Abstract
A major task of the sociology of religion in our time is to account for the rise of the “nones,” non-believers, individuals who consider themselves “not religious.” This category includes atheists, agnostics, and dropouts from hundreds of denominations. American Secularism: Cultural Contours of Nonreligious Belief Systems, by Joseph O. Baker and Buster G. Smith, is an ambitious book that seeks to provide an empirical and theoretical account of the rise of the nones and of the larger process of secularization.
Although the United States is by some measures the most religious industrial society, this country has more individuals who consider themselves “not religious” than any other nation except China. The percentage of Americans who consider themselves “not religious” or “atheist” who also rarely attend religious services rose from 8 percent in 1981 to 28 percent in 2011. Similarly, a recent UCLA national poll found that 29.5 percent of college freshmen did not affiliate with any religion—an all-time high. Portraying the Unites States as an exceptionally religious nation obscures the fact that more than a quarter of American adults are not religious.
Rather than viewing secularism simply as the absence of religious belief or affiliation, the authors call attention to the wide variety of secular expression and worldviews, or “non-religious cosmic belief systems” (p. 6). And rather than viewing secularism as one thing, the authors frame a useful typology showing the diversity of secularities found in contemporary American society: atheism (3 percent of American adults), agnosticism (6 percent), non-affiliated belief (believing without belonging, 11 percent), and cultural religion (theistic beliefs but rarely, if ever, attending religious services or praying, 8 percent).
The authors also distinguish between individuals raised within a religion who dropped out (apostates) and those who were raised secular and stayed outside of religion (socialized seculars). And the edges of secularity are “fuzzy” because some who are agnostic with regard to theism are nonetheless quite devout in their practice of religion, as with Buddhism and Unitarianism. Data from the General Social Surveys (GSS), the Pew Religious Landscape Survey (RLS), and other surveys were used to assess these types of secularity and their correlations with other variables.
The book includes several extended excurses on the sociological study of religion and of the secular. Pioneering American sociologist Lester F. Ward (1841–1913) is celebrated for studying religion seriously in a time when most scholars shunned it, but he is criticized for his narrow positivism and his negative view of religion as impeding scientific progress. Ward is presented as an example of what not to do.
In contrast, Baker and Smith approach meaning-making both inside and outside of religion with tools provided by studies of culture, interaction, and cognition. Secularity is framed as a cultural phenomenon analogous to religion. Doing so allows secularism to be conceptualized neutrally, as a sign of neither utopia nor apocalypse. Two chapters are devoted to the historical development of secularism in the United States, emphasizing the interplay between politically conservative Protestantism and secularism. Changes to family structure and the politics of religion have driven many Americans out of organized religion. Put differently: the sex and gender revolution (beginning in the 1960s) and the political engagement of the religious right (beginning in the 1970s) are major factors in explaining the decline of religion and the rise of the nones.
An extended discussion of W. E. B. Dubois (1868–1963) helps illuminate some deeper connections between ethnicity, religion, and conventionality. Dubois reminds us that formal religion does not have a monopoly on languages of transcendence, morality, or prophetic critique.
In general, individuals with less power (including minorities) are less likely to be secular. In the Pew RLS less than 1 percent of African American respondents were atheists or agnostic, while less than 2 percent were culturally religious. Like blacks, Hispanic Americans are less likely to be secular compared to whites. Among Latinos, there is a higher likelihood of secularity among the upper class. Religion and secularity necessarily reflect the imprint of societal distributions of racialized power.
Asian Americans contradict the trend of minorities having low rates of secularity, as a higher percentage of Asian Americans are atheists, agnostics, non-affiliated believers, and/or culturally religious—perhaps because Asian Americans have higher education and income levels than other minorities. A high proportion of second-generation Asian Americans drop out of the religion of their parents. Third and later generations adopt Protestantism at relatively high rates, with nearly 80 percent becoming Christian and the remainder dividing between secularity and Buddhism.
An extended discussion of the life and work of Frances “Fanny” Wright (1795–1852), a nineteenth-century philosopher, orator, and feminist, provides the authors with a frame for examining how gender and sexuality are related to secularity. Men are more likely to be secular than women, with 2.6 male atheists for every female atheist. There is, however, no gender gap in infrequent attendance, with men and women having an equal probability of nonattendance. People who identify as LGBT are not drastically different from heterosexuals with regard to secularity. Tests for differences in secularity or religiosity based on sexual orientation were statistically non-significant.
Individuals who drift away from the faiths in which they were raised often re-connect with their religions when they marry and have children, feeling the need to raise children in a moral environment. Those who have never married or do not have children are more likely to be secular, but the effects are stronger for men than women.
While 71 percent of divorced or separated men are actively religious, 85 percent of divorced or separated women are. There is a drop-off in rates of religiosity for men after the dissolution of a marriage, but not for women. Each of the various secular categories increases with cohabitation. Unmarried women are roughly twice as likely to be non-affiliated believers or atheists if they are living with a partner. Almost one in four atheists have their children attend some type of religious education program, in contrast with the less than one in ten who pray or read religious texts with their children. Overall, about four out of five of those who are raised in Christian households maintain Christian beliefs, identities, and practices, but approximately 8 to 9 percent become unaffiliated, 4 to 5 percent become nonbelievers, and 4 to 5 percent stop participating.
Evangelical forms of Protestantism have relatively high rates of retention: a higher proportion of members stays affiliated with a religious tradition (although perhaps not the same one), maintains theistic beliefs, and continues religious practice. Baptists, Pentecostals, the Church of Christ, and Methodists have above average numbers of adults who remain active religiously. Presbyterians maintain their religiosity into adulthood at the same rate as the general population. Liberal Protestant denominations, such as the Episcopalian, Congregational, and United Church of Christ traditions, have the highest rates of secularity once members grow up. In general, the most conservative religious traditions have the highest rates of retention and the lowest rates of secularity in adulthood.
Adults raised Mormon (Latter-Day Saints) have rates of secularity almost identical to Protestants and Catholics: 83 percent actively religious, 10 percent unaffiliated believers, 1.9 percent agnostics, 1.6 percent atheists, and 3.2 percent culturally religious. These patterns support the idea that Mormons are becoming more similar to other Christian groups.
A relatively high rate of people who were raised Jewish become culturally religious as adults (17 percent), with another 6 percent becoming unaffiliated believers. Overall, while most American Jews retain some religious affiliation and beliefs, many are not engaging in religious life and practice, such that 68 percent of those raised Jewish have lower rates of active religiosity in adulthood.
Openly secular politicians are quite rare in the United States. A 2014 Pew survey found “atheist” was the attribute that the largest percentage of respondents said would make them less likely to vote for someone (53 percent), more than having an extramarital affair (35 percent), marijuana use (22 percent), or never previously holding political office (52 percent). Even 24 percent of non-affiliated respondents reported they would be less likely to vote for an atheist compared to a theist.
Politically, there was a strong tendency for seculars to self-identify as more liberal than the average American. Only 18 percent of actively religious Americans self-identified as politically liberal. Seculars are far more permissive in their views of abortion. More than 70 percent of respondents in the four secular categories believe that pre-marital sex is not wrong at all, in sharp contrast to 41 percent of the actively religious. Seculars hold more egalitarian views of gender, while actively religious Americans show the highest level of gender traditionalism. Actively religious people (63 percent) were the least likely to agree that stricter environmental laws are worth the (hypothetical) loss of jobs.
The most common political choice for secular Americans is to remain independent of political party affiliation. Secular voters were strong supporters of Ralph Nader in the 2004 presidential election. There is a distinct tendency for secular respondents not to be Republicans.
American Secularism provides a useful account of unbelief and secularization processes. The book is stronger in its empirical element than in its theoretical, historical, and interpretive elements. Durkheim, Marx, and Weber go virtually unmentioned. I would like to have seen more engagement with Peter Berger, Robert Bellah, Christian Smith, the philosopher Charles Taylor, and other major voices in the contemporary exploration of secularization.