Abstract
Someone who expects Weber’s Rationalism and Modern Society: New Translations on Politics, Bureaucracy, and Social Stratification to be a close examination of rationalism and modern society is likely to be disappointed: it is not a monograph on either rationalism or modern society. In contrast, someone who, following the book’s subtitle, expects new translations of Weber’s writings on politics, bureaucracy, and social stratification is unlikely to be disappointed. The book has seven chapters; three are introductory, and four are translations of passages on class, charisma, and bureaucracy, as well as “Politics as Vocation.” In the introductory chapters, Tony Waters and Dagmar Waters argue that Weber is relevant for the twenty-first century, but most Weberian scholars are already convinced of this. The editors maintain that these writings are a “product of World War I,” but they undermine their claim by noting that two of the pieces were written prior to 1914 (pp. 19, 25).
The editors are correct that translations often require revisions over time, and they are right that some of Weber’s words are simply resistant to translation (pp. 29–30). However, their new translations are sometimes flawed, and often they are no improvement over earlier ones. Waters and Waters are mistaken that Gewalt (“force,” “compulsion”) can be rendered “authority,” and they are wrong to maintain that their students are correct “that professors exercise Gewalt in the classroom through the manipulation of grades.” For Weber, Gewalt is clearly a type of compulsion that is primarily the use, or the threat of the use, of physical force, which is clearly inappropriate in the classroom (pp. 32, 136; Weber 1992:158–159, 240, 244–245, 247).
Gesinnungsethik (“ethics of conviction”) isanother problematic term; Weber oftencontrasted it with Verantwortungsethik (“ethics of responsibility”) but admitted this opposition was fluid. However, Waters and Waters are wrong to insist that Gesinnungsethik “always has ideology embedded in it” (p. 30). Jesus, St. Francis, and Luther are Weber’s representatives who adhere to the Gesinnungsethik, and their actions are not based on any ideology, but on ethical principles (Weber 1992:247). Similarly, the editors are confused about Weber’s use of Luther: “Here I stand, I can do no other” is not an indication of Luther’s “resignation” but is a refusal to do otherwise, and it is in no way connected to the German Stand (pp. 12, 14).
Translating is often difficult, so the question arises, why are new translations warranted? The editors devote Chapter Three to explaining why they have chosen certain terms and how they have translated them, but their answer to this general question is found in their prefatory article to their translation of Weber’s “Class, Status, Party” in the Journal of Classical Sociology: their major goal is “general readability for a modern English-speaking audience” (Waters and Waters 2010:153). They invoke Stephen Kalberg’s assertion that classic works should be retranslated every generation or two in order to reflect changes in language.
The editors have broken up Weber’s lengthy paragraphs and modernized words in an attempt to make Weber’s writings “more accessible to students in both graduate and undergraduate social theory courses” (pp. 155–156). Unfortunately, they have changed, if not distorted, Weber’s language and meaning. To give two examples: toward the end of “Politics as Vocation” they have given this translation: “Verily, verily, I say unto you: politics are made by using your head, but surely not only” (p. 196). This is hardly twenty-first century speech. The Lassman and Speirs translation renders this passage: “For truly, although politics is something done with the head, it is certainly not something done with the head alone” (Weber 1994:367). The older translation better reflects Weber’s original “Wahrlich: Politik wird zwar mit dem Kopf, aber ganz gewiß nicht nur mit dem Kopf gemacht” (Weber 1992:249).
The editors translate a passage on bureaucracy from Economy and Society as “The idea that there can be a law without loopholes is generally strongly contested. Also, the idea that the modern magistrate is nothing more than a ‘judging machine’ is rejected with disgust” (p. 192). Compare that with the older Gerth and Mills translation: “In principle, the idea of ‘a law without gaps’ is, of course, vigorously disputed. The conception of the modern judge as an automaton . . . this conception is angrily rejected” (Weber 1946:219). The Gerth and Mills translation is not verygood, but it is better than the “improved version.” This is shown by a comparison with the original: “Der Gedanke des lückenlosen Rechts ist bekanntlich prinzipiell heftig angefochten, und die Auffasung des modernen Richters als eines Automaten . . . wird entrüstet verworfen” (Weber 2005:195). Two points are relevant here: “gaps in the law” is not the same as “loopholes,” and Weber’s original casts doubt on the editors’ claim about the importance of the “judging machine.”
The editors are often good at providing contexts for concepts, but there are a number about which they are simply mistaken. They are correct to emphasize the role that charisma plays in Weber’s thinking, but they are wrong to suggest that “charismatic leaders are not normally found in positions of political leadership” and to insist that “charismatic leaders arise from the Gemeinschaft” (p. 31). Their own examples of Napoleon, Bismarck, and Hitler, not to mention Gladstone, serve as counterexamples. And, charismatic leaders do not normally come from the Gemeinschaft because they are unusual individuals who possess extraordinary powers.
The editors are right that Gemeinschaft is a key, but frequently neglected, concept, and they are correct to trace its origins to Ferdinand Tönnies (pp. 1, 3–6, 13). However, they misunderstand Tönnies’ use of Gemeinschaft as well as Gesellschaft. There is not a “linear progression” from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft (pp. 14, 33–34). For Tönnies, this was no progression but was the uprooting of the traditional, organic, and ethical form of community by the new, impersonal, and arbitrary forms of individualism. This might not have been a significant flaw by itself, but when the editors insisted on the relevance of Tönnies’ notion of Gemeinschaft, they made it important.
The book does have redeeming features. The editors frequently make some critically important points: one is their reminder that people almost automatically associate the term Führer with Hitler, but during Weber’s lifetime it lacked a pejorative sense (pp. 6, 31–32, 201 notes 2 and 3). Weber specialists may not find this book to be helpful, but students might find it interesting.