Abstract
Cruz-Feliciano’s essay aptly describes the political context that brought Ortega back to power and led to the Nicaraguan social and political upheaval of 2018. In particular, it clarifies the sources of Daniel Ortega’s grip on power before 2018, including the agreements with the business sector that created what he calls “neoliberalism lite.” He also goes into some important details that are often overlooked. While the social security reforms detonated the protests, it was the need for accountability for brazen acts of violence and abuses of power by security forces that quickly became the focus of the demonstrations, in which a broad segment of society joined many groups (peasants, indigenous groups, environmental activists) that had had these complaints for many years. He also touches on the fact that many Sandinistas abandoned Ortega. Indeed, the cities of Masaya, León, and Estelí, historical centers of Sandinista power (Masaya being the birthplace of the insurrection in 1978 that culminated in the 1979 Revolution), were once again centers of resistance against the government but this time against Ortega.
While discussing the tally of murders and other human rights abuses during 2018, Cruz-Feliciano could have cited much more robust evidence to allay a sense of ambiguity regarding responsibility for the violence, of which the work of the Grupo Interdisciplinario de Expertos Independientes (Interdisciplinary Group of Independent Experts—GIEI), led by Claudia Paz y Paz (Nobel Peace Prize nominee for her work in Guatemala against the dictator Efraín Rios Montt), is the most important. Over six months in the country, the GIEI investigated the first 109 dead and 1,400 wounded during the crisis (they were only allowed to look at the events up to May 30) and concluded that “the majority of murders and severe wounding were the responsibility of the National Police, who acted directly and in coordination with armed parastatal groups”. 1 Meanwhile, the number of 325 dead provided by the Mothers of April Association (a reputable national source) was corroborated by that the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights before both were expelled from the country in the second half of 2018.
It is also worth bringing more attention to the current level of political violence in the country. All opposition leaders either have police presence outside their homes (and are followed) or are under house arrest, and political opposition meetings are regularly broken up by police throughout the country. 2 Placing too much emphasis on the political differences within a broad block of opposition without underlining the structured system that prevents any free association (or free press) would be a mistake.
Cruz-Feliciano’s final words about Nicaraguan youth are worth repeating for a sense of the medium-term political future of the country. He points to “a new notion of the left, more inclusive, less partisan, more wide-ranging in its political scope” and says, “In that new conception, the caudillos of old are gradually losing ground, and here is where I see hope.” I share his optimism and concur that this source of progressive change will be a potent force in the years to come as the country finds its way out of autocracy.