Mariculture Policies and Ocean Grabbing in Brazil

Abstract

Aquaculture (the breeding of freshwater and marine organisms) is commonly cited as a solution to the crisis that has plagued global fisheries in recent years. Since the 2000s, the Brazilian government has encouraged aquaculture production through government funding, sectoral planning, and environmental regulations. This government-driven mariculture has been responsible for the appearance of ocean grabbing mechanisms. Document analysis of government policies and environmental regulations and semistructured interviews with important members of the federal government show that the promulgation of the new Brazilian Forest Code stimulated shrimp farming in formerly protected areas and the federal government created a system for the auctioning and of areas in public waters. These mechanisms promoted the privatization and commodification of public sea, land, and other natural resources and negatively affected communities whose livelihoods depend on coastal and marine spaces. There is an ongoing campaign to dismantle the socioenvironmental legal framework responsible for regulating and protecting Brazil’s coastal and marine environments while mariculture is encouraged through sectoral policies based on a neoliberal economic model.

La acuicultura (cultivo de organismos de agua dulce y marinos) se menciona comúnmente como una solución a la crisis que ha colapsado las pesquerías mundiales en los últimos años. Desde comienzos de los años 2000, el gobierno brasileño incentivó la producción acuícola a través de fondos gubernamentales, planificación sectorial y regulaciones ambientales. La maricultura promovida por el gobierno es responsable por la aparición de mecanismos de usurpación de espacios y recursos naturales de las comunidades marino-costeras (“ocean grabbing”). Análisis de documentos de políticas gubernamentales y regulaciones ambientales sobre maricultura y entrevistas semiestructuradas a informantes clave del gobierno federal muestran que la promulgación del nuevo Código Forestal Brasileño (2012) estimuló el cultivo de camarón en áreas anteriormente protegidas y el gobierno federal creó un sistema de subasta y venta de áreas de aguas públicas para cultivos. Tales mecanismos promueven la privatización y mercantilización del mar, la tierra y otros recursos naturales públicos y afecta negativamente a las comunidades cuyos medios de vida dependen de los espacios costeros y marinos. Hay una campaña en curso para desmantelar el marco legal socioambiental responsable de regular y proteger los ambientes costeros y marinos de Brasil, al mismo tiempo que se incentiva la maricultura a través de políticas sectoriales basadas en un modelo económico neoliberal.

Keywords

Fisheries policy Aquaculture Fisheries Blue economy

Aquaculture is the breeding of aquatic organisms within individual or collective enterprises for the purpose of increasing production and generating profit on a commercial basis. This activity can be divided into two primary categories based on the organisms and breeding environments in question. Inland or fresh-water aquaculture is geared mainly toward raising fish in reservoirs, rivers, lakes, and canals (both natural and man-made). Marine aquaculture (also known as mariculture) is practiced using saline or brackish water and can be developed artificially using systems located within the sea, oceans, coastal environments, wetlands, estuaries, inlets, bays, and lagoons. This type of aquaculture is used primarily for breeding fish, algae, shellfish, and marine crustaceans (FAO, 2018).

The expansion of aquaculture¹ is often cited as a key component of solving the global fisheries crisis and as a way of restoring the world’s fish supply in order to feed future generations (FAO, 2018; Golden et al., 2017). Many have called aquaculture the “Blue Revolution.” This term is similar to another phenomenon known as the “Green Revolution,” which changed agricultural production on a global scale during the 1950s. It combined mechanization, genetic manipulation of seeds, and the use of agrochemicals (such as fertilizers and pesticides) for the purpose of growing and cultivating monocultures (Krause et al., 2015).

Of the 171 million tons that is the total amount of global fisheries production that was recorded in 2016, close to 88 percent was used for human consumption. Fifty-two percent of this production corresponds to aquaculture. According to recent estimates, aquaculture will constitute 60 percent of global fisheries production by the year 2030 (FAO, 2018).

What can be seen is a general trend (especially in developing countries) toward stimulating aquaculture through measures that seek to either reduce or eliminate any obstacles or restrictions relating to this type of production. These measures include establishing property rights for physical spaces onshore and/or in the water and easing restrictions relating to the issuing of environmental licenses. There appears to be a joint effort on the part of fish farmers, investors, equipment manufacturers, service providers, scientists, and governments to encourage the growth of aquaculture production and commerce on a global scale (Krause et al., 2015; Longo et al., 2019).

Aquaculture can have negative environmental and social consequences depending on the production systems and management models utilized and where they are located. The concept of an ongoing Blue Revolution is indicative of a larger process that has intensified over recent decades and focuses on amplifying aquaculture production through the use of extensive monocultures, genetic modifications, chemical products, hormones, the creation of new technologies, and the mechanization of labor. The process has deepened the economic and technological dependence producers have on these methods and technologies. Something similar occurred during the Green Revolution in the field of agriculture. Moreover, this model privileges exports, and the economic benefits are not necessarily used to improve the food security of the most vulnerable sectors of the population in countries where these fisheries are produced (Golden et al., 2017; Ramalho, 2015).

Aquaculture’s negative impact occur in the physical and biological means used in its production. This is especially the case in developing countries because of the way in which natural resources are directly used and consumed by the population and other forms of interference, such as pollution and alterations in the biogeochemical cycles of ecosystems (Beitl, 2012; FAO, 2009; Udoh, 2016).

Fisheries monoculture has serious social consequences because of the economic competition between industrial aquaculture producers and small-scale fish farmers and/or artisanal fishers (Franco et al., 2014), because the private appropriation of aquacultural public areas, and the pressure exerted by landholders to expand these areas into already existing localities (Clausen and Clark, 2005; Longo et al., 2019). The competition for the use of these spaces and the environmental resources contained within them leads to the expropriation of communities who collectively own territories used for residence and work. Often this expropriation results in the brutal exploitation of labor and can even erupt in violence within areas where aquaculture is expanding (Franco et al., 2014; Krause et al., 2015).

In Latin America, for instance, salmon production in Chile (Barton and Román, 2016) and shrimp farming in Mexico (Cruz-Torres, 2000), Honduras (King, 2008), Ecuador (Ocampo-Thomason, 2006), Brazil (CMADS, 2005; Queiroz et al., 2013), and elsewhere have varying socioenvironmental impacts that cause socioeconomic conflicts and have drastic consequences for coastal ecosystems and populations (especially for traditional communities and indigenous peoples).

Aquaculture is expanding in Brazil. The country’s situation regarding its fisheries mirrors that of the current global fisheries crisis. In 2011, a total volume of 1,431,974 tons of fishing was recorded in the country—38.7 percent from marine fishing, 38 percent from inland aquaculture, 17.4 percent from inland fishing, and 5.9 percent from mariculture. Of the total for aquaculture, 86 percent came from inland aquaculture and 14 percent from mariculture (MPA, 2013a).

Mariculture in Brazil is divided into two main productive sectors: shrimp farming and shellfish breeding (exotic and native oysters, scallops, and mussels). According to the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics—IBGE), Brazil’s national production relating to shrimp farming in 2019 was approximately 54,300 tons. The Northeast region was responsible for almost all of this production (99.6 percent of the national total). The states of Ceará and Rio Grande do Norte together produce the most shrimp in the region. These two states alone account for 30.8 percent and 38.2 percent of national production respectively (IBGE, 2020). In contrast, shellfish breeding accounted for 15,215 tons in 2019. The state of Santa Catarina in southern Brazil is the biggest national producer of shellfish, providing 97.3 percent of the total volume produced (IBGE, 2020).

A large part of this growth in Brazilian aquaculture (both inland and marine) in recent years was due to greater investments, which stemmed mainly from government policies designed to stimulate and organize the sector. Policies were implemented by the Secretaria Especial da Aquicultura e Pesca (Special Department for Aquaculture and Fishing—SEAP), which was established in 2003, and by the Ministério da Pesca e Aquicultura (Ministry of Fishing and Aquaculture—MPA), created in 2009. One of the main goals of the government’s fisheries policy was the development of mariculture, which represented a new frontier for the expansion of capital. This policy is justified, by the government, as a way to increase the food supply available to the general population and, at the same time, not to exacerbate or even reverse the existing national crisis of fishing resources caused by marine fishing, also representing an opportunity for work and income for traditional fishing communities (Silva, 2020).

However, the historical development of mariculture in Brazil has had negative effects on the country and is currently the cause of major socioenvironmental conflicts, stemming mainly from the expropriation of territories from traditional populations (especially fishing communities). This expropriation separates communities from their means of production as well as from their living spaces and ways of life (Paulilo, 2002; Queiroz et al., 2013; Ramalho, 2015).

As stated previously, this article seeks to identify the Brazilian government’s major policies regarding mariculture and to show how they contributed to ocean grabbing during the past two decades in Brazil. Ocean grabbing is the expropriation and predation of existing natural coastal and marine spaces in order to generate profit-making opportunities for private investors (Harvey, 2004).

In the following section we will present the theoretical and methodological approaches utilized in this study. We will then summarize the institutional, legal, and political history of Brazilian mariculture and examine the two main political/regulatory processes that are connected to ocean grabbing in Brazil.

Theoretical and Methodological Approach and Research Methods

In the past 30 years, a series of mechanisms emerged from the political economy of contemporary capitalism. They made their appearance on the world stage in the context of various crises as well as phenomena such as globalization, neoliberalism, and global geopolitical changes. The goal of these mechanisms was to incorporate public and common assets into the market through privatization. David Harvey (2004) calls this “accumulation by dispossession,” which, as he points out, differs in various respects from the originating accumulation of capital described by Marx.

Accumulation by dispossession implies the use of unethical modes of expansion regarding territorial and political boundaries for the purposes of capitalist investment and profit, that surpass what was instituted during previous phases of expansion. Mechanisms were created that allowed for the expropriation and predation of existing spaces for the express purpose of generating money-making ventures, including rights to intellectual property regarding commerce, biopiracy, the commercialization of nature, the decline of regulatory statutes designed to protect workers’ rights, the patenting and licensing of genetic material, and the privatization of public goods that were previously managed by the state. This allows, among other actions, the private, exclusionary, and profitable use of territories and natural resources, previously preserved for other means, so that capital could invest, value, and speculate on them (Harvey, 2004).

Since the outbreak of the global economic crisis in 2008, accumulation of capital by dispossession continues to intensify and spread in coastal and ocean areas around the world. It is in this context that the catchword “Blue Economy” began to gain prominence. The term became especially popular in periods of neoliberal government, which sought to implement measures that privileged market interests in conflicts over development and the environment (Winder and Heron, 2017).

The Blue Economy was presented by neoliberal advocates as having multiple benefits. According to them, the Blue Economy could simultaneously protect the environment, generate new jobs, and integrate coastal communities into the global economy. At the same time, however, it could serve as an opportunity for investors and as a chance for developing countries to create new sectors for economic growth. The latter included coastal development of maritime transport, renewable energy, mining, tourism, fishing, and mariculture (UN, 2013).

Economic interests sought to gain exclusive access and control of coastal (as well as marine) spaces and resources. This process is known as “ocean grabbing.” The term describes actions, policies, and initiatives adopted by the government and the private sector that are designed to privately dispossess and appropriate coastal or marine spaces and resources for the purposes of creating new opportunities for the accumulation of capital (Bennett, Govan, and Satterfield, 2015). In the process, states enter as supporters creating new legal frameworks and reinterpreting existing laws, regulations, and policies concerning the environment and the management of coastal areas. The result is the establishment of private property rights regimes that claim ownership of natural spaces and resources through market and tax mechanisms (Franco et al., 2014; Mansfield, 2004).

The theoretical and methodological approach of this article seeks to understand how political and legal structures influence the development and organization of mariculture and the creation of ocean grabbing schemes in Brazil. Data were collected from the Brazilian government’s policies concerning mariculture and from the specific legal instruments used to implement these policies. Data published starting in the 2000s were collected by reviewing documents released by government agencies.

The first part of these data was obtained from electronic sites communications with representatives of governmental bureaus such as the Secretaria de Aquicultura e Pesca at the Ministério da Agricultura, Pecuária e Abastecimento (Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Supply—MAPA), the Ministério do Meio Ambiente (Ministry of the Environment—MMA), and the IBGE. Certain policies and regulations were selected for their effectiveness in encouraging ocean grabbing. With this in mind, the following documents were analyzed: Programa Nacional deDesenvolvimento da Maricultura (National Program for Mariculture Development 2005), Censo Aquícola Nacional (National Census of Aquaculture 2008), Política Nacional de Desenvolvimento Sustentável da Aquicultura e da Pesca (National Policy for the Sustainable Development of Aquaculture and Fishing 2009), the new Código Florestal Brasileiro (Brazilian Forest Code 2012), and the Concession Agreements of Use Rights Regarding Mariculture Areas in Public Waters (2003-2010) among others.

Semistructured interviews were also conducted in order to collect data that were not available on the Internet and to verify information obtained from secondary sources. Managers and technicians from SAP and the MMA were interviewed in Brasília in March 2018. They include João Crescêncio (head of the Department for the Design and Planning of Aquaculture at the SAP), Elielma Borcem (head of the Agency for the Design and Planning of Fisheries at the SAP), Cláudio Maretti (head of the Department for Socioenvironmental Policy and Territorial Consolidation Within Conservation Units at the MMA), Francisco Joeliton Bezerra, and Carlos Proença (environmental analysts at the Agency for the Management, Allocation, and Preservation of Biodiversity at the MMA). The audio (close to 10 hours in total) from the interviews was recorded with the permission of the interviewees.

Information concerning the concession and auctioning of areas for mariculture was collected from an external hard drive that was provided by the SAP in Brasília (Federal District) in October 2019 in order to update data.

The goal of this article is to examine policies and regulations in order to determine continuities and discontinuities in the Brazilian government’s proposed plans concerning mariculture. It will pay special attention to the Brazilian government’s orientation, its institutional/administrative apparatus, and the prevailing political environment (Frey, 2000).

The Institutional, Political, and Legal History of Mariculture in Brazil

Two recent institutional stages can be identified as being decisive in determining who had jurisdiction in regulating Brazil’s fishing and aquaculture sectors. The first stage began in 2003, when the SEAP and the MPA were established during the governments ruled by the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party—PT). The second stage began after President Dilma Rousseff (PT) was impeached in August 2016 and represented a discontinuity in terms of government policies toward the country’s fishing and aquaculture sectors.

From the Establishment of the SEAP to the Dissolution of the MPA (2003–2015)

After President Luís Inácio Lula da Silva (PT) came to power in 2003, the SEAP was created in order to stimulate, plan, and organize Brazil’s fishing and aquaculture sectors. As was the case in previous governments, the environmental policies related to these sectors remained divided with the MMA.

The goal of the SEAP was primarily institution building. It lent its support to new laws and policies that were gradually enacted for the purpose of stimulating and organizing Brazil’s fishery and aquaculture sectors. Between 2003 and 2009, it played a major role in establishing the institutional, political, and economic framework necessary for developing developing, mainly, industrial ocean fishing, and inland and marine aquaculture sectors (Azevedo, 2012).

According to Azevedo and Pierri (2014), the SEAP during these years received a budget allocation that totaled R$722,786,000. The distribution of funds, published by the SEAP, shows that traditional fishing, industrial fishing, and aquaculture received 36 percent, 26 percent, and 14 percent, respectively, of its total investments during that period. The remaining 24 percent was used for publicity and administrative costs. If the number of producers that existed in each sector is considered, a reversal occurred in the way in which resources were distributed. More than 800,000 traditional fishers in Brazil (MPA, 2013a) received much less investment than those involved in industrial fishing (with 9,822 registered fishers in 2014) (Brasil, 2015) and aquaculture (with 15,469 inland breeders and 1,585 marine farmers registered in 2008) (MPA, 2013b).

During the years 2003–2009, SEAP signed agreements and contracts with different states and municipalities to structuring the aquaculture productive chain (units and build infrastructures to support the sector), especially with regard to inland activity (Brasil, 2011).

Besides the budget allocation, the federal government promoted the aquaculture though: simplifying environmental licenses and other legislations; articulating with other ministries and promotion agencies; partnering with some public university sectors and research agencies; spatial planning of mariculture; and the implementation of aquaculture parks² in coastal and marine areas (Azevedo and Pierri, 2014; Ramalho, 2015; Santos and Acioly, 2015).

The SEAP established a legal framework for concession agreements of use rights regarding aquaculture areas in public waters.³ Decree 4,895 in 2003 and the Interministerial Normative Ruling 6 in 2004 (Brasil, 2003; 2004) simplified the issuance of environmental licenses and the legislation involving the cooperation of several Brazilian ministries. Then, public notices were launched for the auction (paid and free concession) of public water areas for continental and marine aquaculture (Santos and Acioly, 2015).

The regulations concerning marine aquaculture in public waters were based on the National Program for Mariculture Development released in 2005, which culminated with the launching of local plans for the development of mariculture. These plans presented environmental, social, technical, and economic studies to achieve the goal of establishing aquaculture areas and parks in coastal states across Brazil (Brasil, 2011). In order to encourage investment in the country’s mariculture sector, 98 marine aquaculture parks were demarcated in the states of Maranhão, Pará, Ceará, Rio Grande do Norte, Santa Catarina, Sergipe, and Paraná between 2008 and 2014 (Brazil, 2015).

In clear opposition to the Brazilian government’s policies concerning the development of mariculture, the MMA issued Normative Ruling 3 on April 16, 2008, which suspended all concessions and licenses for new shrimp farming businesses (especially in the federal protected areas and its buffer zones). The ruling contributed to combat environmental crimes primarily in areas of mangrove forests and in associated ecosystems (CMADS, 2005; Prates and Fumi, 2018).

The MMA’s environmental regulations were considered obstacles to develop Brazilian aquaculture and fishing. This intensified the conflict between the SEAP and the MMA. With the aid of members of Congress and leaders from Brazil’s an attempt was made to design a new institutional framework which culminated in the creation of the MPA in 2009. At the same time, Congress approved the National Policy for the Sustainable Development of Aquaculture and Fisheries (also named the new Fishing Law), which gave the MPA, in addition to the promotion functions, new competences of environmental management, and organization of Brazil’s fishing and aquaculture sectors, although some of them were in joint competence of the MPA and MMA (Azevedo, 2012).

The new Fishing Law relied on aquaculture to overcome the need for producing fish on a national scale. To attain this goal, the new law recommended that the Brazilian government centralize its licensing practices, widen its credit, and investigate ways to improve the production chain. In the years 2012–2015 alone, the MPA spent R$1.4 billion in order to expand aquaculture (especially inland one) and modernize Brazil’s fishing sector (Brasil, 2016).

Specifically for mariculture, between 2011 and 2014, the MPA began the bidding process for areas in aquaculture parks that were previously demarcated in public waters (MMA, 2015). Furthermore, the MPA adopted a strategy to promote shrimp farming on two fronts. The first was through the Plano Nacional de Desenvolvimento da Carcinicultura (National Plan for the Development of Shrimp Farming), which was based on an exhaustive diagnosis of activity situation in the Brazilian Northeast. The second was through the Plano de Interiorização da Carcinicultura (Plan to Inland Shrimp Farming), which attempted to expand shrimp farming in Brazil’s semiarid Northeast region as an alternative of continue the activity, due to limitations in the coastal zone by conflicts and obstacles to the issuing of environmental licenses. The goal was to increase the production of exotic shrimp (Litopenaeus vannamei) in low-salinity waters given the fact that this species (which is also the most popular species in Brazil in terms of shrimp farming) renders remarkably positive production results under these conditions (MMA, 2015).

Brazil’s shrimp farming sector reached its peak at the start of the 2000s after the technological definitions and the structuring of the production chain, added to the growth of demand for the product in the foreign market. Thereat, the industry increasing production from 3,600 tons in 1997 to 90,190 tons in 2003, representing a growth of 2,400 percent (MPA, 2013a). The growth of shrimp farming was due to the substantial public/private investments that large private businesses (especially in the Northeast) received along with licenses facilitated by local environmental agencies and, sometimes, had aid from public universities, research institutions, local media, and regional officials (CMADS, 2005; Ramalho, 2015).

Nonetheless, between the years 2004 and 2009, the sector faced commercial problems as a result of the existence of viruses among the shrimp that were being raised. As a result, many shrimp farms were abandoned (Nunes and Feijó, 2017). Thus, the aforementioned plans sponsored by the MPA were geared toward a recovery of Brazil’s shrimp farming sector. The recovery, however, was allegedly contingent on the relaxation of environmental laws, as occurred with the congressional approval of the new Brazilian Forest Code in 2012 (Brasil, 2012).

Faced with pressure to reform existing environmental policies and impose fiscal adjustments during a period of intense political conflict in Brazil, President Dilma Rousseff decided to dissolve the MPA in October 2015, transform it into the Secretaria de Pesca e Aquicultura (Department of Fishing and Aquaculture), and incorporate it into the MAPA.

The End of the MPA and Recent Institutional Trends in Fishing and Aquaculture in Brazil (2015–2019)

Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment disrupted various fishing and aquaculture programs throughout Brazil. The changes took place within the several reforms of agencies responsible in a short period of time, during the government of Michel Temer (the vice president who replaced Rousseff), which lasted from May 2016 until January 2019, when Jair Bolsonaro assumed the presidency.

A little over a year after its creation in October 2015, the Department for Fishing and Aquaculture was transferred from the MAPA to the Ministério da Indústria, Comércio Exterior e Serviços (Ministry of Industry, Foreign Trade, and Services—MDIC) in March 2017, where it remained almost one year. These deficiencies compelled the Michel Temer government to bring back the SEAP in April 2018. However, the new SEAP lasted only nine months and was immediately dissolved by Bolsonaro, who reintegrated the department into the MAPA, which was renamed the Secretaria da Aquicultura e Pesca (Department for Aquaculture and Fishing—SAP) in January 2019.

According to the previous context, little was done by the Brazilian government to improve aquaculture during the period following the dissolution of the MPA. The initiatives were limited to dialogues with state environmental agencies in order to adopt more responsive procedures for environmental licenses, to develop studies and technology for the sector, and to promote inland aquaculture (Silva, 2020).

According to João Crescêncio, “this transfer of institutional powers created a fishing and aquaculture activity [that was] devoid of any regulation and perspectives, that was justified to the sector’s lack of human, structural, and financial resources (interview, Brasília, March 22, 2018). In addition, the Brazilian government’s mariculture policies achieved little progress. Only from 2019 did the SAP release new public bidding notices for mariculture areas (Silva, 2020).

Considering the previous context, it is revealed that the articulations and measures developed by the federal institutions responsible for fisheries and aquaculture (together with related necessary instances of federal and state agencies) enabled the flexibility of legislation to facilitate the commodification and private ownership of country’s coastal and marine spaces. The goal was to attract investors and expand the country’s mariculture industry through two principal mechanisms: the issuing of concession of public water areas for mariculture through public biddings; and the approval of the new Forest Code to stimulate the recovery of the shrimp farming sector in Brazil.

Concession Agreements of Use Rights Regarding Mariculture Areas in Public Waters

The concession of public water areas for aquaculture in Brazil occurs through public biddings. Two different types of public bidding notices were identified. In the first case, these can be ‘paid concession’ through bidding processes, when the areas are intended for private (for profit) enterprises. The interested party that submitted an aquaculture project cannot receive this area directly from the government, and a selection process for the paid concession of the area will open through an auction system. The second case includes bidding for areas in aquaculture parks assigned by the federal government. The areas are also offered on a competitive basis, in paid (auction-based) or free-of-charge systems, when the areas are intended to members of traditional populations or to groups served by social inclusion programs, who are selected in public notices. The contract concerning the rights of use (paid or free concession) is awarded to the winner for a period of 20 years (renewable for the same period).

From 2008 to January 2020, 18 bidding public notices were issued after private individuals’ requests, covering eight coastal states. In total, 73 areas were tendered, but only 44 of them were won by the highest bidder. The majority were for mussel culture (Perna perna), oyster culture (exotic Crassostrea gigas and native C. rhizophorae), algaculture (Gracilaria sp., Kappaphycus alvarezii and Hypneia sp.) and marine fish farming (Centropomus parallelus and Rachycentron canadum). The areas won were acquired at different prices depending on the size and species the area would go on to produce. The lowest amount paid was R$204.00 (around US$113.00) for an area of 0.077 hectares (ha) to breed native oysters in São Paulo. The greatest amount paid was R$72,916.54 (approximately US$40,509.18) and covered an area of 8.44 ha to breed cobia (R. canadum) in São Paulo. U.S dollar rate was $1.80 (average) in 2008 and 2010, when these areas was sold.

Public notices offering areas in aquaculture parks were launched between 2011 and 2014 in the Paraná and Santa Catarina states, aiming to plan and develop the cultivation of bivalve shellfish in southern Brazil. Five free-concession bidding notices were issued, with 871 areas offered in these states, 643 of which were won. Additionally, three notices were published via the paid system, with 59 areas offered, 44 of which were won. The areas that were sold varied in size between 2.18 to 10 ha (equaling a total of 166.47 ha) while the areas that were obtained at no cost varied from 0.25 to 2.11 ha for a total area of 1,322.89 ha. Within the areas that were sold, the minimum bid was R$7,168.00 (close to US$4,266.66) and the maximum bid was R$400,400.00 (approximately US$170,382.97) - U.S dollar average rate was $1.68 and $2.35 in 2011 and 2014, respectively, when these areas was sold. The largest amounts correspond to bids launched by aquaculture companies.

Despite the MPA’s interest and the continuity of some studies for the demarcation of new marine aquaculture parks, no new parks have been created since 2014. According to Francisco Joeliton Bezerra and Carlos Proença, “[the creation of new parks] will probably never happen because of the complex management and operation [involved] and the long time it takes [to obtain] licenses” (interview, Brasília, March 23, 2018). According to João Crescêncio, it is for this reason that “the agency government must promote future mariculture through paid concession areas on the basis of individual projects” (interview, Brasília, March 22, 2018).

The New Forest Code and the Recovery of Brazil’s Shrimp Farming Sector

Federal Law 12.651, popularly known as the new Forest Code, was enacted in 2012. The law established regulations regarding the conservation of native vegetation that included Áreas de Preservação Permanente (Permanent Preservation Areas - APPs), and determines the allowed forms of economic exploitation of forest resources and the control system of its use. The APPs encompass areas that are ecologically important and must be protected to ensure the well-being of human populations (Brasil, 2012).

In comparison with the old Forest Code of 1965, the new code represents a weakeing of Brazilian laws regarding the conservation of native vegetation. Its most notable differences are the following: removal of government protection over certain environmentally vulnerable areas, and allowing for the continuation of certain commercial activities without the recovery of native vegetation (Brancalion et al., 2016).

During the process in which the new Forest Code was being debated and written, the Coletivo Nacional da Pesca e Aquicultura (National Fishing and Aquaculture Association) and the Associação Brasileira de Criadores de Camarão (Brazilian Shrimp Farmers’ Association) pressured the government to remove apicuns (transition zone in the terrestrial part of mangroves - they are sandy areas with scarce vegetation important for the maintenance of biological diversity) from the list of APPs. The measure facilitated the expansion of shrimp farming in these areas (Azevedo, 2012).

After its approval, the Code authorized and regulated shrimp farming businesses in apicun areas. The owners of these businesses were granted exemption from fines for illegal farming in these and other environmentally protected areas (Brasil, 2012). The exemption was also incorporated into states laws which the environmental licenses depend. Indeed, state governments (especially those in the Northeast) actively promoted shrimp farming through diverse legal instruments (Silva, 2020).

After its decline as a result of viruses, shrimp farming in Brazil entered a period of gradual recovery starting in 2012. The use of various forms of management and modern breeding systems facilitated the recovery. The renewal was due not only to technical factors and production techniques but also to new government incentives that consisted primarily of the relaxation of environmental laws. A study carried out by the MMA (Prates and Fumi, 2018), which included a comparative analysis of areas of shrimp farming in Brazil, demonstrated an increase in the size of production areas that went from 30,480.5 hectares in 2013 to 36,985 hectares in 2016. Of the production areas in use today, approximately 6,000 hectares were located within conservation areas. The shrimp breeding farms and nurseries that are still in use cover close to 42,000 hectares across Brazil. An estimated 25 percent of Brazil’s natural vegetation located in mangrove forests were destroyed. At least 38 percent of this destruction occurred as a direct result of shrimp farming (Prates and Fumi, 2018).

Mariculture and Ocean Grabbing in Brazil

The decline in marine fishing stocks forced capitalist development in to find new ways to increase its profit margin as the intensification of fish production (Clausen and Clark, 2005). Mariculture not only represents a quantitative change with regard to the intensification and concentration of production but also places the life cycle of organisms under the complete control of capitalists. For “fishing capitalism” to expand, aquaculture sector had to invest in, commercialize, and develop new ways to control nature (Longo et al., 2019). Political and economic measures were designed to meet this need by guaranteeing private property rights concerning physical spaces on land and in water as well as depriving the public of the use and control of these spaces. These measures are part of a larger process of ocean grabbing (Bennett, Govan, and Satterfield, 2015; Mansfield, 2004).

Krause et al. (2015) argue that nation states worldwide incorporated commercial, environmentally friendly, and technological approaches into their sectoral policies for the purposes of intensifying aquaculture production and reducing its negative effects. However, in recent years, little has been done to enhance social sustainability within this sector. The authors recommend that various socioeconomic aspects be included in these sectoral policies to make aquaculture more politically transparent and socially equitable. This can be achieved if stakeholders greatly increase their participation in the decision-making process.

Unequal power relations exist among interested parts in fishing and aquaculture governance. Therefore, the development of sectoral policies happen in a neutral place, nor is it necessarily fair and equitable. Even though broad social participation is encouraged, mechanisms were created with the goal of reinforcing the power and interests of local and regional elites, considering their capacity to influence policies on their own benefit, as it happened in process to approve the new Brazilian Forest Code (Azevedo, 2012).

The globalized market for fishing products based on a type of “aquabusiness” had considerable opportunity for expansion in Brazil (especially with regard to mariculture). This market is seen as a new frontier for the expansion of capital and is currently expected to extend across more than 9,000 kilometers of Brazil’s coastline. Therefore, within the past 20 years, other than handling the initial investments necessary to jump-start the expansion of mariculture (Silva, 2020), the coordination between federal agencies and the measures they implemented to regulate fishing and aquaculture in Brazil (in conjunction with other relevant federal and state agencies) led to a relaxation of laws that, in turn, allowed for the private appropriation of resources and spaces located within coastal and marine areas (Ramalho, 2015).

The data collected in this study lend themselves to the argument that private interests were privileged in the Brazilian state’s concession of public water areas for aquaculture. This was done under the pretext of democratizing access to national waters for the purposes of breeding fish and solving the country’s fishing crisis through aquaculture. Nevertheless, the concession of public waters and the changes made to the Forest Code have served as ocean grabbing mechanisms that favor businesses that specialize in mariculture (Silva, 2020). Bidding notices to concession public water areas for aquaculture represents a process of water privatization for present and future use. In Santa Catarina, for example, people compete in auctions that are established in a no-cost format for the chance to obtain one of the areas. Shortly after acquiring, they illegally cede them to aquaculture farmers. Another problem concerns the leasing, purchase, and sale of breeding areas even though the transfer of the rights to the use of these waters is illegal (Paulilo, 2002; Silva, 2020).

The difficulty in acquiring necessary documentation (including those needed to participate in auctions in a no-cost format) limits the ability of small farmers and breeders to access marine waters. These barriers privilege aquaculture industries and producers who know the ins and outs of Brazil’s bureaucracy. The red tape not only hinders government incentives meant to develop and stimulate Brazilian mariculture but also hampers the implementation of projects outlined in proposals relating to the Blue Economy (Winder and Heron, 2017), in which mariculture is portrayed as a means to generate jobs and income (especially in traditional fishing communities). In Florianópolis (the capital of the state of Santa Catarina), for example, many aquaculture areas are owned by media networks and large companies with ties to the oyster farming sector, including the Fazenda Marinha Ostravagante and the Fazenda Cavalo Marinho (Silva, 2020). Thus, the government enables the formation or increase of regional inequalities in the development of mariculture, establishing an unequal market competition among aquaculture producers, but also with artisanal fishing (Paulilo, 2002).

Bidding notices to concession of public water areas for aquaculture represents a mechanism legally ordered and politically encouraged by the Brazilian State which allows exclusive access and control of coastal and marine spaces to large industries and private owners. As mariculture grows, complaints with regard to ocean grabbing are becoming more common (Franco et al., 2014; Longo et al., 2019). Over the past decade, traditional fishers’ social movements have led various protests. attempting to block the privatization of national waters at the same time that they filed lawsuits related to conflicts caused by mariculture. These conflicts were especially pronounced in marine fish farming areas in the states of Pernambuco, Bahia, and São Paulo and shellfish farming areas in the states of Paraná and Santa Catarina (Silva, 2020).

On the other hand, shrimp farming in Brazil represents a productive model aligned with Blue Revolution (Longo et al., 2019). The pact of compliance of the Brazilian State with the demands of national and international capital is expressed through the flexibilization of environmental regulations in favor of the accumulation of capital by dispossession (Acselrad, 2019). Zones that were previously seen either as a public good or as environmentally protected areas are being privatized for shrimp farming. These measures are driven by the false promise that they will create jobs, generate income, develop local regions, and improve the living conditions of the surrounding population (Ramalho, 2015).

The shrimp farming industry has stripped a large part of Brazil’s traditional coastal populations (especially those whose livelihoods depend on traditional fishing) of their traditional rights to use mangroves, rivers, and the sea for their own needs (CMADS, 2005; Queiroz et al., 2013). According to Claudio Maretti, “there are cases in the history of shrimp farming in the Northeast whose legal outcomes are due to irregularities regarding environmental licenses” (interview, Brasília, March 22, 2018). Since 2009, 37 fines were registered for environmental violations by individuals and companies accused of illegal activities related to shrimp farming within protected areas in Brazil. Companies (such as Aquaswiss and Água do Mar Maricultura in the state of Bahia and Aquafarm in the state of Piauí) have been sued for farming and breeding in protected areas without an environmental license (ICMBio, 2020).

The Michel Temer government beginning in 2016 and even more so the Bolsonaro rightest government after 2019 relaxed environmental legislation, adopted practices that destroy Brazil’s ecosystems, and expropriated lands from agricultural laborers, traditional communities, and indigenous peoples, who are seen as not fit for commercial competition in the national and international economy (Acselrad, 2019). To achieve their goals, both governments weakened socioenvironmental policies and regulations to give advantages for Brazil’s agro-industrial sector, that also favored the enterprise aquaculture sector. Proof of this were the articulations of Brazilian federal agencies in 2020 to further facilitate the concession of public waters for aquaculture and to weaken socioenvironmental policies and regulations for the conservation of coastal ecosystems.

In December 2020 President Bolsonaro issued a decree that mandated new procedures for the concession of public waters for aquaculture practices (Brasil, 2020) altering the previous legal framework (Decree 4,895 of 2003). It abolished the need to sell (through auctions or other methods) public waters and authorized the SAP to grant them directly to petitioners. It also ensured that no new aquaculture parks would be created and transferred the management of existing ones to the states. Above all, the decree barred the Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais Renováveis (Brazil’s environmental agency—IBAMA) from issuing environmental licenses for aquaculture projects and instead transferred the responsibility to state environmental agencies. This was done with the hope of facilitating the issuing of environmental licenses because state agencies are more susceptible to pressure from local aquaculture organizations (Azevedo, 2012).

With regard to the weakening of legal mechanisms responsible for protecting Brazil’s coastal ecosystems, the Brazilian federal government in 2019 significantly reduced the representation that civil society organizations (as well as those of educational and research institutions) had within the Conselho Nacional do Meio Ambiente (National Council for the Environment—CONAMA). The Council is connected to the MMA and establishes regulations and standards concerning the licensing of activities that could potentially pollute the environment, guiding state environmental agencies and the IBAMA in the issuing of new environmental licenses.

The CONAMA’s membership dropped from 96 members to 23 after 2019. This decline is related to the relaxation of environmental regulations as the result of the agenda pursued by the Bolsonaro government (Copertino et al., 2020). Furthermore, in September 2020, the CONAMA abrogated the internal resolution (303/2002) that listed the standards and protection limits regarding APPs. The measure was justified on grounds that the guidelines overlapped with sections contained in Brazil’s Forest Code. Thus, dunes without vegetation and transition areas with mangroves and beaches became no longer protected. CONAMA’s Resolution 303/2002 established the mangrove swamp as an APP, including the transition areas. Instead of that, the current Forest Code considers mangrove forests as APP, but allows shrimp farming in transitional zones, such as apicuns. Thus, due to the contradictions and ambiguities of these legal instruments, the licensing of shrimp farming has generated conflicts and law-suits. The ABCC, for example, since 2014 repeatedly tried to contest the constitutionality of the CONAMA Resolution as well as others concerning the licensing process for shrimp farming (Copertino et al., 2020).

In December 2020, the Supremo Tribunal Federal (Supreme Federal Court) reinstated Resolution 303/2002 defining the new Forest Code only as a complement to the framework prescribed in it and reaffirmed the CONAMA as responsible to establish standards regarding the protection of APPs. Nevertheless, these measures represented only a small victory given the fact that in Bolsonaro’s government existed a real campaign to dismantle the socioenvironmental framework responsible for regulating and protecting Brazil’s environments and ecosystems.

Conclusion

This article has provided evidence to demonstrate that government intervention led to the domination of Brazil’s mariculture sector by capitalist entrepreneurs. On the one hand, the approval of the new Forest Code stimulated marine shrimp farming in Brazil by authorizing and regulating the industry in certain environmentally protected areas (especially in apicuns). On the other hand, the federal government created a system for concession public water areas for aquaculture within estuaries and marine areas.

These mechanisms sought to establish ways with which to guarantee property rights relating to physical spaces in coastal and marine areas as part of a larger process of accumulation of capital by dispossession and ocean grabbing. In short, the Brazilian government has encouraged the expansion of mariculture through the intensification of sectoral policies based on a neoliberal economic model that has led to social exclusion and privileged a select minority of corporate producers, causing serious impacts to the environment and, consequently, harming the livelihoods of local populations, especially traditional ones.

Footnotes

1.

The term “aquaculture” will be used in this article to refer to marine and inland production. When relevant, the terms “inland aquaculture” and “mariculture” will also be used.

2.

Brazilian law defines the following categories as physical spaces suitable for aquaculture: aquaculture sites, spaces that are reserved in an aquatic environment for individual and collective projects; aquaculture parks, a group of areas reserved for collective production that are organized and demarcated by relevant public agencies; and preferential areas, where social use – for low-income populations and traditional communities – takes priority (Brasil, 2004).

3.

Marine and continental waters in Brazil are property of the federal or states governments (henceforth ‘public waters’). Some physical spaces can be temporarily ceded for particular activities.

Hugo Juliano Hermógenes da Silva and Naína Pierri are enrolled in the Graduate Program in Environment and Development, Federal University of Paraná, Brazil. This article was completed thanks to a doctoral scholarship awarded to Silva by the Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa do Brasil and the Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico. Nick Ortiz is a writer, researcher, linguist and translator with over a decade of experience relating to Latin American history and politics, hemispheric approaches, and new definitions of democracy.

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