Abstract
As a candidate, Michelle Bachelet asserted that hers would be a citizens’ government. This gave the impression that she would create a favorable climate for social actors such as the Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (Unitary Workers’ Federation–CUT) to participate in the policy-making process. Instead, while the government treated the federation as labor’s representative both for negotiating the minimum wage and for reaching agreements in important labor conflicts, these gains took place in a context in which the federation’s action served the government’s interests. In contrast to the situation under previous Concertación governments, the federation, like most social actors, was only allowed to express its points of view before the advisory commissions of technocrats that were entrusted with the responsibility of making policy. Paradoxically, however, the outcome was more favorable for its interests because of the disposition, at least discursively, of Bachelet’s government to move forward on matters that the CUT had long considered “pending issues.”
Como candidata, Michelle Bachelet acertó que el suyo sería un gobierno ciudadano. Esto dio la impresión de que crearía un clima favorable para los actores sociales como la Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (CUT) para que participen en el proceso de la toma de decisiones. En vez, mientras el gobierno trataba con la federación como representante laboral en negociaciones sobre el salario mínimo y en acuerdos en importantes conflictos laborales, estos avances tomaron lugar en un contexto en donde las acciones de la federación servían al interés del gobierno. Contrastándose con la situación en previos gobiernos concertacionistas, la federación, a igual que otros actores sociales, solo se le permitía expresar sus puntos frente comisiones de asesoro en donde se confiaba la responsabilidad en la toma de decisiones a los tecnócratas. Paradójicamente y sin embargo el resultado fue mas favorable a sus intereses por causa de la disposición, por lo menos divagadora, del gobierno de Bachelet en avanzar en materia que la CUT había considerado por largo tiempo como “asuntos pendientes.”
Around 2005, as a candidate buoyed by popular support as demonstrated in public opinion polls, Michelle Bachelet asserted that hers would be a citizens’ government. This discourse, which has been criticized for its lack of content, reflects the attempt of the then-candidate and later president to take advantage of the autonomy from political parties that her popularity in the polls conferred. The preference for citizen participation over the influence of technocrats in policy making was a hallmark of her campaign.
In conjunction with this promise of a citizens’ government, expressed in the “Agenda for Citizen Participation” (Aguilera, 2007), the then-presidential candidate made other statements giving the impression that she would create a favorable climate for social actors such as the Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (Unitary Workers’ Federation—CUT), the principal labor federation, to participate in the policy-making process. In the specific case of the union federation, this optimistic view was based on the fact that during her campaign she expressed her desire to improve working conditions and reform the pension system. In addition, upon taking office she appointed as minister of labor the Socialist Osvaldo Andrade, who advanced an agenda favorable to union interests.
This article assesses the situation of the CUT under the Bachelet administration and argues that the balance sheet was paradoxical. Whereas the government treated the federation as labor’s representative both for negotiating the minimum wage and for reaching agreements in important labor conflicts, these gains took place in a context in which the CUT’s action served the government’s interests. Furthermore, in the area of policy discussion, “the Bachelet style”—creating presidential advisory commissions on public policy issues—meant a serious setback for the federation. In contrast to the situation under previous Concertación governments, in which the CUT was recognized as an actor to be included in setting the labor agenda, under Bachelet the federation, like most social actors, was only allowed to express its points of view before the advisory commissions of technocrats whom Bachelet entrusted with the responsibility of making policy. Thus, beyond the weakness attributable to the neoliberal model, the federation found itself limited by its political dependence on the Concertación.
The Cut 1953–1990
The Central Única de Trabajadores (Sole Workers’ Federation—CUT), as the federation was originally named, arose in 1953, after years of division between communist and socialist union sectors had brought about the demise of the Confederación de Trabajadores de Chile (Confederation of Chilean Workers) in 1946. Until 1973, the CUT played an active role in Chilean politics, seeking to incorporate into state policy the issues that it considered fundamental, such as improving workers’ working and living conditions, indexing wages to the cost of living, stabilizing the cost of subsistence and housing, revaluing the currency, increasing the purchasing power of wages, promoting full employment policies, protecting female and young workers, and defending the democratic regime as a guarantor of stronger labor organization, labor law reform, and the CUT’s participation in the institutions of social security (Barría, 1971: 52–55).
Although the foregoing shows the CUT’s participation in the political system and its recognition by governments from Carlos Ibáñez del Campo (1952–1958) to Salvador Allende (1970–1973), it was not until the latter took power that the federation achieved legal recognition and an increased role in the political system (Angell, 1993: 76). During the Unidad Popular (Popular Unity) era the CUT found that the popular government shared its vision of the path to follow. Therefore it made progress in signing collective bargaining agreements on wages and in creating tripartite commissions that sought to increase workers’ participation in the administration of businesses (Barría, 1978: 115). The CUT was also among the strongest pillars of the Allende government, with great power to mobilize workers in defense of the overall UP political economic project of a democratic transition to socialism.
The fall of Allende was a blow not only to democracy, political parties, and the Chilean left but also to the labor organization. The CUT was persecuted and banned along with the rest of the political organizations of the left. However, the dictatorship’s actions against the federation were not limited to the political sphere. The neoliberal revolution advanced by the Pinochet dictatorship (1973–1990) created an economic boom in the mid-1980s and 1990s, but, as Peter Winn (2004) has shown, the “economic miracle” had its victims: workers paid the price of a model that made work contingent, cut social benefits, and made collective organization and action by workers impossible. The labor law that took effect in 1979 created a multitude of problems for forming unions and carrying out union work, preventing them from serving as sites for making economic demands. The dictatorship imposed an economic model that deprived the federation of the resources it needed to achieve its goals.
Perhaps more important was the effect of the neoliberal revolution on the possibilities for union action in the following decades. Neoliberalism increased unemployment and underemployment and reduced the size of the manufacturing, construction, mining, and state sectors, where unions were traditionally strong. Furthermore, the enactment of labor legislation, known as the Plan Laboral (Labor Plan), proposed in 1979 by Minister of Labor José Piñera impeded the formation of unions, which were increasingly weakened as workers’ representatives (Rojas, 2007; on its effects, see Lear and Collins, 1995). The new institutional arrangements represented a serious obstacle for the union movement. The decentralization of negotiations over wages and working conditions made it almost impossible for unions to act at an industry-wide level (Taylor, 2006: 160). The voluntary nature of union membership and the unions’ ineffectiveness caused unionization levels to plummet. In 1986, approximately 14 percent of workers were union members. This increased to 22 percent at the start of the transition but fell to 10 percent by 2000 (Drake, 2003: 151).
Even though the union movement was at a disadvantage in the 1980s in terms of economic representation, being just a shadow of the social force it had represented before 1973 (Nef, 2003: 20), it played an important role in activating and organizing the opposition to the Pinochet dictatorship. In May 1983 the Confederación de Trabajadores de Cobre (Confederation of Copper Workers–CTC) organized one of the first demonstrations against the government. The copper workers—who had already expressed their rejection of the dictatorship in 1977 through a demonstration at the El Teniente mine—became the base for organizing workers into the Comando Nacional de Trabajadores (National Workers’ Command), which in 1988 became the new CUT (Angell, 1993: 119–121).
The Government-Union Relationship
The transition to democracy that began in 1990 was shaped by a series of issues, some conjunctural and others related to the character of the state and the neoliberal model, that affected the relationship between the Concertación governments and the CUT during the 20 years in which the coalition governed Chile. The governments of Patricio Aylwin, Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, Ricardo Lagos, and Michelle Bachelet had to confront the tensions that arose between democratization and the neoliberal economic model (Bresnahan, 2003: 3) and between responding to social demands and meeting the requirements for capital accumulation (Taylor, 2004: 77).
Chile experienced a pacted transition after the dictatorship, and its opponents reached a basic consensus. The Concertación committed itself to respecting the neoliberal economic program and maintaining the human rights amnesty that benefited the military. In other words, it accepted an economic model that generated economic polarization in order to avoid a political crisis that might either cause the military to act against democracy or mobilize the opposition of the national and transnational interests that benefited from the neoliberal model (Bresnahan, 2003: 5–6). To avoid placing the transition at risk, it imposed the rationale of progress “to the degree possible.” This involved not only excessive caution in dealing with the military and in the treatment of human rights violations but also replication of the economic policies of the dictatorship and the subjugation and co-optation of social movements.
These conjunctural aspects are not the only factors to be considered in order to understand the relationship between the Concertación governments and the CUT. The analysis should also take into account the economic policies of postdictatorship Chile, especially labor policies, grounded in capitalist state theory (see Taylor, 2004). The state’s role, given its interdependence with capitalist development (Block, 1980; Jessop, 2007; Offe, 1984), is to protect and reproduce the structures of capitalist societies, creating suitable economic conditions and mediating the class struggle (Barrow, 1993: 51). Specifically, the state performs a series of technical-economic, ideological, and political functions intended to facilitate capitalist reproduction and capital accumulation (Poulantzas, 1978: 48; Offe, 1984: 120–121). To do so, it utilizes a series of institutional mechanisms and practices that allow it to advance certain class interests and obstruct others. In this context, only some strategies and narratives consistent with the capitalist character of the state and its maintenance of current material conditions and social relations have the possibility of penetrating the state and becoming policy (Jessop, 2007: 46–47, 50, 127).
Specific features of the transition process as well as the essential characteristics of a capitalist state meant that popular participation was affected. First, the threat of military intervention was present for almost a decade, until Pinochet’s arrest in London in 1998 (see Nef, 2003). In the resulting elitist management of the transition, the emergence of autonomous popular movements was viewed as a problem. In response, participation was restricted to the electoral sphere, social demands were moderated, and the political leadership co-opted social groups (Oxhorn, 1994: 51, 57). In this context, parties that before 1973 had channeled social demands, such as the Socialists and the Christian Democrats, were transformed into exclusionary rather than inclusive institutions whose function seemed to be to protect the transition’s restricted democracy (Olavarría, 2003: 10).
Second, neoliberalism not only restructured the institutions necessary for capitalist reproduction but also acted politically and ideologically. Chilean society was characterized by depoliticization, individualism, and the triumph of the private sector over the state. The result was the dismantling of class relations and collective actions at the same time that social identities were increasingly based on consumption patterns (Taylor, 2006: 6–7, 199). In the sphere of state action, although during the past 20 years policies intended to reduce poverty were implemented, neoliberal assumptions became the dominant discourse in policy discussion and in measuring what was valid and possible in meeting social demands. Thus, social movements whose demands contradicted the neoliberal model were unable to translate their interests into actual policies. Similarly, although social spaces expanded, including innovative ones like the Internet, participation remained extremely limited and in many cases was restricted to a merely advisory role (see Araya and Barría, 2010; Araya, Barría, and Campos, 2009; Araya, Barría, and Drouillas, 2009). Neoliberalism did not entirely nullify the CUT’s role in political debate, and the federation was recognized by the Concertación governments as an important actor in discussions about labor policy. Nonetheless, it did limit the federation’s ability to influence that debate.
The Cut and the Concertación 1990–2006
Despite its weakening during the dictatorship, the CUT was an actor that, although in a limited and not highly effective way, participated in the discussion of labor policies during the 20 years of Concertación government. Workers also played an important role in the transition to democracy, since their willingness to collaborate in this process, even at the cost of concessions on labor demands, helped create favorable conditions for the success of the transition. The federation adopted a collaborative and proactive strategy reflected in its willingness to negotiate with the Confederación de la Producción y el Comercio (Confederation of Production and Commerce—CPC), the main business organization in the country, and to sign protocols of agreement (Uggla, 2000: 119, 160). This attitude, unthinkable before 1973, took concrete form in subsequent years in the tripartite agreements known as “frameworks” signed in 1990, 1991, 1992, and 1993 (Díaz-Corvalán, 1993).
For the CUT, this option had a political objective, since the union leadership, dependent on the governing parties (Uggla, 2000: 116), believed that democratic consolidation should be prioritized during the early years of the transition. To that end, the Spanish example, in which the democratic transition was aided by reaching broad agreements between labor and business—the well-known Moncloa Agreements—was considered a viable alternative for Chile (Rozas, 2007).
In recognition of this attitude, the Concertación treated the CUT deferentially. It invited the federation to participate in developing its first program of government, although only as a sectoral actor in the area of labor relations (Posner, 2008: 51–52; Uggla, 2000: 121), and the governments of Aylwin, Frei Ruiz-Tagle, and Lagos considered it a valid interlocutor in labor matters. In view of the CUT’s weakness, resulting from the dictatorship’s actions, its dependence on political parties, and its inability to influence political decision making (Taylor, 2004: 85), it is evident that the governments “subsidized” the federation, giving it an importance in policy discussion greater than its ability to exert pressure. This is because the federation, except for a short time toward the end of the 1990s, was dominated by leaders from the governing parties such as the Christian Democrats and the Socialists and because these governments needed a legitimate interlocutor to represent labor.
Since the role of the CUT up through the Lagos administration has been well studied (see, e.g., Araya, Barría, and Drouillas, 2009; Campero, 2007; Frank, 2000; 2002; Taylor, 2004; 2006; Uggla, 2000), after a brief review of the first three Concertación governments our analysis will center on the Bachelet administration.
The Cut and President Aylwin
At the start of the transition to democracy, the government of Patricio Aylwin (1990–1994) made a series of gestures toward the federation to ensure its participation in agreements to reform labor legislation. It promoted reforms that did not fundamentally alter the arrangements inherited from the dictatorship but did seek to improve labor’s ability to negotiate with business (Taylor, 2004: 77; see also Araya, Barría, and Drouillas, 2009; Campero, 2007; Frank, 2000; 2002; Posner, 2008; Rojas, 2007; Taylor, 2006). These changes were limited and left pending issues that the CUT wanted addressed, among them permitting collective bargaining at the supraenterprise level (Campero, 2007; El Mercurio, January 6, 1995). In January 1995 the president of the CUT, Manuel Bustos, made clear the federation’s position that establishing supraenterprise-level collective bargaining should be the new legislative priority. Furthermore, he opposed fining businesses for unfair labor practices and maintained that in these cases fired workers should be rehired (El Mercurio, January 6, 1995).
The Cut and President Frei Ruiz-Tagle
During the second half of the 1990s the federation distanced itself from the government of Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994–2000) and began to pressure for a series of reforms important for the organization’s interests such as collective and interenterprise bargaining. In 1995 the government attempted to advance a new labor reform project that incorporated several issues that were priorities for the CUT, especially collective bargaining. In addition it included eliminating business’s ability to replace workers after offering a raise indexed to inflation, instituting a benefit to workers equivalent to 30 days’ pay after the end of a labor dispute, and requiring employers to justify their rejection of union demands (Frank, 2000: 77). The project failed because of rejection by the right despite the government’s efforts to reach an agreement among the CUT, the CPC, and the various political sectors represented in Congress (Campero, 2007: 30; Frank, 2000: 77).
The attempt to reach an agreement between labor and business made it clear that the CUT was still an actor with which the government needed to negotiate. However, the federation’s failure to have its demands met created discontent and an attitude change within the organization. It abandoned the strategy of moderation for the sake of the transition for a more radical one. Additionally, Arturo Martínez, who became CUT president in 2000, had formed an alliance with the Partido Comunista (Communist Party—PC) in 1996 (Frank, 2002: 56; Posner, 2008: 54; Taylor, 2006: 165). The end of the tacit agreement with the Concertación for union moderation and the emergence of the PC did not translate into an increase in the CUT’s ability to exert pressure, since the unfavorable context for union action remained unchanged. Another important factor was the PC’s exclusion from Congress from 1990 to 2010. Isolated outside the political system in a social context of low political participation and mobilization, with limited access to the mass media and neoliberal discourse as a filter, the Communists were unable to participate in political debate, and this directly affected the CUT by depriving it of channels of influence. 1
The Cut and President Lagos
During the Lagos administration (2000–2006), although the CUT continued to participate in discussions of reform, it abandoned its passivity and began to take to the streets to carry out national work stoppages. At the start of Lagos’s presidency, the CUT’s change of attitude toward the Concertación governments constituted an obstacle to his inviting the federation and the CPC to a tripartite round table aimed at an agreement on the fundamental elements of the labor reforms that the government planned to introduce. When it created this forum for dialogue, the government sought to form three technical commissions with representatives from both sectors in which agreed-upon legislative proposals with regard to collective bargaining, labor rights, and types of hiring could be discussed (El Mercurio, June 23, 2000). These approaches were not successful, and the government presented its own project for increasing workers’ individual and union rights (Campero, 2007). The labor reform of 2001 incorporated into the legislation International Labor Organization (ILO) agreements that strengthened union action such as establishing paid time for union officials to conduct union business (fuero sindical), nullifying firings involving antiunion practices, and allowing union mergers (Núñez and Aravena, 2005).
In 2001 the president gave top priority on his labor agenda to establishing the labor flexibility that would make Chile competitive in the “modern world.” Simultaneously the CPC asserted that one of the main problems to be addressed was the ability of the Dirección de Trabajo (Directorate of Labor) to require rehiring workers who had been fired during strikes. In turn, CUT President Martínez criticized business leaders for placing economic interests above social justice in labor issues and the government for always finding excuses not to make progress on labor policy. He emphasized that if Lagos’s reform package did not establish collective bargaining and the unrestricted right to strike, it would not modernize labor relations (Frank, 2002: 52–53). The labor flexibility agenda was not implemented clearly and decisively. On the contrary, the government took contradictory positions. In August 2002 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) said that the Chilean labor market involved many costs related to hiring practices and therefore recommended moving forward with flexibilization. The government responded that it would move ahead on that issue only to the extent that agreements were reached between business and labor. Days later, Minister of Labor Ricardo Solari stated that labor flexibilization should be dealt with, while a government spokesman denied the existence of such a plan (El Mercurio, August 1, August 20, and August 31, 2002). The CUT responded by organizing a march in Santiago and other regions to reject the IMF proposals. This action had a political impact, since it had been a long time since the federation had mobilized other than for May 1 and it had the support of the president of the Socialist Party, Gonzalo Martner.
August 2002 made it clear that neither the majority of the Concertación’s congressional bloc nor the CUT would accept legislative proposals for labor flexibility. It was also evident that a diversity of opinion on the subject existed within the government and that Lagos was not willing to move forward on this issue at the cost of confronting his own congressional representatives and the federation. The CUT once again appeared as an actor whose support was required to modify labor legislation and that had succeeded in obtaining the support of the congressional members of the governing coalition.
The balance sheet for the 1990–2006 period shows that, despite its weakness in terms of political resources (Araya, Barría, and Drouillas, 2009), the CUT was recognized by the Concertación governments as an important actor when considering policies that affected workers’ interests. Under the Bachelet administration, in contrast, it was no longer considered a key actor but did achieve greater visibility in the public debate because of its mediating role when new labor conflicts arose.
The Cut and President Bachelet
Upon Michelle Bachelet’s taking office in 2006, the relationship between the government and the CUT changed radically. Labor issues were directly discussed, but the federation’s participation in policy discussions was reduced. Although the president began her term promising to open up opportunities for social participation, which made it seem that the CUT would enjoy a favorable environment for participating in policy discussions, the opposite occurred. In contrast to the governments of Aylwin, Frei, and Lagos, in which the CUT had a place at the bargaining table when labor policy was discussed, the Bachelet administration did not recognize it as an actor qualified to engage in policy development.
The New Turn in Labor Debate and Union Reactivation
Under the Bachelet administration, two changes occurred in the labor sphere. On one hand, discussion turned away from the efforts to achieve labor flexibility to a debate centered on strengthening the unions’ negotiating power. The key to this change was the appointment of Osvaldo Andrade as minister of labor. On the other hand, social protest was reactivated. With unusual frequency compared with the 1990–-2006 period, there were work stoppages and demonstrations by high school and university students, mortgage debtors, public employees, and subcontracted workers (see Ruiz in this issue), especially those of CODELCO, the world’s largest copper producer and the principal Chilean state enterprise, which was significant not only for its size but because its revenues constituted a major source of government revenue. The Chilean experience did not differ from what the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB, 2006) has identified as a tendency for union conflicts in Latin America to be centered on relationships between government employees and the state. These two factors worked in the CUT’s favor, since, as a result, the discussion of labor issues focused on themes and reform options that the federation had sought for the past 18 years, and, in addition, its role as interlocutor with the government was strengthened, at least insofar as the resolution of public employee strikes was concerned.
Bachelet’s naming Andrade minister of labor was innovative in two ways. First, previous presidents, in general, had appointed people with technical qualifications, usually with doctorates in economics, such as René Cortazar and José Pablo Arellano. In contrast, Andrade was a lawyer who had dedicated much of his professional career to labor issues. Second, until his appointment Andrade had been a just a mid-level actor in Chilean politics. Within a short time he became one of the most relevant political actors on the Chilean scene and brought to the fore a previously inconceivable labor agenda. Because President Bachelet put special emphasis, at least in her discourse, on the need to improve job quality, the minister had a margin for maneuver to turn the discussion of labor reform toward issues such as collective bargaining and stronger unions. Moreover, three days after beginning his term, during a meeting with the CUT’s Consejo Directivo Nacional (National Leadership Council), he laid to rest any possibility of an eventual labor flexibilization project (La Segunda, March 14, 2006). Reaffirming his agenda to business leaders, he asserted that it was necessary to make progress on expanding collective bargaining, increasing communication between labor and business, and creating institutionalized spaces for social dialogue. In addition, during discussion of a bill that sought to regulate subcontracting, he indicated that in no case could outsourcing mean diminishing labor rights (La Nación, March 31, 2006). Other labor issues discussed during Bachelet’s presidency, although never formalized in bills, were the prohibition of replacement of striking workers, increasing penalties for antiunion practices, and the creation of training programs for union leaders (La Nación, July 10, 2007).
With consideration of labor issues focused on those mentioned above, the CUT found itself in a more favorable environment compared with the intense discussion about labor flexibility during the Lagos administration. The change of agenda, however, resulted from the minister’s actions and not the federation’s agenda-setting capabilities. Nonetheless, the CUT was able to raise anew old demands such as expanding collective bargaining at the interenterprise level. The federation unsuccessfully sought legislation to require business owners to negotiate with all of their workers as a whole, not atomized into different work categories (El Mercurio, September 25, 2007).
Since the mid-2000s, a number of enterprise-level unions had succeeded in carrying out strikes that achieved public visibility. In this process, the copper workers played a fundamental role. The miners, especially the CODELCO workers, led the way for a large number of workers—among them the salmon and agricultural workers—who began to mobilize against the labor conditions existing in Chile since the imposition of the Labor Plan in 1979. Led by the young Communist CTC president Cristián Cuevas, the subcontracted workers at CODELCO carried out work stoppages beginning in 2005, when they took advantage of the presidential election to bring their problems and demands to public attention. It is interesting that this upsurge of labor conflicts was the product of organizing by workers who had been hired under forms of labor contingency such as subcontracting. We will not go into this issue at length, but it would be interesting to explore how these workers were able to organize despite the efforts of the system to suppress their ability to do so. We will simply agree with Arturo Martínez (La Nación, June 20, 2007) that one of the main changes in recent years has been the movement from organizational atomization to the formation of large unions, mainly of contingent workers, in various sectors of economy that have enabled them to exert pressure in the private sector. What we do want to highlight is the fact that the higher public profile of labor conflicts meant a repositioning of the CUT as the workers’ representative. The federation supported strikers in their mobilizations and called on the government to set the example as an employer and respect the labor laws (La Nación, June 26 and July 25, 2007).
Along with increased visibility supporting workers, the CUT took on the role of interlocutor with the government to resolve conflicts, especially in the public sector. Examples include the 2008 strike of CODELCO workers and the work stoppage of public employees in November 2007. The subcontracted workers, led by Cuevas, ended their mobilizations once the CUT, as their designated representative, succeeded in reaching an agreement with the government. Something comparable took place with the members of the Asociación Nacional de Empleados Fiscales (National Association of Government Employees—ANEF), who since 2007 had engaged in work stoppages every time that they had to negotiate pay raises. The ANEF allowed the CUT to serve as its interlocutor with the government, which, in the end, offered larger pay increases than those proposed before the stoppages. The events of recent years allowed the CUT to negotiate not only at the political level, as occurred in the 1990s, but also at the level of labor relations. In this respect, the federation improved its position in relation to the 1990s.
Social Actors Subordinated to Technocrats
Bachelet took office committed to changing the political operating principles that prevailed under the previous administrations. She promised gender parity, new faces in the government, and a citizens’ government in which social participation would have an important role (see Navia, 2009). This participation was formalized in the development of procedures for citizen participation within each ministry, the formation of management accountability councils (Araya and Barría, 2010), and the creation of a series of presidential advisory commissions responsible for presenting policy proposals in various areas. Bachelet believed that these bodies represented an expansion of social participation in public policy discussion. In her 2006 annual state-of-the-country address she declared: “How much easier it would have been, and perhaps faster, to give a handful of technocrats from the same political tendency the responsibility of writing a bill in a few days! But we wanted to do it differently, including more viewpoints, with the widest possible citizen participation. In this way, we clear away myths and reach consensus on diagnosing our problems” (Aguilera, 2007: 120).
It is paradoxical that these commissions ultimately wound up being bodies in which a handful of technocrats, not from any single political tendency but nonetheless having similar views on political and economic matters, formulated legislative proposals. Channeling and processing social demands, these groups of “technical experts” ended up performing a function that corresponded to that of political parties. This tendency resulted from the nature of Bachelet’s relationship with political parties. Her candidacy was not a project supported by the Concertación’s party leadership; instead it came from her excellent showing in public opinion polls (see Navia, 2009). This indicated a distant relationship between the candidate and the parties that became apparent when the president named her first cabinet without consulting party leaders. Without parties as her government’s base of support, Bachelet opted to draw on technocrats from think tanks such as Expansiva. 2 As a result, it has been argued, a technocratic stratum became a “structural component of Bacheletismo” (Silva, 2007: 101).
The main advisory commissions on social policy were those focused on reforming the pension system, developing child welfare policies, creating a consensus approach to educational reform, and issues of “work and equity.” The first and last dealt with issues that directly affected workers’ interests. Contrary to the president’s rhetoric, the pension reform commission, in particular, reduced the possibilities for participation by social actors such as the CUT. Neither the CUT nor business leaders were called in to reach consensus on a proposal. For the first time, a political decision to modify a private pension system based entirely on employee contributions was made without giving workers a voice.
The distinguishing feature of this commission was its composition. Its members were experts (academics or think-tank researchers), people with administrative experience in government, or representatives of interest groups. In general, they represented the ideas of the right and the Concertación. The selection of members balanced a technical criterion (selecting people with strong academic credentials, preferably doctorates) with the political one of representing all the sectors in Congress. It excluded those who had the requisite technical qualifications but viewed the pension problem from outside the dominant neoliberal perspective, among them the Communist Manuel Riesco. Of the pension commission’s 15 members, 13 were experts (as measured by holding a postgraduate degree), 6 had government administrative experience, and 2 represented interest groups (but not workers). Seven members came from think tanks. Concertación-affiliated think tanks with one representative each were Chile 21, CIEPLAN, and Proyectamerica, while Expansiva had two members. Two think tanks on the right, Libertad y Desarrollo (Liberty and Development) and the Centro de Estudios Públicos (Center of Public Studies), each had one representative (Aguilera, 2009: 25–30).
All members met periodically to discuss reform options, and in addition the “experts” held sessions with social actors who made proposals. Although union actors took part in 21 of 78 hearings, this did not mean the unfolding of a dialogue between “experts” and unionists, since the latter only made presentations based on topics already identified by the commission. Moreover, there was no mechanism for ensuring that these presentations be taken into account, and they were considered individually and voluntarily by each of the commission members (Aguilera, 2007). Thus, instead of opening up spaces for political discussion or social agreement about how to proceed on the pension issue, President Bachelet chose to give a group of specialists the responsibility for filtering social demands (an eminently political rather than technical matter).
This design, plus the fact that research centers, international financial institutions, business organizations, and the country’s three labor federations presented their views in the commission’s hearings, made it difficult for the CUT—and the small federations—to achieve a significant degree of influence. Fundamentally, the CUT’s proposals were aimed at providing a solid foundation for pension funds, establishing minimum guaranteed pensions, and ensuring equity between men and women (for example, compensating for the gap in contributions from the latter). A number of these proposals became part of the reform (see Martner, 2007; Ruiz-Tagle, 2007), but it must be recognized that, rather than shaping that reform, the CUT was a just another force agreeing to a project that, ultimately, the government had designed. Radical measures from the CUT proposal—“radical” in that they differed from what the commission was willing to propose—such as employer contributions and workers’ participation in administration of the funds (Ruiz-Tagle, 2007) were not included in the commission’s final report.
At first, Arturo Martínez was confident that this could be reversed in Congress (interview, Santiago de Chile, December 2006). In fact, the CUT had received the support of Concertación members of Congress at various times, such as the 2002 work stoppage. However, during the Bachelet administration Congress failed to serve as a space for discussing reform options because members were limited to approving projects originated by the presidential advisory commissions, where a political and technical consensus had already been reached.
The commission on work and equity was created when the call by Chilean Catholic Church spokesman Monsignor Goic to improve wage conditions in Chile until an “ethical minimum wage” was achieved caused a commotion in the midst of labor disputes. At a time when the monthly minimum wage was just 150,000 pesos (around US$300), the ethical wage was calculated to be at least 250,000 pesos (approximately US$500). What is significant is that whereas the CUT had consistently tried and failed to place this issue on the public agenda, a single declaration by the Church was sufficient to make the government decide to take action. Given that the commission arose in a context of social protest, the president decided to bring social actors into the discussion (Aguilera, 2007). On this occasion, along with about 50 other people, the president of the CUT was invited to join the working group. Although at least the government was now treating the federation as an actor that had to be dealt with, acceptance of the invitation would have meant legitimating the position that the CUT was just one of many organizations with which the government needed to dialogue about labor reforms. In fact, experts (36 of 48 members) also predominated over social representatives (only 8, mainly priests, evangelical pastors, and a few labor leaders) on this commission. Just as with the pension commission, those from outside the Concertación or the right were not invited to participate, and of the 16 think-tank representatives 9 were from the Concertación and 7 from the right (Aguilera, 2009: 25–30).
The CUT refused to participate in a commission whose composition was adverse to its interests in that it was dominated by advocates of structuring the labor market according to neoliberal logic and was so large that the CUT would have had little influence. Very probably, Martínez understood that the commission would produce no important results. (The main outcome was that some subsidies were reformed and a few matters related to unemployment insurance were changed.) Taking an ironic tone toward the commissions, he declared that the CUT was an organization representing workers and not a think tank (Radio Cooperativa, August 23, 2007) and made it clear that the federation dealt directly with more important actors, such as the government itself, business leaders, and the political parties (El Mercurio, September 25, 2007). Furthermore, he asserted that commissions were not necessary to make progress on improving conditions for workers; all that was needed was for the government to decide to do it (El Clarín de Chile, August 21, 2007).
In subsequent years, the relationship between Bachelet and the CUT remained tense. In 2009 the federation organized a work stoppage to protest what it considered business’s taking advantage of the conditions created by economic crisis of 2008 to fire workers and violate labor rights. A month later, in a move unprecedented during Bachelet’s presidency, the government called on the highest levels of leadership of the CUT and the CPC to agree on a package of measures to keep unemployment from rising as a result of the economic situation. Called the National Agreement for Employment, Training, and Job Security, it provided for a series of public and private subsidies for training workers and avoiding layoffs (La Segunda, May 7, 2009). The launching of this agreement was perhaps the only time when Martínez was seen at La Moneda signing an accord with the government. Possibly the fact that 2009 was an election year made the government want to appear to be negotiating with the CUT. However, this agreement was a momentary and isolated event compared with the constant exclusion of the CUT from debate over labor policy in Bachelet’s Chile.
The Cut, the Concertación, and the First Year of Piñera
Between 1990 and 2006, the CUT’s organizational weakness limited its ability to exert pressure and act as a negotiator in labor disputes. However, because of its decision to prioritize the transition to democracy, it was treated as an actor to be taken into account by each of the Concertación governments. During the Bachelet administration, the situation changed. The concept of citizens’ government promoted by the president seemed to seek a counterpoint to the control that political parties had exercised over the discussion of public issues in the three preceding administrations. However, this autonomy from the parties led the president to rely on think-tank technocrats (Aguilera, 2007; Silva, 2007) rather than seeking to establish relationships with organized civil society. Thus, although the government expressed its desire to increase citizen participation, the CUT was limited in its ability to take part in policy discussion on issues of concern to workers. This was the result of Bachelet’s governing style, which prioritized presidential advisory commissions over relationships with social organizations. The Bachelet government empowered the federation to act as an interlocutor only in resolving the increasing labor conflicts that arose in the public sector.
It is paradoxical that although the CUT no longer had a seat at the table for labor policy discussions, the outcome was more favorable for its interests than between 1990 and 2006. This was because of the disposition, at least discursively, of Bachelet’s government to move forward on matters that the CUT had long considered “pending issues.” In this Osvaldo Andrade played a fundamental role.
From this analysis of the Chilean transition we can conclude that social movements, especially in the labor arena, found themselves limited by the effects of neoliberalism not just in their ability to organize but also in the content of their demands. In addition, it was clear that the CUT’s role in policy discussion was dependent on the political will of the government. As was apparent in Bachelet’s term, the approach of each president was fundamental for understanding the government-CUT relationship and the federation’s possibilities for taking action.
This raises the question what role the federation will play during a right-wing government like Sebastian Piñera’s. The government has sent a series of contradictory signals with regard to organized labor. On one hand, in a televised debate that took place five days before the presidential runoff election in January 2010, Piñera played down the importance of the CUT, even attacking Arturo Martínez for allegedly not representing labor. However, this incident did not initiate a conflictive relationship between the CUT and the government. On the contrary, the Piñera government has recognized the CUT as a valid interlocutor on labor issues. The current minister of finance, Felipe Larraín, met with Martínez and negotiated with him about the minimum wage for 2011 but failed to reach agreement. In doing so, he restored the relationship established by the first three Concertación governments.
During his first year in office, Piñera also maintained the logic established by Bachelet and her advisory commissions. In 2010 he created an advisory commission on labor and the minimum wage made up of experts and academics with minority participation by technical experts named by the CUT (Radio Cooperativa, April 28, 2010) and by the Unión Nacional de Trabajadores (National Workers’ Union), a parallel federation created in 2003 whose legitimacy the CUT does not recognize (see Araya, Barría, and Drouillas, 2009). What is significant about this is that Martínez agreed to take part in the commission, probably thinking that with a right-wing government in power there were fewer possibilities for participating in policy discussion than during the Bachelet era. He made it clear, however, that ultimately “those who discuss the minimum wage are the labor leaders and the government at a political-union bargaining table” and added, “We hope that this year business will also take part” (cited in La Nación, April 30, 2010).
The signals from the current government give the impression that the CUT can continue to participate in the restricted areas that the technocratization of politics and neoliberalism have left open. During the Bachelet period, the CUT was distanced from the arenas of policy development but had the compensation that the discourse on labor issues centered on the expansion of workers’ rights. Today it appears that technical experts will continue to play a key role but the debate has shifted to other issues. The tragedy of the 33 miners trapped at the San José de Atacama mine became a window of opportunity for the government to focus its concern almost exclusively on worker safety. By attacking the mine owners, the government attempted to remove its pro-business label and present itself as the defender of workers’ rights against business. Additional concerns were labor flexibilization and other measures that tend to reduce unemployment. In this context, the historic demands of the CUT, such as the expansion of collective bargaining, very probably will not even have the possibility of being discussed.
Footnotes
Notes
Diego Barría Traverso is a faculty member at Central University of Chile.
Eduardo Araya Moreno is an adjunct professor at the University of Valparaiso, Chile.
Oscar Drouillas Carrasco has taught at the University of Chile and is currently director of planning at Capacita S.A. They gratefully acknowledge the Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail for funding the research on which this study is based. They thank Rosalind Bresnahan for her support during the review process and the Latin American Perspectives reviewers for their comments on an earlier draft of this article.