ metamorphosis into the realities of policing. In addition, Paoline and Terrill (2005) found support for Van Maanen’s framework, but they also noted the dearth of research extending the detailed assessments of line-level officer culture to police executives. Having previously been line-level officers, chiefs shared in a number of similar experiences throughout their careers. Chiefs’ socialization into police culture, therefore, was likely built through an iterative process (i.e., sensemaking) between the chiefs and multiple internal and external stakeholders supporting the foundation of institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Future research must focus specifically on turnover in police leadership, especially at the executive level, to better understand the impact that changes in leadership have on decision-making in the field.

Although bivariate findings suggested uniformity in chiefs’ ratings of environment and agency priorities, the OLS models demonstrate differing relationships between stakeholders and priorities across groups. The multivariate relationships are interesting when compared with the mean importance chiefs attributed to each agency priority. Although Maintain Law and Order, which is arguably the primary function many stakeholders attribute to the police (Bayley, 1994), held the greatest mean importance, it possessed the fewest significant models. The limited relationships with Maintain Law and Order can likely be attributed to what Bayley (1994, p. 3) describes as “[t]he myth of the police.” The reality which is not widely broadcast outside of policing is that “[t]he police do not prevent crime,” due to the reactive rather than proactive nature of their work (Bayley, 1994, p. 3). Although Bayley’s assertions directly contradict the crime fighter image modeled by police (Westley, 1970), chiefs continue to attribute great importance to the maintenance of law and order. The continued importance suggests the institutionalization of the myth and ceremony surrounding the crime fighter image in chiefs’ environments. In addition, the image is sustained though researchers have provided evidence to refute it (Bayley, 1994; Biderman & Reiss, 1967). More important, the myth is so taken for granted by the environment that few stakeholders must be engaged by police organizations in its maintenance.

Relationships between Police Employee Associations and agency priorities warrant further discussion though not all relationships achieved traditional significance. These relationships are of interest due to the low mean importance chiefs attributed to Police Employee Associations and the nature of Texas’ right-to-work law, meaning that payment of union dues cannot be a condition of employment. Although employees cannot be forced to support employee associations, chiefs in this sample appear cognizant of these associations in relation to the priorities Maintain Relationships with Constituents and Adopt Innovations. Related to maintaining relationships, it is likely that the use of collective bargaining by these organizations sustains them as relevant stakeholders in Texas police chiefs’ environments. Prior research has demonstrated the influence on salary and benefits and at times the adversarial nature of collective bargaining between union and agency representatives (Kadleck, 2003; S. Wilson et al., 2006). Although police employees cannot strike in Texas (The Fire and Police Employee Relations Act, 1993), it appears that maintaining positive relationships with stakeholders directly related to their labor force is in chiefs’ interests. Much of the police union literature has focused on unions as barriers to the implementation of innovation (see Kadleck, 2003, for a summary). Recent research, however, has demonstrated the positive influence of unions on the implementation of community-oriented policing (Morabito, 2014). The current research also found similar patterns in chiefs’ ratings of Police Employee Associations and positive assessments of Adopt Innovations, but these findings do not allow for the assessment of specific innovations.

The multivariate models displayed shifting agreement between Chiefs T, R, and C, suggesting that stakeholder influence varies by jurisdiction. For example, a relationship between Local Criminal Justice Organizations and Maintain Relationships with Constituents was identified for only Chiefs T. Although not achieving traditional significance, only Chiefs C suggested jurisdiction-specific relationships between Elected Officials and Local Emergency Medical Organizations on Adopt Innovations. Experience in the position also appeared to influence relationships of stakeholders with regard to Adopt Innovations; though not traditionally significant, relationships were identified with Federal/State Law Enforcement Agencies for Chiefs T and C but not for Chiefs R. Jurisdiction and experience seem to influence chiefs in differing ways. These experiences also appear to be additive, suggesting a sensemaking process, which supports the iterative nature of building legitimacy. Differences between Chiefs T and R suggest that Chiefs R are beginning the process of building legitimacy. Although approximately a quarter of Chiefs R had prior experience as police chiefs, they had not built relationships in their new agencies. For the remaining new chiefs, police supervisors are frequently selected and promoted to their new leadership roles due to success at their prior rank. New chiefs may not yet be aware of the importance of all aspects of their new positions, such as networking, budgeting, and public relations, from an administrative perspective with stakeholders outside their organizations or the formal law enforcement structure. Differences between Chiefs T and C support the tailored responses of organizations maintaining legitimacy by responding to the competing and often conflicting demands from stakeholders. Therefore, differences between Chiefs T and C may be due to their experiences in different environments leading to variation in stakeholders they must engage.

Navigating the environment of police chiefs appears to be a craft rather than science, due to the variation in relationships identified in the multivariate models. In addition, the craft appears to be learned over time. For example, findings suggested relationships between Adopt Innovation and Federal/State Law Enforcement Agencies for Chiefs T and C. This may be indicative of learning where access to innovation is obtained (Bayley, 1994). Chiefs R may possess greater concern for their presentation to stakeholders by Local Media because they are in the initial process of building legitimacy and may feel greater vulnerability. The important point is that while chiefs rate stakeholders and agency priorities similarly, their individual jurisdictions influence the relationships between the two.

The findings suggest that chiefs are not symbolic placeholders, but there are no key indicators within chiefs’ assessments of their environments or agencies’ priorities that would identify a pattern for agencies to follow when selecting a new chief. Bivariate findings suggest uniformity in chiefs’ assessments of the position; therefore, those selecting new chiefs should focus on the multivariate findings when assessing candidates. Candidates should be evaluated on their potential responses to the environment. This evaluation should include candidates’ identification of stakeholders surrounding the police agency, agency priorities, methods of legitimacy building with stakeholders, and methods of legitimacy evaluation for the agency. Proposed measures will likely be indirect, but through this discussion an understanding of candidates’ priorities for the agency should begin to emerge. Hiring committees must better understand the candidate’s process of navigating their environment to determine whether they fit the current needs of the agency.

Although informative, the current research is not without limitation. First, it draws on an extremely small sample of police agencies that experienced turnover in one state (n = 71). In addition, it is not known why turnover occurred or how it impacted the perceptions of the replacement chiefs. Situations in which turnover is part of a planned succession are likely to influence replacement chiefs differently than chiefs who came to their position with a mandate for reform following the termination of the prior chief. Due to infrequent data collection (e.g., U.S. Census and CSLLEA), unique agency and community information were not available for Chiefs T and R. Therefore, a full assessment of factors (i.e., contingencies) that may influence chiefs’ positions regarding the environment could not be completed; this restricted the use of alternative theoretical frameworks. The data collection efforts were also unable to capture the sensemaking process of chiefs. This leaves us to speculate that the variation in impact of chiefs’ stakeholder perceptions is related to diverse experiences that occur during sensemaking. Finally, data were collected prior to and during the initiation of a nationwide legitimacy crisis facing U.S. police regarding use of force. Due the death of Michael Brown in 2014, it is not clear how chiefs’ assessments of stakeholders and priorities may have changed. The sustained nature of the legitimacy crisis and resulting civil unrest as well as the COVID-19 global pandemic have presented police with continued uncertainty. Due to the rapidly changing circumstances surrounding these situations, chiefs must continue to react to the demands of stakeholders but with less information or time for reflection than in the past. Future research must capture the influence of multiple citizen and advocacy groups that have been created as a result of these situations. Capturing the influence of these groups may assist researchers in identifying a point of intersection for both policing legitimacy literatures.

Overall, the bivariate and multivariate analyses suggest there is not one formula for navigating the institutional environment surrounding police agencies. Researchers must explore the differences across institutional environments of policing (e.g., municipal, county, rural, suburban, and urban), not just individual chiefs’ perceptions of their environments. Police chiefs have extensive experience during socialization into police culture, but researchers know little about how socialization/culture changes over time, across ranks, or influences decision-making. There are multiple stakeholders that chiefs engage throughout their careers that may influence priorities and decision-making. Unions are one of those understudied stakeholders that are critical to policing. Rather than focusing on employee benefits, researchers must better understand the overall influence that unions have on police decision-making. Although the environment of police organizations is almost limitless (Maguire, 2003), we must create a more systematic and accurate account of stakeholders occupying that environment if we hope to fully appreciate the pressures placed on law enforcement executives. Better assessments of these environmental issues will aid researchers in understanding the impact of the environment on police organizational decision-making. While the current results suggest chiefs may not bring novel perspectives to their positions, they do build new relationships influencing how those perceptions are implemented. That building process and its outcomes require further exploration.

Supplemental Material

sj-pdf-1-cjb-10.1177_00938548211006753 – Supplemental material for Do New Chiefs Mean Fresh Perspectives? The Institutionalization of the Police Executive Environment

Supplemental material, sj-pdf-1-cjb-10.1177_00938548211006753 for Do New Chiefs Mean Fresh Perspectives? The Institutionalization of the Police Executive Environment by Matthew C. Matusiak in Criminal Justice and Behavior

Footnotes

ORCID iD

Matthew C. Matusiak

Supplemental Material

Supplemental Appendix 1 is available in the online version of this article at .

Matthew C. Matusiak, PhD, is an associate professor in the Department of Criminal Justice at the University of Central Florida. His research interests focus on the application of organizational theory to policing, organizational structure, and executive police leadership.

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