Strategic Culture and the Military Modernization of South Korea

Two schools of thought in international relations theory have sought to explain the accelerated pace of arms acquisitions in Asia. The "arms" school posits that weapons purchases are a function of emerging peer competition. Countering this view, the "affluence" argument focuses on economics and status-hierarchy factors as the proximate cause for the buildup. This article tests these schools against the Republic of Korea (ROK) case, and finds both to be wrong. In spite of the economic crisis that hit Korea in 1997, the ROK's inelastic demand for military modernization confirmed that threats and strategy, not excess liquidity, drove arms acquisitions. While this finding undercuts the affluence argument, it does not confirm the predictions of the arms school. Though strategy drives Korea's pursuit of modern weapons systems, predictions of this process creating new rivalries and regional insecurity are premature. The net effect of such arms acquisitions in Asia on stability is a function not just of power and strategy, but also of these variables as refracted through the prism of culture.