Migrant Smuggling on Mexico’s Gulf Route: The Actors Involved

Methodology

The method employed was the in-depth interview with an open-ended questionnaire adapted to the experiences of interview subjects. The subjects were selected through purposive sampling, a nonrandom selection of a small number of cases for in-depth study. This was done using snowball sampling; respondents were contacted with the help of informants who knew people who engaged in migrant smuggling. Fieldwork was conducted between April 2008 and December 2011, and 70 smugglers, mostly of rural origin and ranging in age from 21 to 49 years, operating in different places along the Gulf route (in San Luis Potosí, Tamaulipas, Nuevo León, Veracruz, and Chiapas) were interviewed. Each participant was interviewed twice; the first interview lasted over an hour, and the second delved into issues that had been left pending or remained unclear during the first. Interviews continued until they became repetitive; thus sample size was limited by the number of subjects able to provide new information. Fifteen Central American migrants who had used the Gulf route were also interviewed.

The methodological rigor of this study is anchored in the following elements: (1) the recording and literal transcription of all qualitative material, (2) the use of a guide that included a few minimum information requirements, (3) the selection of informants willing to talk extensively about their experiences, (4) the continuation of data gathering to the point of saturation, (5) prolonged residence in the field, (6) guaranteed anonymity regarding the information collected, and (7) the selection of a large number of locations for fieldwork.

The Commodification of Immigration

Immigration theory has emphasized the autonomous character of migration. For some theorists the key actor is the individual (neoclassical theory), for others the family (the new economics of labor migration), and for still others the community (migration networks theory, the theory of cumulative causation, transnational theory). Neoclassical theorists explain emigration as a result of individual decisions guided by an economic rationality that seeks to maximize expected income. The new economics of labor migration contemplates the determination to emigrate as a collective family decision meant to maximize revenues and minimize risks. Migration networks theory argues that the mechanism that favors migration is the emergence of kinship and friendship relations that link emigrants with residents in local communities. The theory of cumulative causation holds that, once initiated, migratory movements become self-sustaining social processes. Transnational theory argues that the establishment of sister communities in the host country provides a permanent social infrastructure that facilitates the settlement of new migrants without breaking their ties with their communities of origin.

The focus on the autonomous and independent nature of migration has obscured the role of other actors. Krissman (2005: 37) criticizes migration theories for failing to emphasize what he sees as the real players: employers. While today emigration is viewed as an autonomous phenomenon supported by social networks (Arango, 2000: 290; Massey, Durand, and Malone, 2009: 29; Portes and Borocz, 1989: 608), it is accepted that during the industrial age migration was dependent on employers who encouraged migration flows through the recruitment of foreign workers. In the case of the Mexico–United States migration system, in 1909 Porfirio Díaz and William H. Taft signed an agreement to export 1,000 Mexican laborers to the United States (Durand, 2007: 28). The crisis of agricultural labor during World War I led to the recruitment of more than 70,000 Mexican workers between 1917 and 1921 (Briggs, 2004: 2). Later, the shortage of unskilled labor in the context of World War II and the Korean War led to the creation of the Bracero Program, which lasted from 1942 until 1964 and recruited 4.6 million Mexican workers. Finally, in the context of the Immigration Reform and Control Act, the H-2A and H-2B visa programs were created to deal with specific problems regarding the shortage of unskilled labor. However, the characteristic feature of the past few decades has been the development of huge migration flows of an irregular nature. As a consequence, Massey et al. (1998: 13) argue that the forces of attraction have diminished in the postindustrial period and, in the face of an avalanche of immigrants, receiving countries have not only stopped recruitment but implemented legal barriers and restrictive border control to stop the arrival of unwanted labor.

In contrast, other writers (Sassen, 2003: 78; Marroni, 2009: 130) have underlined the dependent character of migration and attributed it to the global restructuring of capitalism, which has increased job precariousness that encourages migration; the forces of expulsion in underdeveloped economies and forces of attraction in developed countries are therefore part of a single international economic process. At the same time, recent studies (Rosewarne, 2010; Schmidtke, 2012) point to a commodification of migrant labor derived from the utilitarian logic of the neoliberal model, which reduces migrants to subjects of economic interest. The result has been an unprecedented increase in the numbers of both undocumented immigrants and guest workers, whose expendability, temporary status, and lack of civil rights contribute to the economic competitiveness of the receiving countries.

The data collected in this study point to the dependent character of international migration and the gradual erosion of forces of expulsion by the commodification of migrant labor. The new paradigm of human life securitization (Payan, 2011: 82) and the transformation, after September 11, of immigration policy into a national security policy that associates illegal immigration with drug trafficking and terrorism have transformed migration. It can no longer be autonomous, and forces of expulsion are increasingly irrelevant to it because individuals, families, and communities lack the resources to sustain it. Migrants are illegal goods the movement of which entails the participation of new actors. In Mexico, gangs monopolize activities that operate on the fringes of the law, and no illegal goods can be transported without their consent; in the United States, restrictive border control policies make entry very difficult for those who do not enjoy the protection of the immigration authorities. In the past decade, irregular flows to the United States have shrunk because emigrating without documents is increasingly complex and expensive and requires contact with networks that are beyond the reach of individuals, families, and communities. However, the financial support, prestige, and contacts of many employers have enabled the continuation of this flow, and therefore there has been a decline in the number of autonomous migrants and an increase in dependent commodity migrants. ³

The new anti-immigration climate, the increase in deportations, and the strengthening of border surveillance have all benefited employers. The cost of emigrating has increased disproportionately, but the fees paid by migrants (some of whom are transported free of charge) have not because employers are financing that cost. Some have their own smugglers, while others buy migrants from suppliers of irregular labor. The global crisis has led employers to devise new forms of reducing production costs; some have replaced autonomous migrants with hardworking people who lacked the economic means to emigrate (Izcara Palacios, 2010a: 70). A migrant who crosses the border using personal resources is not so easily exploitable. In contrast, a commodity migrant works harder, having been subjected to greater scrutiny: only the healthiest, most robust, and most productive individuals are chosen (Izcara Palacios, 2011). Many smugglers underscore an increase in labor demand over the past five years: migrants suffer from increased seclusion, and many are forced to work for 12 or more hours per day (Izcara Palacios, 2010b). This degree of overexploitation would not be possible without the sponsorship of the state, which favors the interests of employers. Fear of deportation discourages idleness and moving from one job to another, while closer ties between employers and the authorities enable the former to exercise greater control over the workforce. The autonomous migrant comes free whereas the commodity migrant is expensive, but the latter is more profitable for being more stable, more productive, and better suited to the demands of neoliberal globalization, which requires a reduction in production costs to enable competition in a global market.

The Role of Organized Crime

There is a tendency to argue that migrant smuggling is operated by organized crime. Official discourse holds that the smuggling of migrants across the Mexico/United States border is a sinister business operated by criminals with little regard for the lives of migrants, who are assaulted, robbed and hit, raped, and abandoned in inhospitable areas (Governments of the United States and Mexico, 2001; HCHS, 2006: 18). Also, a report by the Mexican Human Rights Commission (Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos, 2009: 15) indicated that almost 59 percent of migrant kidnappings were perpetrated by smugglers, which supports the hypothesis that these are indeed members of gangs. Academic discourse has also stressed the connection between migrant smuggling and criminal organizations (Alonso Meneses, 2010: 29; Andreas, 2006: 65; Slack and Whiteford, 2010: 88).

Other academics argue that migrant smuggling is a nonviolent operation that is not linked to gangs (Sharma, 2005: 94; Spener, 2008; 2009), and the interviewees agreed with this assessment, defining this activity as a nonviolent business driven by people who try to provide good service to migrants in order to be able to increase their client base. They repeated expressions such as “You look after them first, and then they look after you” (Inocencio), ⁴ “As a smuggler you must always be ready for anything and even fight for your life if necessary in order to defend the people you are transporting” (Hugo), and “If one day I was assaulted or they tried to take the people away from me, I’d be the one to go first” (Jacinto), all of which show the smugglers’ interest in the welfare of migrants.

Although gangs have controlled migrant smuggling along the Gulf route since 2004, they are not directly involved in it. They extort the smugglers in the same way they extort businesspeople, and this extortion has increased in recent years. The collection of fees from smugglers and the kidnapping of migrants are among their most profitable activities. Whereas in 2004 each migrant paid a few hundred dollars to cross the Tamaulipas border, by 2011 some smugglers paid almost a thousand dollars for each migrant they guided. Paolo explained how gangs’ quotas mounted between 2004 and 2008: “One would pay 1,000 pesos, then 2,000, then 5,000, and, well, it kept rising, and in 2007 it jumped to 20,000, then 30,000 in 2008, and from there on it more than doubled; it is 70,000 nowadays, and some get charged more.”

Some migrants think that gangs also engage in human trafficking. When they are deported to Mexico, it is not uncommon for criminals to offer them work in exchange for taking them into the United States. This was the case of Moisés, a 31-year-old Guatemalan who in December 2008 was deported to Reynosa (Tamaulipas); a criminal group there got him working in a bar and then took him to San Fernando (Tamaulipas), where he worked collecting businesses’ fees, but he was never paid or taken to the United States. Another young man from El Salvador who worked picking oranges in Tamaulipas was offered passage to the United States in exchange for work; a few days later, in July 2011, he disappeared. His friends, two workers from Honduras, suspected that he had been kidnapped because he had not come to say goodbye.

When gangs come to migrants and offer to take them to the United States, this is an empty promise. Drug trafficking and migrant smuggling are different activities carried out by different groups via different channels. Gangs do not engage in migrant smuggling because they can obtain greater benefits by charging an extortion fee that they can raise at will; if they smuggled migrants themselves it would be absurd to charge themselves exorbitant prices (Izcara Palacios, 2012b: 58). Respondents agreed that gangs did not engage in migrant smuggling because this business was not as profitable as drug trafficking, kidnapping, and extortion. Sigfrido argued that these groups do not deal in smuggling because “people do not see them as trustworthy.” Smugglers get most of their customers through recommendations made by other migrants, and an organization that frightens people will have few customers.

None of those interviewed said that they belonged to a criminal group; on the contrary, most of them complained of extortion and the large amounts they had to pay in order to operate smoothly. They agreed that the most negative and problematic aspect of migrant smuggling was the violence caused by organized crime. It has replaced banditry and extortion by state agents and is more implacable than either.

Alliances between organized crime and u.s. and mexican state officials

In Mexico, the General Population Law of January 7, 1974, declared illegal immigrants criminals, and this enabled immigration authorities, police, and civilians to act with impunity. Spener (2010: 19) has documented that from the second half of the 1990s on the Mexican authorities have charged smugglers a monthly fee for crossing the border with undocumented clients, and this rose from US$1,000 to $3,000 between 1997 and 2002. Between 2004 and 2007, state agents battled gangs for the collection of fees, but after 2008 organized crime prevailed.

At the same time, Spener (2010: 20) says that a decade ago some smugglers were forced to buy illegal migrants whom the Mexican authorities had seized from smugglers who failed to pay their dues. In 2007 the seizure of autonomous migrants and those traveling with smugglers who had not paid their fees to gangs intensified and state agents had begun selling migrants to those groups (Izcara Palacios, 2016: 13). In this connection, a report of the Mexican Human Rights Commission (Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos, 2009: 14) pointed out that the kidnapping of migrants revealed complicity between gangs and the Mexican authorities. Some Central American migrants who were kidnapped after being deported to Mexico confirmed the participation of the Mexican authorities in the sale of their conationals to organized crime: “I saw how the immigration agents delivered the migrants who came down from the bus [to the group of kidnappers]” (Oscar); “They [the police] brought people down from the bus and gave them to the people I was with” (Rafael); “I began to get scared when I saw that police received up to 5,000 pesos for each immigrant they delivered to the gang” (Uriel); “The police are also under the orders of the gangs, because policemen brought them kidnapped people” (Paulino).

The alliance between the Mexican immigration authorities and organized crime to extort migrants has been denounced by human rights organizations and the media. It remains unknown whether the U.S. authorities have forged alliances with gangs in order to benefit economically from migrant smuggling. When the smugglers were asked if there was such a pact, their responses shed little light; they were unaware of the intricacies of the agreements made between different actors. Most of those interviewed thought that there was no communication between the actors involved in migrant smuggling in Mexico and those who operated in the United States. Expressions such as “What’s from here is here and what’s from there is there. It’s different” (Jacinto), “One thing is Mexico and another the United States, but everyone takes something in the end” (Inocencio), and “The smuggler pays what they charge here for crossing, and the boss arranges things there to be safe and have no problems” (Leonel) underscore the disconnect between the two sides of the border. However, some suggested that all the actors involved in migrant smuggling were part of a single chain that crossed borders and involved employers, immigration authorities on both sides, and gangs.

Marcelo said that “it is known” that some the fees charged by the gangs “reach U.S. immigration cops” and remarked that those who did not pay were sent back to Mexico by the border patrol. When we asked him how the border patrol knew who had paid the fees imposed by organized crime, he replied, “One is all, and all are the same.” In addition, Misael pointed out that payments made to criminals were distributed among multiple stakeholders, including the U.S. authorities. He said that when a smuggler managed to evade the fee demanded by the gangs he was arrested by the U.S. authorities but when the payment was made they turned a blind eye: “You always you have to pay to get through. There are many people involved because of the money, which is divided among all of them. Sometimes we have run into immigration along the way, and they pretend they do not see us and do not stop us. . . . You have to pay because if you don’t you can’t cross, and if you do [manage to do so] you won’t get very far before they report you.”

Interviewees agreed that corruption is widespread on both sides of the border. As Paolo pointed out, “The migra takes money, the Mexican betas and the immigration police from over there.” The smugglers refer to the U.S. immigration authorities with phrases such as “There is corruption beyond measure” (Jacinto) and “Migration is corrupt, of that there is no doubt” (Gabriel). When describing the Mexican authorities, opinions are more derogatory. Rolando, a Chiapas smuggler, said, “You have to pay so they let people through and you have no problems. . . . They engage in many abuses, from punches to other things. . . . Unfortunately there is a lot of corruption, from the top down.”

Alliances between employers and u.s. Immigration authorities

The smuggling of migrants is sustained by the complicity of public servants on both sides of the border (Escobar Valdez, 2006: 82, 85; Spener, 2001: 233). U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement has acknowledged cases of corruption ⁵ while insisting that it involves just a “few corrupt federal agents.” However, the words of the interviewees reveal a different situation: most of them said that corruption was widespread among U.S. immigration agents. If corruption cases were isolated, only a few hundred migrants would cross the border with the connivance of the authorities. However, respondents say thousands of people cross the border this way. Also, only an unlikely 35 percent of smugglers interviewed reported having been arrested at some point by the immigration authorities, which strongly suggests complicity.

According to many smugglers, crossing the U.S. border if no arrangements have been made with the immigration authorities is a very difficult task. Marcelo said, “Some people have crossed up to ten times, and they keep getting returned because they don’t know whom to make a deal with in order to be safe.” He also remarked, “I have never been stopped, and it’s not luck that they don’t catch me. It’s because I never fail to pay them.” Servando pointed out: “There is money there, because if it were not so, no one would get through or it’d be very difficult, because they have many ways of stopping you—they have cameras and trucks equipped to catch illegals, and they don’t.” These arrangements are usually made not by the smugglers but by the employers. Respondents noted that in recent years, in the midst of a world economic crisis, the demand for undocumented immigrants has intensified because of a contraction of irregular migration flows. As a result, employers have had to reach agreements with the immigration authorities so that the latter will allow smugglers and their clients into the United States.

The participation of the immigration authorities in the smuggling of migrants is not something new. ⁶ What is new is the systematization of this participation and the wealth derived from it. This has lessened the independence of immigration authorities; some smugglers said that their employers blackmailed them and moved more people than initially agreed; others said that sometimes and against their will they had to release some captured migrants because of the interference of powerful people. The smugglers interviewed did not consider the Mexican gangs part of their networks, but when we asked them how many people took part in them and what the function of each one was, some did mention the U.S. authorities. While gangs are seen as an impediment, the U.S. authorities are sometimes seen as support.

According to interviewees these past years the U.S. border has been partially open. Although the border is now more closely guarded than ever, the smugglers have never had such ease crossing. The following comments reflect the increasing degree of collusion by the U.S. authorities with the smuggling networks: “If they see you with the equipment they have, they just turn around or go, play dumb, and move away” (Tobías); “Lately it’s quite blatant, because if there is money in between they won’t bother you, even if you just pass in front of them; they pretend they don’t see you and let you through without disturbing you” (Santiago); “Many illegals cross on a daily basis, at all hours; before, this only happened at night, but now it’s also during the day” (Paolo); “Now it’s easier because one has arranged things with them. People who have been working at this for a while say that it was not this way before; before it was just a matter of taking care” (Sigfrido); and “Things have changed since a while ago, and, well, it’s arranged; before, they’d grab and you would be arrested and sent back” (Velasco). Until a few years ago, successfully crossing the border depended on the skill of the smugglers; now it is up to the authorities to let them through. Smugglers whose employer has a deal with the authorities do not encounter any difficulties crossing the border; migrant smuggling networks that do not have the backing of a U.S. employer with the right contacts encounter many. As Victoriano put it, “You have to be careful when you go there so you don’t get caught; those who give them money are usually not caught, but they work for a single employer. Me, I work for different people, I’m not covered; it’s as if I worked on my own.”

Interviewees constantly referred to the large amounts received by the U.S. immigration authorities for allowing crossings. However, they did not know the exact amounts because according to them the payments were usually made by the employers. Sebastián said, “They talk with the employers and arrange things between themselves.” When the smuggler pays, he does so having been instructed by his boss. As Sigfrido put it, “I am the one who pays. I am the one who arranges things with a person there but on the instructions of my employer” (an agricultural entrepreneur from Texas). Only one of the interviewees provided an approximate figure for the money paid to the immigration authorities by his employer, an agricultural entrepreneur who hired a few hundred undocumented workers: “How much does he pay? I don’t know; he apparently paid US$100,000 three years ago, don’t know if it is still the same amount; but he makes at least ten times more from the crops” (Tadeo). This entrepreneur, who years ago had hired workers on H-2A visas, had eventually come to the conclusion that it was more lucrative to bribe the authorities to allow the import of undocumented workers; they received lower wages, worked more hours, and did not protest. The above quote allows us a glimpse into the enormous amount of money received by the U.S. authorities to turn a blind eye to smuggling. Velasco said that the U.S. immigration authorities obtained more profits from the smuggling of migrants than the Mexican gangs because they charged in dollars. Violeta pointed out: “U.S. immigration are the ones who get most of the money paid by migrants. If I charge for carrying people and that money is distributed among the people who help me, there the employer pays twice this much per person. It’s expensive, but it’s business.”

The payment of large sums of money to obtain undocumented workers in sectors employing unskilled labor is becoming the norm rather than the exception according to interviewees. In sectors such as agriculture, most of the employed workforce is undocumented workers recruited in Mexico. Statements such as “Some people do go asking for work, but they are very few; most of those working in ranches have been taken there” (Teobaldo), “If they sit there and wait for them to arrive alone, only a very few would get there; there are many ranchers who want illegals” (Tadeo), and “Most of the workers there are people carried in from Mexico” (Tobías) refer to the scarcity of undocumented workers and employers’ need to recruit Mexican labor in order to meet their labor needs.

The ease with which employers can come to agreements with the immigration authorities to ensure the free passage of their smugglers is reflected by a story told by Paolo. In 2005, the fourth time that he crossed a group of migrants into the United States, he was arrested twice by the border patrol. This made the migrants angry, and they wanted him to return their money, so he phoned his employer, an agricultural businessman from North Carolina, to ask him to fix the situation. “That time it was 15 of us. Imagine, calming them all, and then they wanted their money back, and I had already used some of it that time! I learned from this experience and talked to my boss to get things fixed, and he did, because I was not deported again. . . . To this day, no one stops me when I travel with the people, but these arrangements are made high up there, from boss to boss.”

The smugglers do not know exactly what it is employers do to fix this situation; they realize something has been arranged because the border patrol automatically stops pursuing them. These “arrangements . . . made from boss to boss” are not isolated cases of corruption but part of a broader political strategy to facilitate employers’ access to a highly vulnerable workforce. Velasco presented different scenarios by pointing out that “some immigration officers don’t keep the money, it’s for their bosses, and others charge you directly and their bosses have no idea.” However, the idea that everything is arranged between the “powerful people,” “heavy people,” or “bosses” and not between employees who occupy the lower ranges is emphasized: “I know that if I follow the instructions I will not get caught by immigration police because that has been arranged between powerful people. It’s already arranged” (Francisco); “The boss has arranged this with his bosses” (Leonel); “If your boss is not on good terms with heavy people, immigration will kick your people out” (Braulio).

For this reason, smugglers describe U.S. immigration policy as a farce aimed at containing anti-immigrant sentiment in U.S. society (Izcara Palacios, 2012a). As Tadeo said, this is a game of appearances: “We are fine this way; they pretend they’re working and we go into the United States without risking getting turned back.” Statements such as “Those are speeches meant to silence unhappy people up there” (Aurelio), “If immigration policy were that good we wouldn’t be crossing people down the river” (Alejandro), and “That’s just stuff they make up to be able to get along with society” (Jacinto) described border policy as a tangle of hollow words used to confuse and contain those who are dissatisfied with the increase in the number of immigrants.

The Role of the Smugglers

Society, the authorities, and the media blame smugglers for the ills suffered by undocumented migrants. Smugglers are the perfect scapegoat and are usually described as a social pathology (Aragonés et al., 2010: 138), unscrupulous people who seek only their personal gain (García Vázquez, Gaxiola Baqueiro, and Guajardo Díaz, 2007: 106; O’Leary, 2008: 117), or perverse intermediaries who take risks and charge for it (González, 2009: 49). However, they are often puppets involved in a game of alliances played among employers, the immigration authorities, and the gangs.

A decade ago the undocumented labor supply exceeded demand and employers did not have much difficulty finding cheap unskilled labor. However, in recent years the volume of undocumented migrants has considerably declined. This has led to a deficit of undocumented workers and thus to increased participation of employers in the smuggling of migrants, which has entailed strengthening the partnerships with immigration authorities. This has transformed the role of smugglers, who have gone from being the sole or main agent in the smuggling operation to being junior actors that, as Francisco put it, merely follow orders.

For some smugglers, crossing the border does not entail any risk or effort because they do so using the international bridges. But most have to cross the river, and even if they have arrangements in place with the immigration authorities they must walk for days through hazardous terrain. Some interviewees boasted of crossing right next to the border patrol without being bothered; that said, crossing the border is not so simple. Even though the smugglers know they will not be arrested, they must still pass unnoticed and are always at risk of drowning, dying from dehydration, etc. Tobías said, “This is fixed; they [the border patrol] have already been instructed, but one must still go around hiding. You’re not going to go in front of them.”

Nowadays, the greatest danger for migrant smugglers is crossing Mexican territory. It is difficult to know how many smugglers have disappeared along with the migrants they were guiding, but the figure is high. Many of the smugglers who worked the Gulf route have been killed for refusing to pay the fees. Statements such as “There’s fear; from the moment you stand on the border you think you can be kidnapped or killed” (Violeta) and “Before, you only needed to know the roads. Right now you need balls to do it because of the violence” (Hugo) reflect smugglers’ fear of being attacked by the gangs. They know from experience that when they duly pay their fees nothing happens, but the mere presence of organized crime monitoring every step they take terrifies them.

Conclusions

The migration flow that goes through Mexican territory via the Gulf route into the United States appears to be driven by the U.S. demand for a cheap and submissive workforce. The prevailing violence has stopped many young Mexican people from emigrating to the United States, so smugglers must work increasingly hard at persuading people to make the trip. Many interviewees felt pressured by U.S. employers to recruit undocumented workers in Mexico. The number of smugglers who work the Gulf route has shrunk since 2009, in some cases because of fear of violence and in others because they have disappeared.

Undocumented immigrants are becoming a scarce and valuable commodity for which employers are willing to pay substantial amounts. This has resulted in a flourishing labor market that benefits employers, producers’ associations, and temporary employment pseudo-agencies. Currently, the main actors in the migrant smuggling business are employers, given their financial contribution, their contacts, and their influence. On the one hand, their economic contribution has ensured the survival of a business in which the participation of new actors (gangs and immigration authorities) has disproportionately increased the costs. On the other, their contacts and influence have resulted in arrangements with the immigration authorities to circumvent increased border surveillance. In return, employers have access to a more vulnerable and submissive workforce that can remain in a state of servitude for years, until workers finish paying off their debts. Migrant smuggling now runs not on the contributions made by migrants but on the money paid by employers to obtain cheap labor. A decade ago, migrants financed the total cost of their transportation into the United States, and smuggling networks kept almost all the money generated by this activity. Nowadays, this business entails more money than before, the financial participation of employers is as important as that of migrants, and according to the interviewees gangs and the immigration authorities obtain as many benefits from smuggling as the smugglers themselves.