The Fall of the Alberto Fujimori Government: New Evidence and Interpretations

Abstract

New evidence and interpretations regarding the end of the authoritarian Alberto Fujimori regime and the Peruvian democratic transition of 2000 suggest that preexisting electoral and institutional rules intrinsic to the authoritarian regime contributed to a process of regime change. Thus Peru can be seen as one of the few Latin American nations in which the transition was caused by a rupture in contrast to the pacted-reform/rupture transitions most common in the region.

Nuevas evidencias e interpretaciones sobre el fin del régimen autoritario de Alberto Fujimori y la transición democrática en 2000 sugieren que las elecciones y las reglas institucionales preexistentes y propias de la naturaleza de un régimen autoritario contribuyeron a un proceso de cambio de régimen. Así, Perú puede ser considerado entre los pocos países en el concierto latinoamericano en los que se estableció una transición por ruptura a diferencia de las transiciones por pactada-reforma/ruptura predominante en la region.

Keywords

Peru Alberto Fujimori institutions political transition legislature

Between 1960 and 1970, most Latin American countries went through some kind of authoritarian regime. Generally speaking, this authoritarianism was the result of the social and political tensions caused by institutional crises, industrialization, changes in the role of the military, and a polarized international context. From 1980 on, there was significant sociopolitical change that led to a set of democratic transitions that included Peru. This new reality required an update of the research agenda, especially in political science (Guilhot and Schmitter, 2000: 615). Techniques, approaches, and theoretical frameworks that had been valid even across disciplines (and, in fact, had enjoyed dominance because of their orientation toward economic and social analysis) were replaced by views based on the voluntarism of political actors. The processes of transition to democracy negotiated in southern Europe and Latin America became a reference for this phenomenon. The skills of the political class, rational choices on the part of the actors involved, the resources they employed, and the consequences of their strategies served as key points for this approach (Arturi, 2001; Linz and Stepan, 1999; Nohlen and Thibaut, 1995). Thus democratic transitions were included in a model of interpretative analysis based on strategic interaction among the relevant actors. This, however, resulted in a degree of uncertainty, since calculation was often limited to moments of change (Karl, 1991; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1991).

More recently, the emergence of a new type of authoritarian regime different from the competitive authoritarianism of the Cold War era led to a reinvigoration of democratization studies, and recent comparative research has shed light on the shift from an authoritarian regime to a democracy of a transitional type (Levitsky and Way, 2002; Roessler and Howard, 2009). According to some writers, varying degrees of international pressure contributed to the democratization of some competitive regimes (Foweraker, 2004; Levitsky and Way, 2010). Others argue, instead, that electoral liberalization has something to do with the waning of competitive authoritarian regimes (Lindberg, 2009; Shirah, 2015), providing an opportunity for the opposition, the elites, and civil society to articulate a series of actions that allowed for the reversal of authoritarianism (Howard and Roessler, 2006). Competitive authoritarian regimes are more prone to pro-democratic change than hegemonic authoritarian ones when national and international pressure are combined (Donno, 2013).

Institutional arrangements are crucial to democratization. Fujimori’s authoritarianism was not defeated solely by the actions of a democratizing coalition; it was the electoral rules themselves, coupled with the economic crisis and pressure from the international community, that led to the erosion and fall of the regime. While this is a pattern seen in other authoritarian regimes, it is important to consider Peru’s particular circumstances at the end of 2000. The authoritarian regime established with the breakdown of the constitutional order on April 5, 1992, began a process of apparent restoration of democracy in accordance with international agreements. This period of political flexibilization led to the 1993 constituent democratic congress that approved a new constitution and eventually to the 1995 general elections and Fujimori’s reelection (Cotler, 2000). However, this apparent restitution of the constitutional democratic order was followed by an authoritarian regression.

While there is an abundant literature describing and explaining authoritarianism in the 1990s, there are no studies explaining the political transition to democracy in terms of the effects of preexisting institutions. Some writers overemphasize the role of civil society (Deza, 2004), while others argue that Fujimori’s Peru, which was formally a democracy, was not a conventional dictatorship but competitive authoritarianism and one could speak of transition or regime change only with the reestablishment of full political competence (Tanaka, 2005). Therefore the debate on Peruvian democracy has focused on political parties as protagonists in a merely procedural democracy. This narrow view has been further restricted by a tendency to overstate the role of the CIA in the dissolution of the Fujmori-Montesinos pact, which presumably toppled the government by revealing Montesinos’s Swiss bank accounts (Cotler and Grompone, 2000), his ties to drug trafficking and arms sales to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Tanaka, 2001; 2005), and the role of the Organization of American States (OAS) as mediator during the transition (Soria, 2009).

Distorted Rules

Documents suggest that Fujimori was confident he would win the April 2000 elections. During the three previous years he had invested all his legal and political means to get Congress to approve his second presidential reelection, which was constitutionally forbidden. He certainly held a hegemonic position in the local political system as the only candidate with national leadership. His party, renamed the Alianza Electoral Perú 2000 (Peru Electoral Alliance 2000), was focused on him and considered him irreplaceable because of his success in economic stabilization and the antisubversive struggle. At the same time, the more traditional and historically grounded parties were in very uncomfortable or inauspicious situations (Kenney, 2004; Tanaka, 1999). In the absence of strong competitors, Fujimorismo had no reason to promote substantial change in the electoral system, which was essentially advantageous for the party.¹

Despite the 1993 constitutional changes, the proportional system, the introduction of the D’Hondt method, and preferential voting reinforced the personalization of elections. At the same time, the country adopted unicameralism, the number of congresspersons was reduced from 240 to 120, and a single electoral district was created. All of this eventually led to the emergence of a purely representational system (in other words, the highest ratio of votes to seats). During the 1992 and 1995 elections, no fewer than 10 groups achieved representation in Congress. By 2000 there was a tendency toward fragmentation (Tuesta, 1995; 1996) stimulated by electoral legislation that allowed the proliferation of independent groups and movements alongside the existing political parties. There were legal inconsistencies, especially with regard to the inefficiency of the mechanisms for the verification of signatures when registering a party and indifference to the verification of operational committees across the national territory.

In any case, the electoral legislation of 2000 encouraged independent electoral platforms that obscured partisan options, dispersed electoral preferences across several presidential candidacies, and fragmented the vote on legislative issues.² With all of the governmental machinery arranged to the benefit of the candidate-president, the only really competitive adversaries were political parties with only limited representation in Congress. Alternative leaderships emerged outside of Congress and the existing parties. The four main leaders were Fujimori, Alberto Andrade, Luis Castañeda, and Alejandro Toledo, all of whom attempted to obscure any kind of link with the old political parties and termed themselves “independents.”

Despite self-imposed censorship by an important sector of the media, which limited its coverage of opposition parties in exchange for economic benefits from the government (Bowen and Holligan, 2003: 360–361), public opinion soured in the context of the economic crisis and excessive governmental arbitrariness. Between April and June 1999, polls by Apoyo (1999), the University of Lima (1999), and Datum (1999) spoke of the stagnation of Fujimori’s candidacy, ranked from 25 to 27 percent in the polls and initially surpassed by a few percentage points by the mayor of Lima, Alberto Andrade, of the Somos Perú movement. A third candidate, Luis Castañeda Lossio (a former state health services manager), was ranked between 11 and 24 percent. In June 1999, Andrade’s and Castañeda’s candidacies began declining as a result of harassment by the government-sponsored press, scandalous resignations in their parties, and an absence of coherent communication strategies. Fujimori began to rebound in the polls, reaching 35 percent in August.

In this context of increasing electoral polarization, one of the few media outlets that maintained its independence was the journal Caretas (1999), which denounced the government’s systematic action to destabilize opposition candidacies. However, even after the implementation of this aggressive strategy, Fujimori failed to rise significantly enough in the polls to win the first electoral round. Candidacies were formalized in December, and the polls stayed much the same until late 1999. The independent candidate Alejandro Toledo became the third alternative candidate in February of 2000, with 10 percent. He rebounded surprisingly in March, from 24 to 32 percent, making it less likely that Fujimori would win the first round, planned for April 9.

Paradoxically, Fujimori’s candidacy was eroded by a set of rules that, in principle, sought to ensure his triumph. This achievement was based on a distorted electoral system and one that was also quite volatile regarding electoral preferences and highly fragmented. Fujimori’s party was overrun by the independent movements generated by the electoral system itself. Now we know that, in the first half of 2000, the ruling party was foiled by an erroneous strategy that sought to maintain power by employing misleading electoral artifices that in fact encouraged outsider representation (e.g., candidates like Alejandro Toledo).

Unexpected Results

On April 9, candidate-president Fujimori failed to obtain a clear hegemonic majority. Even though he got the most votes (49.87 percent), he could not avoid a second round. Additionally, he lost his absolute majority in Congress. Finally, during the second round on May 28, Fujimori claimed a landslide (74.33 percent) in what were rather lackluster elections of doubtful credibility. Given these results, civil society and the political opposition found themselves powerless in the face of a fait accompli.

Fujimori’s formal third government began on July 28 amid the chaos of a civil rejection in the capital that resulted in six deaths at the hands of government officials. The president started his term despite questions regarding the legitimacy of the electoral process. The main political novelty was a less favorable congressional configuration for the ruling party, Alianza Electoral Perú 2000, which did not attain a congressional majority (receiving only 52 of 120 seats; Table 1). Opposing parties and movements had in excess of 60 seats and sought to use this new power balance in Congress to appeal for redemocratization using all the institutional means available.

Table 1

Congressional Representation, 1995 and 2000

	1995		2000
	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes
Cambio 90–Nueva Mayoría/	67	2,277,423	–	–
Alianza Electoral Perú 2000			52	4,189,018
Unión por el Perú	17	611,804	3	254,582
Frente Independiente Moralizador	6	213,777	9	751,323
CODE–País Posible/País Posible	5	181,397	29	2,308,635
Renovación/Avancemos	3	130,060	3	307,188
Obras	2	87,252	–	–
Movimiento Independiente Agrario	1	34,463	–	–
Frente Popular Agrícola	1	46,990	2	216,953
Somos Perú	–	–	8	715,396
Solidaridad Nacional	–	–	5	399,985
Partido Aprista Peruano	8	285,526	6	546,930
Acción Popular	4	146	3	245,115
Partido Popular Cristiano	3	135,060	–	–
Izquierda Unida	2	82,061	–	–
Perú al 2000/FNTC	1	46,728	–	–
Valid votes		4,371,037		9,935,125
Blank votes		502,774		703,345
Null votes		3,359,869		1,304,340
Issued votes		8,233,680		11,942,810
Abstentions		4,046,858		2,624,657
Voters		12,280,538		14,567,467
Total	120		120

Source: Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales.

At the same time, the congressional opposition had to rethink its political strategy. After overcoming some ideological and personal disagreements in order to defend democracy, opposition groups had reached a governance pact in December 1999. Signed by 14 political groups, this agreement called, among other things, for independence of government branches, fiscal discipline, responsible economic management, and prohibition of immediate reelection. Following these precepts, after the elections it formed the Congressional Committee for Democracy, which began promoting a declaration of presidential vacancy as part of the congressional agenda.³ Thus threatened, the government sought to recruit new congresspersons who could ensure the continuation of its legal structure and nullify any attempt at redemocratization by the legislative branch.

The loss of congressional control generated greater polarization and the hardening of stances against the government. Given the conflict and impasse, the OAS offered to serve as a mediator. The opposition, hoping for change in a context in which the legitimacy of the administration and the power balance in Congress were being questioned, sought to impose a 29-item democratizing agenda, but the most radical pro-regime sector in Congress had little interest in promoting democratizing reforms.⁴ During the month of August and in the face of the double discourse that characterized the government’s strategy, it became evident that the regime was unwilling to compromise. On August 14, for example, Fujimori stated that the 29 items on the agenda were “only proposals for dialogue and not reforms.” Likewise, the minister of justice, Alberto Bustamante, stated, “We honor our commitment to the OAS regarding our willingness to discuss 29 issues but not to reach a conclusion” (Caretas, 2000c).

In protest, the opposition disavowed the government’s democratizing committee. A precise timetable with deadlines and specific measures for verifying results monitored by the OAS was issued. The opposition’s threat to abandon legislative tasks as a way of blocking the work of Congress forced the regime to begin negotiations on August 21. Together with some members of civil society, they met under OAS mediation and proposed four working committees that could produce immediate agreements.⁵ Be that as it may, a few weeks after negotiations had begun a video released on September 14 showed the National Intelligence Service adviser Vladimiro Montesinos bribing the newly elected congressman Alberto Kuori to join the official ranks. This led to the most serious crisis of the newly inaugurated presidential period. The opposition immediately broke off its dialogue with the government, demanded that Montesinos be expelled, and stopped work in Congress.

The Transition and the Legislative Branch

In fact, the political crisis created by the disclosure of the so-called Vladivideos had such serious repercussions that Fujimori had to call new elections (in which he pledged not to participate) and to deactivate the intelligence service, an anomalous institution of particular relevance in the structure of his power regime. From a neo-institutionalist perspective, it seems clear that the September 2000 crisis was the result of an error in electoral calculations. Here, we must take note of both a modification of the electoral system that presumably gave an advantage to the governing party (independent candidacies) and a number of postelectoral procedural errors. If the Fujimori regime had approved, for example, a barrier clause for parties that did not obtain at least 5 percent of the votes (an issue that was on the political agenda at the time), this would have eliminated small parties and some independent movements and artificially enlarged the official majority (Table 2).

Table 2

Effects of a (Hypothetical) 5% Barrier on Congressional Seat Distribution

	Seats Without Barrier	Votes	SeatsWith Barrier	% of Seats
Alianza Electoral Perú 2000	52	4,189,018	49.2	59.40
Frente Independiente Moralizador	9	751,323	8.8	10.56
País Posible	29	2,308,635	27.1	32.52
Somos Perú	8	715,396	8.4	10.08
Partido Aprista Peruano	6	546,930	6.5	7.80
Total		8,511,302	100.0

Given the difficulty of obtaining a more favorable electoral result for Fujimori, the administration proceeded to recruit and co-opt opposition congresspersons, but the crisis unleashed by the videos encouraged the opposition to prompt Congress to take control of the political transition (López, 2001: 63). Under the circumstances, congressional support for Fujimori fractured. His majority in Congress and its allies were politically weakened. The Vladivideos had finally managed to call attention to the ongoing political-electoral corruption and prove that the government was behaving like a political-criminal organization.

In the following days it became increasingly evident that the Fujimori administration was losing its legitimacy and stability. The president was forced to destroy the government’s hard core in an attempt to maintain some legitimacy and disprove the allegations, but there was already a call for him to vacate the presidency because of incapacity on the basis of his close relationship with Montesinos.

On September 20, opposition congressmen abandoned talks with the government and began applying more pressure on Congress. Opposition blocs stopped working, meaning that plenary sessions lacked a quorum. One of the opposition’s main demands was the formation of a new congressional board to help advance bills that prioritized the agreements reached during the OAS-sponsored dialogue, aimed at general elections and the creation of committees to investigate scandals. A few days later it resumed talks with the administration on the conditions that the intelligence agency be activated and that Montesinos (then a refugee in Panama, after threatening a coup d’état) undergo due process. At the same time, it demanded the resignation of controversial figures obstructing the democratization process such as Alipio Montes de Oca, the president of the National Electoral Jury, José Portillo, the head of the Office of Electoral Processes and the one responsible for the fraudulent election of April 9, and Nélida Colán, the state prosecutor. The army, for its part, was waiting on the sidelines in the midst of uncertainty, and much the same was true of the Catholic Church, civil society, and the most important unions.

Meanwhile, increasing internal divergences within the regime’s own delegation were leading to its loss of control of Congress. On September 28 Fujimori deputies were faced with a pro-democracy majority when the plenum voted almost unanimously to deactivate the intelligence agency. Gradually, the regime’s supporters had to submit to the opposition’s agenda to fulfill the agreements reached under OAS mediation. By July 2001 Fujimori’s government itself had been drastically reduced with the repeal of the law that allowed titular and provisional magistrates, the extension of the life of the committee on deactivation of the intelligence agency, and the scheduling of new elections on April 8 that would involve the restoration of multiple electoral districts and other laws aimed at safeguarding a transparent, competitive, participatory, and democratic electoral process.

Likewise, at the end of October 2000, amidst a series of outbursts and entanglements, the opposition refused to negotiate an amnesty law addressing both human rights violations and cases of corruption and drug trafficking. In this context, Montesinos’s untimely return to Peru on October 23 created a new crisis. Having obtained legal protection through blackmail, he forced Fujimori’s hand: the latter had to dismiss the members of the high command closely attached to Montesinos, who was obliged to flee the country again. At this point Lieutenant Colonel Ollanta Humala and his brother Antauro revolted in the South, bypassing Fujimori’s authority and that of the military high command. This was an isolated event that failed to garner support and thus had few political repercussions, but it revealed the cracks and discontent within the army.

Finally, on November 13 the opposition, now the majority (see Table 3), managed to elect the center-right deputy Valentín Paniagua⁶ to preside over Congress, and on the same day the increasingly isolated Fujimori, lacking a real base of political support, went to Brunei. During Paniagua’s brief tenure he reinstated the three Constitutional Court judges dismissed in 1997, thus establishing an autonomous legislative agenda in order to redemocratize the country and guaranteeing a peaceful political transition. Fujimori, given the criminal connotations arising from his extensive network of corruption, which would eventually make their way to him, announced from Tokyo on November 19 that he was stepping down as president. His resignation was rejected by Congress, which instead declared a presidential vacancy due to moral incapacity.⁷ Faced with the resignation of Fujimori’s vice presidents, Paniagua, as president of Congress, took over the country’s reins.

Table 3

Congressional Representation before and after Realignment in 2000

y	Seats before 7/28^a	Seats by 8/31^b	Seats by 9/30^c	Seats by 11/13^d	Seats by 12/13
Fujimori’s supporters
Alianza Electoral Perú 2000	52	67^e	56	53	20
Cambio 90	–	–	–	–	–
Vamos Vecino	–	–	–	–	21
Con Fuerza Perú	–	–	–	–	6
Frente Popular Agrícola	2	–	–	–	–
Avancemosf	3	2	–	–	–
Subtotal	57	69	56	53	47
Opposition groups
Unión por el Perú and	6	6	6	6	8
Acción Popular
Frente Independiente Moralizador	9	8	8	8	8
País Posible	29	25	21	21	21
Somos Perú	8	7	7	7	7
Solidaridad Nacional	5	–	–	–	–
Partido Aprista Peruano	6	5	5	5	5
Subtotal	63	51	47	47	47
Declared independents
Turncoats	–	–	4^g	4	–
Unaligned	–	–	10	13^h	10
Grupo Parlamentario Independiente	–	–	–	–	7
Grupo Parlamentario Unión Parlamentaria	–	–	–	–	–
Avancemos	–	–	–	2	–
Total	120	120	119ⁱ	119	119

Based on the results of April 9.

Election of the administrative board of Congress.

A week after the Montesinos and Alberto Kuori videos were released.

Censuring of president of Congress.

Joining the ranks of the regime: Luís Cáceres Velásquez and Roger Cáceres Velásquez (FIA), José Elías Ávalos (Avancemos), Rudy Rodríguez (APRA), Gregorio Ticona (SP), Jorge Polack, Eduardo Farah, Miguel Mendoza del Solar, Acuña Peralta, and Luna Gálvez (SN), Edilberto Canales, Mario Gonzáles Inga, Antonio Palomo and Alberto Kuori (PP), Waldo Ríos (FIM).

Declared “constructive opposition” but voted for and defended the government.

Leaving País Posible: Burgos Montenegro, Marsano Chumbez, Núñez Del Castillo, and José Eduardo Villena Vela.

Leaving Alianza Perú 2000: Cecilia Martínez del Solar (Cambio 90), Gregorio Ticona (Perú 2000), Fernán Altuve-Febres Flores, Jorge Pollack, Joaquín Ormeño, Moisés Wolfenson, Miguel Mendoza del Solar, Eduardo Farah, Mario Gonzáles Inga, Antonio Palomo, Miriam Schennone, Ángel Bartra, and Waldo Ríos.

119 because Kuori had been expelled.

This conjuncture, which left deep marks on the Peruvian political transition, had its origins in an institutional model characterized by executive/legislative power relations that were prone to erode the executive’s legitimacy. The electoral system led to an extreme fragmentation of political representation, especially because of the simultaneity of congressional and presidential elections. In this context, the 2000 opposition left the executive with little room to maneuver. Given the need to activate congressional mechanisms of information and control and the rationale of the zero-sum political game played by the regime throughout the political crisis, political actors in the opposition finally acted effectively in the legislature to demand a political transition via rupture. Although its exercise of so-called political responsibility was unavoidable in light of the Montesino video crisis, its virtues must nevertheless be acknowledged. While still subject to the institutional hurdles created by the regime, it overcame one political crisis after another, reaching beyond the initial negotiation political scenario to take control of the political transition.

Conclusions

We have shown how institutions that predated the political transition helped determine both the nature of this process and the role of the legislative branch in that context. From this perspective, it is apparent that the institutional variable, in contrast to civil action, the stance of the political elites, the economic crisis, and international pressure, has not been adequately examined. It was the combination, articulation, and joint action of all these factors that ultimately characterized the Peruvian political transition.

The opposition and the government acknowledged each other in the midst of the political transition. Generally speaking, they agreed that the formal rules of the political game had to be modified. However, given the asymmetric positions of the actors and the favorable position of the authoritarian executive, which was managing to control the rules of the transition, a sequence of unfavorable events ended up eroding the administration’s legitimacy. Gradually, the regime started losing control of the transition process and was unable to negotiate favorable agreements. The legislative branch thus became the cornerstone for the formalization of arrangements in the process of redemocratization.

After Fujimori’s flight, Fujimorismo failed to impose safeguards that would limit the process of redemocratization, and no coalition of powers capable of preventing the regime from toppling and thus stopping the return of democracy emerged. For this reason, the Peruvian transition can be identified as a rupture—a transition without any room for authoritarian remnants. The Peruvian legislature therefore enacted contingency measures in the face of the kinds of unforeseen situations inherent in a rupture.

Some analysts have argued that the political transition was the product of external factors. However, in spite of criticism regarding the electoral process, the international community ended up acknowledging Fujimori as president in 2000.⁸ While international pressure was important, it did not trigger the events that led to the transition. The greatest pressure came in the form of OAS mediation, but Peru was never threatened with international isolation if the regime did not show itself willing to negotiate with pro-democracy actors.

The legislative arena became a space par excellence for demands meant to alter the political system, containing the overflow of conflict and unforeseeable consequences. From the onset of the crisis, legal formality was required to provide legitimacy for transition agreements based on the modification of the institutional rules and to guarantee a controlled and nonviolent political process.

The rupture transition offered an opportunity to displace authoritarian remnants. This estrangement was temporary: the legislative protagonists of the posttransition period sought to restore the electoral rules, and the institutional changes ended up being less relevant than expected. A procedural view of democracy was imposed, and this prevented a call for a constituent assembly to develop a new political pact. It is this omission that has led to the institutional conflicts and delay of democratic consolidation reflected in the current deterioration of Peruvian democracy.

Supplemental Material

DS_10.1177_0094582X19857170 – Supplemental material for The Fall of the Alberto Fujimori Government: New Evidence and Interpretations

Supplemental material, DS_10.1177_0094582X19857170 for The Fall of the Alberto Fujimori Government: New Evidence and Interpretations by Carlos Ugo Santander Joo and Carlos Federico Domínguez Avila in Latin American Perspectives

Footnotes

Notes

Carlos Ugo Santander Joo is a postdoctoral researcher in political science at the Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali in Rome and a professor and researcher in the Human Rights Ph.D. Program of the Federal University of Goiás. Carlos Federico Domínguez Avila is a professor and researcher in the Master’s in Human Rights, Citizenship, and Violence Program at the Unieuro University Center in Brasilia and a postdoctoral researcher at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul. Mariana Ortega Breña is a freelance translator based in Mexico City.

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