Abstract
After Khomeini’s publication and the bulk of Saïd Amir Arjomand’s references predate two major recent developments, one regional and one domestic: regionally, the Arab Spring and Awakening; and domestically, the internal dynamics of leadership in Iranian society. Nevertheless, based on meticulous textual research, this book sheds light on aspects of both—directly on the latter, and indirectly by extension on the former development. Thus, it serves as a useful source for the scholarly and policy communities, as well as the public at large.
Its most salient feature is a fairly accurate account and a cogent analysis of the place of constitutionalism in present-day Iranian society, specifically the course of its post-revolutionary evolution to the present. As any reading of the constitution would reveal, it embodies what can best be described as rule by the clergy, or more precisely, a theocracy, as opposed to Western-style liberal democracy. Officially it is called “religious democracy,” a modification of liberal democracy and avowedly more democratic than the original liberal version developed in the West. It is widely believed that liberal democracy is secular by nature, neglecting its religious roots in the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century, as well as the prevalence of democracy (but not theocracy) in otherwise religious societies in the West and elsewhere.
Gradual evolution of this position, and its embodiment in the two constitutions since the Revolution, is fairly well-documented; so is the evolution of the various reformist positions. The same trends are responsible today for the current polarization in government and changing concentration of power. There are at least three factions that have recently branched away from the radical end of the political spectrum, in the absence of a viable reformist faction, which are vying for parliamentary seats in the upcoming elections of March 2012.
The reformists did not propose reforms in the constitution, especially when it came to modifying or limiting theocratic authority, let alone proposing secularism. It is often erroneously assumed by many that the present constitution is violated. This is not true, since by and large it is followed. If there are differences with a Western-style democracy, Arjomand demonstrates that it is due to the theocratic Islamic foundations of the constitution, resulting in a modified form of Western democracy. Indeed, officials have on many occasions reiterated that the Revolution was not for democracy, but that “Islam has everything.” Liberal democracy is generally critiqued; and books by scholars (such as the Frankfurt School) who criticize liberalism, liberal democracy and the culture and values of modernity, and support “social democracy,” are published by private publishers and sponsored by the Organization of Islamic Propaganda (Saziman Tablighat Islami). There has not been a transformation of the dominant revolutionary Islamic ideology, nor has a shift away from religious democracy toward liberal democracy materialized, demographic, social and political consequences of the Revolution notwithstanding.
Important relevant works by Iranian sociologists and other social scientists living and working in Iran are absent from the book’s many references. Such works provide further social, cultural and historical explanations for current developments as well as those leading up to the Revolution of 1979. This particularly manifests itself in the quality and extent of mass support for the Revolution. The author rightly points out the main intellectual contributors to the nationalist-cum-xenophobic-cum-nativistic outlook, which was a large part of the discourse and social psyche during the Revolution and the post-revolutionary era. As partly mentioned by Arjomand, it is an admixture of several historical traditions and heritages and their various “readings”: Mesopotamian (going as far back as Sumerians, but never mentioned and consciously recognized); nationalistic-pre-Islamic (more than three thousand years old, even six thousand, as commonly believed to be the “Aryan” heritage as opposed to the Semitic Islam); Islamic-Shi’ite (1,400 years); Turkic-Mongolian (close to 1,000 years, which is not consciously present in the common discourse and psyche, even ignored); and the various European ideologies, prominently nationalisms, liberalisms and communisms and socialisms of different sorts (for almost 400 years). These are the red threads that run through social and cultural history, leaving their indelible marks to the present. They form the culture and the many ethnic-regional-class subcultures running the gamut from urban to rural to tribal (whether urban, agrarian or nomadic).
Not that such complexity makes Iranian society unique in any way, at all; but it does point to complexities that easily escape outsiders and the domestic population and their policy makers alike, whether concerning Iran, Iraq, or Afghanistan—in fact, all societies from Austria to Zimbabwe. This has implications of enormous international significance in today’s world, namely that of national sovereignty versus universal international norms, due to different countries’ constitutions supporting their versions of democracy. This is more than just the issue of observing human rights; it becomes a matter of definitions that are culture-bound, which can result in widely divergent perceptions embodied in different constitutions and socio-political systems and their worldviews. Where does one draw the line? This forms the underlying dynamics of the Arab Spring and Awakening.