This article assesses “democratization” under military and quasimilitary regimes in the Gambia following the 1994 coup d'état until 2006. The “transition” program back to “civilian” rule in 1996, the 2001 and 2006 presidential elections, and the aftermath of deepening authoritarianism and economic crisis are also evaluated. The formation of a five—political party coalition, the National Alliance for Democracy and Development, in 2005 raised expectations for a new political dispensation. Its breakup in 2006, however, dashed hope of this occurring. President Jammeh won a third 5-year term amid suffocating external and domestic indebtedness, declining exports, poor economic performance, and endemic corruption. Continued poor leadership and policy choices are likely to exacerbate abject poverty, countercoups, instability, and conflict. McGowan's neo-Marxist/liberal political economy approach has helped rekindle more critical scholarship on the linkage between underdevelopment and conflict in Africa and the Third World as well as provide an antidote to neo-liberal economic policies.
Patrick J. McGowan, “Coups and Conflict in West Africa, 1955—2004, Part II, Empirical Findings,” Armed Forces & Society32 (January 2006): 1; McGowan, “Coups and Conflicts in West Africa, 1955—2004, Part I, Theoretical Perspectives ,” Armed Forces & Society32 (October 2005): 5—23.
2.
Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, ( Norman: University of Oklahoma Press) , 262.
3.
Abdoulaye Saine , “The Coup d'État in the Gambia, 1994: The End of the First Republic,” Armed Forces & Society23 (Fall 1996); John A. Wiseman and Elizabeth Vidler, “The July 1994 Coup d'État in the Gambia: The End of an Era?The Round Table333 (1995): 53—63; Modou Loum, “Bad Governance and Democratic Failure: A Look at Gambia's 1994 Coup,” Civil Wars1 (2002): 145—74.
4.
McGowan, “Coups and Conflict in West Africa,” 250.
5.
See the comprehensive and seminal work by Robin Luckham, “The Military, Militarization and Democratization in Africa: A Survey of Literature and Issues,” African Studies Review37 (September 1994): 13—75.
6.
Claude E. Welch Jr. , “Changing Civil—Military Relations,” in Global Transformations and the Third World, ed. Robert O. Slater, Barry Shultz , and Steven Dorr ( Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), 71.
7.
SeeBoubacar S. N'Diaye ,“The Military in the Politics of West Africa ,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology28 (Winter 2000): 187.
8.
Mathurin C. Houngnikpo, “The Military and Democratization in Africa,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology28 (Winter 2000), 215.
9.
Earl Conteh-Morgan , “The Military and Democratization in West Africa,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology28 (Winter 2000), 341—55.
10.
Sulayman S. Nyang, “Politics in Post-Independence Gambia ,” A Current Bibliography on African Affairs8 (1975): 113—26; Tijan Sallah, “Economic and Politics in the Gambia” Journal of Modern African Studies28 (1990): 621—48; Omar A. Touray, The Gambia and The World: A History of the Foreign Policy of Africa's Smallest State, 1965—1995 (Hamburg: Institute of African Affairs, 2000).
11.
Abdoulaye Saine , “The Military and Foreign Policy,” in Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior , ed. Jeanne A. K. Hey ( Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003 ), 120.
12.
Carlene J. Edie, “Democracy in the Gambia: Past, Present and Prospects,” African Development 25 (2000): 168; Ebrima Sall and Halifa Sallah, “The Military and the Crisis of Governance: The Gambian Case” (paper presented at the eighth general assembly of CODESRIA, Dakar, Senegal, July 1995); Ebenezer Obadare, “ The Military and Democracy in the Gambia,” in Governance and Democratization in West Africa, ed. Dele Olowu, Adebayo Williams, and Kayode Soremekun (Dakar, Senegal: CODESRIA ), 349.
13.
Arnold Hughes , “The Attempted Gambia Coup d'État of 27—30 July, 1981,” in The Gambia: Studies in Society and Politics , ed. Arnold Hughes, Birmingham University African Studies Series, no. 3 (Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham , 1991), 92-106.
14.
Hughes, “ The Attempted Gambia Coup d'État of 27—30 July, 1981,” 95; Sulayman S. Nyang, “After the Rebellion,” Africa Report (1981): 47—51.
15.
“The Collapse of the Senegambian Confederation,” Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics30 (1992): 200—22.
16.
Ousman Manjang , “Marriage of Confusion-2,” West Africa (November 10, 1986): 2358—60.
17.
Wiseman and Vidler, “The July 1994 Coup d'État in the Gambia,” 55.
18.
Obadare, “ The Military and Democracy in the Gambia,” 346.
19.
Saine, “ The Coup d'État in the Gambia, 1994,” 101.
20.
See Jeffrey Herbst, “Economic Incentives, Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa,” Journal of African Economics9 (2000): 286; Baffour Ageyman-Duah, “Military Coups, Regime Change, and Interstate Conflicts in West Africa,” Armed Forces & Society16 (Summer 1990): 547—70.
21.
Peter J. Schraeder, African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation (New York: Thomson & Wadsworth, 2004), 231; Abdoulaye Saine, “The Soldier-Turned-Presidential Candidate: A Comparison of Flawed Democratic Transitions in Ghana and Gambia ,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology28, 2 (Winter 2000), 191—209.
22.
Schraeder, African Politics and Society, 231.
23.
See Abdoulaye Saine, “The 1996/1997 Presidential and National Assembly Elections in the Gambia,” Electoral Studies4 (December 1997): 555. 24. See Ebrima Ceesay, The Military and “Democratisation” in the Gambia: 1994—2003 ( Toronto, ON: Trafford, 2006), 38.
24.
Obadare, “The Military and Democracy in the Gambia,” 351.
25.
Abdoulaye Saine, “ The Military's Managed `Transition' to `Civilian' Rule in the Gambia,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology26 (1998): 157—68.
26.
See Arnold Hughes , “Democratisation under the Military in the Gambia: 1994—2000,” Commonwealth and Comparative Politics38 (November 2000): 35—32.
27.
For a detailed discussion, see Boubacar N'Diaye, Abdoulaye Saine, and Mathurin Houngnikpo, Not Yet Democracy: West Africa's Slow Farewell to Authoritarianism ( Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press), 79—106.
28.
Country Profile, The Gambia and Mauritania: Economist Intelligence Unit Country Profile (London: The Economist, 2001), 11.
29.
The Gambia Human Rights Country Report (Washington, DC : U.S. Department of State, 2002 ), 2.
30.
Ibid., 3.
31.
Ibid., 4.
32.
Abdoulaye Saine, “ Post-coup Politics in the Gambia,” Journal of Democracy13 (October 2002): 169.
33.
Ibid., 170.
34.
While the Media Commission Bill was eventually done away with in 2004, this did not stop the junta from its continued abuse of citizens' rights. Journalists are Jammeh's main targets and they continue to be arrested, tortured, and held incommunicado despite laws that prohibit detention without charges within seventy-two hours. The press corps in the Gambia has seen its numbers dwindle considerably; many opted instead to leave the country. Once outside of the Gambia, many have launched online newspapers, including AllGambian.net, Freedomnewspaper.com, and Thegambiaecho.com, to name a few. These papers continue to be very critical of the regime resulting in the hacking of Freedomnewspaper.com by computer experts in the pay of the regime. Many subscribers residing in the Gambia were rounded up and detained. Those abroad have been blacklisted.
35.
At a conference held in Atlanta of all Gambian political parties in 2003, agreement was reached to commence talks that would lead to the formation of a coalition to contest the 2006 presidential election as a single force. Save the Gambia Democracy Project (STGDP) organized the meeting to coincide with the Fourth of July weekend marking the U.S. day of independence. It was clear, however, that personal ambitions and desires to become the presidential candidate would in the end lead to major future problems.
36.
The reaction over Darboe's resignation from the National Alliance for Democracy was extremely critical, and it was voter anger of approximately 280,000 potential supporters who did not vote that helped President Jammeh's reelection bid. Others also voted for Jammeh, as the opposition gave them no choice.
37.
Many observers doubt that a coup attempt had taken place in Banjul, and speculations focused on a possible power struggle within President Jammeh's ruling party ahead of general elections. Jammeh had turned more and more despotic, thus alienating many of his ruling Alliance for Patriotic Re-orientation and Construction Party followers. During the past few years, President Jammeh has acted increasingly paranoid to opponent views, resulting in mass arrests of Gambian opposition members and strong attacks on the press, including the murder of the editor of The Point. Until now, the army has been seen as faithful to the dictator, but there are signs of fatigue among military leaders as President Jammeh's regime turns more paranoid. See “Coup Claims in Gambia Lead to Wave of Arrests” Afrol News, March 22, 2006 (www.afrol.com/articles/18521 ).
38.
For a detailed discussion of the 2006 presidential elections, see Abdoulaye Saine , “The 2006 Presidential and National Assembly Elections in the Gambia, Continuity or Change,” African Studies Review (forthcoming).
39.
See Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, “Popular Protest and Political Reform in Africa,” Comparative Politics24, 4 (July 1992), 419—42.
40.
Samuel Decalo , “The Process, Prospects, and Constraints of Democratization in Africa,” African Studies Review91 (1992), 7—35.
41.
Rene Lemarchand , “African Transitions to Democracy: An Interim (and Mostly Pessimistic) Assessment,” Africa Insight22 (1992), 178—85.
42.
Julius O. Ihonvbere , “On the Threshold of Another False Start: A Critical Evaluation of Pro-democracy Movements in Africa,” Journal of Asian and African Studies31, 1/2 (1996 ), 125—42; Julius Nyang'Oro, “ Critical Notes on Political Liberalization in Africa,” Journal of Asian and African Studies31, 1/2 (1996), 44—50.
43.
Name of author withheld for safety/security reasons.
44.
Richard Joseph, “ The Reconfiguration of Power in the Twentieth-century Africa,” in State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa, ed. Richard Joseph (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999), 61.
45.
Robert Fatton Jr., The Making of a Liberal Democracy: Senegal's Passive Revolution, 1975—1885 ( Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1987 ).
46.
Robert Fatton Jr., Predatory Rule in Africa: State and Civil Society in Africa ( Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992 ).
47.
Today, the Gambia is more vulnerable to collapse given the events of March 2006 and increased junta paranoia. Deterioration in personal safety and growing opposition to Jammeh's rule would make the Gambia more vulnerable to collapse. For the 2005 “Failed State Index,” see www.fundforpeace.org.
48.
Bakary Dabo, “ Living in Crisis,” West Africa (February 13—19, 1995), 217—18.
49.
A good and readable summary of The IMF Report, 2004 is provided by Ousman Kargbo, “ Report on The Gambia's Economy,” The Point (September 2005), at www.thepoint.gm.
50.
For a detailed discussion, see Abdoulaye Saine, “The Gambia's Changing Political and Economic Landscape: A Regime Performance Evaluation, 1994—2002,” Africa Insight33, 3 (September 2003), 57—64.
51.
Peter Schraeder , African Politics and Society, 214.
See Robert Jackman, “Politicians in Uniform: Military Governments and Social Change in the Third World,” American Political Science Review70 (December 1976), 1078—97.
54.
Robin Luckham , “Taming the Monster, Democratization and Demilitarization,” in The Military and Militarism in Africa, eds. Eboe Hutchful and Abdoulaye Bathily (Dakar, Senegal: CODESRIA, 1998), 589—98; Robin Luckham, “ Armaments, Underdevelopment and Militarization in Africa,” Alternatives: A Journal of World Politics6 (1980), 179—245; Eboe Hutchful, “Militarism and Problems of Democratic Transition,” in Democracy in Africa: The Hard Road Ahead , ed. Marina Ottaway ( Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997 ), 43—64. See his incisive analyses from a Marxist perspective , “ Marx and Radical Militarism in the Developing Nations ,” Armed Forces & Society4 (Winter 1978), 254—55; Ruth First, The Barrel of the Gun ( Middlesex, UK: Penguin African Library, 1972).
55.
Peter D. Feaver, “The Civil—Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control,” Armed Forces & Society23 (Winter 1996), 149—78; James Burk, “Theories of Democratic—Military Relations,” Armed Forces & Society29 (Fall 2002), 24.
56.
“Hard Truths, The Doha Trade Round Is Still Alive, but Hardly Healthy,” The Economist (December 24, 2005), 97—98.
57.
Kate Eshelby, “ Cotton, the Huge Moral Issue,” New African (January 2006), 26—28.
58.
Joseph E. Stiglitz, MakingGlobalization Work ( New York: Norton & Company, 2006), 27.
59.
Walden Bello and Shalmali, “ Crisis of Credibility, The Declining Power of the International Monetary Fund ,” Multinational Monitor (July/August 2005), 19—22.
60.
Jeff Faux, “ Without Consent: Global Capital Mobility and Democracy,” Dissent (Winter 2004), 43—50.
61.
Jean-Francois Bayart, The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly (New York: Longman, 1993).
