Abstract
Martin Albrow is a distinguished commentator on Max Weber whose 1996 The Global Age: State and Society beyond Modernity won the Amalfi Prize. Global Age Essays on Social and Cultural Change is very closely linked to the earlier volume: most of the essays collected within it were written in the 1990s, though some seek to spell out further implications of Albrow’s position, especially those that concern the proper moral response to the world in which we live.
The central idea in Albrow’s late work is simple. He opposes what he regards as the mainstream use of the word “globalization,” seeing in it merely a continuation of modernization theory—in which evolutionary progress will take all of us to some sort of harmonious homogeneity. Albrow agrees that we live in a global age, but he sees it in harsher terms. An interesting essay in this volume suggests that the first global event was the dropping of atomic bombs on Japan in 1945. He has a point, and one can add to it. I have spent my whole career judging societies to be successful when they grew economically, not least given the softening effects this can have on political life. But this growth may involve destroying the planet in which we live, something that would certainly count as a second global event.
The book has three parts: first, a set of essays on classical theorists, and on Arnold Toynbee and Norbert Elias, in light of the general position noted; second, a set of essays on the necessary theory for his view of global society; and third, a set of essays on the appropriate norms for the new epoch in which we live. The essays are closely linked, and in fact are rather repetitive. Some interesting points are made, such as the “need” for the United States to be more “diverse,” together with a useful distinction between “sociospheres” and “socioscapes.”
Still, with regret, it has to be said that the essays do not add much to the excellent general point already noted. For one thing, all the essays are excessively abstract, almost entirely free of empirical referent. For another, much that is said is not really different from the work of other writers on globalization—as in the claim that the nation-state has lost its salience, and that identities are accordingly more complex than in the past. And this suggests finally that we ought to question some of the more extreme statements made. Modern times have globalized the idea and the institutionalization of the nation-state. Are we really sure that the dynamics associated with this form have come to an end? Are there not national interests inside the European Union, belying ever more clearly the claims of some that it could become somehow transnational? Don’t we see national interests all too present in the Near East, not least in the behavior of Putin? The world is more connected than before and capitalism is hegemonic—but so too are varied national interests, not least those of the United States.