Abstract
From the first chapter of The Social Order of the Underworld: How Prison Gangs Govern the American Penal System, readers are drawn into David Skarbek’s exploration of the mystery-shrouded inner workings of prison gangs. Skarbek sheds light on the origins and functions of gangs in the U.S. prison system and illustrates the significant role that gangs play in the prison system, explaining that, far from being pale, less-potent shades of their non-incarcerated counterparts, gangs behind bars often have even greater influence. In Skarbek’s words, “the primary focus of this book is to understand how criminal institutions form, function, and evolve and to determine their effectiveness and robustness” (p. 8).
Skarbek analyzes prison gang formation through a rational choice theoretical lens, with gangs as the pinnacle of extralegal governance organizations that criminals create, however unconsciously, in order to meet their needs. In his examination, he either critiques or avoids the two traditional theoretical perspectives underlying prison life, namely deprivation theory, in which it is the structural conditions of the prison itself as opposed to the specific characteristics of the inmates that determine prisoner misconduct, and importation theory, in which prison lifemay be organized through the pre-existing mechanisms of socialization that prisoners carry with themselves in their incarceration.
There are two important ways in which Skarbek diverges from the usual theoretical underpinnings. The first is that he discusses norms as emergent in society, rather than pre-existing as eternal, immutable social laws. Norms are fluid and are created as a means to an end through the coordination of social actors. The second divergence is his position that prison gangs are created in order to foster a measure of extralegal governance, a demand that arises when prison institutions and administrators fail to provide adequately for the needs of inmates.
A great number of scholastic examinations of gangs and their formation and functions exist, but most focus on street gangs rather than prison gangs. While many of these gangs share the same names and the same rules, leadership, and activities, the reasons for their inception and reproduction can be different. Prison gangs have been described as the final frontier of gang research (Fleisher and Decker 2001). Much excellent research studying prison social order exists (Trammell 2011, Kuttschnitt and Gartner 2008, Crewe 2009, Fleisher and Kreinert 2009, and Dolovich 2012), but no such work has yet addressed the role of extralegal governance in prison gang formation.
Prison gang research may be the final frontier, but it’s not from lack of pioneer interest. The rise in popular media portrayals of prison life depicted in such programs as “Oz,” “Prison Break,” and, most recently, “Orange is the New Black” serves as a sign that interest in prisons is high but that the usual limiting factor is access. Prison gangs operate behind tall walls that cast long shadows. Researchers (Trulson, Marquert, and Kawucha 2006) lament that “data on gang-affiliated inmates remain some of the most elusive figures in corrections” (p. 10). Obstacles to qualitative data include the prison gangs’ codes of silence, potential loss of a prisoner’s privileges if gang affiliation becomes known, the fact that respondents’ claims may be exaggerated or false, and the fact that field studies are, by any measure of practicality, impossible.
In an effort to clear these very high hurdles, Skarbek utilizes a dizzyingly wide range of data sources, the synthesis of which, he writes, “provides an accurate and convincing picture of the criminal underworld” (p. 12). He underpins his arguments with data drawn from academic research, over 150 years of California inmate population records, state prison histories, legal documents detailing California street and prison gangs, FBI declassified files, personal memoirs and biographies of former law enforcement officials who investigated prison gangs in California, memoirs and biographies of (former) gang members, conversations and interviews, documentaries and media reports, and on-site prison visitations.
Skarbek argues that only by more fully understanding the economic, social, and political needs that prison gangs meet can any meaningful practices or policies be implemented to weaken their grasp on prison governance. He discusses the two most common approaches utilized by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to minimize gang membership, which are 1) to identify, track, monitor, and sanction those individuals found to be involved in gang activity, and 2) to make available administrative advising to prisoners to advise them of the unacceptability of joining gangs. CDCR’s practices have shown mixed results: the former are reactive and perform little function in deterring initial gang membership; the latter meet with few positive outcomes given that such awareness programs tend not to be any more successful than anti-smoking public service announcements. Few individuals in the last several decades have taken up smoking under the misapprehension that cigarettes are brimming with Vitamin C. Inmates join prison gangs not out of a warped sense of civic pride, but to meet a need in the prison system.
Skarbek continues that the only way to reduce prison gang membership is to improve formal governance mechanisms in prison sufficiently so that extralegal governance mechanisms, particularly gangs, have no cause to arise. He introduces three solutions: 1) make prisons safer and more liberal, 2) incarcerate fewer people, and 3) hire more police. In an effort to implement the above solutions, Skarbek also suggests a number of proposals to improve formal governance, most of which are designed to reduce potential danger to inmates, such as corrections officers’ use of body cameras, in-cell cameras, and single-person cells.
Skarbek concludes that only by recognizing the frequently positive impacts that prison gang membership has on the average inmate will any in-depth understanding of the problem be attained and any effective policy changes be devised. Prison gangs do not arise out of an inmate’s continuing desire to violate social norms nor out of an adolescent rebellion against imposed authority, but out of a desire for an increased sense of safety and security that all too often is not being provided through formal governance mechanisms.
In Skarbek’s widely cast data nets, it might have been fruitful to have examined the degree to which corrections officers and administrators withhold formal governance elements in favor of either cost savings or their own perceptions that prison is supposed to be a harsh environment. In the absence of such data, this is merely speculative, and Skarbek leaves the reader with a reiteration to lock up fewer people, make prisons safer and more liberal, and to deploy more police in communities. If you are left puzzled as to how more police in communities will co-exist with fewer people incarcerated, then you’re not alone.
All in all, The Social Order of the Underworld is a unique examination of the reasons undergirding the origin of prison gangs that frames the issue with a rational choice perspective in arguing that prison gangs arise as extralegal governance structures in settings where formal governance structures are either inadequate or absent. This is a text that would be appropriate for both undergraduate and graduate students in disciplines such as criminology, criminal justice, sociology, ethics, and economics.