Abstract
Sexual abuse oftentimes occurs in institutional settings involving a power imbalance, including churches, sports, schools, and workplaces. Abuse in the Catholic Church was a reoccurring media fixture beginning in 2002 but continues to be a prominent feature even today. On September 30, 2021, The Athletic published an article documenting a coach’s sexual coercion, emotional and verbal abuse, and retaliation, exposing a toxic league culture that failed to protect its players. Negative outcomes for assault survivors can be exacerbated when institutions fail to prevent or respond appropriately to sexual assault, a phenomenon known as institutional betrayal. Using institutional betrayal theory as a context for understanding experiences, this paper presents an exploratory analysis of abuse and misconduct experiences from two separate institutions: the National Women’s Soccer League (NWSL) and the Catholic Church. This discussion offers insight into how the various dimensions of institutional betrayal appear differently in distinctive institutional settings.
Sexual violence occurs in a wide variety of societal contexts; however, it remains difficult to determine the true prevalence of sexual violence in society. Sexual abuse has been reported in numerous institutional settings including education, church, the military, and sport. Recent public focus on sexual violence has made society aware of institutional wrongdoing (e.g., media attention on sexual abuse in the Catholic Church or in the entertainment industry). Black women’s rights activist Tarana Burke launched the #MeToo campaign in 2006 as a call to action for creating a public space for sexual assault survivors to achieve “empowerment through empathy.” A decade later, the #MeToo banner was amplified when numerous sexual harassment allegations against a prominent Hollywood film producer swiftly united and became a social movement known as #MeToo. Although not a novel problem, the #MeToo movement brought issues of institutional culture and responses to sexual harassment to the forefront of societal discourse once again.
The enhanced media attention to sexual violence and harassment was applied to a multitude of institutions, including sports. In the previous decade, scandals involving coaches, such as Jerry Sandusky, or team doctors, like Larry Nassar, have illuminated the presence of sexual misconduct by trusted individuals in authority positions. In 2021, five head coaches from the National Women’s Soccer League (NWSL) were fired or forced to resign amid allegations of misconduct or abuse. As recently as 2023, investigations into sex abuse in the Catholic Church continue. Many have recognized the commonalities in experiences of institutional sexual abuse regardless of the institution type: entertainment industry, sports, church, military, or education. Spraitz and Bowen (2016) compiled a collection of work exploring how #MeToo has altered the landscape of various institutional settings when addressing the problem of sexual abuse. There are many similarities to experiences of institutional sexual abuse, despite the occurrences in different institutional settings.
The current study explores abuse and misconduct experiences through a lens of institutional betrayal (IB) theory from two separate institutions: The NWSL and the Catholic Church. While research has identified and cemented the common themes associated with IB (Freyd et al., 2005; Smith & Freyd, 2013, 2014, 2017), a gap remains in understanding if there are qualitative differences in how those themes are presented in different institutional settings. This analysis and discussion offer insight into how these IB dimensions may appear differently in a religious institutional setting like the Catholic Church and a professional sports league setting.
Sexual Abuse and the Catholic Church
Numerous high-ranking officials spent over 50 years attempting to cover up the sexual violence taking place within the Catholic Church (Doyle et al., 2006). The abuse first gained some media attention in the early 1980s and continued its media presence throughout the 1990s (Jenkins, 1996; Mercado et al., 2008). However, the extent of the abuse present in the Catholic Church became public knowledge in January 2002 when the Boston Globe began publishing numerous stories uncovering the actions of former priests’ misconduct and their associated dioceses covering up the events and settling with abuse victims. Two thorough reports at John Jay College found that 4% of the priests in their sample (97% of Catholic dioceses and 64% of religious communities in the United States) committed acts against 10,667 victims (John Jay College of Criminal Justice, & Catholic Church, 2004).
Research suggests that individuals who experience sexual violence within an institution experience a dual betrayal—first from the individual offender and second by the offending institution (Doyle, 2009; Smith & Freyd, 2014). Scholars have argued that institutions prioritize reputation over individual value and create barriers to encourage silence and discourage disclosure (Vieth et al., 2012). Historically, it was rare for a faith-based organization to condemn sexual abuse with its actions (Gardner, 2012). Piquero et al. (2008) argued that a lack of accountability from stockholders contributed to the Church’s delayed response to abuse and its focus on protecting itself instead of protecting victims. Gardner (2012) posits that the defining response of faith-based communities to abuse disclosure is institutional narcissism and defensiveness.
Institutional support of abuse cover-ups is a key factor in IB (Smith & Freyd, 2014). The Church varied greatly in its responses to allegations of sexual abuse in different jurisdictions and over time, oftentimes depending on the judgment of diocesan leaders. Forty percent of priests with allegations of abuse received some form of treatment including psychotherapy and specialized treatment for sex offenders (Terry, 2008). In 2002, the Church implemented a zero-tolerance policy against clergy abuse (United States Conference of Catholic Bishops [USCCB], 2011). Prior to that policy implementation, abusive priests were frequently either being sent to counseling or transferred to other parishes as a punishment. Only 3% of clergy with one victim and 11.57% of the 137 priests with 10 or more known victims were completely removed from the Church (Mercado et al., 2008). Archbishops were more likely to transfer chronically abusive clergy than those with only one known victim (Mercado et al., 2008). The secrecy and covert decision-making by people in power within the Catholic Church contributed to an environment where the abuse continued for generations.
Sexual Harassment and Abuse in Sport
Sexual violence, including harassment, abuse, and rape, infiltrate all levels of various sports (Fasting et al., 2004; Marks et al., 2012). While the United States does not yet have national-level incidence data available, the media has reported frequently on the significance of sexual misconduct in sport. As a result of differences in methodologies, the reported rates of sexual abuse in sport have ranged from 2% to 48% (Brackenridge et al., 2008; Mountjoy et al., 2016). Mountjoy et al. (2016) report that research estimates the prevalence of sexual harassment in sport to vary between 19% and 92%. In addition, the likelihood of being sexually harassed seems to increase with performance level (Fasting et al., 2010).
In 2016, coinciding with the #MeToo movement’s amplification, hundreds of athletes came forward disclosing decades of sexual assault disguised as medical treatment by Larry Nassar, a professional team doctor with USA Gymnastics (USAG), Michigan State University (MSU), and the United States Olympic Committee (USOC). The earliest reports of Nassar’s sexual assault occurred as early as 1992, but none were taken seriously, and formal charges were not filed until 2016 (Murphy, 2017). Despite numerous officials within these major organizations receiving various complaints about his actions, Nassar was consistently promoted and never forced to change his behavior throughout the four decades of his professional career. The dismissiveness of accusations and lack of corrective action by officials at USAG and MSU allowed the abuse to continue for decades. A congressional report confirmed that USAG, MSU, the USOC, and the Federal Bureau of Investigations all “knowingly concealed abuse by Nassar, leading to the abuse of dozens of additional amateur athletes,” and that these organizations “had opportunities to stop Nassar but failed to do so” (Fitzpatrick et al., 2019, para. 9).
Sexual abuse occurs in individual sports, such as gymnastics, but also in team sports such as hockey, baseball, and soccer. On September 30, 2021, The Athletic published an article on then North Carolina Courage coach Paul Riley, documenting the sexual coercion, emotional and verbal abuse, and retaliation during his tenure as a coach on different teams in the NWSL (Linehan, 2021). The article exposed a toxic league culture that did little to protect its players. In 2015, Riley was accused by two players, Mana Shim and Sinead Farrelly, of sexual abuse and sexual coercion. The Portland Thorns quietly investigated for a week, resulting in Riley’s contract not being renewed for the following season. Without any details of the investigation being made public, within months, Riley was hired as head coach by another team in the league, where his abusive patterns of behavior continued. In the span of 4 months, four different NWSL coaches were fired for problematic patterns of behavior involving sexual misconduct, verbal abuse, racist remarks, and toxic work environments (Murray, 2021). These coaches were hired despite teams knowing previously about their patterns of problematic behavior (Murray, 2021). In the aftermath of the numerous abuse allegations, two separate independent investigations were conducted into the abuse in the NWSL, which helped to create a timeline of allegations, reports, and institutional inaction in response to these claims (see the work by Yang, 2022, for a full timeline and overview of events). The Sally Yates report was released on October 3, 2022, and the Covington and Burling report was published soon after on December 14, 2022. Within the two reports, all 10 NWSL teams (prior to the two expansion teams added in 2022) dealt with some sort of misconduct issue (Yang, 2022). In 2023, following a review of the independent investigations, four coaches received lifetime bans from the NWSL, and six teams received fines for failure to act on misconduct allegations (Jiménez, 2023).
Institutional Betrayal
People who experience trauma frequently struggle with long-term mental and physical health consequences that can be intensified when associated with feelings of betrayal from a trusted group or institution (Martin et al., 2013). Freyd’s (1996) betrayal trauma theory states that when a person depends on another person or institution for survival and that trust is violated, the effects of the trauma experience are exacerbated (Freyd et al., 2005). The mishandling of cases and mistreatment of abuse survivors by larger institutions such as universities, military branches, and priests representing a church have been referred to as IB. In their understanding of IB, Smith and Freyd (2014) included survivors’ experiences with institutional behaviors ranging from passive actions, such as failing to take proactive steps to prevent the abuse, to actively working to cover up the experience or retaliate against the survivor.
Research has identified a relationship between IB and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms for specific populations including graduate students who experience sexual harassment (Rosenthal et al., 2016), campus sexual assault survivors (Herres et al., 2021; Smith & Freyd, 2013), and LGBTQ+ undergraduate survivors (Smith et al., 2016). IB has also been used to examine the impact of betrayal and harm within marginalized groups known as cultural betrayal trauma theory (Gómez, 2022) and in specific institutions such as medicine (Tamaian et al., 2017) and the military (Monteith et al., 2021). IB has been shown to exacerbate mental health outcomes of sexual violence survivors (Monteith et al., 2016; Rosenthal et al., 2016; Smith, 2017; Smith & Freyd, 2013, 2017).
Current Study
The current study sought to compare themes of IB dimensions in official investigation reports of the abuse in the Catholic Church and in the NWSL. Two investigative reports were conducted by researchers at John Jay College: One focused on the nature and scope of abuse in the Catholic Church (John Jay College of Criminal Justice, & Catholic Church, 2004), and the other explored the causes and context of the abuse (Terry et al., 2011). There were two reports conducted on the misconduct throughout the NWSL: an independent investigation report commissioned by the U.S. Soccer Federation (USSF) led by former acting Attorney General Sally Yates (Yates, 2022), and a joint investigation with team members from two law firms commissioned by the NWSL and NWSL Players Association (NWSLPA) (Covington & Weil, 2022). The purpose of the current research was to explore the experiences of individuals described in official report sources of abuse that described instances where they felt their institution let them down, betrayed them, or did not act in their best interest.
Method
Data
Data for this study came from four investigative reports; two on the sexual abuse in the Catholic Church conducted by researchers at John Jay College, and two independent investigations on the sexual abuse and misconduct in the NWSL by separate law firms (King & Spalding and Covington & Weil). Although the reports for the Catholic Church and the NWSL were commissioned for different reasons and during different time frames, all four reports contain information about abuse, misconduct, and institutional responses conducted in official investigative settings. The four reports selected are the only publicly available investigative reports on institutional sexual abuse and misconduct in the institutions relevant to this study, in the United States. Using a qualitative content analysis of these documents, this study sought compare the presence of IB dimensions present in official investigation reports from two different institutional settings: The Catholic Church and the NWSL.
In 2003, researchers at John Jay College were commissioned to conduct a study on the nature and scope of child sexual abuse by Catholic priests (John Jay College of Criminal Justice, & Catholic Church, 2004). The “nature and scope” study was based on reports from records for all priests and deacons in the United States from 1950 to 2002. This study included information on the number of abuse incidents, geographic and time distribution of offenses, characteristics of the priests and victims, and the Catholic Church’s response to the allegations. The data included in the report are “based upon surveys provided by 195 dioceses, representing 98% all diocesan priests in the United States, and 140 religious communities, representing approximately 60% of religious communities and 80% of all religious priests” (John Jay College of Criminal Justice, & Catholic Church, 2004, p. 3). A second study on the causes and context of child sexual abuse by Catholic priests was later commissioned and published in May 2011 (Terry et al., 2011). The “causes and context” study sought to understand the reasons why the sexual abuse against minors by Catholic priests occurred. The primary data sources for the “causes and context” study included surveys of and interviews with inactive priests with allegations of abuse and active priests with no accusations, interview data from a Loyola University study of American Catholic priests from 1971, clinical data files from treatment centers, and surveys of survivors, victim assistance coordinators, bishops, priests, and other diocesan leaders (Terry et al., 2011).
In the aftermath of The Athletic story on Paul Riley and the allegations of misconduct (Linehan, 2021), the USSF, the NWSL, and the NWSLPA commissioned independent investigations into the abuse and misconduct apparently present throughout the league. The USSF-commissioned report, published on October 3, 2022, was led by former acting Attorney General Sally Yates and her law firm, King and Spalding (Yates, 2022). The Yates investigation report included information with over 200 interviews including current and former players, coaches, owners, and front-office staff from current and former league teams, league employees, representatives from players unions, and others with relevant information. Over 60 document productions were collected from approximately two dozen teams and individuals. Over 89,000 relevant documents provided by the federation were reviewed. In addition, the USSF independent investigation created a hotline and email address for anyone to report relevant information anonymously.
The NWSL hired Covington and Burling to conduct an independent investigation, while the NWSLPA engaged counsel at Weil, Gotshal, and Manges. The NWSL and NWSLPA eventually decided to have Covington and Weil jointly conduct an independent investigation. The joint investigative team “reviewed all reports indicating that a person in a position of power in the NWSL or one of its member clubs engaged in or facilitated inappropriate conduct toward NWSL players, including discrimination; harassment; sexual, physical, or emotional abuse; and retaliation related to such reports” (Covington & Weil, 2022, p. 1). The joint investigative team also reviewed the NWSL policies and practices related to identifying, investigating, and addressing misconduct. A significant number of players, past and present, participated in the investigation, while the league granted the joint investigative team full autonomy and access to all necessary resources.
Coding Instrument
Using previously identified measures of IB (Smith & Freyd, 2013), a codebook was developed. The potential coding categories comprised five themes constructed from the Institutional Betrayal Questionnaire (IBQ) created by Smith and Freyd (2013). The questionnaire introduced the concept of institutional involvement by asking participants to think about larger institutions such as a university, the military, or organized religion. The questionnaire then asks about seven potential experiences (i.e., creating an environment that normalizes abuse, covers up experiences, fails to prevent experiences, difficult reporting experiences, responding inadequate to experiences, punishments for experiences) (Smith and Freyd, 2013). The current study used these questions and condensed them into five major themes for content analysis: (a) failure to prevent abuse, (b) normalizing abusive contexts, (c) difficult reporting procedures and inadequate responses, (d) supporting cover-ups and misinformation, and (e) punishment of victims and whistleblowers.
Analysis Strategy
The researcher coded all four investigative reports according to the previously described interpretation of Smith and Freyd’s (2013) themes of IB (see Table 1). Each investigative report was imported into MAXQDA for qualitative thematic coding and data analysis. Statements were coded at the sentence level. Coding was completed during two cycles. During a pilot study of this project, a second coder was used to establish inter-rater reliability by coding 20% of a sample pulled from all four reports. If there was disagreement over the coding of a statement, the coders would discuss it within the context of the report and explain our reasoning for the selected code until we were in 100% agreement for all reports. A second, and final, cycle of coding was applied to the entire sample after the initial codes had been refined and further analyzed. All variables were open-coded and converted to numerical codes to quantify findings in the form of theme frequencies. The frequencies for all variables were examined and cross-tabulated by institution type to explore some of the similarities and differences of IB themes. The use of MAXQDA software allowed the researcher to reference qualitative examples for the themes coded later in the analysis offering descriptive information for the IB themes. The project itself was not designed to construct or test the themes present in IB theory (Smith & Freyd, 2013), but rather to be an extension where IB dimensions are examined in separate institutional settings to determine if and how they differ in recognition. While not inherently theoretical, the findings can be used as an example with greater detail than a broad theme, showcasing how these individual institutional settings (i.e., religious and sporting institutions) may recognize IB dimensions in their individualized institutional settings.
Codebook
Note. Adapted from Smith and Freyd’s (2013) Institutional Betrayal Questionnaire.
Results
Description of the Sample
The four reports analyzed varied in number of pages and in number of references to IB themes (see Table 2). Report sizes ranged from 128 to 291 pages of documentation. References to codes also varied from 10 to 740 references to themes. The joint investigative team report was the shortest in length (128 pages), and it had the most references to IB themes (n = 740). The John Jay College nature and scope report was the longest (291 pages) but had the fewest references to IB themes (n = 10).
Sample Descriptive
Note. NWSL = National Women’s Soccer League; USSF = U.S. Soccer Federation.
Institutional Betrayal Themes
Throughout the four reports on misconduct and sexual abuse in the NWSL and the Catholic Church analyzed, 1,458 statements were consistent with themes of IB identified by Smith and Freyd (2013). Overall, the most frequent theme used in both institutional reports was normalizing abusive contexts followed by difficult reporting procedures/inadequate response from officials (see Table 3). Normalizing abusive contexts was the most frequent theme used in the NWSL reports, followed by difficult reporting procedures/inadequate response from officials, and then supporting cover-ups and spreading misinformation. In the reports on the Catholic Church, difficult reporting procedures/inadequate responses from officials were the most frequent theme referenced, followed by normalizing abusive contexts, and failure to prevent abuse.
Patterns of Institutional Betrayal Themes
Note. Institution type: χ2 (4, n = 1,458) = 45.9, p = .00. Individual reports: χ2 (12, n = 1,458) = 63.1, p = .00. NWSL = National Women’s Soccer League; USSF = U.S. Soccer Federation.
A chi-square test was used to determine whether frequency of IB theme variables was significantly dependent on institution type (i.e., NWSL or Catholic Church). The results of the chi-square test revealed that the frequency of IB themes was significantly different dependent on the institution type, χ2 (4, n = 1,458) = 45.9, p < .001; the NWSL reports were more likely to reference IB themes than Catholic Church reports.
Theme 1: Failure to Prevent Abuse
The failure to prevent abuse theme was referenced 265 times in the four files analyzed: 223 references in the NWSL reports and 42 references in reports on the Catholic Church. The use of this theme in NWSL reports emphasized a lack of policies and protocols in the league to address issues of harassment, investigations, and misconduct. For example, Yates (2022) reported that “for most of the League’s history, there was no anti-harassment policy, no anti-retaliation policy, and no anti-fraternization policy” (p. 6). The joint investigative team report explained: the lack of clearly established responsibilities allowed individuals within these institutions to disclaim personal responsibility for player protection and to turn a blind eye or shift blame to other individuals and entities, while players were left exposed to further misconduct and unsafe environments (Covington & Weil, 2022, p. 2).
As a specific example, one area referenced was the failure of both the league and the individual clubs “to take adequate steps to protect players in hiring and filling positions” (Covington & Weil, 2022, p. 82). In addition, there were no investigation policies and protocols “establishing how and by whom investigations of abuse would be conducted and how results would be communicated” (Yates, 2022, p. 13).
The John Jay Causes and Context report referenced similar issues regarding a lack of policies to respond to instances of misconduct. Despite the advice of legal counsel and insurers, “in many dioceses, there was not a thorough recognition of the problem or implementation of policies” (Terry et al., 2011, p. 76). In the aftermath of learning about many of these instances of abuse, there were unanimous calls for action guidelines. However, “their development in the Restoring Trust documents, and the establishment of written policies that encoded them, the promise of these principles were not uniformly fulfilled” (Terry et al., 2011, p. 84). In addition, failure to prevent abuse in the causes and context report referenced a failure to address allegations and allowing “a ‘recidivist’ priest to continue in service” (Terry et al., 2011, p. 87). Diocesan leaders failed to remove a known problematic priest even following repeated cautions about problematic behavior and after he admitted to the abuse (Terry et al., 2011). Consistent with previous research (Berry, 2000; Wurtele, 2012), the failure to remove abusive priests and transferring them to different parishes was a common practice referred to as “passing the trash.”
Theme 2: Normalizing Abusive Contexts
As the most frequently referenced theme for the NWSL reports (n = 356) and the second most frequently referenced theme for the John Jay reports (n = 50), normalizing abusive contexts was the overall most frequently referenced theme (n = 406). Normalizing abusive contexts meant that inappropriate behavior would be explained by special circumstances of the specific context, such as the coach and player relationship. In the NWSL, “many players and staff admitted that they struggled to identify the line between emotional misconduct and ‘tough coaching’” (Covington & Weil, 2022, p. 68). Yates (2022) reported that “the ubiquity of certain kinds of sexist or demeaning remarks as ‘tough coaching’ normalized verbal and emotional abuse” (p. 15). Many of the coaches “justified their behavior by relying on the rationale that the behavior was cultural or by doubling down on claims that their behavior was oriented around fitness” (Covington & Weil, 2022, p. 74). In addition, players in the NWSL explained that they had experienced “an innate instinct to ‘put up with’ problematic behavior and to protect a nascent, unstable league” to prevent the league from folding (Covington & Weil, 2022, p. 17). Fear of the league’s failure contributed to an environment in which players felt like they had to endure manipulative and abusive working conditions.
Some of the priests included in the John Jay reports similarly used their “status as a priest to justify actions to the victims and to intimidate them into silence” (Terry et al., 2011, p. 77). Much of this theme referenced grooming behaviors that began once potential victims “became altar boys or otherwise served a role in the church” (Terry et al., 2011, p. 103). The report also considered the ways in which the institutional environment may have made it easier for the abuse to occur. For example, Terry et al. (2011) explained that “diocesan priests often serve in an isolated environment with little oversight, and the response to deviant behavior goes through an accountability mechanism within the church itself (canon law and related procedures)” (p. 91). In essence, the way the institution of the Catholic Church is structured made it possible for the abuse to occur within the context of typical institutional activities.
Theme 3: Difficult Reporting Procedures/Inadequate Response
Difficult reporting procedures and inadequate responses were the second most frequent theme referenced overall (n = 377). In the NWSL reports, as the second most frequently referenced them (n = 321), much of this theme was referencing a lack of knowledge about reporting channels. In more than one instance, years apart, occurring on different clubs with different victims and abusers, players reported being unsure about who to contact or how to make a report (Covington & Weil, 2022). Not only did players and staff members struggle to identify certain behaviors as misconduct, but they were also unsure of where to report it. Even during the course of the independent joint investigation, players “expressed skepticism that reports would be appropriately handed due to historical distrust in the League” (Covington & Weil, 2022, p. 17).
As the most frequently referenced theme in the reports on the Catholic Church (n = 56), this theme was more likely to reference the difficulties in reporting and the less-than-stellar responses when abuse was reported. Many priests reported struggling to identify a “clear way to share their concern[s], and many had an incomplete understanding of diocesan policies and actions” (Terry et al., 2011, p. 91). In the event that an allegation was formally received, “if an accused priest did not admit to the allegation, the canonical process of determination of guilt was lengthy and cumbersome” (Terry et al., 2011, p. 86). It was rare for there to be any sort of episcopal action or follow-ups after an allegation was made. John Jay College of Criminal Justice, & Catholic Church (2004) reported that “the actions and responses of the Church to allegations are various and multiple: An individual priest may have been counseled, evaluated, provided with treatment, suspended, or limited in his priestly capacity” (p. 94). Overall, the reports on the abuse present in the Catholic Church indicated that it was incredibly difficult for anyone, including victims, loved ones, and even other priests, to file formal reports of misconduct. In addition, the lack of a legitimate response by leaders when allegations were received was less than desirable.
Theme 4: Supporting Cover-ups and Misinformation
There were 266 references to institutional cover-ups or spreading of misinformation in the four reports analyzed, making it the third most frequently referenced theme. In the NWSL, this theme often referred to the narratives presented by the institution in the aftermath of allegations and investigations. For example, Yates (2022) explained how “abusive coaches moved from team to team, laundered by press releases thanking them for their service and positive references from teams that minimized or even concealed misconduct” (pp. 2–3). Players reported that Arnim Whisler (a club owner) “knew Rory [an abusive coach] was a bad man and had heard everything that he’s done but they are friends and didn’t want to fire him” (Yates, 2022, p. 121). The joint investigative team argued: the assertion of legal privilege over the investigation, and various communication breakdowns, had the effect of enabling Riley to continue coaching in the NWSL for years after the Thorns fired him, leaving Riley’s players, who were not provided with any reason to be wary of him, vulnerable to further misconduct (Covington & Weil, 2022, p. 19).
Rather than communicating the allegations and findings about abusive coaches to other teams and the public, league administrators instead only highlighted certain aspects or downplayed the severity of the misconduct, ultimately publicizing a misleading narrative.
The Catholic Church frequently focused on preventing reports of abuse from spreading. Terry et al. (2011) explains how leaders “were preoccupied with controlling negative publicity and so were not forthcoming with information to the affected parishes,” essentially covering up the abuse (p. 89). These cover-ups also included the Catholic Church’s practice of transferring priests accused of sexual abuse between parishes or dioceses, so they could remain in ministry rather than removing them altogether (John Jay College of Criminal Justice, & Catholic Church, 2004; Terry et al., 2011). In addition to not informing their parishioners about any allegations, diocesan leaders also buried the allegations from law enforcement. “Diocesan leaders rarely provided information to local civil authorities and sometimes made concerted efforts to prevent reports of sexual abuse by priests from reaching law enforcement, even before the statute of limitation expired” (Terry et al., 2011, p. 89). Officials would ensure that any investigatory files were devoid of any incriminating evidence. Families frequently reported being “pressured by church leaders to keep the incident confidential” (Terry et al., 2011, p. 76).
Theme 5: Punishing Victims and Whistleblowers
The fifth IB theme, punishing victims and whistleblowers, included references to punishing or retaliating against a person who reports the misconduct. Although it was the least frequently referenced theme overall (n = 144) and for both institutions, NWSL (n = 142) and the Catholic Church (n = 2), the few references made were worth noting. The joint investigative team reported that certain investigations conducted by the NWSL put complainants at risk of retaliation (Covington & Weil, 2022). Players reported experiencing “interactions [that] made them uncomfortable, but they felt like they had to tolerate the behavior because they were concerned they would face retaliation, including loss of playing time or being cut from their team, if they raised any concerns” (Covington & Weil, 2022, p. 56). Throughout different clubs in the league, multiple players experienced consequences from reporting misconduct or supporting those that did. “Players reported that as a result of reporting misconduct or supporting others in doing so, they were verbally abused, isolated and ignored by coaches, removed from starting roles, waived, traded, and not re-signed, among other consequences” (Covington & Weil, 2022, p. 77). It was common for players who reported misconduct or participated in investigations to be met with skepticism and ridicule (Yates, 2022).
Similarly, diocesan officials would attempt to punish those who made allegations against priests. Whistleblowers, such as priests who complained about other abusive priests, were treated even more poorly than the abusive priests themselves. For example, one interviewee explained that “Dioceses would intimidate priests who brought charges against other priests” and “that the law firm hired by the diocese wiretapped his phone and went through his trash” (Terry et al., 2011, p. 90). Delayed reporting that was quite prominent for the abuse in the Catholic Church may have played a significant role in minimizing the potential retaliation victims would have faced for reporting. If someone did attempt to file a complaint, oftentimes diocesan officials would attempt to appeal to the guilt of a survivor to get them to drop the complaint. One interviewee explained that after the denials and attempts at obfuscation, diocesan officials appealed to his guilt, “It’s your fault; you seduced Father. You’ll ruin his life.” (Terry et al., 2011, p. 90). The Church was so focused on protecting its image that it would close ranks and protect the abuser, even if it meant becoming the aggressor against victims and whistleblowers.
Discussion
The purpose of the present study was to explore the nature of IB themes and if they manifested differently in investigative reports of sexual abuse and misconduct in two distinct types of institutions: the NWSL and the Catholic Church. The representation of the various items of the IB questionnaire presented in the reports of abuse in the NWSL (Covington & Weil, 2022; Yates, 2022) and the Catholic Church (John Jay College of Criminal Justice, & Catholic Church, 2004; Terry et al., 2011) was consistent with the percentage of endorsement found in Smith and Freyd’s (2013) initial study. The Catholic Church reports followed the exact ranking of IB themes found in the initial study (Smith & Freyd, 2013). Normalizing abusive contexts was the most frequent theme of IB referenced to explain the actions of abusers and the wider institution (n = 406). The second most common theme overall, and consistent with previous research (Smith & Freyd, 2013), was difficult reporting procedures and inadequate institutional responses (n = 377). These patterns were also similar to the perceptions of IB among veterans with military sexual trauma (Monteith et al., 2016). Veterans with military sexual trauma most commonly reported the perception that the military made it difficult to report sexual trauma and created an environment where abuse was more likely to occur and was considered normal or common (Monteith et al., 2016).
Despite being different institutions, investigative reports on the NWSL and the Catholic Church included similar thematic findings regarding the most common types of IB. Although the traditional IB dimensions are worthy of note, it is also worthwhile to explore and identify how the dimensions may present themselves differently in distinct institutional settings. The detailed examples regarding the nature of IB themes in different institutional settings identified in this research could be beneficial in helping prevent future instances of institutional responses leading toward feelings of IB. For instance, other religious or sporting institutions may also use these findings to help identify potential red flags in their own institutional settings as well as guidelines for how not to respond and create further distress. These findings offer examples of how IB dimensions may appear in different institutional settings and can be used as a guide for institutions to address policy and procedure concerns preemptively and reduce the potential for feelings of IB.
Institutional Differences
The “failure to prevent abuse” IB dimension focused on different issues for the NWSL and the Catholic Church. The NWSL reports referencing failure to prevent abuse frequently discussed the lack of any anti-harassment policies or investigative procedures at the league level. Without any formal structures focused on investigating and preventing abuse and harassment, players were exposed to years of abuse without any potential recourse. Although the American Conference of Catholic Churches finally developed policies to effectively prevent future abuse, the reports in this study showed that many parishes failed to properly implement the policies. The ideas presented in the 1994 Restoring Trust documents were not uniformly executed throughout the institution at large, resulting in a lack of policy enforcement for abusive priests (Terry et al., 2011). These findings point to the importance of not only having policies in place to protect people from abuse and misconduct but also the necessity of those policies to be implemented and enforced.
No matter the institution type, previous research (Monteith et al., 2016; Smith & Freyd, 2013), in conjunction with the present findings, suggest that normalizing abusive contexts, difficult reporting procedures, and inadequate institutional responses are the most recognizable and common indicators of IB. One of the biggest differences was the willingness of the NWSL to support cover-ups and spread misinformation regarding the abuse and misconduct in the league. In other institutional settings (Monteith et al., 2016; Smith & Freyd, 2013), including the Catholic Church findings in this study, supporting cover-ups and misinformation was one of less frequently referenced themes of IB (ranked fourth out of five). Although previous research into the Catholic Church’s response to abuse has indicated their willingness to engage in cover-ups and “passing the trash” to protect the institution and keep information out of the realm of public knowledge (Kochansky & Herrmann, 2004; Spraitz & Bowen, 2016; Wurtele, 2012, p. 2445), this was not as commonly referenced as a wider theme of IB in the current study.
However, in the NWSL, nearly 20% of references to IB fell into this category. On numerous occasions, team and league administrators minimized or concealed the misconduct of coaches, thanking them for their service in a press release before announcing their departure. The choice to construct an inaccurate narrative to share with the public created an environment where the abuse was allowed to continue for years and spread throughout the league. Abusive coaches were able to move from team to team throughout the league due to the ways the individual teams and the NWSL participated in covering up investigations into misconduct. The identification of the differences in which themes are more prevalent for certain institutions and what these different IB dimensions look like is key for institutional policymakers to recognize what issues to address when trying to reduce IB moving forward.
Limitations and Future Research
This research does not come without limitations that are inherent to all case studies and content analyses. First, due to the exploratory nature of this research, this is a case study of one professional sports league. While research estimates suggest that the prevalence of sexual harassment in sport varies between 19% and 92% (Mountjoy et al., 2016), the findings of the current study are only reflective of one league from one sport, and we cannot generalize these findings to all sports leagues. In addition, the reports analyzed were not specifically written for the purpose of this study, and therefore are not specifically comparable for the purpose of analyzing IB themes. It is possible that the frequencies may have been influenced by writing style or word choice of the investigative report authors. As such, the qualitative examples take on additional importance to providing context to these frequencies that come from data not explicitly comparable for the purpose of this study. Finally, content analysis is subjective and open to the interpretation of the researcher. Different researchers may interpret the data differently.
Despite the limitations, the current study provides qualitative insights into how the various dimensions of IB manifest in different institutional settings including the Catholic Church and the NWSL, a women’s professional soccer league. This exploratory study found that these very different institutional settings experienced sexual abuse and misconduct decades apart but had mirrored IB responses. In some institutional settings, IB may be more easily recognizable (Smith & Freyd, 2014). Regardless of the institution type, decade, or the situational abusive context, the action or inaction of administrators and leaders can lead to perceptions of IB. While much research has focused on responses to assaults, these results are aligned with others (Monteith et al., 2016; Smith & Freyd, 2013), suggesting that betrayals can occur both after a disclosure and leading up to the traumatic experience by creating an environment conducive to misconduct and ineffective reporting procedures. Future research should focus on exploring how the specific dimensions of IB manifest in different institutional settings. Smith and Freyd’s (2013) original measure focused on sexual assault trauma in university settings. Future research should consider identifying themes of betrayal specific to different types of trauma and different institutional settings, including sports, similar to Tamaian et al.’s (2017) identification of IB feelings at different levels in the medical system. In conclusion, additional thematic understanding of IB across more diverse settings and people can only benefit organizations and individuals experiencing traumatic experiences.
