Abstract
In The End of the Cognitive Empire: The Coming of Age of Epistemologies of the South, Boaventura de Sousa Santos engages with ongoing efforts to decolonize knowledge and academia. Santos pursues three objectives: he joins efforts to challenge the primacy of western-modern scientific knowledge by considering other forms of knowledge as equally valid; explains the concepts and methods of the “epistemologies of the south”; and analyzes experiences from the epistemic south that have challenged capitalism, colonialism, and patriarchy. These objectives belong to a twofold struggle against epistemicide (or the practice of disregarding non-western, non-scientific knowledge) and against exclusion and oppression. The volume is overarching in scope and approach, and perhaps for this reason, it falls short of addressing the complexities entailed in some of the experiences it relies on for the analysis. The author also misses key opportunities to engage with western scientific knowledge, especially with social movements theory, or to discuss similar contemporary efforts to decolonize knowledge within academia. Doing so would have strengthened Santos’s argument on how collaborations between activists and thinkers from the North and South take place.
Santos taps his concept of the abyssal line to build his argument. This line divides two epistemic worlds, modern and colonial, and is also the primary source of exclusion between (abyssal exclusions) and within (non-abyssal exclusions) these worlds. As one of many outcomes, these exclusions determine the unequal treatment of knowledge produced in the South and the North. Indeed, those who inhabit the North assume their experiences and forms of knowledge as universal. Consequently, they are unable to see the abyssal line that separates them from the South. Inhabitants of the South, on the contrary, are overly aware of the line, given that their knowledge is often disregarded by those who inhabit the North because it does not meet with the standards of western science.
The epistemologies of the South can interrupt this “abyssal order” by validating and putting into practice alternative forms of knowledge. This process consists of making visible, strengthening, and producing counterhegemonic knowledge (through the sociology of absences and the sociology of emergences) that is not only written or individual, but also experiential, collective, sensual, or oral. Through intercultural translation, these forms of knowledge give life to the ecologies of knowledges, which then inform the artisanship of practices, or the strategies and methods of struggle that individuals use to fight against colonial, capitalist, and patriarchal domination.
Santos divides this process into three sections. In the first one (Chapters 1 to 5), “Postabyssal Epistemologies,” he elucidates the main concepts of the epistemologies of the South and situates the latter within the literature on decolonial thinking. This section provides useful discussions on thinkers and activists from both the epistemic North and South who have problematized the idea of the superiority of western modern science. The author finds that while intellectuals from the North (i.e., Bourdieu and Foucault) have challenged the primacy of western scientific knowledge only partially, scholars and activists from the South have gone much further as they have challenged the structures that sustain this primacy. Contributions on decolonization (e.g., Quijano, Lugones, Maldonado-Torres, Fanon, Mignolo, and Walsh) and open criticisms to western scientific knowledge (i.e., Gandhi and Cabral) are significant in these efforts.
In the second section, “Postabyssal Methodologies” (Chapters 6 to 9), Santos proposes the concept of epistemological imagination, which is based on C. Wright Mills’s sociological imagination. Unlike its predecessor, the epistemological imagination challenges the primacy of western science, mainly by fostering cooperation among different forms of knowledge. This cooperation takes the form of an epistemic minga, a term Santos borrows from the indigenous Quechua term minga (which refers to voluntary and collective work for the social good). As a variation of the ecologies of knowledge, the epistemic minga builds upon non-extractive methodologies, eliminates the division between objects and subjects of study, and validates knowledge that pursues common goals.
In the final section, on “Postabyssal Pedagogies” (Chapters 10 to 12), Santos draws connections among struggles from the South and the North. Specifically, he uses the work and actions of Gandhi in India, Paulo Freire in Brazil, and Orlando Fals Borda in Colombia to demonstrate their potential to inform struggles against oppression and decolonization of academic institutions across the globe. Santos, for instance, refers to the factual collaborations that took place between Gandhians and black North American activists from the Civil Rights movement, as well as the shared objectives against colonialism and extractivism of the movement led by Gandhi in the 1920s and current Andean indigenous movements in Latin America. The section concludes by highlighting the potential of the pedagogical approach of Freire and the participatory action research proposed by Fals Borda to decolonize academic institutions and also to fight oppression.
Overall, Santos privileges scope over depth, which at times leads him to only touch on the surface of the phenomena he analyzes. For instance, when explaining the nature of abyssal exclusions, he relies on three hypothetical examples of racial, religious, and gendered exclusion (p. 22). While such examples resonate with extant forms of exclusion, they highlight an approach that overlooks the complexities of the phenomena in question. Such distance leaves aside the lived experiences of actors themselves, something that becomes apparent in Santos’s praise for the indigenous Quechua-Aymara term for “good living,” incorporated in the Bolivian and Ecuadorian constitutions. While the author acknowledges that these governments contradict their vows to respect the environment by the continued exploitation of natural resources, the author does not address the contested origins and appropriations of “good living” for political purposes. Moreover, he does not analyze how indigenous peoples experience and engage (or not) with the term both in Bolivia and Ecuador, or in neighboring Peru.
This lack of depth in the analysis goes along with missed opportunities to weave in knowledge produced in the North and the South. Consequently, questions such as how or why critical knowledge from the North completely fails to challenge the structures of domination, or how Santos’s argument engages with similar efforts to decolonize knowledge from the North and South, remain unanswered. For instance, on the first point, Santos’s analysis of the role that memory plays in future struggles, which he denominates “knowledges born in struggles” (p. 131), could have enriched social movements’ debates on repertoires of contention, collective framing, or cognitive liberation. On the second point, Santos misses engaging with similar efforts to decolonize knowledge in academia such as the Otros Saberes/Other Knowledge initiative from the Latin American Studies Association. Engaging with these debates and efforts would have significantly enhanced his argument on the potential that collaborations between the North and South hold to fight oppression.
Despite these limitations, the volume offers a thorough map of ongoing conversations and struggles to move decolonization further. Graduate students and scholars interested in a general overview of these topics or the global connections of social movements will find this book useful. Santos’s perseverance in challenging the primacy of western-modern scientific knowledge, his synthesis of the decolonization literature to situate the epistemologies of the South, and his efforts to connect struggles and ideas to fight against oppression born in different moments and places all make this book a welcome addition to the literature on decolonization.