Cuba’s New Socialism

Recent Changes in Cuba

The current changes can be traced to a speech given by former President Fidel Castro on November 17, 2005, in which he warned for the first time publicly that the Revolution could be reversed. In contrast to the situation in the past, when the main causes of most economic problems in Cuba were attributed to U.S. economic sanctions and geopolitical warfare against Cuba, ³ Castro said that the Revolution’s major enemies were our own mistakes, especially unfair income inequality, vices such as theft, and lack of control and poor management decisions at high levels (F. Castro, 2005). Less than a year later, in July 2006, he became ill, and before undergoing surgery he ceded power to his legal successor and brother, Raúl Castro. Soon after, Raúl Castro began preparing for the deeper transformations that were needed to tackle those problems.

In a speech on July 26, 2007, Raúl Castro referred to the need for “conceptual and structural changes” and proposed a national debate to identify the main problems besetting Cuban society. More than 5 million people participated in more than 215,000 meetings between September and November of 2007, and more than 1.6 million criticized the shortcomings of daily life, the underperformance of state institutions, and the behavior of public servants in bureaucratic posts. It was not the first time that this type of nationwide debate involving large numbers of people had taken place in Cuba. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, more than 80,000 “workers’ parliaments” were held in workplaces, schools, and mass organizations in 1993, ⁴ and more than 3 million people expressed concerns and put forward proposals on how to deal with the new situation.

The 2007 debate served as a prelude to the Sixth Congress of the Cuban Communist Party, but the only official information that immediately resulted from it was what everyone knew: that low salaries and inadequate food, transportation, and housing were Cubans’ main source of concern and that people were tired of prohibitions regarding their daily lives. Only a few of the measures that were expected to follow materialized in 2008–2009: the ability to buy certain goods and services previously limited to foreigners, the turning over of idle agricultural land to individuals and cooperatives, the elimination of committees in charge of approving the use of hard currency by state institutions (known as the Comités de Aprobación de Divisas), the creation of a national supervisory institution (Contraloría de la República), and initial steps toward reducing the size of ministries. Efforts were concentrated on dealing with the difficult financial situation that resulted from a series of costly hurricanes in 2008 and the international economic crisis.

Since 2010, Raúl Castro has more emphatically warned about the importance of overcoming serious economic obstacles. The preservation and sustainability of Cuba’s socioeconomic system lay in the balance. ⁵ Reflecting the need to solve long-standing problems with the management of the Cuban economy, the Sixth Congress was scheduled for April 2011 for the purpose of approving general guidelines to improve economic performance, including some social policies and other areas closely related to the economic sphere.

The congress was preceded by debates in workplaces, neighborhoods, and social organizations over a document titled Draft Guidelines for Economic and Social Policy (PCC, 2010). People were encouraged to propose changes, express concerns, or simply make comments on it. The document was organized into chapters that listed expectations of what should happen in specific areas such as economic management, macroeconomic policies, external economic relations, investment, science, technology, and innovation, social policy, agro-industry, industry and energy, tourism, transportation, construction, housing and water resources, and commerce. Many of the objectives listed, such as replacing imports and increasing exports, had been established in previous PCC congresses but remained to be achieved. Cubans were called on to reach consensus on the what, not the how. It was suggested that the more complex discussion about how to reach the goals agreed-upon would occur later on as institutions prepared new legislation and policies. So far, only a few have been passed and with little debate, possibly because they relate to completing ownership rights of personal property, about which there appears to be consensus. ⁶

However, even before the debates in preparation for the congress began in December 2010, some measures were adopted and some experiments were carried out with the idea of later applying them on a wider scale. The most consequential economic measure, which has been equated with another agrarian reform, had been in place since 2008. From 2008 to mid-2011, nearly 15 percent of agricultural land (1.13 million hectares) had been given in usufruct to 146,000 individual farmers (70,000 new ones) and, to a lesser degree, to worker cooperatives, while recognizing that permanent (not only seasonal) wage labor was used by both. ⁷ This process is redistributing land from ineffective state farms and cooperatives, mostly to private farmers.

Resolution 9 of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security was passed in 2008 to link state workers’ wages with productivity, following criteria approved by the ministry. These rules eliminated the cap on the amount workers could earn beyond their base salary, thus allowing for greater wage differentials. But their implementation has stagnated because, among many factors, the Labor Ministry has ended up imposing productivity-tied pay schedules that are not attractive to either workers or managers.

In early 2010, several municipalities had begun to allow some barbers, beauticians, and transportation workers to lease barbers’ chairs and taxis, respectively, from the state enterprises that previously employed them. Under the terms, the former state employees were obliged to cover all the costs of operation that the state had previously assumed but could freely set prices and keep the profits after taxes, whereas before they had in effect set prices higher than the regulated ones and kept the difference (in addition to their salaries). ⁸

On October 25, 2010, a number of regulations were made public with regard to the process of “availability” (disponibilidad), in which state institutions were expected to relocate “excess” workers who reduced productivity. Excess workers were estimated at over 1 million or 20 percent of total employment, averaging 30 percent of state enterprises’ payrolls. These workers were to be offered alternative state jobs where there were openings, and if they decided to reject the offer they were to be laid off with only a few months’ pay, depending on how much time they had worked. The process was soon suspended because it was impossible to fulfill Raúl Castro’s commitment that no one would be “abandoned to his fate” (Martínez and Puig, 2011). ⁹

Other rules were passed that made independent work (cuentapropismo) more flexible, including the possibility of hiring wage laborers on a permanent basis. Independent workers are now able to rent spaces, establish economic transactions with state institutions, and receive bank credit. The number of licenses for independent work more than doubled in less than a year, ¹⁰ in part because many simply legalized their status. In spite of high taxes, many have seen benefits from legalizing their activities, such as access to retirement, security for disabilities and maternity, bank credit, and state contracts (Piñeiro, 2011: 68–69).

Noting that measures with such great consequences for Cubans’ lives (land rights, wages, labor relations, etc.) had been approved in previous years, some argued that the Sixth Congress was only a “show” to ratify decisions already made. Nonetheless, there was massive participation in the discussion of the Draft Guidelines. From December 2010 to February 2011, a significant part of the Cuban population (9 million of a total population of about 11 million, but since most participated in more than one meeting they were counted more than once) discussed the document in their places of work and study, their neighborhoods, and their social organizations. About 68 percent of the more than 200 guidelines were modified. Nevertheless, only a few of the changes, such as those related to market planning and prices, were substantial.

Some have criticized the congress for concentrating on “economic” problems that in reality cannot be separated from political, cultural, and social ones (see, e.g., D’Angelo, 2011a). Given the complexity of the Cuban economic system and the challenges it faces, the decision to concentrate efforts on that front is understandable. Nevertheless, one of the most important goals incorporated into the Guidelines—in addition to the expansion of nonstate enterprises (private and cooperative), greater autonomy for state enterprises, and greater weight for market relations—is that local governments should play a guiding role in state and nonstate economic activities, creating new enterprises, collecting taxes, and handling funds earmarked for local development.

Other important political measures were announced at the congress. In his closing speech, Raúl Castro proposed establishing a limit of two consecutive five-year terms for “fundamental political and state posts” and defended the current law establishing that being a party member is not a requirement for occupying public posts (R. Castro, 2011a). He suggested that substantial changes in the political system and a rejuvenation of the party national leadership would take place at the PCC conference set for January 28, 2012. ¹¹ Changes in the newly elected membership of the Central Committee, including greater representation in terms of gender, race, and, to a lesser extent, age could be considered a “first step.” ¹² In contrast, the PCC Political Bureau continued to be dominated by men who came from the ranks of long-time leaders of the Revolution, especially the “historic generation” (those who had led the Revolution since the 1950s).

The congress debate process has also been criticized on grounds that it did not include ideological or ethical issues (see, e.g., Campos, 2011c; D’Angelo, 2011a). Socialism, which was referred to only twice in the draft document, was defined in the final document as “equality of rights and opportunities” (PCC, 2010: 5). Nevertheless, there are plans for the executive commission that oversees implementation of the Guidelines to define the “integral theoretical conceptualization of the Cuban socialist economy” (R. Castro, 2011b; Murillo in Granma, December 24, 2011). Now that Fidel and Raúl Castro have acknowledged the unsustainability of Cuba’s current “socialist model” and the need to update or change it, it is important to fill in this “ideological vacuum” so that socially minded Cubans can be less fearful about the future and help shape the new social pact that will emerge. There is also dissatisfaction with the way in which various statements from the debate process were synthesized by PCC functionaries and with the failure to establish a horizontal exchange of ideas among PCC nuclei, workplaces, and neighborhoods (see, e.g., Campos, 2011c; D’Angelo, 2011a). Despite these shortcomings, however, many have argued that the congress served to articulate long-recognized problems in the internal organization and management of the country and to craft a national consensus in favor of reforming Cuban socialism.

Moreover, although some argue that the root causes of the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the Cuban state have yet to be identified, this reform period can be distinguished from others in that self-criticism by government and state functionaries is more blunt and profound. There is an acknowledgment that the historic generation is obliged to rectify its errors and hand over a country in better shape to the next generation. Recent statements made by Raúl Castro and opinions published in Granma ¹³ have addressed concerns that it is not realistic to expect changes from the same people who put the current rules and practices in place and have argued that bureaucrats who create obstacles to change should be forced to resign.

The Statists: Perfect State Socialism

The main socialist goal for the “statists” is a well-managed, representative state in control of society—a stronger state, not necessarily a bigger one but one that functions properly and ensures that subordinates perform their assigned tasks. They stress that such a state differs from a capitalist one in that it responds to the interests of working people, not private capital.

In the statists’ view, a centralized state with a vertical structure is best suited to providing all citizens with goods and services to satisfy their basic needs. Faced with the shortcomings of top-down planning, however, some statists have accepted a degree of market relations as inevitable. In their vision of socialism, horizontal coordination of autonomous individual or collective actors is impossible and will only generate chaos; democratically managed organizations are inefficient and conducive to social conflict and disintegration. ¹⁴ At the center of the statists’ strategy is bringing control to the Cuban economy, and the reduction of fiscal and commercial deficits is the number-one priority. This thinking has sometimes been translated into the cutting of services, closing of enterprises, and levying of taxes that are too high for both state and nonstate enterprises.

The statists deny that major changes are needed. They believe that with more control by state managers and the party, ¹⁵ along with some decentralization and consultation with the people, the current institutions can work properly. However, some accept that the state should withdraw from the management of small enterprises and that local governments should have their own resources to solve problems. They repeat Raúl Castro’s call for a “change of methods” but do not recognize a need to allow institutions to be more autonomous and democratic or to guarantee transparency by means of, for instance, the publication of information on the budgets of local governments and state enterprises. ¹⁶

The main problems of Cuban society according to the statists are lack of discipline; insufficient control; the low standards set by managers, ministry functionaries, and party members, which have led to low productivity; disorganization; widespread petty theft; and corruption, which, although substantially less serious than in other countries, is still considered unacceptable. Indeed, an unproductive informal agreement between workers and managers has been established: “We pretend to work, and you pretend to pay us.” Control, discipline, and consistency are necessary for any project to be successful, and they have not been common among Cuban workers and administrators for decades.

Although advocates of all three positions recognize a harmful lack of control in Cuban institutions, they differ in what they see as its root causes and therefore in the type of control methods they consider effective and fair. Statists stress the cultural nature of the problem and maintain that it could be solved with education by traditional means. A “change of minds/thinking” is presented as the key solution. In contrast, the economicists point to low wages and defend the need for adequate material incentives, while the self-managementists propose changing the way Cuban institutions are organized in favor of more democratic, less alienated forms of social relations. ¹⁷

In short, the solution for statists is more control and supervision in the vertical structure along with a modicum of autonomy and a wider scope of legal responsibility for managers. ¹⁸ External supervisory bodies are expected to keep state institutions in check, with directors making sure that subordinates fulfill their responsibilities. There is little recognition of the limits of external and vertical supervision, the advantages of social control and self-monitoring by workers’ collectives, or the importance of transparency and true accountability in public institutions.

The statist position is well represented in state bureaucracies among those who fear losing their posts—not an unfounded concern, since state institutions are being reduced or “rationalized.” This position is also supported by many ordinary Cubans who are tired of the social disorder that has arisen in recent decades. They want to restore order, and they reject more substantive changes because they are afraid of losing the social achievements of the Revolution. In addition, some intellectuals educated in Soviet-style Marxism reject any kind of decentralization and opening to any organization—whether private or collective—that is not directly and closely controlled by a heavily centralized state. Some officers in the Cuban military may be close to statism because of their preference for order and control.

Economicists: Market Socialism

According to the “economicists,” the main goal of socialism should be to develop society’s productive forces in order to create more material wealth; thus they focus on productive capacity and overlook social relations. For them, economic growth generates an increase in purchasing power and in turn an improvement in the material conditions of people. They argue that socialism implies redistribution of wealth and that if there is no wealth there is nothing to distribute (Márquez, 2011). ¹⁹

For those who support this position, current changes in Cuba should aim, above all, at improving the performance of the Cuban economy in order to satisfy the “ever-increasing material needs of the people.” They argue that, with effective redistribution of wealth, all institutional arrangements that are efficient and productive are useful for building socialism. ²⁰ While for the statists private enterprises and market relations are risky but necessary evils to be tamed by the state and for the self-managementists they are evils that can be gradually overcome with the expansion of alternative organizations that fuse economic and social goals, for the economicists both privatization and a market economy are essential for economic development.

Economicists attribute the serious underperformance of the Cuban economy to centralization, state monopoly of commerce and production of goods and services, soft-budget constraints, and lack of private entrepreneurship and market relations. Although it may not be publicly acknowledged, economicists believe that the private capitalist management model (based on autonomous, nondemocratic managers responsive to private interests) is the most effective way to run an enterprise and that markets are the most efficient form of coordinating enterprise activity, allocating resources, and promoting efficiency and innovation.

Economicists defend the notion that if economic actors are to behave optimally and, specifically, managers are to make the right decisions and workers are to increase productivity, material incentives and the “discipline of the market” are unavoidable. ²¹ They add that producers should pay the consequences of their poor performance even if it is due to market changes or events beyond their control. They argue against paternalistic relations between Cubans and state institutions in which the former expect to have all their problems solved by the latter.

The economicists play down warnings that their policies would aggravate inequality, the marginalization of social groups, the exploitation of employees in the private sector and in more autonomous state enterprises, and the deterioration of the environment. These social concerns are to be dealt with at a future date and meanwhile should not be allowed to interfere with the advance of privatization and marketization. ²² They point out that significant inequality in nonwage-related income is already a reality (see Márquez, 2011: 6, and Lambert, 2011). The economicists predict that their policies will produce “winners” and “losers” depending on their ability to adapt to market imperatives, but they point out that some measures can be taken to limit the “collateral” consequences of the reforms.

“Social justice” is for economicists an uncomfortable, messy word: social goals are too abstract, and a tax system to control the income gap and legislation to protect customers, the environment, and wage workers is sufficient. They suggest that we must choose between efficiency with inevitable inequality, on one hand, and social justice with poor material conditions, on the other. In contrast, the self-managementists argue that genuine democratic management would lead to efficiency, productivity, equality, and justice (Chaguaceda and Centeno, 2011: 53; Guanche, 2011).

As a means to achieve accelerated economic growth, the economicists propose the incorporation of Cuba into international production chains and policies to attract foreign investment. They point to the success of China and Vietnam in promoting growth by attracting direct foreign investment and Cuba’s need for external financing. In the process, however, they fail to mention the negative impacts of market reform in those countries, such as increasing signs of inequality, corruption, social unrest, environmental degradation, spiritual emptiness, and the dismantling of social programs. They offer no suggestions for avoiding these consequences.

The economicists ignore core Marxist arguments about labor exploitation and alienation. Their line of reasoning has influenced officials at the Ministry of Labor, who fail to recognize that hired workers are in a subordinate position to the person who hires them even if he or she also works (J. A. Rodríguez, 2011) and that this uneven relationship is going to increase as the availability of state jobs decreases. Denying the unequal and largely antagonistic relationship between business owners and employees allows technocrats to ignore the need to protect the latter with a labor code or some rules that guarantee their minimum rights and the complicated topic of allowing unions that represent workers vis-à-vis management rather than vis-à-vis the state.

Economicists tend to disregard arguments that point to the complexity of human behavior and social factors that explain the effectiveness of democratically managed enterprises. They overlook the advantages of cooperation over self-interest. Calls to employ other means of human fulfillment such as harmonious relations among people, professional development, and social recognition and warnings about the dangers of compulsive consumption appear to them irrelevant or even antithetical to individual freedom and therefore dogmatic.

Economicism finds fertile ground among state technocrats and bureaucrats who assume that the private sector will regulate itself through the operation of the market and therefore social concerns can be overlooked. The most fervent economicists tend to be enterprise administrators who hope that they will be left to manage a state enterprise as they see fit, avoiding all the barriers and restrictions that centralized planning currently creates. Achieving more autonomy and less supervision, less job security, and only formal worker participation appears to them an almost perfect arrangement. ²³ At the same time, economicism characterizes the thinking of many ordinary Cubans influenced by the discourse that favors efficiency over social goals and attributes China’s and Vietnam’s economic growth to privatization and marketization. Some academics, speaking the language of mainstream scholarly circles, are the most outspoken defenders of economicist views.

Self-Managementists: Democratic Socialism

The self-managementists defend the need for a social order that is more just and sustainable than capitalism. However, they envision a different path both from the state-centered socialism that has strongly marked the Cuban version of the system and that the statists are now trying to refashion and from the market-guided socialism that the economicists present as the only feasible model. Self-managementists argue that there can be no real socialism without solidarity, equality, and substantive democratic participation of the people in decision making in all spheres of life (political, economic, cultural, etc.). The essence of socialism is instituting the social relations of self-management or self-government from communities and workplaces up to the national—and eventually global—level, that is, a democratic social control of society, the state, the economy, and all social institutions. ²⁴

Inspired by the conceptualizations of twenty-first-century socialism that have been guiding transformation processes in Latin America in recent years ²⁵ and reasserting the humanist, emancipatory, and egalitarian ideals that have marked the Cuban Revolution since its inception, ²⁶ self-managementists argue that the goal of socialism should be overall human development (Fernández and Guanche, 2010: 4, 10–11). For them supreme happiness, freedom, and fulfillment are achieved by allowing people to develop their capacities through active participation in everyday social activity in an environment where the control of decision making has been democratized or “socialized.” ²⁷ To build socialism is to free individuals from all forms of oppression, subordination, discrimination, and exclusion that impede the satisfaction of their material and spiritual needs; it is to achieve a society in which people are active, conscious subjects rather than passive beneficiaries of welfare programs. Self-managementists seek emancipation both from an oppressive state and political system and from undemocratic economic institutions. ²⁸

For self-managementists, the goal of Cuban socialism should not be to satisfy the ever-increasing material needs of its citizens but to create conditions that allow them to fully develop their capacities as human beings and thus satisfy their material and spiritual needs, assuming that material needs will change under a more liberating daily life. Although wage-labor and market relations are also forms of oppression to be overcome, most self-managementists agree that they should not be prohibited and that society can advance toward their gradual conversion or virtual elimination by making democratically managed enterprises and socialized horizontal exchange relations more effective and attractive (Piñeiro, 2011: 70–76).

The main problem of Cuban socialism for self-managementists has been the lack of substantive participation of workers and citizens in the administration of their lives and society. Decisions at the central state level and all the way down to local governments and enterprises have too often been made without the true participation of the people, and therefore the benefits of participatory democracy have been lost (see Campos, 2011b; Espacio Laical, 2011a: 20–21; Espina, 2008: 137). The requirements of economic activity and social implications would have been taken into consideration, they argue, if experts and affected social groups had participated in decision-making processes that have been limited to state functionaries.

The self-managementists attribute the underperformance of state institutions to the insufficient sense of true ownership (which is not the same as legal property) by workers and even managers. This position sees the realization of the sense of ownership or property as essentially derived from the nature of the decision-making process and thus the social relations that are established, while statists would argue that it derives from education of workers about their rights and duties (see Vascós, 2009: 104) and economicists that it derives from material incentives such as linking workers’ income to their individual performance. ²⁹ It is low democratic participation, insufficient democratic control of management and executive bodies, that, in addition to insufficient incomes, results in low motivation to work, mistaken management decisions, and corruption (Campos, 2011b). Without true ownership by workers and citizens in general, it is argued, there will be no motivation to ensure that resources are used properly (Espacio Laical, 2011b: 19). ³⁰

While for self-managementists workplace democracy is indispensable, both statists and economicists view it as a utopian concept that challenges the necessary role of their vanguard cadres and experts or entrepreneurs and would result in underperformance and chaos. Self-managementists argue that self-management in the form of cooperatives, co-management, and community enterprises in coordination with democratically managed local governments is not easy to accomplish but is necessary to achieve higher levels of development of both workers’ capacities (manual, intellectual, and spiritual) and the productive forces, since social control ensures that resources are used effectively at the same time that it provides positive incentives to increase productivity.

Self-managementists argue that transforming nonstrategic state enterprises into cooperatives—without ignoring the need for workers’ willingness and preparation—is preferable economically and ethically to both the current situation and the proposals for renting them to private entrepreneurs. Economicists do not oppose cooperatives, mostly because they see them as a first step toward the eventual privatization of larger enterprises. Statists distrust any arrangement in which the state would lose direct control.

Defenders of self-management place great emphasis on the need to democratize not just enterprises but the economy and thus society at large, but they have differing viewpoints regarding the degree to which self-managed enterprises should operate through market relations. Most of them favor decentralized, horizontal exchange relations among economic actors and have faith that worker-managed enterprises will behave responsibly on behalf of the interests of society as a whole. While some self-managementists maintain that the fundamental space of participation should lie in the workplace and overlook the consequences of markets for enterprises’ behavior toward society, others warn that democratically managed enterprises are not immune to market logic and envision democratic local governments and social organizations in more direct control of them. ³¹

The self-managementist position highlights the need not only to redistribute wealth but to change the way it is created by establishing relations of freely associated labor and thus achieving the principle of true socialist property, which in turn would stimulate productivity (Hernández in Espacio Laical, 2011b: 43; Espina, 2008: 134–135; Martínez, 2009: 33–34; Perera and Martín, 2011). Democratization at the point of production is what Marx identified as the basis of a society that has truly transcended the capitalist order (Campos, 2006). The self-managementists note that these changes, and not only higher wages or greater autonomy for managers, are a source of important incentives for productivity and efficiency and at the same time promote the development of the “new” socialist men and women (see Espina, 2008: 135–137; Tablada, 2009: 141–145, 148–149). ³²

Those who identify with this position warn of the risks of decentralization of government and enterprises without democratization and without taking into consideration the interests of workers and all those affected by their activities. ³³ Some defend the need to establish—in addition to a sound regulatory framework—spaces for democratic coordination between producers, consumers, and other social groups (environmentalists, feminists, minorities, etc.) so that the local economy will respond to social interests rather than profit maximization and market laws. ³⁴

It is difficult to determine which sectors of Cuban society identify with the self-managementist position. Support is related not so much to any geographical or employment situation as to exposure to these “alternative” ideas. Bombarded by bold messages for privatization and marketization, many Cubans not surprisingly consider self-management proposals “utopian” or impractical. Also, the idea of democratic participation may have lost its meaning among Cubans because authorities have constantly insisted that the nation’s political system, local governments, and state enterprises are the most participatory possible and because the independent decision-making capacity of agricultural cooperatives has been severely curtailed. The staunchest advocates of the self-managementist position are undoubtedly intellectuals and professionals who have been exposed to alternative, post-Stalinist socialist ideas and the discourse about twenty-first-century socialism that resonates in Latin America. However, as Cubans have started to suffer the consequences of the expansion of private enterprises and the adjustments in state institutions, they have begun to raise concerns about expanding selfishness and insensitivity and about the undemocratic practices of state managers and local authorities. ³⁵ Similarly, as the wages of state workers have become tied to the performance of their enterprises, some workers have become increasingly interested in having control over them, even demanding to be able to elect managers. ³⁶ Some of these workers even defend the proposal to convert most nonstrategic state enterprises into cooperatives. ³⁷

Final Considerations

Cuban society is currently engaged in defining its future direction, whether toward a better-organized state-led society, a more market-based one, a more democratic one, or—more likely— a combination of the three. Some evidence can be brought to bear on the question of the weight of each position and whether it is likely to grow or diminish in influence.

Without a doubt, the economicist position is the one that currently predominates both within the state and among a majority of Cubans. After more than 20 years of hardship, Cubans are first and foremost interested in increasing their incomes in order to satisfy basic needs. Heavily exposed to the hegemonic worldview that private enterprise and markets work best, many believe that privatization and marketization represent the best path to sustained economic growth. Faced with the failure of state enterprises and top-down planning and largely unaware of other ways of socializing the economy, they see no alternative. At the same time, however, Cubans generally do not consider private enterprise and markets natural and hope to prevent their inequalities and other negative side effects, such as price differentials and higher profits for commerce over production.

Statist positions are openly recognized as representing the status quo and what Cuba needs to move away from and are thus rejected by the vast majority of the population. The position, however, still enjoys significant support within the state and among Cubans who place a premium on social services. In fact, some argue that the final version of the Sixth Congress’s Guidelines is less economicist and more statist than the initial draft. ³⁸ Additional evidence of the economicists’ loss of influence are the moratorium on the plan to lay off 10 percent of the Cuban workforce and the increase in subsidies and social security expenditures, at least those related to health issues and injuries, in the first semester of 2011 (Fernández Sosa, 2011).

There is very little of the self-managementist vision in the Guidelines. The document fails to incorporate the self-managementists’ main goals (satisfaction of people’s broader needs, such as human development) and means (participatory democracy, democratic control of social institutions) (se Rafael Hernández in Espacio Laical, 2011b: 29). Although President Raúl Castro had made reference to the importance of “participation,” ³⁹ the Guidelines mention it only three times, and mostly in the sense of “consultation” (PCC, 2011: 21, 22, 38). The document does acknowledge cooperatives as a socialist form of enterprise but fails to prioritize them over private ones. Its stated goal of providing state enterprises and municipal governments with more autonomy is a positive step but still far from recognizing the need to democratize them. This shortcoming accurately reflects the fact that self-managementists are in the minority, which is partly the result of Cuba’s verticalist, older-male-dominated culture.

Nevertheless, the social imaginary of social justice and emancipation is still present. Although the grandchildren of the historic generation are less familiar with socialist and revolutionary ideals, they generally grasp the importance of dignity and justice and reject subordination. ⁴⁰ A culture of solidarity cultivated by the Revolution still endures, making inequality seem particularly unacceptable. Moreover, some have warned that without participation and social control of autonomous local governments and enterprises, Cuba is paving the way for the restoration of capitalism. ⁴¹ Signs of the increasing weight of the self-managementist position have emerged recently in the form of articles in official newspapers defending the need for workers to participate fully in management decisions and thus begin to resemble true owners. ⁴²

However, the self-managementists are not waging the battle of ideas effectively. Only recently have the Cuban mainstream, official media begun to air some of their points of view. Some self-managementists behave like outsiders in that they distrust state institutions and fail to interact with the media. ⁴³ Furthermore, the defenders of self-management have not yet put forward detailed, realistic propositions that appear feasible. They—as well as the economicists— need to deal with the fact that more autonomous private or even collective enterprises are already resulting in an increase in prices, especially of basic goods and services, thus further reducing the real income of Cuban workers. ⁴⁴ Self-managementists also border on voluntarism when they fail to consider that not all Cubans are interested in assuming the responsibility of participating in management decision-making schemes. Their model of democratic socialism rests on the assumption that people are willing and to some degree able to put up with the inconveniences of democratic decision making in their communities, workplaces, and broader organizations. In short, defenders of democratic socialism and self-management must do a better job of presenting clear proposals that address questions of feasibility and efficiency.

The three main visions analyzed in this paper (state socialism, market socialism, and democratic socialism based on self-management) cannot be reduced to “good” or “bad” choices. All sides make legitimate points that need to be considered in the strategic decisions that are made. However, the desirability of democracy—not the formal, liberal representative one but the substantive, “participatory” one—is now widely accepted throughout the world. From a normative perspective, pursuing more democracy would appear more desirable than conferring inordinate power on state functionaries who pledge to represent the interests of society or on resourceful economic actors who direct from the shadows an “invisible hand” that affects us all.

A strategy focused just on sustaining economic growth and improving the performance of the Cuban state should improve living conditions for at least part of the population and could help maintain support for the Cuban socialist project. But to the extent to which economic growth fundamentally comes not from democratically managed enterprises and socially controlled markets but from privatization and marketization, as in capitalist and market-oriented “socialist” countries, the interests of the new capitalists are inevitably going to move farther away from social interests, and they will find ways to contribute less in taxes, ⁴⁵ charge higher prices, externalize as many of their costs as possible to society, and eventually make sure that the state responds to their private interests. Similarly, to the extent to which state managers are given greater autonomy without democratizing political and economic institutions, abuses of power and inequalities will become increasingly common. The ones who will suffer the most from such reforms are the staunchest supporters of the Revolution today and would be less inclined to sustain a project that does not address their needs and expectations of fairness.

In the current process of redefining the kind of socialism that is desirable for Cuba, there is an alternative to “state socialism” and “market socialism.” If the goal is to create the fairest society possible, more space needs to be opened up for the discussion of self-managementist proposals in the public media, and public discourse should center on the values of equality, justice, and solidarity. The important role that direct, participatory democracy has played in other revolutionary processes currently under way in Latin America should influence the Cuban debate. In this way, the principles and social cohesion that have sustained the Revolution could be advanced rather than weakened.