Abstract

In Precarious Lives: Job Insecurity and Well-Being in Rich Democracies, I sought to explain the recent rise in precarious work in rich democracies and how this affects peoples’ experiences of job and economic insecurity, their transition to adulthood, and their subjective well-being in countries with dissimilar institutions and cultures. I examined these questions by studying six countries that differed in their labor market and social welfare protection institutions. I also outlined some of the policies needed to address some of the major challenges related to precarious work and lives. These are big and complex questions, which is reflected in the diversity of issues raised by the contributors to this symposium.
I thank Steve Vallas for organizing the symposium and the first-rate scholars who have weighed in on various topics raised by the book. These scholars have identified some of the gaps in my arguments that need to be fleshed out in order to reach a fuller understanding of how people in the different countries have responded to the challenges created by the recent rise of precarious work. Their insightful comments form an agenda for future research on work, inequality, and social welfare and point to themes that should be included in any sequel to Precarious Lives. Here, I expand on four general themes raised by these authors: gender and race differences in precarious work; the role of culture in shaping the experience and meaning of precarious work; precarious work and technological and organizational changes; and public policies to address precarious work.
Overview of Precarious Lives
My analysis of precarious work and lives was based on six rich democracies: Denmark, Germany, Japan, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These represent different types of employment and production regimes that are identified by theories of the varieties of capitalism and power resources. These countries display the institutional variations that differentiate political economies and shape the organization of work and how it is experienced by groups and individuals. My research design represents a compromise between studies of specific countries or regions (which limits generality) and large numbers of countries, sometimes represented by typologies (which hinders a deeper understanding of country dynamics). My choice of these six countries was also influenced by my previous knowledge and experience; I could of course have made other choices, such as including other interesting cases such as France, or, for example, substituting Italy for Spain, or South Korea for Japan. My focus on precarious work as the main source of insecurity also reflects my longstanding emphasis on the centrality of paid work to individuals, families, and societies. This is not to downplay other sources of risk and insecurity in these societies that have not been at the forefront of my analysis, however, such as precarious housing, political turmoil, climate change, and so on.
I supported empirically my cross-national, multi-level arguments about institutions and precarious work and lives by quantitative data obtained from surveys of individuals and statistical indicators of country-level spending on labor market and welfare policies and of worker power. This empirical approach enabled me to compare countries on key dimensions of their political economies. Cultural influences figured in the argument indirectly through ideologies such as neoliberalism or gender divisions of labor. Nevertheless, the subjective understandings of workers received short shrift in my analysis, as survey questions are limited in illuminating workers’ experiences and expectations, which are better approached by in-depth information obtained from individuals in particular settings.
Gender and Race Differences in Precarious Lives
My theoretical argument, grounded in the political economy of these countries, focuses more on the structure of paid work than on workers. The liberalization of labor markets and the rise of precarious work has been particularly dramatic for (white, native) men, who were the main beneficiaries of labor protections in the post-World War II era and thus have experienced the biggest loss in privilege as these labor protections have been eroded. Women and workers of color have always been in a more precarious position, though they too of course have suffered from a dramatic growth of insecurity.
A gender lens offers a more complete understanding of the recent rise of precarious work and its impact on individuals and families; precarious work affects men and women differently, as Joya Misra and Allison Pugh point out. Looking at precarious work through a gender lens puts families and social reproduction at the center of the analysis and expands the focus to unpaid as well as paid work. Thus, welfare protection systems have provided more collective support for social reproduction in some countries than others, through parental leave and other flexible working arrangements (e.g., Denmark). Some countries (e.g., Denmark, Japan, Germany) have incentivized part-time work for women more than others, facilitating their balancing work and family.
Race matters more in some countries than others (e.g., Blacks and Whites in the United States), depending in part on the racial diversity and history of race relations in the country. But all countries are faced with labor force issues related to ethnicity, and especially immigration, making the distinction between natives and the foreign-born especially relevant. For example, Denmark and Japan are fairly unwelcoming to the integration of immigrants into the labor force. The United States and the United Kingdom are the most ethnically diverse countries and have higher fertility rates due to greater numbers of immigrants.
Culture, Precarious Work, and Well-Being
My narrative focuses more on the structure of paid work than on the cultures of work in the different countries. I touched on culture indirectly in various ways—for example, when discussing gender ideologies and patriarchal arrangements. Culture is also important to my discussions of the transition to adulthood and family formation and of subjective well-being.
Nevertheless, a more robust conception of culture than I have presented would illuminate how people experience precarious work and lives, as Elena Ayala-Hurtado and Michèle Lamont, Allison Pugh, and Woody Powell point out. Expectations are vital to more deeply understand workers’ subjective experiences of job and economic insecurity and how they define their futures. A cultural lens that emphasizes the voices of workers and their families would provide a richer appreciation of what people understand to be possible. For example, people in the United States are likely to have relatively low expectations about having a secure job and so may be relatively satisfied with their quality of life regardless of their objective level of job insecurity.
Cultural shifts also help to explain how people have adapted to how work is organized in various periods. As Powell points out, our enthusiasm for the “Golden Age” of capitalism in the three decades after World War II is dampened somewhat when we recall that the standard employment relationship of that era was exemplified by the idea of the conforming “organization man.” By contrast, the current excitement and celebrations of entrepreneurship represent a cultural shift that supports emerging forms of relations between individuals and organizations, such as independent contractors who work for gig economy platforms.
Technological and Organizational Changes and Precarious Work
Technological changes are an important part of the explanation for changes in the nature and arrangements of work. I argued that digitalization facilitates the kinds of global connections among countries and organizations that create greater pressures on employers to compete in global markets by cutting costs and obtaining greater efficiencies. I said relatively little, however, about precarious work and topics related to technology moving forward, such as automation or artificial intelligence. While technological advances and innovation are inexorable, the form technologies take and the uses to which they are put involve choices made by employers, workers, and political actors.
How automation and digitalization will affect precarious work depends on the organizational contexts within which these technologies are used. This underscores the utility of looking at precarious work through an organizational lens, as Powell points out. My discussion made a number of assumptions about organizations at the meso level of analysis, such as how employers responded to the liberalization of labor markets. But I did not analyze these organizational differences explicitly, a gap that could be filled by exploiting the increasing number of matched employer-employee data sets that are now becoming available for many countries.
Recently, attention has focused on the emergence of the platform economy, which provides a governance mechanism for organizing work that is different from markets, hierarchies, or networks (for a review, see Vallas and Schor 2020). This organizational form is fairly recent but has grown rapidly and illustrates the application of digital technologies to the control of “independent contractors” who are only loosely tied to organizations. The platform economy provides numerous advantages for employers, while having both advantages and drawbacks for workers. These mixed outcomes are reflected in the varieties of cultural discourse about the pros and cons of the platform economy and the many unanswered questions about its future, which Powell ably summarizes.
An organizational lens also helps to anticipate new ways in which precarious workers may be able to acquire power and greater security. For example, SMart-Belgium is a cooperative that was established over 20 years ago to support freelance artists but has been extended to those in other occupations, and it is part of the global Platform Cooperative Movement (Charles, Ferreras, and Lamine 2020). This organizational form seeks to increase earners’ autonomy and job and economic security.
Precarious Lives and Public Policies
The most fundamental policy implication of my arguments is the imperative to decouple economic security from one’s labor market activity and the type of work arrangement one has, whether employed by a “good” organization or self-employed. This is essential in order to help workers navigate the increasingly uncertain landscape of work in the future as well as to be able to expand our conception of work beyond paid market work.
An old idea that has recently received increased attention is the Universal Basic Income (UBI) for all legal residents of a country. The idea behind this policy is the provision of a universal, unconditional, regular, government-funded income that would provide a basic level of economic security. UBI’s appeal has been enhanced by fears that automation will eliminate many jobs as well as the high unemployment rate due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, it is controversial for economic, political, and cultural reasons, and it is unclear how it would work on a large scale. Objections to the UBI are that it redistributes value that has already been created in society, that it may be an excuse to cut back on other forms of social welfare protections, and that it may alleviate pressures to regulate employers and the quality of work. While the idea of universality is appealing, one wonders whether the design of policy programs such as this should be tweaked for different groups within the population. A means test based on income, for example, might target funds to those who most need it rather than to those who are already economically secure.
Conclusions
The rise of precarious work has created uncertainty and insecurity for large portions of the workforce in all countries. The extent to which precarious work translates into precarious lives depends largely on the social and legal protections that are linked to particular work arrangements. My account in Precarious Lives of the liberalization of labor markets in six rich democracies emphasized how this differed depending on how employers organized production and on labor’s power resources. My multi-level argument sought to link macro features of countries to the meso-level organization of work and ultimately to outcomes at the individual, micro level. Given the complexity of these connections, it is not surprising that there were gaps in my narrative. I am grateful to the contributors to this symposium for identifying and elaborating on some of the key next steps in studying precarious lives.
First, we need to understand how precarious work affects men and women differently and the implications of this for families and social reproduction. Second, more of a cultural lens would enhance our appreciation of how structures and cultures interact to produce differences in both the objective and subjective nature of work. More in-depth studies of organizations and workers would provide more insight into the expectations and experiences of workers. Third, we need more of an organizational lens, a meso perspective to complement the macro perspective I presented. This offers a fruitful area of research, as there is increasing availability of multi-national linked employer-employee data as well as opportunities for numerous deep dives into particular organizations and their members. Finally, we need to figure out ways to decommodify workers, so as to separate the nature of the work arrangement from basic social protections such as health care, unemployment insurance, retirement benefits, and other social welfare protections.
The current COVID-19 pandemic has magnified precarious lives. High rates of unemployment and insecure work have strained countries’ finances and threatened the social welfare protections people need more than ever. Enhancing job and economic security constitutes an even greater, more central challenge for countries now than when the book was written.
