Abstract
Is Chinese state capital a different kind of capital in Africa? This pressing question guided Ching Kwan Lee’s multi-year ethnographic research, culminating in her path-breaking and provocative book, The Specter of Global China: Politics, Labor, and Foreign Investment in Africa. The short answer is: yes. Chinese state capital is different from global private capital because of different forms of political control and the eventful, contingent nature of capitalism. This book is long overdue, especially considering growing curiosity about “China in Africa” and the lack of accurate accounts available on this issue. The ever-deepening cooperation between China and Africa—demonstrated by the recent China-Africa Summit in September 2018—only makes Lee’s inquiry even more timely and valuable.
Through ethnographic studies of the mining and construction industries in Zambia, Lee compares Chinese state capital and global private capital as two ideal types of capital in Africa. In brief, these two types of capital have different imperatives of accumulation, generate different regimes of production, and are enabled by different ethoses of management. Taking the three aspects together, to many readers’ surprise, “Chinese state capital, rather than being more dominant and influential, has made more compromises to accommodate Zambian state and labor demands than global private capital has” (p. 28). From Zambia’s point of view, it is precisely politics—a political synergy between state and society—rather than bureaucratic autonomy and capacity (as often argued by developmental state theory) that is the key for Zambia to leverage Chinese state capital for its development.
Throughout the book, Lee makes the comparison by detailing the three aspects (or what she calls “three moments”) of capital (Chapters 2 to 4). First, in terms of imperatives of accumulation, global private capital often pursues profit-maximization goals, while Chinese state capital seeks profit-optimization goals. In addition to profits and capital accumulation, Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) have other strategic goals or seek to accumulate other forms of “capital,” including political capital for maintaining alliances with African countries and security of long-term resource supplies. As such, they provide opportunities for Zambia to channel Chinese state capital for their long-term national development.
Second, regarding production regimes, while global private capital is more flexible and speculative by establishing a tyranny of finance over production, Chinese state capital pursues stable physical production and sustainable mining practices. In the mining industry, for example, Chinese state capital maintained a productionist orientation for the long-term, stable production of copper ore. By comparison, global private capital holds a trader mentality by pursuing short-term profit from processing copper for sale. However, there are cross-industry variations even when both industries receive Chinese state capital: the mining workers are better off than the construction workers because of inherent sectoral differences in the organization of work, the relative strength of unionism, and the government’s differential strategic emphasis.
Third, global private capital and Chinese state capital generate distinct ethoses of management: the former features individualistic careerism while the latter is characterized by collective asceticism. As embodied in the “China House”—a dorm building where Chinese employees live together—there is a collective rhythm of everyday life in the Chinese firm. Infused with individuals’ moral compulsion and corporate control imperatives, Chinese work ethics and culture have caused both praise and misunderstanding from Zambian workers.
Lee further situates her empirical findings at the intersection of two theoretical traditions: Karl Polanyi’s primacy of politics (i.e., economic activities are embedded in politics at multiple levels and are shaped by ongoing double movements), and William Sewell Jr.’s eventful capitalism (i.e., capitalism is a contingent, open-ended, and transformative event). Lee reconciles the tension between these two approaches by recognizing “the dialectical relationship between capitalism’s self-reinforcing, abstract, expansive logic and its hypereventful history” (p. 10). She further solves the theoretical gap by employing the extended case method, which enables her to make general claims from ethnographic fieldwork by connecting micro-level processes to macro-level structures of global capitalism.
In doing so, Lee offers persuasive theoretical insights different from three mainstream interpretations of Chinese state capitalism: institutionalists’ “varieties of capitalism” thesis, structuralist Marxism, and liberals’ neo-colonialism interpretation. Above all, Lee disagrees with institutionalists for their path-dependence, equilibrium model and their methodological nationalism. To Lee, the key here is not the distinctiveness of American, Japanese, or Chinese capitalism; rather, it is the distinction of capital within a single global capitalism. In particular, “China in Africa” has to be contextualized within the global dynamic of capitalism by going beyond methodological nationalism and China’s geographical boundaries. However, Lee also opposes the structural determinism of Marxian scholarship that considers China’s economic mode as inevitable repetition of old cycles of capital accumulation. This structural determinism, according to Lee, overlooks the eventful, open-ended nature of capitalism in the present as well as in the past. Finally, Lee argues against the narrative about China’s empire-building and neo-colonialism in Africa, a narrative that is popular in both western media and liberal scholarship. In her opinion, this narrative not only lacks sufficient evidence, but is also unable to capture the drivers and dynamics of Chinese economic initiatives in Africa.
A keen reader may raise some concerns about Lee’s book, nevertheless. While the ideal-type method empowers Lee to make sharp comparisons and to construct logically consistent claims, readers might doubt whether such contrast is clear-cut in reality, considering that really existing capitals are often hybrid and have all been socialized in the stock market. In addition, although the extended case study can link the micro and macro levels, some of Lee’s conclusions have not been substantiated because of the insufficient analysis of macro-level forces, such as the Chinese state’s capacity to coordinate different industries in favor of China’s strategic interests. At this point, an ethnographic study might reach its limits. Finally, while Lee has presented cross-industry variations to avoid oversimplification, readers may still be concerned about the generalization of her findings: to what extent can these findings be applied to other social-spatial settings, to other industries, and to other African countries?
That being said, Lee does not simply portray an optimistic picture. Precisely because of the eventful nature of capitalism, Lee claims it is unclear whether Chinese state capital will bring about added value, industrialization, or development in Zambia. Likewise, China’s accommodations to Zambian interests do not necessarily secure its success in achieving its encompassing goals to optimize profits, seek political influence, and gain access to ore. After all, the existing achievements and current trends can be derailed and reversed in the highly volatile and contingent world of global capitalism.
To date, Lee’s book has been the most theoretically lucid, analytically fine-grained, empirically sophisticated, and methodologically solid book surrounding the theme of “China in Africa.” While some earlier studies have provided continent-wide accounts of China’s economic activities in Africa, Lee’s book offers a thorough theoretical framework to understand the causes and consequences of such activities. A must-read for anyone who has interest in the relationship between China and Africa, this book has also made refreshing contributions to global and transnational sociology, sociology of development, and sociology of labor.