From Euphoria to Retreat: Formal Employment in Twenty-first-Century Brazil

Abstract

In the 1990s the Brazilian labor market underwent a destructuring process that had profound consequences for Brazilian society. This situation, characterized by high levels of unemployment and informality, began to be modified only with the rise of a government focused on reconciling workers’ interests with the interests of capital associated with the economic growth that began with the international commodity cycle in the early 2000s. The result was a new phenomenon for the labor market—the strong growth of formal employment and labor income and the decline of other types of occupation—that was one of the pillars of social transformation of the country in this period. In recent years, however, a deep economic, political, and institutional crisis has reversed the favorable conditions that allowed this advance, producing a change in the labor market structuring of the previous period. Analysis of the labor market regression of these years using information from the Monthly Employment Survey (PME) and the new continuous National Household Sample Survey (PNAD) helps clarify the determinants and consequences of the recent economic crisis.

Nos anos 1990, o mercado de trabalho brasileiro passou por um processo de desestruturação, com profundas consequências para a sociedade brasileira. Esta conjuntura, caracterizada pelos altos níveis de desemprego e de informalidade, só começou a ser modificada com a ascensão de um governo simpático aos interesses dos trabalhadores (conciliando-os com os interesses do capital) associada ao crescimento econômico que se iniciou no Brasil com o ciclo internacional das commodities no início dos anos 2000. Esta situação resultou em um fenômeno novo para o mercado de trabalho: o forte crescimento do emprego formal e da renda do trabalho, juntamente com retração das outras posições na ocupação, o que foi um dos pilares da transformação social ocorrida no país durante este período. Nos últimos anos, no entanto, uma profunda crise econômica, política e institucional reverteu as condições favoráveis que possibilitaram este avanço, apontando para a reversão da estruturação do mercado de trabalho que havia sido verificada no período anterior. Este artigo faz uma análise do retrocesso do mercado de trabalho nos últimos anos utilizando as informações da Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego e da nova Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios Contínua, elucidando os condicionantes e consequências da recente crise econômica.

Keywords

Formal employment Economic growth Social inclusion Labor market Unemployment

The labor market of Brazil in the 1990s was characterized by high levels of unemployment and the predominance of informality. Pressured by neoliberal policies, privatizations, indiscriminate trade and financial openness, and productive restructuring, Brazilian workers who lost their jobs were forced to seek alternative ways to survive, whether with one of the few informal jobs available or with self-employment, both characterized by job insecurity and low wages. In short, the labor market in Brazil underwent a deregulation that gradually led to severe destructuring and made formal employment the privilege of a few. This situation began to be reversed only in the early 2000s, when the devaluation of the national currency and the growth of exports created the conditions for the recovery of employment growth in export sectors. However, the recovery of the domestic market occurred only with increased aggregate demand in 2003–2004, which enabled continuous growth in employment and income. This process initiated strong growth in formal employment, a drop in unemployment, and a decline in informality that persisted for almost a decade.

The advance of the labor market in this period must be understood in terms of the intense growth of formal employment and the formalization of the economy, registering levels much higher than those of variation in the gross domestic product (GDP). The average annual GDP growth of 5.1 between 2003 and 2008, calculated annually in September in order to avoid the sharp contraction of the last quarter of 2008 with the international financial crisis, was below the average annual change in the formal employment rate, which was 6.8 percent, according to the Annual Report of Social Information (RAIS, 2016).¹ This lack of proportionality would be even greater if the figure were based on the official GDP index of 4.8 percent per year. In other words, a certain configuration of the international market, combined with a given domestic growth strategy, promoted a strong increase in consumption and investment that generated both reasonable GDP growth and an increase in formal employment and the formalization of company structures that was disproportionate to the increase in productivity and even more so to the increase in industrial output (3.9 percent per year).

With the economic recovery of 2004, initially boosted by the commodity boom with strong demand from the foreign and especially the Asian market, there was a greater stimulus to formal hiring, mainly because of the increase in productive capacity of medium-sized and large companies of the export sector. This employment growth based on standard jobs was enhanced by an increase in consumption and investment due to long-term credit growth.² In addition, since the government promoted increased inclusion of the base of the social pyramid through a series of public policies, the consumption capacity of low-income families increased, dynamizing local services and commerce especially in the small and medium-sized municipalities of poorer regions such as the Northeast and stimulating the formalization of contracts in small companies (Cardoso Jr., 2007; Cardoso Jr. and Hamasaki, 2014; Oliveira, 2014). Among the public policies implemented were an increase in the real value of the minimum wage (Souen, 2013), the establishment of the Benefits of Continued Social Assistance³ and Family Grant⁴ programs, broadened access to consumer credit, support for family farming, the expansion of credit lines by the National Bank for Economic and Social Development, and a campaign to eliminate forced labor and child labor.

Thus the increase in formal employment and income and the improvement in income distribution (Souza Campos, 2015) reinforced the expansion of the formalization of the economy, not only increasing consumption at the base of the social pyramid and thus dynamizing small businesses but shifting consumption to goods and services offered by large stores and fostering employment growth in larger and more structured companies. Under these conditions, underemployment alternatives gave way to formal salaried jobs, and in an environment of strengthening trade union activity workers themselves demanded greater formalization to guarantee their rights, which also increased access to credit (Cardoso Jr. and Hamasaki, 2014; Krein and Santos, 2012: 67; Medeiros, 2015).

The slowdown in economic growth since 2014 and its aggravation by the recession of 2015, along with the country’s extensive political-institutional crisis, have significantly threatened the restructuring of the labor market. Since 2015, short-term indicators have begun to show negative results with regard to formal employment that had not been observed since the 1990s and a strong increase in the unemployment rate. This reversal of the labor market has challenged recent social achievements, becoming a threat to the economic growth that had achieved social inclusion through the growth of formal occupations and the greater structuring of the economy.

The aim of this article is to analyze the recent history of the Brazilian labor market with emphasis on the evolution of formal employment. The first part examines the growth of formal employment and labor market structuring before and after the global financial crisis of 2008. The second part deals with the recent period, in which there has been a decline in general employment and an increase in informal employment and unemployment.

The Evolution of Formal Employment

Acceleration of Economic Activity and Formal Employment (2003–2008)

The progress of the labor market restructuring process with the increase in formal employment must be understood from the perspective of changes in the way the economy operates, with the relative price changes that took place under the impetus of an increase in the valuation of the national currency.⁵ This increase, in addition to favoring the growth of the economy without inflationary pressure, contributed to a recovery of the purchasing power of wages that promoted significant growth of demand. These effects were possible because of the lower cost of production as the prices of imported inputs fell and the lower prices of imported finished goods. This process, in turn, produced a change in labor market dynamics toward a more structured trend, with a strong increase in formal employment and the formalization of establishments and a reduction of the percentages of other types of employment.

This mode of operation of the economy, based on an overvalued domestic currency, established a particular structure of relative prices between tradable and nontradable sectors.⁶ Prices in the tradable sectors declined sharply in contrast to those in the nontradable sectors and even in those tradable sectors that presented the greatest comparative advantage (where the decline was less). This price differential between sectors favored the nontradable sectors, which, in a scenario of higher domestic demand, were able to increase installed capacity, augment labor formalization, generate more employment, and pay better wages. Thus the decline in inflation, the advance of formal employment, and the reduction of unemployment led to a nominal increase in labor income above the inflation rate that, combined with actual increases obtained from increases in wages (Dedecca and Lopreato, 2013; Souen, 2013) and of salaries of several categories (DIEESE, 2012; Krein and Teixeira, 2014), sustained an increase in the purchasing capacity of wages. The improvement in labor income, in turn, positively impacted demand, promoting the activation mainly of sectors that did not compete with foreign products—nontradable products. In this process, unstable establishments that generated little formal employment disappeared and others advanced and tended toward greater structuring and formalization. In addition, there was an increase in better-structured establishments that offered workers full benefits.

The increasing formalization and greater structuring of the economy were reinforced by a new public sector framework initiated at the end of the 1990s. The goal was to augment tax collection to guarantee the surplus of public accounts by intensifying the activities of the Federal Revenue Service and by intervening the three public institutions related to labor—the Ministry of Labor and Employment, the Labor Courts, and the Labor Prosecutor’s Office—to enforce the law (Cardoso Jr., 2007; Simão, 2009). Limits were imposed on the discretionary power of employers and the freedom of action of capital.⁷

Thus from 2003 to 2008 the strong growth in the generation of formal job vacancies and the greater formalization of the economy disproportionate to GDP growth were mostly influenced by this larger economic process. There was strong growth in consumption and investment and a movement toward the appreciation of the national currency, reinforced by the differential between the Brazilian inflation rate and the international rate. With the greater consumption capacity of wages, demand in the nontradable sectors increased, producing a considerable increase in their activities. In construction, trade and repair, accommodation and food, transportation, storage and communication, and real estate, for example, there was vigorous formal employment growth, surpassing the economic growth rate, and better-defined structure.

The intense growth of formal employment and greater formalization of this period were therefore a consequence of a mode of operation of the economy characterized primarily by the extraordinary improvement of activity in the nontradable sectors and in the tradable sectors in which there was greater competitive advantage. However, this kind of growth in economic activity, with the real overvalued and the generation of a lot of formal employment, meant a relatively low GDP compared with the strong growth of consumption and investment. The explanation for this is related to the fact that much of the domestic demand was focused on the foreign market. The coefficient of imported goods almost doubled at the end of the first decade of the 2000s despite the positive trade balance that persisted until 2013 (Medeiros, 2015; Santos, 2013; see also the trade data of the Foreign Trade Secretariat and the Ministry of Trade and Development).

In other words, part of the dynamism caused by the exchange rate improvement produced a loss of the dynamic potential of the domestic market generated by an increase in aggregate demand that flowed to the foreign market, harming mainly the productive sector and causing a negative trade balance over the period. This “leakage” meant an average annual GDP growth rate of 5.1 percent (23.5 percent less than the average annual growth rate of formal employment, which according to the RAIS [2016] was 6.3 percent) and an industrial product of 3.9 percent for this period.

Despite this leakage, until 2008, before the international crisis that affected Brazil’s productive structure, the manufacturing sector showed greater structure and considerable variation of the formal employment rate of 40 percent, particularly in sectors that did not suffer the strong competition of finished-product imports. Such imports included metallurgy, chemistry, transportation materials, machinery and equipment, and metal products, which, even with a large number of imports, were focused on parts and components, meaning that a lot of assembly or even internal processing was needed, and this generated formal employment. In contrast, the textile, footwear, and wood and furniture industries, as suppliers of finished goods, suffered the impact of imported finished products directly.

Deceleration of Economic Activity and of Formal Employment (2008–2013)

The favorable economic conditions were modified with the international financial crisis of October 2008. Since then, foreign and domestic market conditions have undergone changes that led to a deceleration in the growth of the Brazilian economy, with a slowdown in demand, especially investment, that had negative consequences for the labor market. However, although the growth rate of formal employment declined by almost half, the decline was much less intense than the slowdown in GDP growth, causing an even sharper disproportion between variation in formal employment and in GDP than in the previous period. Thus the ratio between formal employment and GDP was still higher between 2008 and 2013 than in the previous period.

The growth rate of the Brazilian economy was greatly affected by the international financial crisis of 2008, although in the immediate postcrisis the anticyclical measures of the Lula government (Barbosa and Souza, 2010) enabled the rapid reversal of the recessive scenario that was expected. The end of 2008 saw massive capital flight, shrinkage of domestic and international credit, and a reduction in the price of commodities due to the contraction of foreign demand, with a sharp decrease in GDP in the first half of 2009. This year ended with a decline in production of 0.2 percent. In this context, there was a decline in exports and a devaluation of the national currency, affecting the confidence of economic agents and reducing consumption and productive activity. This produced a technical recession in the first six months of 2009 that could not fail to affect the labor market, with massive layoffs and a considerable drop in employment levels especially in the manufacturing sector.

The recessive conditions were promptly addressed by the federal government with countercyclical fiscal and monetary measures. This was possible because of the high level of international reserves (US$210 billion at the time) that allowed the government to operate quickly to expand liquidity, both in the foreign exchange market and in the domestic market, to avoid the consequences of international liquidity retraction in the domestic interbank market. In addition, short-term credit was expanded for the productive sector in general, via the National Bank for Economic and Social Development, and for other highly fragile sectors, such as agriculture, construction, basic inputs, and the marketing and production of durable goods, via the Bank of Brazil and the Federal Savings Bank (Barbosa and Souza, 2010).

These initiatives were complemented by the implementation of temporary tax relief to stimulate sales and consumption, beginning with the reduction of the tax on industrialized products for the automotive sector at the end of 2008—a measure that extended over the course of 2009 to household appliances, furniture, construction material, motorcycles, and even some food items. With the same countercyclical logic, the federal government promoted budgetary transfers to states and municipalities of around 0.2 percent of GDP in 2009 (Barbosa and Souza, 2010).

All these measures, despite the strong initial decline in GDP and private banks’ credit and profits, sustained household consumption and guaranteed access to capital for companies. In addition, in the second half of 2009 there was an improvement in the international scenario, with an increase of foreign capital flow, the recovery of commodity prices, appreciation of the real, and declining inflation and interest rates. Thus there was a rapid recovery of the Brazilian economy and labor market, and formal employment again increased rapidly in the six metropolitan regions in the second half of 2009, surpassing the precrisis peak of November of the same year (ILO, 2011: 20–22).

The rapid intervention of the federal government therefore not only reversed the adverse conditions of the economic scenario, accelerating the recovery of demand, as early as in the second half of 2009, but also enabled a favorable-expectations scenario in domestic and foreign economic agents that was seen in an increase in GDP of 7.5 percent. However, stimulus to demand meant very little in terms of increased manufacturing output, since its total increase between 2008 and 2010 of 0.3 percent per year corresponded to 1.0 percent of total GDP. This performance was even worse between 2010 and 2012, when manufacturing showed a negative annual variation of 1.3 percent. In this context, what sustained GDP and employment growth was the nonmanufacturing sectors, albeit with a reduction in their growth rate (economic activity and employment generation). According to data from the National Accounts System (2016), whereas between 2006 and 2008 these sectors had grown by 5.9 percent per year, the increase was 4.1 percent between 2008 and 2010 and 2.3 percent between 2010 and 2012 (IBGE, 2011). In 2011 the total output of the economy decreased, with growth of 2.7 percent, and it continued to fall in 2012, with an increase of only 1 percent. As for employment generation, the main nontradable sectors, which between 2003 and 2008 had an annual average growth of 7.5 percent for formal employment, between 2008 and 2013 registered an increase of 6.1 percent per year.⁸

The poor performance of manufacturing was strongly related to the cycle of the increased basic interest rate. The interest rate, which had been on a fast-drop path since January 2009 (falling from 13.8 percent to 8.8 percent in September), increased again, reaching 12.5 percent in a two-year period starting in September (according to the Institute of Applied Economic Research [IPEA, 2016]), and measures were adopted to contain credit, especially in the vehicle sector, at the end of 2010 (FUNDAP, 2011). The strategy was to restrain aggregate demand, given the upsurge in inflation in mid-2010,⁹ and to adjust fiscal measures to meet the primary surplus target of 3.1 percent of GDP (FUNDAP, 2012; Serrano and Summa, 2015). In this process, there was a considerable reduction of public spending, from 4.2 percent between 2009 and 2010 to 1.9 percent between 2010 and 2011. Public sector investment saw a 12 percent decrease in real terms in the same period, compared with an average growth of 16.2 percent between 2004 and 2010, and investment by state-owned companies fell 8.6 percent, compared with an average increase of 14 percent from 2004 to 2010. According to the IPEA (2016), as a result, 2011 was marked by a slowdown in the growth of all segments of the private sector compared with the same period of 2010. The worst performance was that of the manufacturing sector, which grew by 10.4 percent in 2010 and only 1.6 percent in 2011. Construction also showed a sharp decline, from 11.7 percent to 3.6 percent. Sectors that recorded strong declines but to a lesser extent were agriculture, from 6.3 percent to 3.9 percent, and services, from 5.5 percent to 2.7 percent.

From the demand viewpoint, there was a reduction of domestic absorption with the drop of household consumption associated with more expensive credit, a high level of indebtedness, and the larger interest and amortization payments that were part of the family budget. Increase in household consumption, which stood at 7 percent between 2009 and 2010, was 4.1 percent between 2010 and 2011. The investment rate declined even more, from 21.3 percent between 2009 and 2010 and to only 4.7 percent between 2010 and 2011. This scenario of investments can be explained by the slowdown in the domestic market and the worsening of the international market. As a result, GDP, which had grown 7.5 percent in 2010, registered a variation of only 2.7 percent in 2011.

In this context of slowing economic activity, the formal employment growth rate was seriously affected despite the fact that rates were still very favorable. Average variation of 35.9 percent (6.3 percent per year) between 2003 and 2008 dropped to 22.5 percent (4.1 percent per year) between 2008 and 2013. As indicated above, reduced performance of the employment indicators was observed in the manufacturing sector, with significant variation in formal employment in the first period (40 percent) and a strong contraction in the second (9.6 percent). These values show the loss of dynamism in aggregate demand and the transformation of the external scenario since the 2008 crisis in the context of intensification of international competition and an exchange rate that prevented domestic products from competing with foreign ones. Thus the contribution to the generation of formal employment of manufacturing, the second-highest of all sectors of activity in 2008 (almost 20 percent, with more than 2 million jobs generated) decreased by 12.1 percentage points in 2013.

In this scenario, the continuation of employment rate increases, although at a slower rate than in the period prior to the crisis, was sustained by the nontradable sectors. In addition to the public administration sector, the most significant contributions were from the trade and repair, real estate, construction, transportation, storage and communication, and housing and food sectors, which together contributed 66 percent to the generation of formal employment between 2008 and 2013. Considering public administration in this calculation would make the contribution of these sectors to the growth of formal employment 78 percent.

In any case, in the 10 years analyzed, despite the slowdown in the growth rate of indicators after 2008, formal employment and the formalization of companies and labor contracts grew significantly, exceeding GDP growth rates in this period. From 2003 to 2008, performance was excellent in most activity sectors, even manufacturing, despite the unfavorable exchange rate. In the second period, between 2008 and 2013, this process was supported by the nontradable sectors, which benefited greatly over the 10 years from the change in the way the economy operated resulting from a combination of factors favoring growth with social inclusion. Attention should also be drawn to greater union activity and the change of position of the Brazilian government to include more favorable public policies based on the social pyramid and greater oversight. In this process, there was an important change in Brazilian society with positive consequences for the structuring of the economy and the labor market that allowed more inclusive growth. However, after 2014, because of political changes and the deepening of the economic crisis, there was a rapid reversal of the favorable conditions for employment and income.

The Reversal of Formal Employment in Recent Years

The number of formal employment links in Brazil had been developing rapidly since 2003–2004, with growth rates exceeding those for GDP pointing to a restructuring of the country’s labor market. From December 2003 to December 2014, the number of formal employment links in Brazil grew by 67.8 percent, about 5 percent per year. Sample data from the Monthly Employment Report (PME, 2016) and especially the continuous National Household Sample Survey (PNAD, 2016)¹⁰ indicate that an inflection of this trend occurred, breaking with a continuous process of formal employment growth and reduction of unemployment.

Despite the downturn in the economic growth trend observed since 2011, formal employment growth remained positive until at least 2013–2014, when growth rates began to decline to become negative in 2015. As explained above, especially after 2011, a slowdown of economic activity produced a deceleration in the formal employment growth rate. Formal employment in the metropolitan regions, which grew by 6.1 percent between 2010 and 2011 and followed a rising trend except for the brief interval of the foreign crisis between the end of 2008 and the first half of 2009, showed a slowdown, with growth of 5 percent between 2011 and 2012, 2.4 percent between 2012 and 2013, and 1.9 percent between 2013 and 2014. This downward trend quickly turned into a downward movement between 2014 and 2015, registering a negative rate of 1.2 percent. The most recent consolidated data, dated February 2016, indicate a continuity of this movement, with a negative rate of 0.5 percent, reversing the trend that had been taking shape since 2003. Thus, in comparison with the subperiods 2003–2008 (prior to the global financial crisis) and 2008–2013 (after the crisis), the final years show an inflection of the Brazilian labor market after 2013. From February 2013 to February 2016, the evolution of formal metropolitan employment was well below what it would take to achieve results similar to those of the previous subperiods (Table 1).

Table 1

Evolution of Formal Employment by Activity Sector for Selected Periods

	2003–2008			2008–2013			2013–2016
Activity Sector	Δ (%)	Contrib. (Δ %)	Share 2008 (%)	Δ (%)	Contrib. (Δ %)	Share 2013 (%)	Δ (%)	Contrib. (Δ %)	Share 2016 (%)
Mining and quarrying industry and public services	12.3	13.6	20.7	16.6	14.0	19.4	−16.9	−3227.1	16.1
Construction	24.4	4.8	4.1	65.1	10.8	5.4	−13.2	−705.0	4.7
Trade and repair	19.0	16.2	16.9	22.7	15.6	16.6	6.0	979.9	17.6
Financial intermediation, real estate, and business services	37.3	31.0	19.0	28.3	21.9	19.6	7.1	1376.1	20.9
Public administration and social services	18.1	21.4	23.3	18.9	17.9	22.2	6.4	1390.1	23.6
Other services	17.3	13.9	15.8	29.9	19.2	16.4	2.1	341.4	16.8
Other activities	−36.5	−0.8	0.2	67.7	0.7	0.3	−17.0	− 55.4	0.3
Total	20.0	100.0	100.0	24.6	100.0	100.0	0.1	100.0	100.0

Source: PME (2016).

The nontradable sector had contributed most to the growth of formal employment in the 2003–2013 period. In the subperiod between 2003 and 2008, formal employment in metropolitan areas grew by around 20 percent, strongly influenced by the sectors of financial intermediation, real estate, and, especially, business services. These sectors contributed 31 percent of the growth of formal metropolitan employment in the period. The sectors of public administration and social services contributed 21.4 percent and commerce and repair 16.2 percent. In addition to these sectors, another one in which formal employment grew significantly was construction, which had no major contribution to overall growth because it represented a smaller percentage of total formal employment (4.1 percent in 2008). In metropolitan areas, most employment is generated by trade, construction, and, especially, services, sectors that are quite significant in cities. In the subperiod from February 2008 to February 2013, formal metropolitan employment grew even more strongly, by 24.6 percent. This increase was greater than that for the country as a whole, which was 22.5 percent, indicating better performance of urban activities related to trade and services in contrast to manufacturing, which was greatly impaired by the international crisis.

As mentioned earlier in this article, the Brazilian government’s rapid action to preserve credit and consumption and the tax subsidies offered to consumer durable goods industries had brought about a rapid resumption of economic activity, and therefore the role of the sectors that contributed more to the growth of formal employment was accentuated in the postcrisis period, in addition to shielding the Brazilian economy from the more immediate effects of the international crisis. In this subperiod sectors linked to financial intermediation, real estate, and business services, other services, and public administration and social services jointly contributed 59 percent of formal employment growth. Additionally, the trade and repair and construction sectors, which in the previous period, between 2008 and 2013, had contributed 21 percent of formal employment growth, contributed 26.4 percent of growth in this period. In fact, the sectors that contributed most to formal employment growth up to 2014 were trade and repair, services in general, and construction—all nontradable sectors. As already discussed, the performance of these sectors and its consequences for the labor market had a strong relationship with a certain mode of operation based on an economy of currency appreciation. This produced a relatively low inflation rate and an increase in the purchasing power of wages, which, added to the wage gains related to the readjustments of the categories and the valorization of the minimum wage, allowed the dynamization of consumption and domestic demand.

However, industry was also important in the increase in formal employment. In the first subperiod it recorded a growth rate of 12.3 percent for formal employment and contributed 13.6 percent to overall formal employment growth. In the following subperiod the figures were 16.6 percent and 14 percent. Even so, processing, especially processing that competes with imported products, which had already displayed a loss of strength in job creation after the international crisis of 2008,¹¹ played a significant role in explaining the reversal of the growth of formal employment in the recent period. Between February 2013 and February 2016, formal employment in metropolitan areas practically stagnated, registering a growth of 0.1 percent. The sectors responsible for this were precisely those related to industry in general and to construction, with the former dropping by 16.9 percent and the latter by 13.2 percent between February 2003 and February 2016. These sectors were the only ones in which the evolution of formal employment presented systematically negative results, closely following the economic retraction that started in 2014 and worsened in 2015. Formal employment in industry decreased its formal employment by 2.5 percent, 7.7 percent, and 7.6 percent in 2014, 2015, and 2016, respectively. On the other hand, the most significant drop in formal construction employment began in 2015, with a 9.2 percent drop, and decreased slightly in 2016, by 4.2 percent (Table 2). It is no coincidence that the GDP of 2015 was the worst of the series analyzed.

Table 2

Variation of Formal Employment by Large Activity Sector and GDP

Period	Industry^a	Construction	Trade and Repair	Business Services^b	Public Administration and Social Services	Other Services	Total	GDP
2003–2004	−1.7	0.8	−1.5	−0.2	−2.0	−4.3	−2.0	5.7
2004–2005	4.4	−4.5	3.6	11.2	4.5	6.6	5.5	3.2
2005–2006	4.6	7.0	3.5	7.9	7.9	−0.3	5.0	4.0
2006–2007	2.5	2.0	3.1	7.5	1.2	5.0	3.6	6.1
2007–2008	2.1	18.3	9.2	6.8	5.7	9.8	6.7	5.2
2008–2009	2.4	16.0	2.8	1.7	3.7	1.7	3.1	−0.3
2009–2010	2.8	12.6	5.6	8.8	2.8	9.2	5.9	7.5
2010–2011	6.0	9.7	7.5	7.2	2.7	7.2	6.1	2.7
2011–2012	2.1	9.2	6.1	7.7	5.3	2.4	5.0	1.0
2012–2013	2.3	5.6	−1.0	0.5	3.2	6.6	2.4	2.5
2013–2014	−2.5	−0.2	2.4	3.0	4.8	1.4	1.9	0.1
2014–2015	−7.7	−9.2	2.2	2.9	−0.8	0.3	−1.2	−3.8
2015–2016	−7.6	−4.2	1.2	1.0	2.3	0.5	−0.5	–

Source: PME (2016), IPEA (2016).

Mining and quarrying industry and public services.

Financial intermediation, real estate, and business services.

At the same time, growth rates in other sectors, although positive, were lower than those previously recorded. The only exceptions in this subperiod of 2013 to 2016 was public administration and social services, which registered a growth of 4.8 percent between 2013 and 2014, possibly reflecting the government’s effort to expand services such as public health and education in the face of a sharp economic slowdown. In addition, the growth in trade and repair and services to companies in those years was outstanding, with rates of 2.4 percent and 3.0 percent, respectively. Thanks to the employment growth in these sectors, formal urban employment in general between 2013 and 2014 showed a positive growth rate, although with a decreasing rhythm. In any case, with the sharp slowdown of aggregate demand, which has deepened since 2014, the urban labor market was systematically affected and the rate of formal employment stagnated. This is not even more worrisome because of the workforce retraction in urban areas of 1.7 percent for the 13 years analyzed.

Not only formal employment¹² but also employment in general have been steadily declining, especially compared with the increase in the unemployment rate. As we have already seen, continuous National Household Sample Survey (PNAD, 2016) quarterly data indicate that employment in general continued to grow, registering a 3.4 percent variation (equivalent to a quarterly growth of 0.6 percent) from the first quarter of 2013 to the second quarter of 2014, while formal employment recorded a growth rate of 5.3 percent (equivalent to a quarterly growth of 0.9 percent) in the same period. Afterward the number of employment contracts for both general and formal employment fell sharply, dropping by 4.7 percent and 4.5 percent (equivalent to a quarterly decline of 0.6 percent) between the second quarter of 2014 and the first quarter of 2016, respectively (Table 3).

Table 3

Quarterly Composition and Evolution of Labor Force and GDP Components

		Employed
		Formal Employment	Informal Employment	Employers	Self–Employed	Assistants Who Are Relatives	Unemployed	Workforce	GDP
Q1 – 2013	%	46.8	17.4	3.8	21.1	2.9	8.0	100.0	2.81
	Δ%	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Q2 – 2013	%	47.0	17.5	3.8	21.3	2.9	7.4	100.0	4.09
	Δ%	1.0	1.4	2.1	1.6	1.1	−6.2	0.6
Q3 – 2013	%	47.5	17.7	3.8	21.4	2.7	6.9	100.0	2.76
	Δ%	1.1	0.9	−0.5	0.6	−5.2	−6.5	0.1
Q4 – 2013	%	47.9	17.5	3.9	21.7	2.9	6.2	100.0	2.41
	Δ%	0.8	−1.3	2.2	1.6	4.6	−10.9	0.0
Q1 – 2014	%	48.2	16.9	3.8	21.3	2.7	7.2	100.0	3.17
	Δ%	1.0	−2.9	−2.3	−1.8	−5.8	16.5	0.4
Q2 – 2014	%	48.5	16.8	3.8	21.3	2.7	6.8	100.0	−0.83
	Δ%	1.2	0.2	0.4	0.8	0.2	−4.0	0.5
Q3 – 2014	%	48.3	16.8	3.8	21.7	2.6	6.8	100.0	−1.08
	Δ%	−0.3	0.0	0.7	1.9	−2.4	−0.9	0.2
Q4 – 2014	%	48.1	17.0	4.0	21.9	2.6	6.5	100.0	−0.68
	Δ%	−0.2	1.3	4.9	1.4	−0.1	−3.8	0.4
Q1 – 2015	%	47.2	16.3	4.1	21.8	2.7	7.9	100.0	−2.02
	Δ%	−1.0	−3.6	3.4	0.0	4.0	23.0	0.6
Q2 – 2015	%	46.8	16.3	4.0	21.9	2.7	8.3	100.0	−2.99
	Δ%	−0.4	1.0	−1.9	1.3	0.8	5.3	0.6
Q3 – 2015	%	46.0	16.5	4.0	22.0	2.6	8.9	100.0	−4.45
	Δ%	−1.1	1.4	1.5	0.8	−2.4	7.5	0.5
Q4 – 2015	%	46.0	16.3	3.9	22.6	2.3	9.0	100.0	−5.89
	Δ%	0.1	−0.9	−2.5	3.1	−11.9	1.0	0.2
Q1 – 2016	%	45.0	15.5	3.7	22.8	2.1	10.9	100.0	–
	Δ%	−1.7	−4.3	−5.8	1.2	−6.7	22.2	0.4

Source: PME (2016), IPEA (2016).

Between the first quarter of 2013 and at least the first quarter of 2014, formal employment continued to grow uninterruptedly at the same rate as GDP. Except for the seasonal characteristics of the series, in spite of the low GDP growth and the deterioration of employment in the industrial and construction sectors, formal employment continued to grow, although slowly. Unemployment, despite the seasonal increase observed at the beginning of each year, remained relatively low, not exceeding 8 percent and reaching the lowest value of the period covered by the continuous National Household Sample Survey (PNAD, 2016) in the fourth quarter of 2013 (6.2 percent).

Despite the already described deceleration of both GDP and formal employment, 2013 still showed reasonable behavior for economic activity and especially for the labor market—positive aspects that began to reverse in 2014. In the first quarter of 2014 there was a sharp increase in unemployment (16.5 percent) and a great drop in various forms of employment (self-employment, family employment, and informal help), with the sole exception of formal employment, which kept growing. This behavior of the labor market in the first months of the year probably had a seasonal component, but the loss of economic activity reflected a modest increase in formal employment, which, combined with the decline of other types of employment, caused unemployment growth. Since the second quarter of 2014, quarterly GDP results have been continuously negative, transforming the downward trend of the economy into recession¹³ and contributing to a meager 0.1 percent annual result. Although the unemployment rate remained relatively low throughout the year, formal employment showed positive variation only in the second half of 2014, after which it started to fall and continued to do so practically until 2016.

The crisis started a reversal of the structuring of the labor market that had been taking place until the beginning of 2014. From the third quarter of 2014, when formal employment had several negative results, the self-employed category always had positive numbers, and in the last quarter of 2015 it produced the best result compared with other types of occupation, indicating an increase in the pursuit of subsistence strategies in facing an adverse formal labor market. Statistics for 2015 only corroborate the assertion that in 2014 a recessive trend in the Brazilian economy had begun, registering increasingly negative GDP results, with a decline of 5.9 percent in the fourth quarter of 2015 contributing to a sharp annual decline of 3.8 percent. In this year formal employment assumed a steady downward trend, registering declines of up to 1.1 percent and a brief stagnation in the fourth quarter, and unemployment surpassed the 8 percent range, reaching 9 percent in the last quarter. In the first quarter of 2016 there was a deepening of this tendency, with a strong setback for employment in general. While the seasonality of the first months of the year was significant in this behavior, the recessive scenario affected formal employment even more adversely, with a decrease of 1.7 percent. Less protected forms such as informal and auxiliary family employment recorded even greater declines of 4.3 percent and 6.7 percent, respectively. This performance had to do with the economic recession, which brought about a general decrease in employment, but also with the increase in number of less protected jobs in an environment that had for many years been one of considerable labor protection. In this scenario, and with regard to the retraction of the formal labor market, self-employment and unemployment reached rates that had not been seen since the beginning of the 2000s, affecting almost 11 percent of the labor force.

To better understand the above-mentioned growth and deterioration of the economy and the labor market with emphasis on formal employment, the following analysis seeks to broaden the research, based on continuous National Household Sample Survey data (PNAD, 2016), with emphasis on the sectoral composition of formal employment. It confirms the results already highlighted by the Monthly Employment Report; the sectors that contributed most to the worst formal employment results were manufacturing and construction, although the data indicate that the destructuring of the labor market was rapidly spreading to all sectors of economic activity, even those, such as trade and services, that had recently increased most and were relatively protected from competition and external market volatility (PME, 2016).

The evolution of formal employment in 2013 (Table 4), although generally positive, had moments of retraction, especially in public administration and domestic services. In the former a decline in tax collection limited the growth of public spending, while the decline in the latter may have reflected more the migration of workers of this sector to other sectors than a disruption. Overall, 2013 showed moderate growth in formal employment but was still positive, especially in sectors that accounted for the larger proportions of formal general employment, such as trade, industry, and social and administrative services. A reversal began to be clear in late 2014, when formal employment in construction fell sharply between the second and third quarters (4.4 percent and 6.4 percent, respectively) and that in public administration dropped 8.2 percent in the fourth. Because these sectors did not represent the bulk of formal employment (which was mainly in trade and services), unemployment remained rather low. In 2015 virtually all sectors went through quarters of negative formal employment growth—among them industry (down by 3.6 percent in the third quarter and 4.9 percent in the fourth quarter), transportation, storage, and mail (3.8 percent in the fourth quarter), construction (more than 11 percent in the second quarter, though an increase of 14.1 percent in the fourth helped to guarantee the overall result in 2015), and administrative services (more than 10.5 percent in the fourth quarter). Despite the difference between the Monthly Employment Report (urban formal employment for employees over 11 years old) and the continuous National Household Sample Survey (general formal employment for employees over 14 years old) samples, the formal employment data for both indicate the same labor market restructuring in 2015 (PME, 2016; PNAD, 2016). There was a decrease in formal vacancies and an increase in employment alternatives such as self-employment, clearly as a subsistence strategy, in addition to rising unemployment.

Table 4

Quarterly Change in Formal Employment by Activity Sector

	2013	2013	2013	2013	2014	2014	2014	2014	2015	2015	2015	2015	2016
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1
Agriculture^a	–	0.0	3.8	0.1	−9.2	2.8	1.6	−2.4	−0.1	−1.3	−1.5	6.8	−0.7
General industry	–	1.3	−1.1	0.9	1.1	1.6	1.1	−0.8	−1.1	−1.4	−3.6	−4.9	−5.1
Construction	–	1.7	2.7	0.1	−1.2	−4.4	−6.4	−1.3	−4.7	−11.7	1.7	14.1	−6.3
Trade^b	–	0.3	1.6	2.0	2.0	0.4	−1.1	0.2	−0.8	−0.3	−0.1	1.5	−2.2
Transportation^c	–	4.4	−0.4	1.8	1.7	−0.4	−3.6	1.4	0.8	−0.7	−3.8	8.5	−4.1
Accommodation and food	–	−0.8	13.2	0.9	2.2	−0.7	1.8	2.8	−2.0	−0.6	0.1	3.7	−1.1
Administrative services^d	–	2.7	0.0	0.2	1.7	4.2	2.0	−2.0	−2.0	2.6	−1.3	−10.5	2.2
Public administration^e	–	−0.1	−2.1	−0.9	1.8	2.1	−0.8	−8.2	−1.6	0.1	0.4	−2.7	−1.0
Social services^f	–	1.7	3.0	0.6	1.4	0.6	0.1	6.7	−0.1	1.1	0.1	5.7	−0.8
Other services	–	2.7	12.6	−1.4	2.2	1.8	−6.3	2.1	0.7	0.4	−0.3	−4.6	−0.6
Domestic services	–	−6.0	−2.9	4.4	0.5	2.0	0.6	0.5	1.1	−1.3	−1.4	10.4	3.9
Total	–	1.0	1.1	0.8	1.0	1.2	−0.3	−0.2	−1.0	−0.4	−1.1	0.1	−1.7

Source: PNAD (2016).

Agriculture, livestock, forestry, fisheries and aquaculture.

Trade, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles.

Transportation, storage, and mail.

Information, communication and financial, real estate, professional and administrative activities.

Public administration, defense, and social security.

Education, human health, and social services.

Finally, the data for the first quarter of 2016 point to a deepening of the labor market destructuring with increased unemployment in strategic sectors and a strong tendency to reverse the results of aggregate demand, such as in manufacturing and construction, which affected the contraction of activities in general and therefore the decline in employment in other sectors. These sectors, which are very vulnerable to political and economic uncertainties and to the dismantling of the state’s investment capacity that has been occurring in recent years, contributed to a great extent to a decline in investment and deceleration of aggregate demand that affected formal employment in general. Construction was the sector most affected, employing 6.3 percent of formal workers compared with the previous quarter, followed by manufacturing, with a decrease of 5.1 percent. There was also a sharp decline in formal employment in the transportation sector, reflecting the decline in production and demand experienced by economic activity in general.

Other sectors showed a less pronounced although still significant decline in formal employment (for example, 2.2 percent in the case of trade) or even a moderate increase (for example, 2.2 percent in administrative services). These sectors will also be impaired if the crisis continues, affecting those segments where formal employment has grown the most in the past decade (Souza Campos, 2016). Employment in trade and services is highly dependent on domestic consumption and demand, so if the recession continues the contraction of employment in industry and construction will rapidly worsen the decline in aggregate demand and increase unemployment in these sectors. This increase in unemployment will be similar to what we see today in industry and construction, sectors that were also quite important in the growth of formal employment observed in the previous period, but it will affect the labor market more deeply because trade and administrative services were the sectors in which formal employment grew the most until 2014 (Table 5). While formal employment in general grew 5.3 percent between the first quarter of 2013 and the first quarter of 2014, from the second quarter of 2014 to the first quarter of 2016 formal employment fell by 4.5 percent, representing a positive balance of only 0.5 percent for the period between the first quarters of 2013 and of 2016. In short, the decline in the growth of formal employment has virtually equaled zero with regard to increases at least since 2013. This result, as mentioned above, would have been mainly due to industry and construction, with decreases of 14.9 percent and 15.4 percent between the second quarter of 2014 and the first quarter of 2016, respectively, and administrative services and public administration, with declines of 9.3 percent and 13.1 percent, respectively.

Table 5

Variation of Formal Employment by Activity Sector for Selected Periods

	Q1 2013 – Q2 2014	Q2 2014 – Q1 2016	Q1 2013 – Q1 2016
Agriculture^a	−3.0	2.2	−0.9
General industry	3.9	−14.9	−11.6
Construction	−1.3	−15.4	−16.5
Trade and repair^b	6.3	−2.9	3.3
Transportation^c	7.1	−2.1	4.9
Accommodation and food	15.0	4.6	20.3
Administrative services^d	8.9	−9.3	−1.2
Public administration^e	0.7	−13.1	−12.5
Social services^f	7.5	13.3	21.8
Other services	18.6	−8.6	8.5
Domestic services	−2.4	14.1	11.4
Total	5.3	−4.5	0.5

Source: PNAD (2016).

Agriculture, livestock, forestry, fisheries and aquaculture.

Trade, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles.

Transportation, storage, and mail.

Information, communication and financial, real estate, professional and administrative activities.

Public administration, defense, and social security.

Education, human health, and social services.

Conclusion

The growth of formal employment and decline of unemployment that characterized the period between 2003 and 2016 were undermined by a slowdown in economic growth that was already in progress by at least 2011–2012, associated, of course, with a problematic social and political situation that began in 2013. The slowing of economic growth created conditions that affected the sectors most sensitive to the political situation caused by political scandals and the conservative wave that has overpowered the country since 2013, such as petroleum and construction. Faced with political and economic uncertainty given the multiplier effects of these sectors, their retraction produced a chain reaction, resulting in a sharp deceleration and even cancellation of several investments in other sectors. At the same time, the decline of fiscal revenues due to the slowdown of the economy caused by declines in aggregate demand and employment made it impossible for the government to take more effective countercyclical measures against the crisis, resulting in a deterioration of economic, political, and economic conditions, especially the institutional ones that culminated in the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff, which was undoubtedly a political-juridical coup d’état. These elements are conditioning the recent trend of reversal of the structuring of the labor market in which the growth of unemployment and of types of occupation other than formal employment predicts a period of social regression.

The data presented by the continuous National Household Sample Survey from 2013 to 2016 indicate that public administration was one of the sectors most affected by this new situation, since it was quite unable to promote, at least at the same rhythm as before, the expansion of social services that had contributed directly and indirectly to formal employment growth (PNAD, 2016). At the same time, the impossibility of continuing structural investment, especially in large infrastructure projects, coupled with reports of corruption among the most important construction companies in Brazil, created a real obstacle to the continued growth of the sectors involved, producing the conditions for the deceleration of employment growth (especially of formal employment).

In this recessive scenario, the decline in consumption, the increase in indebtedness, the higher cost of credit, and rising inflation, combined with the adverse political environment, directly affected the demand for durable goods, especially those of high unit value such as automobiles and household appliances, directly impacting a manufacturing industry already badly shaken by the decline in investment that started with the 2008 international crisis. Finally, this context caused a significant drop in the demand for companies providing services to other companies, and this important employer sector soon became one of those strongly affected by the crisis. This situation is expected to worsen if the crisis continues.

These temporary economic and political changes created the conditions for disrupting the structural trend of the Brazilian labor market and of the base of the social pyramid that started at the beginning of the century, interrupting formal employment growth and producing an increase in the most precarious forms of subsistence and even in unemployment rates. If the country cannot overcome the breakdown of democracy and face up to the frontal attack of conservative interests on all the social and labor achievements of the 1988 Constitution, the crisis will deepen and tend to be lasting. Under such conditions, unemployment rates will increase even more, in addition to the increase in the most precarious forms of occupation, causing the definite disruption of the economic growth with social inclusion that we have been experiencing in Brazil for over a decade.

Supplemental Material

DS_10.11770094582X19845383 – Supplemental material for From Euphoria to Retreat: Formal Employment in Twenty-first-Century Brazil

Supplemental material, DS_10.11770094582X19845383 for From Euphoria to Retreat: Formal Employment in Twenty-first-Century Brazil by Jacqueline Aslan Souen and Guilherme Caldas de Souza Campos in Latin American Perspectives

Footnotes

Notes

Jacqueline Aslan Souen has a Ph.D. degree in economic development from the Economics Institute of the State University of Campinas and is a researcher at the Center for Labor Union Studies and Labor Economics. Guilherme Caldas de Souza Campos is a Ph.D. student in economic development from the same institution and is a technician at the Federal Institute of Education, Science, and Technology of São Paulo. Patricia Fierro is a translator living in Quito, Ecuador.

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