Former cold war nations are grappling with how to transform their militaries in light of new strategic challenges. The implementation of these initiatives often requires a great deal of civil—military interaction. In developing transformational concepts, many of these countries rely on a functional view of capabilities. This article proposes an alternative capabilities model based on the interaction of effects, time, and space and asserts that this model has certain advantages vis-à-vis military transformation. To make its case, this article examines the effectiveness of both capability models in developing transformational concepts. It then uses the case study method to demonstrate the alternative model’s practical utility. The results of this analysis indicate that the alternative capabilities model has certain advantages in developing transformational initiatives, integrating these initiatives with defense processes, and communicating these proposals to civilian leaders. The new model is not meant to replace but to complement the functional one.
The following research describes changes in the post-cold war strategic environment: Norman D. Levin, ed., Prisms and Policy: U.S. Security Strategy after the Cold War (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994); and Ryan C. Hendrickson, "NATO’s Secretary General and the Use of Force: Willy Claes and the Air Strikes in Bosnia," Armed Forces & Society 31, 1 (Fall 2004): 95-96. Other post-cold war challenges such as an altered defense industrial base and increased globalization are described in Aaron Major, "Which Revolution in Military Affairs? Political Discourse and the Defense Industrial Base," Armed Forces & Society 35, 2 (January 2009): 337-57; Barry D. Watts, The U.S. Defense Industrial Base: Past, Present and Future (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2008), 26-32, found online at http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20081015 ._The_US_Defense_In.pdf; and Bradford Booth, Meyer Kestnbaum, and David R. Segal, "Are Post-Cold War Militaries Postmodern?" Armed Forces & Society 27, 3 (Spring 2001): 324-27.
2.
The manner that transformational principles are adopted may vary from country to country. Some countries enshrine new imperatives in doctrine, while others prefer a more unofficial approach. These different approaches are described in John A. Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 6-7, 126-27, 194-205.
3.
One enduring framework is the Principles of War. Codified in the nineteenth century, these precepts have remained relatively popular, although their form may marginally vary from country to country. U.S. Principles of War are found in Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0: Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), A1-A3.
4.
These societal characteristics (described as "national role conceptions") were first formulated in Kal Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy," International Studies Quarterly 14, 3 (November 1970): 233-309. Others have updated and expanded Holsti’s seminal work. These include Ulrich Krotz, "National Role Conceptions and Foreign Policies: France and Germany Compared" (Working Paper 02.1, Program for the Study of Germany and Europe, Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 2002); and Pascal Vennesson, Fabian Breuer, Chiara de Franco, and Ursula C. Schroeder, "Is There a European Way of War? Role Conceptions, Organizational Frames and the Utility of Force," Armed Forces & Society 35, 4 (July 2009): 628-45.
5.
Samuel Huntington describes this interaction of the social imperative and functional imperative as the classic dilemma of civil-military relations. Found in Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 2.
6.
For example, at the end of the cold war, it was fairly obvious to European civilian and military leaders that their military forces could downsize given the dramatically reduced likelihood of a conventional war in central Europe. These force reductions had the readily apparent benefit of freeing up resources (i.e., a "peace dividend") for other purposes. Found in Jolyon Howorth, "The Transformation of European Military Capability," in Service to Country: Personnel Policy and the Transformation of Western Militaries, ed. Curtis Gilroy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), 37-40.
7.
The U.S. Army’s future combat systems (FCS) program is an example of a complex transformation initiative that required considerable civil-military interaction. This program has been scrutinized by the U.S. Congress for nearly a decade, generating several studies. Discussion of the FCS is found in Andrew Feickert, "The Army’s Future Combat System (FCS): Background and Issues for Congress," Report RL32888 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 29, 2009).
8.
Discussion of subjective and objective control of the military and military professionalism is found in Huntington, Soldier and the State, 82-89.
9.
Peter D. Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control,"Armed Forces & Society23, 2 (Winter 1996): 166.
10.
Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait ( Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1971).
11.
Peter D. Feaver, "Crisis as Shirking: An Agency Theory Explanation of the Sourcing of American Civil-Military Relations,"Armed Forces & Society24, 3 (Spring 1998): 408.
12.
In this multibranched game, civilians must determine the degree of monitoring of the military. This monitoring is not free but comes at a cost. The military agent then decides whether to comply with civilian directives (work or shirk). If the monitoring regime catches the military shirking, then the civilian authorities must decide if the infraction should be punished. Adding friction to this game are uncertainty and external monitoring mechanisms (e.g., the press). Found in Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight and Civil- Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003) and Feaver, "Crisis as Shirking," 407-16.
13.
Douglas L. Bland, "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations ," Armed Forces & Society26, 1 (Fall 1999 ): 7-23, p. 13.
14.
Huntington, Soldier and the State, 57.
15.
Dale Herspring draws on his own experience as both a military officer and a civilian official. His blunt conclusion is that the civilian and military spheres fundamentally "misunderstand each other." Found in Dale R. Herspring, The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), xi.
16.
Kobi Michael points out that various civil-military theories recognize that the military has influence over civilian policy making; however, this is often presented as a "black box." Michael uses a discourse model to better understand this interaction. One input to this model that enhances civil-military communication is "similarity of interpretive conceptual systems." Found in Kobi Michael, "The Dilemma behind the Classical Dilemma of Civil- Military Relations: The ‘Discourse Space’ Model and the Israeli Case during the Oslo Process," Armed Forces & Society 33, 4 (July 2007): 521-30.
17.
For example, regulations governing capabilities processes for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization can be found in North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Research and Technology Organisation (RTO), "RTO Technical Report 69: Handbook on Long Term Defence Planning," RTO Studies, Analysis and Simulation Panel (SAS), 2003, http:ftp.rta.nato.int/ public//PubFullText/RTO/TR/RTO-TR-069///TR-069-$$TOC.pdf. Regulations governing capabilities processes for the Technical Cooperation Program (a forum for collaboration among Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States) can be found in the Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP), "Guide to Capabilities Based Planning," TTCP Joint Systems Analysis Group (Technical Panel 3), http://www.dtic.mil/ttcp/ JSA-TP-3-CBP-Paper-Final.doc.
18.
At the second tier level, U.S. capability categories are similar to the British macro categories but also include capability areas such as "logistic services," "installations support," and "net management." The third tier (where most capabilities reside) contains more specific categories, ranging from "kinetic engagement" and "sustain the force" to "cyber management" and "persuade partner audiences." The current U.S. Department of Defense capabilities lexicon can be found on the J7 Joint Experimentation, Transformation, and Concepts Division Web site at http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/strategic/jca_lexicon.doc.
19.
The structure and description of the Canadian capabilities model can be found on the National Defence and the Canadian Forces, Directorate Military Capability Management Web site at http://www.cfd-cdf.forces.gc.ca/sites/page-eng.asp?page=6204.
20.
European Defence Agency capabilities are found in Julian Lindley-French and Franco Algieri, A European Defence Strategy (Gütersloh, Germany: Bertelsmann Foundation, 2004), 69-72.
21.
The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report endorses the acceleration of transformation by "develop[ing] portfolios of joint capabilities rather than individual stove-piped programs." Perhaps even more telling, the 2006 QDR report describes these portfolios in terms of the U.S. capabilities taxonomy. (It should be noted that the U.S. capabilities lexicon has been modified since the writing of the 2006 QDR report.) Department of Defense, "Quadrennial Defense Review Report" (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, February 6, 2006), 4.
22.
In 2005, the Chief of the Defence Staff of the Canadian armed forces mandated the use of capability-based planning to drive force structure changes within the Canadian Department of National Defence. This process is expected to result in a list of programs that will meet the demands of the security environment over a twenty-year period.
23.
Discussion of the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) is found in Council of the European Union, "Declaration of European Military Capabilities" (paper, Council of the European Union Military Capability Commitment conference, Brussels, November 2004), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/MILITARY%20CAPABILITY%20COMMITMENT%20CONFERENCE%2022.11.04.pdf .
24.
The progress of forming these rapid response battle groups is monitored every six months using the ECAP framework. Found in Council of the European Union, "Press Release: Capability Improvement Chart I/2006," http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/ docs/pressData/en/esdp/89603.pdf.
25.
Lindley-French and Algieri, European Defence Strategy, 69-72.
26.
These are third-tier capabilities in the U.S. taxonomy.
27.
In this context, a force can refer to a single system or a group of systems.
28.
Carl von Clausewitz, On War , ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, 1976 ), 75.
29.
Interactions between friendly forces and hostile forces often result in effects on both sides. For example, a friendly ground unit may destroy an enemy system, but at the cost of heavy casualties (and a corresponding decrease in combat capability). The existence (or lack of) force protection effects is one way to model the impact of these two-way effects.
30.
This assumes that the individual effect maintains the same rate of speed for each trial.
31.
It should be noted that many systems generate more than one type of effect. For example, a single system could generate some effects that are directed at hostile targets and other effects directed at friendly targets.
32.
With regard to penetrating the mind of one’s opponent, a paper by Kevin Cunningham and Robert R. Tomes discusses the differences in time-space paradigms between different cultures and how this may affect the effectiveness of Western concepts of diplomacy, military operations, and grand strategy. Found in Kevin Cunningham and Robert R. Tomes, "Space-Time Orientations and Contemporary Political-Military Thought," Armed Forces & Society 31, 1 (Fall 2004): 119-40.
33.
Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, former director of the Office of Force Transformation in the U.S. Defense Department, recognized that rigorous algorithms may not be useful as predictors of transformation. He suggests that using data from the past may bias one in evaluating new programs because these data are generated by old programs. He makes the case for "data free research," which utilizes standard reasoning tools such as logic, hypotheses, and disciplines such as "physics, economics, sociology, politics and psychology." Found in Arthur K. Cebrowski, "Seven Secrets of Transformation," On the Horizon: Institutional Change 13, 1 (2005): 33.
34.
Discussion of steppe cavalry and the tumen is found in Eric Hildinger, Warriors of the Steppe: A Military History of Central Asia, 500 B.C. to 1700 A.D. (New York: Sarpedon, 1997), 118-21.
35.
Discussion of Mongol sociopolitical reforms is found in Jack Weatherford, Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World (New York: Crown, 2004), 14-30, 67-77.
36.
Mongol reconnaissance techniques are found in Sean J. A. Edwards, Swarming on the Battlefield: Past, Present and Future ( Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), 30.
37.
One favored tactic, called the "crow swarm," entailed groups of Mongol horsemen suddenly attacking from all directions at once and then (just as suddenly) disappearing. Another tactic was to surround an enemy force, leaving (what appeared to be) a narrow avenue of escape. As the unsuspecting opponent streamed though this opening, the Mongols would turn and destroy a more disorganized and vulnerable adversary. Discussion of Mongol tactics is found in Weatherford, Genghis Khan, 89-94.
38.
Discussion of Mongol siege capabilities is found in Hildinger, Warriors of the Steppe, 126-29; and Weatherford, Genghis Khan, 94-95.
39.
Vo Nguyen Giap studied Mao’s concepts of guerrilla warfare in the 1930s and incorporated many of his principles. Found in Kevin Ruane, War and Revolution in Vietnam, 1930-75 (London: UCL Press, 1998), 10, 19-20. Influence of Mao theories of guerrilla warfare in Latin America is found in Thomas C. Wright, Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001), 61-94.
40.
Mao Tse-tung , On Guerrilla Warfare, ed. and trans. Samuel B. Griffith II (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 74.
41.
A sample of these regulations includes "be neither selfish nor unjust," "be courteous," and "replace what you break." Found in Mao, Guerrilla Warfare, 92.
42.
These people-derived capabilities were so vital that Mao established a three-phased protocol to sustain this union until the capabilities of the guerrilla force had sufficiently matured. Found in Mao, Guerrilla Warfare, 20-22.
43.
Mao recognized this improved agility when he wrote of the importance of "quick intelligence that constantly watches the ever-changing situation and is able to seize on the right moment for decisive action." Found in Mao, Guerrilla Warfare, 104.
44.
The case for an effective second strike capability as a foundational element of nuclear deterrence is found in Carl H. Builder, "The Case for First-Strike Counterforce Capabilities" (paper, 41st symposium of the Military Operations Research Society, Fort McNair, VA, July 1978).
45.
Discussion of the nuclear triad’s role in deterrence is found in Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Deterrence in the MIRV Era," World Politics 24, 2 (January 1972): 221-42; and J. P. Ruina, "The Triad in U.S. Strategic Policy," in The Future of the Sea-Based Deterrent, ed. Kosta Tsipis, Ann H. Cahn, and Bernard T. Feld (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1973), 13-32.
46.
Discussion of deterring nonstate actors found in Austin Long, Deterrence from Cold War to Long War: Lessons from Six Decades of RAND Research (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), 80-84.
47.
For example, on the land, brilliant mines deployed by unmanned transporters could canalize enemy vehicles into open terrain for destruction by weaponized unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). On the sea, robotic naval mines seeded in critical areas could slow or even prevent enemy access. In the atmosphere, missiles from unmanned ground vehicles and UAVs could neutralize an adversary’s air force.
48.
Long-distance control of unmanned systems has already occurred in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Predator UAVs operating in Iraq were controlled by personnel located in the United States at Nellis Air Force Base. Found in Office of the Secretary of Defense, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, August 4, 2005), C3-C4.
49.
For illustration purposes, a speed of Mach 10 enables transit from New York City to Paris in less than 30 minutes.
50.
It should be noted that effects-time-space metrics would differ from key performance parameters (KPPs) that currently exist in U.S. acquisition processes. KPPs capture the essential attributes of a particular system, whereas the subatomic metrics can be applied to groups of systems.
