U.S. Hegemony in Latin America during an Age of Challenges: The Perception of Threats by the U.S Southern Command

Hegemony, Pacification, and the Armed Forces

In his Prison Notebooks, Antonio Gramsci (2000: 261) argues that hegemony relates to the supremacy of the ruling classes and is based primarily on consensus building. Coercion also plays a role, but its exercise must be legitimized and accepted by the majority of the population:

The “normal” exercise of hegemony in what became the classic terrain of the parliamentary regime is characterized by the combination of force and consent variously balancing one another, without force exceeding consent too much. Indeed, one tries to make it appear that force is supported by the consent of the majority, expressed by the so-called organs of public opinion—newspapers and associations—which are therefore, in certain situations, artificially increased in number.

A classic example of the way Gramsci's reflections are applied in international politics is seen in Cox’s (1983: 171) view that international hegemony is based on the expansion of a domestic hegemony that is sustained by the ruling classes, the economic and social institutions, culture, and technology of which become “patterns for emulation abroad.” The emulation of police and military forms of organization is one of the mechanisms through which hegemony is maintained (both domestically and internationally).

In another important attempt to translate Gramsci’s reflections to international politics, Ana Esther Ceceña (2005) argues that hegemony has economic and military aspects as well as producing common ideas. Together, these aspects result in a group’s ability to lead society as a whole. Ceceña sees an analysis of hegemony as being situated at two levels of abstraction: one that corresponds to modes of production and social organization, which includes contestation and alternatives to capitalism as such, and another that refers to the competition between modes of domination and types of capitalist regulation. Here what competition means is not the existence of alternative production systems but the possibility of changing the type of capitalism regulation and determining who leads in the capitalist system. Interstate disputes are located at this level. Therefore, the hegemonic actions of the United States involve creating conditions that are seen as favorable in the expansion of its way of life, thought, and institutions and in the maintenance of norms that are conducive to the spread not only of its capital but also of the worldviews of the U.S. ruling classes. Perceived challenges to this hegemony correspond to threats located on two axes: conflicts for leadership between states in the international power hierarchy and challenges originating from noninstitutionalized groups that present possible organizational models different from those of capitalism (Ceceña, 2005).

However, containing systemic threats to capitalism can also be understood as a process aimed at the pacification, production, and maintenance of a capitalist order. A large part of the critical security studies literature highlights the fact that police and military organizations were historically charged with controlling elements of the population that were seen as threats to the capitalist order and identified these groups as either criminal, disobedient, or rebellious (Neocleous, 2014; Graham, 2016; Barder, 2015). According to Neocleous (2011: 193), the logic of security is a mode of governance or “political technology of liberal order-building” that sustains a regime based on accumulation. Domestic and foreign spheres of power are connected, and both police and military power are responsible for producing the violence necessary to sustain a capitalist system (Neocleous, 2014). As McMichel (2017: 3) argues, “police and military distinctions in liberal democracies should be understood as part of a continuum of state power, in which domestic social control and international warfare build and secure capitalist order.”

Neocleous (2014) contends that capitalism has an intrinsic quality that constantly generates ideas of insecurity and instability, and this leads the bourgeoisie to demand more policies relating to its own security. He calls this process “pacification” or “securing the insecurity of capitalist accumulation” (Neocleous, 2011: 1). Pacification relates to police power and the power to wage war. It is a way of shaping the behavior of individuals, classes, and groups in favor of a model of accumulation. Acts of pacification imply both the destruction and the construction of social order and therefore include both the soldier and the administrator, force and politics, coercion and consensus. At the same time, however, pacification can also manifest itself in permanent wars (against drugs, crime, and terror for example). It generates expropriation and the repression of certain social groups, whether in the global periphery or in the center.

Although there are parallels between peripheral and core countries in the reproduction of a capitalist order and in the stamping out of resistance, a peripheral position imposes particular constraints. Capitalist accumulation in the periphery is oriented toward the economies of foreign countries, and therefore the ruling classes use external methods to legitimize their authority and maintain their hegemony, while making more intense use of violent methods (Rouquié, 1984). Training and military equipment largely comes from outside the country, and this perpetuates dependency (Wendt and Barnett, 1993). Threat perception is connected to international processes because it is transmitted by international, regional, and multilateral institutions and through bilateral relations between militaries across the world (Saint-Pierre, 2011; Milani, 2019).

Historically, the hegemony of the U.S. ruling classes in Latin America has been tied to consensus building with regard to threats that had to be neutralized by military and police officials. The United States tends to associate its internal security with regional stability. It has two “fundamental concerns with regard to Latin America: the prevention of instability and the exclusion of extracontinental threats” (Pecequilo, 2011: 219). The threats perceived, sometimes seen as interrelated, include the regional influence of foreign powers and the dynamics stemming from internal instability such as transnational crime and insurgency—in Ceceña’s (2005) terms: interstate disputes inherent to capitalism, and ill-defined threats that are potentially foreign to the capitalist mode of production.

The writings of the historian Alan Knight (2008: 39) help to contextualize this situation by highlighting two basic imperial functions: molding peripheral societies in a way that is favorable to the interests of core countries and limiting the expansion of rival powers. During the Cold War there was a tendency toward fusion of the two; “molding Latin American regimes . . . became inextricably mixed up with fending off rival imperialist (i.e., Soviet) threats.” Mapping these perceived threats in a certain context is important not only for understanding the priorities of military elites but also for identifying what is perceived as problematic to the maintenance of the global hegemony established by the U.S. ruling classes. However, identifying threats is not a unilateral process; the agency of Latin American military elites must be recognized. Demands by domestic actors surrounded the adoption of the national security doctrine during the Cold War (although the role of foreign influence in this process cannot be ignored). In fact, before the Cuban Revolution and the emphasis on a counterinsurgency doctrine by the U.S. government, the Brazilian and Argentine militaries were already looking for a counterinsurgency doctrine (Martins Filho, 2008; López, 1987). Especially after the Cuban Revolution, , the United States wanted to convert the Latin American armed forces into a force for internal order in line with its strategic vision (Rouquié, 1984).

Currently, Latin American militaries continue to be used for domestic purposes (such as in the fight against drug trafficking and organized crime). Although pressure from the United States was a determining factor in the adoption of the “War on Drugs” paradigm in Latin America, the paradigm was eagerly accepted by the region's military and police (Tokatlian, 2015; Rodrigues, 2012). Different scholars have interpreted it as a form of capitalist expansion and reproduction and as a way of justifying the coercion exercised by the ruling classes (Pereira, 2021; Avilés, 2018).

Latin American militaries play a crucial role in the reproduction of capitalism, and military cooperation is one of the mechanisms through which the hegemony and worldview of the United States are transmitted to Latin American countries. To create an environment that allows capitalism and U.S. dominance to perpetuate themselves, various mechanisms are used to establish priorities and identify which challenges need to be contained. Identifying threats is one of these mechanisms. That said, the possibility exists that these projects will be met with either active acceptance or limited resistance by Latin American military officials. This article will analyze only the most general aspects of U.S. demands. Analyzing these aspects from a Latin American perspective will be the goal of future studies.

A caveat is necessary here. I am not arguing that political and social transformations in Latin America originate solely or primarily in the actions of the military. On the contrary, such transformations are influenced by a wide range of actors, among them political parties, think tanks, social movements, and segments of the bourgeoisie (Boito Jr., 2006; Saad-Filho and Boito, 2016; Singer, 2012). U.S. hegemony is exercised and supported in a similar way through the transmission of ideas by think tanks, international financial institutions, technocrats, transnational companies, and other actors (Vidal, Lopez, and Brum, 2020; Biegon, 2017; Avilés, 2018). The Latin American military also has a role in maintaining this hegemony, and therefore it is important to analyze its ideas and actions.

Transformations in Latin American Geopolitics and the U.S. Reaction

The security agenda has undergone major changes at the global level (especially in the Western Hemisphere) since the end of the Cold War. Demands for change in the ways in which force is legitimized arose as a direct result of the collapse of the USSR and the disappearance of “communism” as a threat. Rearticulation was necessary to legitimize U.S. hegemony and the ongoing processes relating to pacification. In the Americas new threats were identified and prioritized, among them transnational organized crime, drug trafficking, terrorism, and migration. These issues were seen as challenges to regional security by the U.S. government and incorporated into discussions about hemispheric security by the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Conferences of Defense Ministers in the Americas (Mathias and Fazio, 2004; Pagliai, 2006; Pereira, 2015; Saint-Pierre, 2011). Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has sought to export its ideas of threats to Latin American countries through organizations of this kind.

After 9/11, terrorism became the main global threat identified by the United States and was incorporated into the regional security agenda. The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—FARC) and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army—ELN) came to be seen as “narco-terrorists” (Isacson, 2005; Villa, 2014; Prevost and Campos, 2007). These ideas continued to predominate during the Obama administration despite nuances in the way they were presented such as the use of the expression “extremist violence” instead of “terrorism” and the idea of shared responsibilities with regard to drugs (Kassab and Rosen, 2016; Buxton, 2011).

Despite being very different from each other, the threats perceived by the United States were similar in that they were either nonstate or transnational in character. This was consistent with Neocleous's (2011) argument that the war on drugs, the war on terror, and the war on crime are all forms of pacification that serve to bolster demands for permanent security policies. U.S. officials began to point to obscure threats while suggesting that there are no longer any major challenges to U.S. hegemony at the level of interstate competition.

More recently, however, various domestic actors in the United States began to identify a global geopolitical transformation unleashed by the substantial growth of China’s economy. The idea that the main global threats were at the nonstate level was replaced by a perspective that increasingly saw China and Russia as challenges to U.S. hegemony. In 2017, during the Trump administration, a national security strategy document said, “When America does not lead, malign actors fill the void. . .When America does lead, however, from a position of strength and confidence and in accordance with our interests and values, all benefit,” and a 2021 Joe Biden administration interim national security strategic guidance document proposed that “by restoring U.S. credibility and reasserting forward-looking global leadership, we will ensure that America, not China, sets the international agenda” (White House, 2021: 20).

China tends to reiterate that it has no intention of being a hegemon and that the maintenance of a peaceful international system is important for its plans for economic growth and internal strengthening (Yan, 2014). It has carried out its policies discreetly with the goal of not challenging U.S. power in Latin America (Paz, 2012; Tokatlian, 2008). Economic issues have figured prominently in Sino–Latin American relations, but cooperation in other areas has gradually increased. A policy paper released in 2016 introduced the idea of comprehensive cooperation, including the expansion of exchanges between political parties and the sponsorship of projects in research and development, outer space, health, culture, education, training for the military, and the fight against organized crime (People’s Republic of China, 2016). Nevertheless, China's ability to project its power in Latin America is limited compared with that of the United States, and (despite some advances in its arms sales) military cooperation plays only a secondary role in China’s agenda in the region (Watson, 2013; Ellis, 2021).

Starting from 2005, U.S. congressional hearings were held to discuss the issue of China’s presence in Latin America and China began to be mentioned by Southcom commanders as a challenge (Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps and Narcotics Affairs, 2005; Milani, 2021). These dynamics became a topic of discussion for an expanding literature on the presence of extraregional powers in the Western Hemisphere (Ellis, 2015; Gardini, 2021; Myers and Wise, 2017; Sabatini, 2013). There was much debate and discussion of their political, strategic, and economic consequences. Less attention was paid to threat perception and its explicitly military implications.

R. Evan Ellis (2019), a professor in the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College, points to a connection between U.S. national interests and strategic formulations and argues that cooperation in matters of security is one of the ways in which U.S. leadership is reinforced. According to Krivolápov and Stepánova (2020), the political/military strategy for Latin America of the Trump administration saw the region from a perspective of strategic competition (even though this did not lead to an increase in the amount of U.S. resources being sent to the region), ² and this perspective can be seen in the speeches given by Southcom military officials. Commander Craig Faller (U.S. Southcom, 2020a:1), for example, called the Western Hemisphere “our shared neighborhood. . .[a] critical space in the global competition—and global challenges—posed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia.”

Threat Perception by Southcom Commanders (2017–2021)

My qualitative analysis of declassified documents produced by Southcom from 2017 to 2021 included speeches made by Southcom commanders to the Armed Forces Subcommittee of the U.S. Congress, the “Enduring Promise for the Americas” strategy developed by the combatant command in 2019, the U.S. Senate confirmation hearing for Laura Richardson as commander of Southcom in 2021, and articles published in Southcom’s journal Diálogo. I wanted to understand how Southcom military officials represented foreign powers on the American continent, what threats and challenges they highlighted and how the connections between them were presented, and what strategies they proposed. The difference between “threats” and “challenges” is not made clear in the commanders' speeches or in the other documents produced by Southcom, reflecting hesitancy in labeling state actors as threats.

In all the speeches I analyzed, the presence of foreign powers is presented as a challenge. China, Russia, and Iran are frequently mentioned together. After the appointment of Craig Faller (the first Southcom commander chosen by the Trump administration), there was an important policy shift whereby China and Russia were labeled “malign actors” (U.S. Southcom, 2020a; 2019a; 2019b). The idea of “malign intentions” or “malign influences” by foreign actors also appears in the questions and responses given during the nomination hearing of Lt. General Laura Richardson in August 2021, and the general uses these terms specifically with reference to Russia’s actions in Latin America (Senate Armed Services Committee, 2021). This demonstrates a relative continuity between the two administrations. Following Ceceña’s (2005) terms, these perceived threats are located at the level of competition—not threats to capitalism per se but threats to the type of capitalism practiced by the United States.

Southcom commanders tend to treat China, Russia, and Iran as a group even though the three pursue very different policies on the American continent. Although military training and arms transfers are increasing, China’s influence in Latin America tends to be broader in scope and primarily economic. Despite its limited influence, Russia is more assertive in its policies and is making gains, especially with regard to arms sales. Iran has less capability for pursuing its agenda in Latin America than China and Russia, but its presence is seen as threatening because of its ties to actors labeled as terrorists by the U.S. government (such as Hezbollah). Treating the three countries as a group may be a way of trying to convince government officials of the seriousness of their involvement despite their limited individual influence and the limited cooperation that exists between them in terms of regional strategy.

Southcom commanders describe partnerships between Latin American countries and China on issues relating to outer space, nuclear energy, telecommunications, and military cooperation as points of concern that need to be addressed. Even though they admit that these partnerships with China are mainly economic, they view wide-ranging initiatives such as the One Belt, One Road Initiative as challenges. In 2018, for example, Admiral Kurt Tidd cautions that “the larger strategic challenge posed by China in this region is not yet a military one. It is an economic one” (U.S. Southcom, 2018: 17). In 2021 Craig Faller warns that China’s economic presence and plans for the One Belt, One Road Initiative are “part of a concerted effort by Beijing to indebt fragile countries in the region.” In other words, these commanders understand that the challenge China poses is not exactly a military one. Nonetheless, its expansion is seen a problem for national security and U.S. power in the region.

In the case of Russia, there is concern about the spread of disinformation and about cooperation between the Latin American and Russian militaries. With regard to Iran, the main concern is its alleged support of terrorist groups. The preservation of perceived shared values (especially democracy and human rights) is seen as being threatened by the growing influence of China and Russia in the region. According to the U.S. military, this influence is tantamount to instability, corruption, and the erosion of democracy in the region (U.S. Southcom, 2019a; 2020a; 2021). As stated by Tidd (U.S. Southcom, 2017),

Broadly speaking, some of this outreach is concerning, especially to those of us who care about advancing human rights and promoting regional peace and stability. Keep in mind there’s no Chinese, Russian, or Iranian equivalent of a Leahy Law, no comparable conditions on security assistance, no independent domestic media that carefully scrutinizes their activities. Their arms sales aren’t tied to international protocols or human rights vetting. Their loans don’t come with requirements to follow strict environmental or anti-corruption standards, or even clear terms and conditions for repayment. ³

Articles that discuss Chinese, Russian, or Iranian influence in Latin America appear constantly in Diálogo—for example, a 2018 article on Russia’s alleged disinformation campaign and a 2020 article argued that China is seeking to create an international order that is compatible with its “dictatorial political model” and affirmed that China’s surveillance technology and business practices are a challenge to democratic institutions in Latin America (Fonseca, 2018; 2020). In 2020 there were articles on the supposed Venezuela-Iran-Hezbollah nexus, Russia’s military policy in the hemisphere, U.S. regional hegemony during an age of competition among the United States, Russia, and China, China’s global military position, the way in which China and Russia are exploiting democratic institutions in the region, and the export of Russian and Chinese surveillance systems to Latin American countries (U.S. Southcom, 2020b). In 2021 there were articles on the “strategic partnership” between Venezuela and Iran and the potential export of Russia’s antidrone technology (U.S. Southcom, 2021b).

In order to counteract Russia and China’s growing influence in the region, Southcom military officials proposed that the United States should build cooperation and interoperability by developing and strengthening security partnerships with Latin American militaries (U.S. Southcom, 2017; 2018; 2019a; 2019b; 2020a; 2021; Senate Armed Services Committee, 2021). Although Southcom commanders do not see Chinese and Russian influence as a strictly military problem, they recognize that preserving and deepening ties between the U.S. military and its counterparts in the region are important in the maintenance of U.S. “leadership” on the continent. At the same time, however, they understand that they must adopt policies that include every government sector. In this way, military power is seen as just one mechanism for stopping Chinese expansion in the region. What can be seen here is a concern about maintaining U.S. hegemony and ensuring that Latin American countries continue to emulate U.S. liberal institutions in the region.

The annual speeches given by the commander of Southcom to Congress also show concerns about threats posed by nonstate actors such as terrorism, organized transnational crime, and immigration and assert that weak governments, corruption, and populism exacerbate these threats. These threats are diverse and may involve actors originating in marginalized populations and critical of the capitalist world order (Table 1).

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Table 1

Threats and Challenges Cited by U.S. Southcom Commanders, 2017–2021

Year	Commander	Themes Cited	States Cited
2017	Adm. Kurt W. Tidd	Threat networks (violent extremist organizations, ISIS, Hezbollah, criminal networks, drug trafficking, ELN, possible criminal-terrorist collusion), natural disasters, migrations, social protests	Russia, China, Iran
2018	Adm. Kurt W. Tidd	Governance challenges (corruption, unmet development goals, and violent crimes), violent extremism (ISIS), migration, natural disasters, threat networks (drug traffickers, arms dealers, human smugglers, terrorist supporters and sympathizers, and money launderers), criminal networks	Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, Cuba, Venezuela
2019	Adm. Craig S. Faller	Natural and man-made disasters, weak government institutions, corruption, underresourced security organizations, violent crime, criminal organizations, and violent extremist cells (ISIS/Hezbollah/Al-Qaida)	Russia, China, Iran, Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela
2020	Adm. Craig S. Faller	Vicious cycles of threats, transnational criminal organizations, malign state actors, and violent extremist organizations	China, Russia, Iran, Cuba, Venezuela
2021	Adm. Craig S. Faller	Institutional instability, corruption, external state actors, COVID-19, transnational criminal organizations, regional terrorist organizations (FARC dissidents, ELN), Al-Qaida, ISIS, Hezbollah	China, Russia, Iran, Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua
2021	Lt. Gen. Laura J. Richardson	Transnational criminal organizations, violence, corruption, COVID-19, migration, natural disasters	China, Russia

Sources: Southcom (2017; 2018; 2019a; 2020a; 2021a).

Tidd (commander from 2016 to 2018) says that Southcom’s role is to contain “threat networks” that he understands as the “principal threat to regional security and stability” (U.S. Southcom, 2017: 5). He argues that such networks are based on illegal activities that stem from profit and “destabilizing” ideologies and include criminal groups and organizations that promote extremist violence. He also highlights problems relating to governance (such as corruption, underdevelopment, and crime) as challenges to regional security. In a similar vein, Faller (commander from 2019 to 2021) lists as challenges and threats weak government institutions, transnational criminal organizations, and extremist groups (U.S. Southcom, 2019a; 2020). Richardson lists transnational organized crime, the instability in Haiti and Cuba, and the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela as nonstate challenges on the continent (Senate Armed Services Committee, 2021). The concept of “illegal networks” or “transnational threat networks” is also applied to criminal and terrorist organizations that appear in the articles published in Diálogo (Cook, 2018; Realuyo, 2019). Certain operations (especially those of a police and military nature) and efforts to promote international cooperation in the fight against transnational threats appear frequently as subject matter. What is especially interesting is that criminal and terrorist groups are treated in the same way even though the commanders admit that these groups have different agendas. There is a tendency to see nonstate threats as problematic in a variety of ways to U.S. dominance on the continent and to treat these threats as a group. There are also concerns relating to the future stability and maintenance of the capitalist order, regional governance, and the preservation of liberal institutions.

The situations in Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua are seen as problematic, especially because these countries have ties to Russia, China, and Iran. Southcom commanders mention that the continent’s fragile institutions serve to expand and reinforce the efforts of China, Russia, and Iran to weaken them and that these three countries are either working with the Venezuelan, Cuban, and Nicaraguan governments or acting through them. The links between various threats are described by Faller and in the Senate hearings on Richardson’s nomination as follows:

Weak governance and corruption provide permissive environments for malign state actors to expand their influence and threaten U.S., allied, and partner nation interests. . . .Corruption incentivizes officials to agree to predatory economic and security arrangements with China. . . .China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian models. Many of their actions around the world, including in this hemisphere, are aimed at undermining the principles of democracy, sovereignty, human rights, and rule of law, as well as contesting U.S. legitimacy. . . .Their regional allies Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua engage in destabilizing activities that threaten hemispheric security and democratic governance. As one of the world's most democratic regions, the Western Hemisphere is an increasingly important space for malign state actors who seek to challenge and subvert the international order. (U.S. Southcom, 2019b: 2–4)

Six state actors (Russia, China, Iran, and their authoritarian allies in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela) and a system of interrelated threats challenge the security of our partners and the region. Threats like natural and man-made disasters and criminal networks feed and fuel drivers of instability, including weak institutions, poverty, corruption, and violent crime. Addressing these challenges requires whole-of-government efforts, led by partner nations at a pace they can sustain, to strengthen democratic institutions and expand economic opportunity. (U.S. Southcom, 2019a: 6)

I am concerned about the increasing Chinese and Russian presence and influence in our hemisphere, particularly where these nations are strengthening ties with governments that do not share our democratic values (like Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua), or taking advantage of our partners facing insecurity, instability, and long-term impacts of COVID-19. I am also concerned about Transnational Criminal Organizations. These organizations pose a direct threat to the United States as they traffic in drugs, weapons, humans, and other illicit goods. Their activities enable violence and corruption, and also drive migration. (Senate Armed Services Committee, 2021: 6)

Southcom military officials associate regional security with the maintenance of liberal institutions that are seen as threatened by the relations between certain countries and foreign actors. Ellis’s (2019) writings, which are sometimes cited by Southcom commanders, reinforce the idea of a connection between threats on the continent and challenges that originate from foreign powers. He argues that “authoritarian anti–U.S. governments. . .serve as enablers for widespread criminality, terrorist threat networks, and collaboration with hostile extra-hemispheric state actors such as Russia and the PRC” (Ellis, 2019: 28). Furthermore, he insists that the military should be a defense against “criminality, corruption, and populism” that can serve as gateways through which various threats (such as Russia and China) can enter the Western Hemisphere. More recently, in a congressional hearing he said that Chinese influence in the region is a threat and argued that the “long-term implications of that [China-Latin America] engagement are grave for prosperity, democracy, and liberties in the region, as well as the security and strategic position of the United States” (Ellis, 2021: 1). The idea that regional security is tied not only to issues that are traditionally military or police in nature but also to governance and politics is one that appears in both Ellis’s writings and the speeches given by Southcom commanders. It plays a role in perspectives that view corruption, authoritarianism, and weak institutions as a problem.

Problems with governance are viewed as facilitating Chinese and Russian expansion on the continent, and cooperation between countries in the region and non-Western actors is considered to exacerbate these problems. The Southcom commanders argue that the appropriate strategy is dialogue between the military and the police, other government agencies, and civil institutions. In this way, military officials are seen as having a role in initiatives that seek to include every government sector (Senate Armed Forces Committee, 2021; U.S. Southcom, 2017; 2018; 2019a; 2020a; 2021a). Therefore, there appears to be agreement on what is needed to deal with different types of threats on the continent: closer cooperation between the U.S. and Latin American militaries and an understanding that these militaries should act in concert with other governmental agencies.

Conclusion

The threats perceived by U.S. military officials in Latin America are of two kinds: domestic issues that are seen to promote national instability (sometimes associated with the possibility of a change in the domestic status quo) and the expansion of foreign powers. The recent turn toward perceiving threats and challenges at the state level is not intended to replace but is added to the perception of diverse transnational issues as threatening. There also appears to be a crude attempt by U.S. military officials to build a discursive correlation between these state threats and transnational issues. In a similar way, there is no clear distinction between the role of the military and that of the police. Given the argument that threats are identified and contained by interagency operations and cooperation between the military and the police, it stands to reason that these actions are also considered necessary to solve the ills that these threats and transnational issues represent. The inclusion of every government sector is seen as playing a role in this process.

The speeches of the Southcom commanders show that their idea of security includes not only problems restricted to areas traditionally associated with the military and the police but also problems with the functioning of liberal institutions. This is similar to Neocleous’s argument on pacification. The challenge to liberal ideals and their U.S. orientation is seen as having the potential to set the stage for “malign state actors” or nonstate actors such as criminals and insurgents to spread their influence across the continent. However, the United States tends to keep searching for new ways to expand its institutions (one of the manifestations of hegemony). This is a process that also occurs in the realm of military policy.

The construction of nonliberal institutions (even capitalist ones) is described as problematic by Southcom commanders and other military officials. They perceive it as implying a shift away from U.S. hegemony to adherence to capitalist models originating in other latitudes. Furthermore, the perspective promoted by Southcom military officials matches that of Neocleous relating to the “construction of order.” This perspective is usually legitimized with the notion that the American continent shares values such as liberal democracy and the rule of law. In other words, U.S. military officials see their mission as including a duty to maintain a stable, liberal, and prosperous hemisphere conducive to capitalist accumulation, and the presence of foreign powers from the region is seen as a challenge to maintaining this order. In future studies it will be important to analyze how Latin American military officials interpret, accept, or partially resist the idea that the presence of China, Russia, and Iran on the continent represents a problem of international security.