Social and Political Diversity and the Democratic Road to Change in Venezuela

Expropriations

The widespread expropriation of large and medium-sized companies has been the outstanding feature of the fourth and fifth stages of the Chávez presidency. The measures ushered in a mixed economy based on state control of basic industry, such as steel, electricity, and telecommunications, and state competition with the private sector in other key areas, particularly food processing and distribution and banking. The transformation impacted different social groups and political currents in different ways. The compensation money paid to the former owners of expropriated companies represented a heavy burden for the state and thus cut into the primacy of its social programs, which favored mostly the unincorporated sectors of the population. At the same time, the expropriations redirected considerable government attention to units of production (as opposed to communities) and in so doing opened opportunities for the organized working class to achieve various objectives, among them worker input into decision making, worker benefits, and the unification of the labor movement. Finally, the expropriations signaled a deepening of the process of transformation that was particularly applauded by the Chavista radicals, who favored a quicker pace of change than the more moderate current within the movement.

The following discussion of the events leading up to the expropriations puts in evidence the complexity of the transformation under way in Venezuela. In general, social and political currents in the Chavista movement exerted a major influence on policy makers. Nevertheless, once the government had ruled out compromise and concessions, the policy of expropriations was thrust on it by circumstances. The expropriations in turn framed issues (such as organized labor’s special treatment of state companies) and helped define positions that separated the internal Chavista currents. This explanation emphasizing complexity is antithetical to what opposition leaders argue on the basis of the “two-lefts thesis” discussed in the introductory essay and elsewhere in this issue.

The wave of expropriations, far from obeying a preconceived ideological scheme promoted by Chavismo’s radical current, was a response to the political and economic challenges posed by the private sector, which was closely tied to the Venezuelan opposition. ⁴ Most important, economic groups, as they have done throughout history when they considered their interests threatened, created a scarcity of important commodities, both during the two-month general strike of 2002–2003 and in the months prior to the December 2007 national referendum on a government-sponsored constitutional reform. Basically, four factors were at play: scarcity, price speculation, government economic controls, and expropriation. Each of them triggered others, producing a spiraling effect. The government, for example, responded to the politically induced scarcity during the general strike, which pushed prices upward, by implementing price and exchange controls in February 2003. These measures encouraged the private sector to reduce production and establish alternative patterns of distribution, including exporting to neighboring nations. The government reacted by expropriating companies in order to fill gaps in the market. The measures were also meant to intimidate the private sector into maintaining production and distribution at normal levels.

This dynamic consisting of government intervention to counter resistance by adversaries demonstrates the complexity of political developments under the Chávez government. Thus the process of change resembled a war of position in which the revolutionaries advanced one step at a time not only as a result of a favorable correlation of forces and improved capabilities but also as a reaction to the initiatives taken by the enemy. In contrast, government critics envisioned a veritable “war of maneuver” by viewing the expropriations as tantamount to socialism by decree or socialism by assault. Spokespeople for the opposition underlined both the economic objective of imposing socialism on the nation and the political objective of delivering a heavy blow to the enemy camp. Teodoro Petkoff, for instance, a leading member of the opposition, wrote in his newspaper Tal Cual, “Chávez is intoxicated with statism. The state takeovers [of industry] do not respond to criteria of economic efficiency but are purely political; the aim is to concentrate maximum power in the government and its caudillo” and at the same time to liquidate the trade union movement (Petkoff, 2009; 2010: 93–99). Alfredo Keller, head of a pro-opposition polling company, claimed that by expropriating companies the government sought to deprive opposition parties of sources of finance as well as “the control that the opposition through its private companies could exercise over the mass of workers” (Unión Radio, 2010). Another leading pollster identified with the opposition, Luis Vicente León (2010), asserted that expropriations were Chávez’s way of “penalizing” leaders of the opposition. Finally, the pro-opposition daily El Nacional attributed the takeovers of foreign-owned companies to “racist hate against any foreigner who dares to invest in Venezuela in the field of food distribution” (EFE News Service [Madrid], January 18, 2010).

More than being motivated by political and ideological (or ethnic) goals, the expropriations after 2007 were the logical outcome of a series of battles between the state and the private sector that began with the 2003 decree regulating prices on basic products. The measure was designed to counter price hikes unleashed by the two-month general strike. In the past, for example, in the weeks leading up to the mass disturbances of the week of February 27, 1989, price controls in Venezuela had generated disinvestment and hoarding, both of which had resulted in shortages. This time, however, the intense polarization that pitted the government against the private sector on the political front and the unwillingness of the Chavistas to make concessions to business as in the past led to an escalation of tension and tactics.

One factor explaining the shortages was political. The decision of the peak business group Federación de Cámaras de Industria y Comercio (Federation of Chambers of Industry and Commerce—FEDECAMARAS) to lead the general strike to topple the Chávez government was the first time in its six-decade history that it had overtly entered the political arena as a leading actor beyond the formulation of specific economic demands. Subsequently, the period of greatest shortages was the months prior to the December 2007 referendum on a proposed 69-article constitutional reform, which business perceived as threatening its vital interests, especially because it appeared to undermine the system of private property.

In addition to the political dimension, the shortages were largely due to the drive for superprofits throughout the distribution chain in the context of price controls. Indeed, the greater the disparity between the regulated price and the market value of a given product, the more intricate and widespread were the illicit mechanisms that emerged. With gasoline prices perhaps the lowest in the world, the government had to resort to rationing the product at pumps in border states in order to impede its illegal transportation to neighboring Colombia. Similarly, in 2010 the Currency Administration Commission established rigid and cumbersome rules for the purchase of preferential dollars by Venezuelan tourists abroad in order to check fraudulent transactions designed to take advantage of the official exchange rate, which was approximately half that on the open market. In the construction industry, wholesalers sold steel rods and cement exclusively to large builders, who were less likely to denounce the violation of legally set prices than self-employed workers, and the latter consequently faced shortages of essential materials. Food wholesalers typically sold products at more than the legally established price to grocery stores, which in turn sold them to street vendors and others whose clientele consisted of personal contacts such as friends and neighbors. At some point along the chain certain goods were hoarded in order to create artificial scarcities that facilitated sales on the black market. “Resellers,” who purchased at the regulated price and illegally sold at the market one, became a permanent fixture of the distribution chain. In the words of Arquimedes Barrios, the regional coordinator of the Anzoátegui office of the Instituto para la Defensa de las Personas en el Acceso a los Bienes y Servicios (Institute for the Defense of People in Access to Goods and Services—INDEPABIS), the agency in charge of enforcing price regulation, “The big producers often use the little guy to get around regulated prices. It would take a superhuman effort for the state to combat all these practices.” Barrios went on to express regret that his office had been unable to count on the collaboration of small-scale retail businesses in documenting the illicit practices of large-scale producers and distributors in order to take punitive measures against them (interview, Barcelona, August 24, 2011).

The government, through INDEPABIS and a host of programs, attempted to halt sales on the black market. Incidents in which ordinary people denounced illicit commercial activity, followed by government confiscation and distribution of regulated goods, were fairly common (Vea, July 21, 2011). In addition, the state-owned steel company Sidor helped establish seven hardware stores that sold metal rods known as cabillas (and, at one point, cement) exclusively to people certified by their neighborhood councils for the construction of their own houses. Furthermore, in February 2010 the National Assembly authorized the community councils to carry out official inspections of the distribution and sale of basic commodities. In November of the same year additional measures were taken to crack down on the illegal sale of regulated goods in the informal economy. Finally, in August 2011 the government passed the Law of Costs and Just Prices, which created a superintendency to regulate prices and envisioned a comprehensive study of the economy in order to expand the system of price controls.

The expropriations were primarily designed to counter shortages, but some of them fulfilled other objectives as well. State control of basic industry including steel, telecommunications, electricity, and petroleum carried out in 2007–2008 had been a goal of nationalistic movements since the 1930s and had been incorporated into the 1961 constitution (Article 96). In addition, in 2009 the government expropriated over 75 contractor firms in Zulia that performed work for the state oil company Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) and others associated with the public Corporación Venezolana de Guayana in an attempt to provide workers job security and curb the practice of outsourcing, a measure that became a Chavista banner.

Moreover, the expropriation of multinationals accused of price speculation, contraband, and failure to supply the national market accorded with the Chávez government’s anti-imperialist rhetoric (Livingstone, 2011: 31). Examples included the Owens-Illinois Glass Company (with 52 years in Venezuela), Cargill (food processing), Monaca (a Mexican food processing company), Fertinitro (a petrochemical company one-third owned by Koch Industries), and Agroisleña (a Spanish agricultural company). In the case of Fertinitro and Sidor, the latter owned by a Latin American consortium, the government took action on the ground that even though they benefited from subsidized raw materials at artificially low prices they sold the final products abroad while neglecting national needs. Chávez also accused Owens-Illinois of environmental destruction in the state of Trujillo and charged another large expropriated company, Sidetur (a Venezuelan steel manufacturer), with (in addition to price speculation) violation of health and safety standards that contributed to labor unrest.

In short, the decision to expropriate was basically a response to the commercial practices of a hostile private sector. Nevertheless, other issues were at stake, and the policy reflected the specific interests and positions of currents within the pro-Chavista movement. Thus Chavista labor leaders had pressured for the elimination of outsourcing, which the expropriations were designed to check but which state managers were not equally committed to discontinuing. Furthermore, the Chavista radicals hailed the expropriations particularly because they appeared to demonstrate that the “revolutionary process” in Venezuela had not stagnated. In contrast, the leaders of at least one moderate group belonging to the ruling coalition, Patria Para Todos (Homeland for All—PPT), criticized the policy, and in 2010 many of its leaders left the Chavista camp.

The Chavista Labor Movement

Throughout the 13 years of the Chavista government and particularly after the expropriations in 2007, trade union militants were frequently reminded that Chávez supported their causes. Certain government decisions that were responses to worker mobilizations created expectations and a sense of empowerment on the part of trade unionists. In general, they perceived that Chávez was committed to enhancing their role and supporting key worker demands. The first action along these lines occurred in 2005, when the government expropriated the paper company Invepal, the valve company Inveval, and several other firms that had been taken over by the workers several years before. Then in 2008 it nationalized the steel company Sidor in response to an extended and violent conflict over a collective-bargaining agreement in the course of which the union denounced management’s false accounting practices which deprived the nation of substantial tax revenue. The following year the national executive organized workshops in the industrial region of Guayana to develop the Plan Socialista de Guayana, which called for worker input into decision making and led to the naming of union militants recommended by the workers to head several state industrial companies in the region, including the aluminum company Alcasa. At the same time, Chávez for the first time pointed to the working class as playing the lead role in the road to socialism; his party, the Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (United Socialist Party of Venezuela—PSUV), called it the “motor force and subject . . . that is called upon to lead the revolution in the context of class struggle” (PSUV, 2010: 85). More recently, accusations by union members against the influential Sidor executive Luis Velásquez led to his jailing on charges of engaging in the contraband to Colombia of company-produced cabillas that were in short supply in Venezuela. Union members had previously picketed in front of the plant gates against Velásquez and sent a report to company executives in which they pointed to his extravagant lifestyle as evidence of wrongdoing. ⁵

The pro-Chavista trade unionists, since their founding of the labor confederation Unión Nacional de Trabajadores (National Workers’ Union—UNT) in 2003, have been divided into two currents. Both are defined by their concepts of class and the relationships they envision between the organized working class and the Chavista government and movement. One group, which can be called the “autonomists,” insists that loyalty to political parties or the government has to be subordinated to the struggle to advance worker interests. The other group, the “nonautonomists,” accuses the autonomists of being influenced by the “foreign factor,” in which dogmatic Marxist schemes (sometimes tied to Trotskyist positions) and ongoing attacks on the state bureaucracy take precedence over the defense of the Chávez government. It criticizes the autonomists for adopting an approach that overlooks the larger political picture and leads to excessive economic demands or economism. While most of the demands of the two currents converge, the autonomists are more militant in their tactics and more vocal in their criticisms of government policy and behavior (Franklin Rondón, interview, Puerto de la Cruz, 2011; Ellner, 2007: 89–95).

The influence of the nonautonomist leaders is greatest in the state sector, undoubtedly because of their ties with state managers and the PSUV leadership. The nonautonomists were led by Oswaldo Vera (spokesman for the PSUV’s workers’ front, the Frente Socialista de Trabajadores) and guided by Foreign Minister Nicolás Maduro (a former labor leader). After the 2010 congressional elections, Vera was the only PSUV trade unionist national deputy, and his alternate was the former metro workers’ president Francisco Torrealba, who was also identified with the nonautonomists. In contrast, Marcela Máspero, who along with the longtime Trotskyist trade unionist Stalin Pérez Borges became one of the two most important UNT leaders, was president of the pharmaceutical workers’ federation, based in the private sector.

Following the UNT’s convention in 2006, which erupted in a physical confrontation between members of the two currents, the nonautonomists began to organize a new confederation. In their determination to play down economic demands, especially in the public sector, they highlighted political objectives and insisted that the new confederation identify itself as explicitly socialist. Thus, for instance, they put forward the propositions that the Foreign Ministry should establish labor attachés in embassies throughout the world in the name of “internationalism” and that organized labor should concern itself with Latin American integration and its impact on workers (Franklin Rondón, interview, Puerto de la Cruz, 2011).

The drawn-out discussion over a proposed labor law to replace the 1990 Organic Labor Law put in evidence the divisions among the autonomists, the nonautonomists, and the various political currents within the Chavista movement. The most polemical issue was the severance pay system, whose modification under the influence of neoliberalism in 1997 was adamantly opposed by Chávez at the time. In effect, the 1997 reform facilitated the practice of paying workers their severance benefits on an annual basis rather than, as formerly, in one large sum at the moment they left their jobs, when they most needed the money. The autonomists favored restoration of the old system, a proposal that moderate Chavista political leaders opposed to any far-reaching changes in the law claimed was too much of a burden for both the state and the private sector. The nonautonomists were more open to the possibility of negotiating a compromise arrangement with those Chavista political leaders who were resistant to any major change in the system.

Another issue of contention was the legal recognition of the authority of labor councils, which the autonomists actively promoted. In contrast, many nonautonomists feared that the councils would compete with and undermine the unions, and in some companies they denounced the autonomists for following a strategy along these lines. Other nonautonomists, however, accepted the labor councils but only as a mechanism for stimulating production including voluntary labor, which had been promoted in the oil industry and elsewhere. The proposed reduction of the work week also divided the internal currents. Chávez had incorporated the 36-hour work week into the constitutional reform that was defeated at the polls in 2007, but at the 2011 May Day rally he reversed his position, arguing that the nation had to “increase national production in order to overcome the oil rentier model.” The autonomists (and many nonautonomists but not the Chavista political moderates) were critical of the change and agreed with the Chavista radicals, who viewed the work-week reduction as an opportunity to enhance the cultural and educational proficiency of workers and specifically their administrative skills to facilitate workers’ management (Lebowitz, 2010: 134, 156). Finally, debate on labor legislation took in the proposed elimination of outsourcing, a practice that Chávez had often opposed (as do labor leaders in general). These differences over concrete issues show that the nonautonomists were more intent on avoiding a position of confrontation toward the moderate Chavistas than were the autonomists.

Despite the government bureaucracy’s and the PSUV leadership’s support for the nonautonomists, the positions assumed by Chávez and the national executive sometimes encouraged the autonomists. For instance, concurrent with the nationalization of Sidor in 2008, Chávez replaced Labor Minister José Ramón Rivero, who openly sided with the nonautonomists, with Roberto Hernández, who along with the former labor minister María Cristina Iglesias played an active role in attempting to reconcile Chavista labor factions. The autonomists were also encouraged by the government’s sponsorship of employee workshops for the purpose of designing the “Socialist Plan of Guayana” as well as the acceptance of worker nominations to head state companies in the region. In the case of Sidor, worker militants belonging to the autonomist current, with the encouragement of the company’s “worker president” Carlos D’Oliveira, monitored production in various departments. In doing so the autonomists attempted to curb the influence of state managers and overcome the problem of scarcity of components and raw materials allegedly due to bureaucratic inefficiency or sabotage.

The new president of Alcasa, Elio Sayago, attempted to sever the company’s links with multinationals (Sayago, 2009: 95–99). The nonautonomists grouped in Movimiento 21, which controlled the Alcasa workers’ union, accused Sayago of failing to honor contractual agreements, and organized a worker referendum to remove him at a time when strife paralyzed much of the plant on a regular basis. The autonomists claimed that the real issue was Sayago’s efforts to carry out a much-needed overhaul of the company’s bureaucracy. The division in the ranks of Chavismo facilitated the triumph of a slate tied to the opposition party Causa R in the union elections held in August 2011. The Trotskyists and other autonomists drew the conclusion that workers’ control in individual companies was doomed to failure without the state’s absolute commitment to guaranteeing operability. They called for the expropriation of other companies located upstream and downstream in the production chain and (because of unfavorable world market conditions for aluminum) the injection of large sums of capital into the industry.

The underlying source of conflict between autonomists and nonautonomists in Guayana and other strategic sectors was the issue of the treatment of state companies by Chavista trade unionists, a debate that the mass expropriations since 2007 have made particularly relevant. The case of PDVSA was of particular significance because of the overriding importance of oil for Venezuela. Company President Rafael Ramírez made clear that under no circumstances would he allow a repetition of the loss of government control of the petroleum industry, including the oil workers’ movement, that had made possible the general strike of 2002–2003. He endorsed the nonautonomist Wills Rangel in the oil workers’ federation elections in 2009 only after having supported an alternative slate that appeared to be even less independent. He also took steps to bypass the federation entirely by promoting worker assemblies and reaching a collective-bargaining agreement without union participation. Ramírez’s intervention and formulation of acceptable and unacceptable conditions manifested the critical attitude toward unions that both the autonomists and the nonautonomists rejected.

The clash between the two worker currents has class implications that shed light on the relationship between the political strategies of the Chavista movement and social cleavages. The autonomous current upholds a vision based on the vanguard status of the working class and the subordination of other social sectors and the political projects they defend in the construction of socialism. The nonautonomists, while also dedicated to the defense of worker interests, envision a broader alliance that is embodied in the PSUV. This difference, far from being confined to theoretical debate, has produced sharp and at times violent confrontations such as those that occurred at the UNT’s 2006 convention and in the days prior to the nationalization of Sidor in 2008 and following the appointment of worker nominees to head Sidor and Alcasa in 2010.

Community Councils and the Unincorporated Sectors

The community councils, along with social programs such as Barrio Adentro (medical service), Mercal (food outlets), Misión Ribas (high school education), and Misión Sucre (university education), are predominantly located in underprivileged areas. The councils, which proliferated throughout Venezuela after the passage of the Community Council Law in 2006, are historically unique in that they design, solicit funding for, and execute public works projects. Involvement in their activities has had a pronounced formative influence on the unincorporated sectors of the population, which for the most part have had no previous experience of direct input into decision making of this nature. The impact on working-class community council members, while not to be underestimated, may be less dramatic in that they have experienced a different type of organizational identification, namely, membership in labor unions. ⁶

The experience of participation in community councils has instilled in many of their members a distrust of government bureaucrats. Part of the problem stems from the frustration and misunderstanding arising from their interaction with state functionaries who are skeptical about the feasibility of projects and cautious in approving proposals because of the lack of organizational experience of community leaders. ⁷ In addition, community council members often resent manipulation by state functionaries in the service of Chavista politicians attempting to control social organizations in order advance political ambitions. This critical attitude converges with the antistatist dogma of Chavista radicals (including Trotskyists and libertarians) who view the the “old state” as counterrevolutionary and call for a “revolution in the revolution” (Webber and Spronk, 2010). ⁸

By early 2010, several developments appeared to signal the playing down or phasing-out of the community council program. In the first place, Chavista discourse began to stress the revolutionary role of the working class in response to the need to win the battle of production in the scores of recently expropriated companies. The rhetorical shift opened up the possibility of the abandonment of the community councils, similar to what had happened with the thousands of worker cooperatives that lost their primacy when the councils were established. Furthermore, the Organic Law of Community Councils passed in December 2009 required the community councils to make a series of structural readjustments (a procedure referred to as adecuación) to retain their legal status, a process that one of the law’s authors called “traumatic” (Jesús Gerardo Rodríguez Rodríguez, interview, Caraballeda, Vargas, September 14, 2011). The National Assembly’s failure to establish the concrete steps required for the implementation of the adjustments through an enabling act complicated the task. As a result, a large number of community councils failed to reaffirm their legal status within the 180-day limit established by the law.

Nevertheless, by 2011 several developments had served to revitalize the community council movement and demonstrate that the government continued to place a premium on programs for the unincorporated sectors of the population. In the first place, state funding agencies became increasingly convinced that allocation of money directly to the community councils to carry out public works projects (often by hiring community residents to do the job) was preferable to government contracts with construction companies. The argument was that the community council could best fulfill its role in ensuring high quality when it controlled the resources. In the second place, government policies and legislation incorporated the community councils into a number of state-sponsored activities, ranging from the enforcement of regulated prices of basic commodities to the selection of the beneficiaries of the government emergency housing program known as the Gran Misión de Vivienda, initiated in 2011. Another sign of stability and consolidation was the significant number of community councils that had successfully completed three or more projects and as a result received preferential treatment from government funding agencies (Víctor Barraez, interview, Caracas, September 15, 2011).

Finally, the government’s commitment to the community council program was demonstrated by its efforts to unify clusters of community councils into “communes,” which were to carry out more ambitious projects in a wider geographical area and were designed to usher in a new stage of the process of change. In contrast to the community councils, the communes were envisioned as representing a fourth level of government (below the central, state, and municipal governments) that was to design projects on a wider scale in accordance with state planning. In addition, policy makers considered the possibility of paid officials’ belonging to the commune’s executive council, which was to be in charge of the “communal development plan.” By 2011, community councils throughout the nation had created 120 “communes in transition” that awaited legalization and were beginning to carry out programs in their areas that involved greater funding than that granted to individual councils (Delgado Herrera, 2010).

Conflicts of Visions and Interests within Chavismo

In spite of the fiery rhetoric of Chavismo and its commitment to revolutionary socialism after 2005, the influence of the moderate current of the Chavista movement, which reflects the attitudes and interests of the middle sectors, has not significantly diminished. The moderates are wary of excessive worker benefits and social programs lacking effective controls. They enjoy strong support in the military and largely articulate the more technocratic criteria of state managers (Eusse, 2010). They were headed by Chávez’s righthand man Luis Miquilena between 1999 and 2001 and then by the retired air force officer Luis Alfonso Dávila, both of whom placed their followers in positions at all levels. Miquilena and Dávila rejected Cuban socialism as a model for Venezuela and favored consolidation rather than further radicalization (Ellner, 2008: 110–112, 165). After Dávila’s thorough defeat in the Chavista party’s internal elections of 2003 and his subsequent exit from the movement, another retired officer, the former vice president Diosdado Cabello (who had participated in the 1992 Chávez-led coup attempt), headed the moderates. Cabello (who exerts considerable influence over the promotion of military officers) and Foreign Minister Maduro (who is closely allied with former National Assembly President Cilia Flores) are the two national Chavista leaders who have most cultivated a following in the government and party leadership in recent years. Maduro enjoys particular influence in the labor movement, and his current tends to favor pro-worker reforms.

In contrast to Cabello and Maduro, many rank-and-file Chavista militants are highly critical of the Chavista government and party bureaucracy and favor more radical policies (Hawkins, 2010: 181–184). ⁹ Their positions reflect the thinking of the trade union autonomists, who reject state interference in the labor movement, and barrio dwellers who attribute the problems of their community councils to excessive state controls and obstacles created by state officials. The antibureaucracy viewpoint is especially directed at Cabello and has been harshly criticized by Maduro in public. It is articulated by a group of Chavista intellectuals affiliated with the think tank Centro Internacional Miranda and the pro-Chavista online publication Aporrea (Monedero, 2009: 192–194). These Chavistas applauded a number of Chávez’s appointments, including that of the former guerrilla Fernando Soto Rojas as president of the National Assembly in 2010 and that of the outspoken Iris Varela as minister of penitentiary service in 2011. They also viewed favorably the selection of Elías Jaua as executive vice president. These appointments demonstrate Chávez’s adeptness at maintaining the unity of his followers and dispelling fears that the government has been taken over by the moderates and “bureaucrats” (or by military officers) and abandoned its commitment to far-reaching change.

The heterogeneity and complexity of Chavismo rule out simple correlations between social groups and political expressions within the movement. The labor movement is highly divided and thus lacks a coherent “worker” position, while not all prominent military officers follow the moderate line. Thus, for example, at one point the PSUV’s Vice President Alberto Muller Rojas and the director of the Ministry of Interior police force, Eliécer Otaiza, assumed radical positions that contrasted with those of their moderate counterparts elsewhere in the government and movement (Ellner, 2008: 167–168). Nevertheless, certain general tendencies clarify and define the preferences of the Chavista groups, the relations between social and political domains, and the sources of internal conflict. Two examples will shed light on the tensions involved.

The first is the perception of Chavista labor leaders in general that there is antiunion sentiment in the Chavista movement and government. Thus trade unionists attribute the refusal of state managers to permit unionization for reasons of “security” in sectors such as airports and among executive-level secretarial personnel to a “militarist mentality.” In addition, antiunion attitudes allegedly find expression in government-sponsored community programs. Community council leaders, often on the advice of state officials, prefer to hire community residents directly rather than granting contracts to companies for fear that they will be vulnerable to the strong-arm tactics of construction workers’ unions controlled by criminal elements. State officials and neighborhood leaders call on workers employed in public works projects to take their grievances to the community council’s employment commission rather than to the unions. Chavista labor leaders recognize the danger of the penetration of unions by organized crime, possibly for the purpose of money laundering, and have even met with the minister of the interior to discuss the problem. Nevertheless, they insist that authentic labor unions and not community councils are the appropriate vehicle for the resolution of labor disputes (Franklin Rondón, interview, Puerto de la Cruz, August 30, 2011; Carlos Itriago, interview, Barcelona, June 29, 2011).

The second example of the political expression of social cleavages in the Chavista movement is the government policy of providing free goods and services, which benefits the underprivileged but raises fears among the middle sectors of fiscal irresponsibility. Traditionally, this practice was associated with crass populism, as symbolized by the sheets of zinc roofs that governments granted to slum dwellers in order to secure their votes. Under Chávez, rhetoric around certain social programs has confused two issues: social justice and the economic viability of commercial practices under socialism. The government justifies free or heavily subsidized goods and services, such as notebooks, textbooks, and computers for students, housing and certain merchandise for hurricane victims, metro tickets for those over 60, and books of classic literature for the general population, as an expression of “humanistic socialism.” In addition, products sold at below-market prices with generous terms of credit particularly for the poor, ranging from electrical appliances (which are interest-free for the very poor) to the “socialist arepa” (Venezuela’s mainstay food), serve to expose the economic injustices and extraordinary profits associated with neoliberal-style capitalism. Nevertheless, Chavista discourse, which emphasizes the state’s “social debt” to the underprivileged, clouds the government’s intentions of avoiding losses in state enterprises and collecting debts owed to it by the poor.

Public institutions have attempted to create effective mechanisms (such as payment feasibility analysis and automatic deductions from salaries) to guarantee the cancellation of loans and mortgages. These efforts, however, are at odds with occasional remarks by Chávez attacking financial practices under capitalism such as collateral requirements for discriminating against the poor (Ellner, 2010: 70). Opposition leaders exploit the failure of government rhetoric to differentiate between social programs providing free goods and services for the underprivileged, on the one hand, and acceptable commercial strategies that target certain clients, on the other, by railing against “populist handouts.” The anti-Chavistas’ claim that the government is overly generous and lenient (Corrales, 2011: 33–35) finds a degree of receptivity among middle-class Chavistas. ¹⁰

Conclusions

Throughout his 13 years as president, Hugo Chávez has acted decisively to retain the fervent support of the diverse and often conflicting sectors of his movement and avoid fragmentation. On the one hand, he has been harsh on internal dissenters who reject the official line. At one point, for instance, he railed against his ally party the PPT, which included the former mayor of Caracas Aristóbulo Istúriz and other staunch supporters, with the result that it refused to endorse his candidacy for the July 2000 presidential elections. When another coalition partner, the Communist Party, launched separate slates in various states in the 2008 state-municipal elections, Chávez attacked it as “counterrevolutionary.” On the other hand, he has maintained an equilibrium between the moderates and the radicals while privileging Chavista military officers, who tend to be located in the moderate camp. Thus in 2003 he passed over William Lara (Dávila’s rival, who was located to his left), whose followers had swept the internal elections for the leadership of the Movimiento Quinta República (Fifth Republic Movement, the PSUV’s precursor), and imposed Francisco Ameliach of the military faction as the party’s general director.

In addition, certain slogans and positions assumed by the Chavista leadership are tantamount to “empty signifiers” (Laclau, 2005) that are acclaimed but interpreted differently by different political and social sectors depending on their specific concerns and interests. Thus, for instance, rank-and-file Chavistas in general view Chávez’s often repeated slogan “unity, unity, and more unity” as a call to submerge differences in thinking and style to face a common enemy. Those who defend the statist approach (Cabello and Maduro, for instance) invoke the phrase in a more specific context to argue that calls by the radicals and the rank and file to purge the state bureaucracy of alleged opportunists are divisive and play into the hands of the enemy. In contrast, when Chávez called for the formation of a broad coalition of parties and movements in 2010 (known as the “fifth strategic line”), radical dissident Chavistas invoked the unity slogan to justify the establishment of and membership in pro-government organizations to the left of the PSUV.

Similarly, the various Chavista currents have reacted differently to Chávez’s unrestrained praise of Cuba and its leaders. The Chavista moderates interpret it as nothing more than a defense of national sovereignty, whereas the more radical currents see it as a defense of the socialist policies pursued by the Cuban government. Chavistas who prioritize a revolution in human values view it as a call for international solidarity above Venezuela’s material interests.

Incidents in which Chávez surprisingly defied his movement’s bureaucratic structure and party leadership by assuming positions in favor of the rank and file convinced those who supported a bottom-up, radical approach (such as the autonomists in the labor movement) that he was really on their side. The decision to expropriate Sidor in the midst of bloody street clashes in 2008, which pitted the union against top Chavista leaders, and the decision to call internal elections for the selection of the PSUV’s candidates to the National Assembly in 2010 against the advice of national and local leaders are just two examples. At the same time, Chávez named the moderate Diosdado Cabello to top positions in the party and the government even though he was widely questioned by the rank and file.

This article has examined the challenges that the heterogeneity of the Chavista movement and the actions of the opposition camp have posed for the Chávez government. All governments face similar predicaments, but the Venezuelan case magnifies their impact. Most important, the democratic road to far-reaching change in the context of acute social and political polarization over a significant period of time provides special opportunities for social and political groups on both sides of the battlefield. The vulnerability of the government as a result of the aggressive tactics employed by its adversaries forces it to be particularly responsive to the demands and aspirations of its movement’s rank-and-file members in order to count on their ongoing mobilization. In addition, the weakness of the tradition of trade unionism in Venezuela, in comparison with those of countries like Chile and Bolivia, and the absence of a working-class party leading the revolutionary process, in contrast to the Soviet Union in 1917 and China in 1949, explains the greater social and political diversity and complexity of the Chavista movement.

The government’s responsiveness to the popular sectors of the Chavista movement ruled out a policy of concessions and negotiations with powerful economic groups, but at the same time its commitment to democracy ruled out repression in response to economic disruptions. Thus the government reacted to shortages by devising intricate legal measures that complicated the problem and eventually led to widespread expropriations. This sequence of events stood in sharp contrast to the Soviet government’s liquidation of the kulak class in the 1930s because of the shortages it created. The takeovers impacted in distinct ways the three sectors that represent the basic social components of Chavismo.

The differences in interests and visions of groups within the Chavista movement were bound to produce internal tensions. Thus, for instance, UNT leaders raised the banners of workers’ control, reduction of the work week, absolute job security, and restoration of the old system of severance payments based on the worker’s last monthly salary. At one point, Chávez appeared to support all these demands. He included the 36-hour work week in the constitutional reform proposal of 2007, reduced outsourcing in the oil, steel, and electricity industries to ensure greater job security, and launched the Plan Socialista de Guayana. Many PSUV leaders, however, had serious reservations about these measures, which they feared were not economically feasible. Their apprehensions explain why the proposed labor law, which included the recognition of worker councils, a reduction in the work week, severe measures against employers who violate the law, and restoration of the old severance payment system, was held up in the National Assembly for an extended period. Resistance to Chavista worker militancy also explains why PDVSA President Ramírez attempted to bypass the leadership of the Federación Unitaria de Trabajadores Petroleros de Venezuela (United Oil Workers’ Federation), which he labeled “Adeco” (follower of Acción Democrática) even though its members were Chavistas whose selection had been endorsed by the Labor Ministry.

The distinct priorities, visions, and biases that manifest themselves in the Chavista movement have a social base. Many Chavista members of the middle class and the unincorporated sectors, for instance, have reservations regarding the role of labor unions and support measures to sidetrack them. Thus government officials have encouraged community councils to undertake state-financed public works projects by directly hiring workers in their community rather than contracting companies. This arrangement is considered less vulnerable to pressure from unions or pseudo-unions, some of which use coercive tactics to implement hiring practices that end up undermining productivity. In addition, the labor turbulence in Guayana has produced building-material shortages that contribute to the critical attitude of some Chavistas toward labor unions. Finally, Chávez’s adversaries have railed against (and exaggerated the extent of) the government policy of distributing free or heavily subsidized goods and services, a practice that privileged sectors including some Chavista sympathizers criticize for representing handouts to the poor.

The image of each Chavista political actor ranges from positive to negative across the political and social spectrum. The middle-class bureaucrats are viewed variously as resistant to the participatory ideals of the Bolivarian Revolution and as intent on checking the extreme and unrealistic demands of the underprivileged sectors. The militant Chavista trade unionists are viewed as using disruptive tactics to achieve infeasible material benefits and as promoting workers’ control, which is the essence of socialist democracy. And members of the unincorporated sectors who have formed worker cooperatives and community councils are viewed as squandering vast sums of public money because of the lack of internal controls or as confronting state bureaucrats in order to achieve the ideal of “participatory democracy” embodied in the 1999 constitution.

Throughout the current stage of mass expropriations, the Chavista leadership and Chávez himself have attempted to maintain an equilibrium among the three social sectors discussed in this article and among the various political outlooks and visions that coexist in the movement. At one point it appeared that the government would subordinate the interests and strategies associated with the unincorporated sectors of the population. Chávez’s discourse began to recognize the working class as the key agent of revolutionary change at the same time that the need to increase productivity to combat shortages focused attention on productivity over social programs. Furthermore, the community council law of December 2009 appeared to impede the creation of new community councils and discourage existing ones. Nevertheless, the consolidation of many community councils and their longevity refute the notion that they have lost momentum as the cooperative movement had several years before.

The relative strength of the three social groups has not changed significantly in recent years, although each one has higher expectations than before and has become more vocal in its criticisms of the government. In the face of a recalcitrant enemy that refuses to recognize the legitimacy of the Chavista government, Chavismo is dependent on the unyielding support of both trade union militants and the unincorporated sectors, which often confront the Chavista bureaucrats. At the same time, subjective conditions and political consolidation are not sufficiently developed for the revolutionaries in power to declare the existence of a workers’ state or to unleash a “cultural revolution” against middle-class values or a “revolution in the revolution” to purge the bureaucracy. In short, in spite of the deepening of change, the Chavista movement retains its character as a multiclass, ideologically heterogeneous alliance with all the internal tensions that such diversity implies.