Does Social Cohesion Determine Motivation in Combat?

Abstract

Based on a new Army War College study of unit cohesion in the Iraq War, Wong et al. argue that successful unit performance is determined by social cohesion (the strength of interpersonal bonds among members) rather than task cohesion (a sense of shared commitment to the unit’s mission). If correct, these conclusions have important implications for scholarship as well as for numerous U.S. military policies such as the Unit Manning System. However, this article disputes their contentions. Wong et al. ignore a large body of empirical research on military and nonmilitary groups showing that social cohesion has no independent impact on performance. They provide no evidence for the representativeness of the interview quotes they cite as evidence for the reliability or validity of their measures. Their methodology fails to meet social science standards for causal inference (e.g., ruling out causal rival factors)

Keywords

military unit cohesion morale Iraq War

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References

Leonard Wong , Thomas A. Kolditz , Raymond A. Millen , and Terrence M. Potter , Why They Fight: Combat Motivation in the Iraq War (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2003).

Ibid., 23, 25.

and Leora N. Rosen , Paul D. Bliese , Kathleen A. Wright , and Robert K. Gifford , “Gender Composition and Group Cohesion in U.S. Army Units: A Comparison across Five Studies,” Armed Forces & Society 25 (1999): 365-386.

and Elizabeth Kier , “Homosexuals in the U.S. Military: Open Integration and Combat Effectiveness,” International Security 23, no. 2 (1998): 5-39.

and S. J. Zaccaro and M. C. McCoy , “The Effects of Task and Interpersonal Cohesiveness on Performance of a Disjunctive Group Task,” Journal of Applied Social Psychology 18 (1988): 837-851.

MacCoun , “What Is Known,” 291-291.

and Kier , “Homosexuals in the U.S. Military,” 5-39.

B. Mullen and C. Copper , “The Relation between Group Cohesiveness and Performance,” 210-210.

Wong et al. , Why They Fight, 23-23.

10.

Ibid., 9.

11.

At the time of their writing, Wong et al. could not have known that there would be a resurgence of combat in Iraq almost a year after their report was completed. Still, with the benefit of hindsight (in spring 2005), we can raise the possibility that task cohesion is indeed higher among Islamic insurgents in Fallujah than among conventional Iraqi armed forces, posing greater difficulties for coalition forces.

12.

Wong et al. , Why They Fight, 10-10.

13.

Ibid., 17-18.

14.

Ibid., 10.

15.

and Roger Tourangeau , Lance J. Rips , and Kenneth A. Rasinski , The Psychology of Survey Response (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

16.

and Timothy D. Wilson , Strangers to Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).

17.

R. C. Nisbett and T. D. Wilson , “Telling More than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes,” Psychological Review 84 (1977): 231-231.

18.

and S. L. A. Marshall , Men against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War (New York: William Morrow, 1947).

19.

Cited in Richard D. Trefry , “World War II: The Shadows Lengthen,” Parameters 28 (Summer 1998): 129-136. Interestingly, Ambrose goes on to cite the importance of task cohesion: “Civil War soldiers were accustomed to using words like duty, honor, cause, and country. The GIs didn’t like to talk about country or flag and were embarrassed by patriotic bombast....Nevertheless, as much as the Civil War soldiers, the GIs believed in their cause. They knew they were fighting for decency and democracy and they were proud of it and motivated by it. They just didn’t want to talk or write about it.”

20.

Movie Cliches List, http://www.moviecliches.com.

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Cynthia Fuchs , “Buddy Counts,” Viet Nam Generation Journal & Newsletter 3, no. 3 (1991), http://lists.village.virginia.edu/sixties/HTML_docs/Texts/Reviews/Fuchs_Buddy_Counts.html.

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Aaron Belkin , Michael Clark , Gulriz Gokcek , Robert Hinckley , Thomas Knecht , and Eric Patterson , “When Is Strategic Bombing Effective? Domestic Legitimacy and Aerial Denial,” Security Studies 11 (2002): 51-88.

23.

See J. T. Quinlivan , “Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East,” International Security 24 (1999): 131-165.

24.

and Daniel Williams , “U.S.-Kurdish Convoy Hit by Mistaken Airstrike,” Washington Post, April 7, 2003, A17-A17.

25.

Richard K. Betts , Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Consequences (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995).

26.

Charles Moskos, quoted in D. H. Marlowe , Cohesion, Anticipated Breakdown, and Endurance in Battle: Considerations for Severe and High Intensity Combat (Washington, DC: Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, 1979).