This article examines civil-military relations in Indonesia and the Philippines in the after-math of the largely unexpected recent coup in Thailand. The central issue it investigates is whether Indonesia and the Philippines may prove equally susceptible to military intervention. The conclusion is that although the potential for coups in the Philippines can never be discounted, Indonesia looks surprisingly stable by contrast. One key cause of this apparent stability, it is argued, is the military's role in economic activities, which makes it more or less content with the status quo. Although the dynamics of civil-military relations are significantly different in both the Philippines and Thailand, all three cases suggest that there is a need to take the political economy of civil-military relations much more seriously if we wish to understand them fully in the contemporary era.
Seth Mydans, “After Coup, Thailand Left in a Dangerous Limbo,” International Herald Tribune 21 September, 2006.
2.
It should be noted, of course, that the fall of the military-backed Suharto regime in Indonesia came about as a direct consequence of the economic crisis that arguably had its origins elsewhere. See Mark Beeson, “Indonesia, the East Asian Crisis, and the Commodification of the Nation-State,” New Political Economy3, 3 (1998): 357—74.
3.
For a more detailed explanation of this point, see Mark Beeson and Alex Bellamy, Securing Southeast Asia: The Politics of Security Sector Reform (London: Routledge, 2007). Parts of the following discussion draw on this work.
4.
On the nature and challenges of “late” economic development, see Alice H. Amsden, The Rise of “The Rest”: Challenges to the West from Late-Industrializing Economies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
5.
S.E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics ( London: Pall Mall Press, 1962).
6.
State capacity is understood here simply as the ability to formulate and implement policy effectively. Its absence may provide the justification for military intervention. For a general discussion of the role of the state in Southeast Asia, see Mark Beeson, “Sovereignty under Siege: Globalization and the State in Southeast Asia,” Third World Quarterly24, 2 ( 2003): 357—74
7.
For the seminal statement on this topic, see Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968).
8.
For an insightful analysis of this period and process, see Mark T. Berger, “ Decolonisation, Modernisation and Nation-Building: Political Development Theory and the Appeal of Communism in Southeast Asia, 1945-1975,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies34( 2003):421—48.
9.
Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century ( Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).
10.
Edward Luttwak , Turbo-Capitalism: Winners and Losers in the Global Economy (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1998).
11.
Muthiah Alagappa , “Asian Civil-Military Relations: Key Developments, Explanations, and Trajectories,” in Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, ed. M. Alagappa (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 433—97.
12.
Muthiah Alagappa , “Introduction,” in Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, ed. M. Alagappa (Stanford, CA : Stanford University Press, 2001 ) 3.
13.
Ibid., 5.
14.
Adam Przeworski , Michael E. Alvarez, Jose A. Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
15.
Tim Huxley , “Reforming Southeast Asia's Security Sectors ,” in Working Papers Number4 (London: The Conflict, Security & Development Group, 2001).
16.
Jane Channa, “ Security Sector Reform: Issues, Challenges and Prospects” Adelphi Paper 344 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002), 55.
17.
Path dependency refers to the idea that historical circumstances impart a degree of direction or determinism to the course of future events. See James Mahoney, “ Path Dependence and Historical Sociology,” Theory and Society29 (2000): 507—48.
18.
GuillermoO'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1986), 32.
19.
Henk Schulte Nordholt, “A Genealogy of Violence,” in Roots of Violence in Indonesia: Contemporary Violence in Historical Perspective, ed. Freek Colombijn and J. Thomas Lindblad (Lieden, the Netherlands: KITLV Press, 2002), 33—62.
20.
See Harold Crouch , “Indonesia,” in Military-Civilian Relations in Southeast Asia, ed. H. A. Zakaria and C. Harold (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985), 50-77; Robert J. McMahon, The Limits of Empire: The United States and Southeast Asia Since World War II (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).
21.
See Ian MacFarling , The Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces: Military Politics in Indonesia (Canberra: Australian Defense Studies Center, 1996).
22.
R.E. Elson, Suharto: A Political Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 127.
23.
Formerly known as ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia), since 1999 the Indonesian army has been known as the TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia).
24.
MacFarling, The Dual Function.
25.
Elson, Suharto, 151.
26.
A. Rabasa and J. Haseman, The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics and Power (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2002).
27.
Joe Cochrane, “ A Military Mafia,” Newsweek, 26 August 2002.
28.
International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Next Steps in Military Reform (Jakarta, Indonesia: Author, 2001), 13.
29.
Bilveer Singh, “ The Indonesian Military Business Complex: Origins, Course and Future,” Working Paper No 354 (Canberra , Australia: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 2001).
30.
Richard Robison and Vedi R. Hadiz , Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 54.
31.
Marcus Mietzner, “ Politics of Engagement: The Indonesian Armed Forces, Islamic Extremism, and the `War on Terror,'” The Brown Journal ofWorld Affairs9, 1 (2002), 77.
32.
Vedi Hadiz , “Decentralization and Democracy in Indonesia: A Critique of Neo-Institutionalist Perspectives,” Development and Change35, 4 (2004): 697—718.
33.
For the definitive study of such internal rivalries, see Jun Honna, Military Politics and Democratization in Indonesia (London : RoutledgeCurzon, 2003).
34.
One of the key issues behind the recent Thai coup was resentment about Thaksin's apparent attempts to promote cronies to senior positions. On the background to the Thai situation, see James Okey, “Thailand: The Struggle to Redefine Civil-Military Relations,” in Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, ed. M. Alagappa (Stanford, CA : Stanford University Press, 2001 ), 187—208.
35.
The Editors, “Changes in Civil-Military Relations since the Fall of Suharto,” Indonesia80 (2000): 125.
36.
Sukardi Rinakit , The Indonesian Military after the New Order (Copenhagen, Denmark: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Press, 2005), 102—4.
37.
Evelyn Rusli , “Indonesia Court Voids 4 Convictions in 1999 East Timor Strife,” The NewYork Times, 7 August 2004 (online version).
38.
The Economist, “Enter a New Star,” 25 September 2004, 27—29.
39.
For more on the importance of state capacity and its relationship with politics in Indonesia and the rest of the region, see Mark Beeson, Regionalism, Globalization and East Asia: Politics, Security and Economic Development (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2007).
40.
Stephen Kinzer , Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq (New York: Times Books, 2006).
41.
John T. Sidel, Capital, Coercion, and Crime : Bossism in the Philippines ( Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).
42.
On the difference between developmental and predatory states, Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation ( Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).
43.
Paul D. Hutchcroft, Booty Capitalism : The Politics of Banking in the Philippines (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 23.
44.
Alfred W.McCoy, “`Same Banana': Hazing and Honour at the Philippine Military Academy,” The Journal of Asian Studies54, 3 ( 1995): 692.
45.
Richard J. Kessler , “Development and the Military: Role of the Philippine Military in Development,” in Soldiers and Stability in Southeast Asia, ed. J. S. Djiwandono and Y. M. Cheong (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1988), 218.
46.
Eva-Lotta Hedman and John T. Sidel , Philippine Politics and Society in the Twentieth Century (London: Routledge, 2000), 47.
47.
Hilario G. Davide, The Final Report of the Fact-Finding Commission (Makati , Philippines: Bookmark, 1990), 475—76.
48.
The definitive analysis of these changes is Alfred W. McCoy, Closer than Brothers: Manhood at the Philippine Military Academy ( New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999).
49.
Davide, The Final Report, 476—79.
50.
Leszek Buszynski, “ Realism, Institutionalism, and Philippine Security,” Asian Survey42 (2002): 483—501.
51.
Philip Bowring, “ The Dirty War that Deepens Philippine Divisions,” International Herald Tribune, 24 August 2006.
52.
Kit Collier and Malcolm Cook, “ Mindanao the Weakest Link in War on Terror,” The Australian , 8 May 2006.
53.
RenatoCruz de Castro, “Philippine Defence Policy in the 21st Century: Autonomous Defence or Back to the Alliance?” Pacific Affairs78 (2005): 403—22.
54.
Anthony Spaeth , “Under the Gun,” Time International, May 2005.
55.
Remarkably enough, many of these claims were detailed in the coup leader's master's thesis. See Antonio Trillanes, “A Study on Corruption in the Philippine Navy,” 2001, www.pcij.org/HotSeat/trillanes.html
56.
Joel FrancisGuinto, “Military: Case vs Alleged Coup Plotters Faces `Long Process ,'” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 10 April 2006.
57.
Feliciano Commission , The Report of the Fact Finding Commission (Manila: Republic of the Philippines, 2003).
58.
Significantly, the withdrawal of military support for Estrada proved decisive but immediately made Arroyo a compromised figure and dependent on military support. See A. Lin Neumann, “Philippines: Military on the Move ,” AsiaTimes, 28 February 2006.
59.
Johanna Son , “`Cheater' Arroyo Faces People's Wrath ” AsiaTimes, 29 June 2005.
60.
Even respected former President Ramos observed that this marked the “beginnings of authoritarianism.” See Jess Diaz, “FVR: GMA Proclamation `Overkill,' ” Philippine Star, 26 February 2006.
61.
Dona Z. Pazzibuga and Philip C. Tubeza, “`We Hold Nation Together,'” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 15 March 2006: A1.
62.
Dona Pazzibuga, “ Senga: Military Council Will Never Happen,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 12 March 2006.
63.
Thailand's embattled finance minister, Pridiyathorn Devakula, recently resigned following a major loss of investor confidence that resulted from a poorly executed and ill-conceived attempt to introduce capital controls. The credibility of the military government has consequently suffered what may ultimately prove a fatal blow and—as in Indonesia a decade earlier—a military-backed regime may be undermined by external economic forces. See A. Kazmin, “ Thailand's Finance Minister Resigns,” Financial Times 28 February 2007.
64.
S. Crispin , “King's Hand behind Overthrow,” The Australian 21 September 2006.
65.
See Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thaksin: The Business of Politics in Thailand (Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books, 2004), 176—84; Rodney Tasker, “Back to the Future in Thailand,” AsiaTimes, 31 March 2007.
