Abstract
The article explores the reform of the Czech military from the perspective of the possible blurring of police and military functions. The understanding of security has changed in recent years and the European militaries have taken up nontraditional tasks both within and outside Europe. Moreover, the fiscal conditions have provoked further reconsideration of the role of military. The Czech Republic’s armed forces have undergone a number of reforms since 1989. The article focuses on three factors distinguishing the military from the police: territorial scope, use of force, and responsibility before the law. It concludes that although the Czech military has become more flexible, it does not use all its potential in practice, especially domestically. The article suggests that despite the adaptation to the new security environment, the military continues to be distinct from police.
Keywords
The end of the Cold War represented a major shift in thinking about security in Europe. The disappearance of the superpower bipolarity attracted scholars’ and politicians’ attention to other forms of threats besides conventional or nuclear war. This opened the way for theoretical approaches seeking an alternative to the traditional rationalist and state-centric streams that were built on the predominance of the interstate conflict between the east and west. Most notably, constructivism-inspired securitization introduced a fluid understanding of security dependent on current discourse and thus brought a number of other sectors, such as environmental security and economic security, into focus. 1 Concurrently, the traditional view of the state as a territorial container was put into question due to the pressures of globalization, European integration, and the decoupling of many state functions from a single territorial framework. 2
As a result, scholars started reassessing the role of the state in providing security and the ways in which security institutions can be utilized. They began to question the validity of dividing security into internal and external, and started to talk instead about an internal–external security nexus. 3 Using a large variety of concepts, the scholars tried to grasp the distinction between internal and external security threats and between internal and external security forces. To name a few, today’s debate uses concepts such as “new wars,” 4 “humanitarian intervention,” 5 “globalization of insecurity,” 6 and “common-risk society.” 7
Account has been taken of the fact that the military forces have engaged in peacemaking, a more proactive form of peacekeeping aimed at the protection of civilians. 8 Moreover, the intervening forces have contributed to the transformation of weak states’ institutions, which requires more cooperation with other actors, including police forces and nongovernmental organizations. 9 The concept of victory has changed, because instead of fighting against the will of the people, the militaries fight for the support of the people. 10 Domestically, military forces have contributed ever more extensively to border control, 11 antidrug policies, 12 and protection of critical infrastructure. 13 Military units with special character and training have received more attention, in particular constabulary forces that operate in the twilight zone between the military and the police. 14 There is, however, a lack of agreement among scholars as to the extent of changes in the military and the police forces today. A number of authors believe that the border between the two is fading away, both within and outside the state. Others, however, express their doubts about whether such a transformation is really taking place. Even those who admit a change challenge its novelty or question its desirability. 15
This article aims at analyzing the impact of the blurring of the internal and external security environment 16 on the military forces in the case of the Czech Republic. It asks whether the Czech military is losing the attributes that traditionally distinguished it from the police. The article contributes to the broader debate on the transformation of security forces today, which is, in fact, a continuation of a much longer discussion started by Morris Janowitz 17 and also led by this journal. 18 The Czech case can be understood as a “revelatory case.” 19 It offers a specific approach to the problem, proposing an original set of factors and applying them to the single case of the Czech Republic in a way that has not been done so far. To a certain extent, it can be perceived as a critical case as well. 20 The Czech Republic is a middle-sized European country, a member of all significant European security organizations and regimes, which has actively contributed to most European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military and police operations. As demonstrated below, the Czech military forces have undergone extensive reforms in the past two decades as a reaction to the changing security environment, international cooperation, and budgetary pressure. The Czech Republic can thus be understood as the most probable (or at least a very probable) case for the purposes of this debate: should there be limitations on the blurring of the police and military forces in the Czech Republic, similar or even stronger limitations can be expected in other cases as well. 21
In this article, the reform of the Czech military is analyzed on the basis of three factors—territorial scope, use of force, and legal responsibility—understood as the key distinctions between the police and the military. The military will become more like the police, if the difference between the two forces is fading away in these three areas. There has been no unambiguous definition of the military and many of the definitions used do not allow for a clear distinction between the soldier and the policeman because they focus on the legitimate and organized use of violence, which is common for both forces. 22 Such additional factors are, therefore, necessary in order to capture change.
First, the territorial distinction between the police and the military is closely connected with the modern state. The police were developed as the internal security force in modern centralized states that had managed to monopolize legitimate violence within their borders. 23 By contrast, the military remained a tool for protecting the society against external threats, for use beyond state borders and against outsiders. Due to legitimacy concerns, the military’s domestic role was restricted to exceptional circumstances. Its extensive use within the state’s territory was deemed too expensive, it diminished the pool of forces available for state defense, and the use of extensive violence against one’s own population threatened to delegitimize the state’s power. 24 With the consolidation of state authority, at the latest during the nineteenth century, two distinctive security environments arose with two distinctive security forces—the police and the military.
Second, what directly followed was that the military and the police differed in the methods they used. The police were supposed to keep order and support the population at the same time. They used softer methods of coercion—more skillfully attuned approaches with minimum necessary force, preferably nonlethal. 25 The military, on the other hand, built on a different logic. As suggested by Clausewitz, there is no logical limitation to the use of force in war. Wars tend to extremes and, logically, the military needs to use the maximum force available in order to break the adversary’s forces and will as quickly as possible with minimum casualties and costs to its own forces. 26 Consequently, the military and the police used different equipment and tactics and underwent distinctive training. The difference is particularly visible in police and military equipment. Whereas British police patrols acquired firearms only in the late twentieth century, defense research has set the pace of extremely costly technological development in areas such as nuclear power, missiles, or even space research. 27
Third, the military and the police were regulated in different ways. In order to increase legitimacy, states regulated police work very strictly, specifying the situations and ways in which force could be applied. 28 The individual police officers were fully accountable for their actions because they were also requested to act independently if they witnessed a breach of law. The military, on the other hand, used force against outsiders and the state did not need to regulate it so strictly in order to keep support from the domestic population. As a result, the military was guided very loosely legally; regulation was restricted mainly to delimiting the military and civilian population in the conflict and to imposing bans on certain types of weaponry or inhuman treatment. Individual soldiers bore a limited legal responsibility for their actions due to the system of subordination, in which action is taken on direct order rather than on individual initiative. 29
In short, this article investigates to what extent the Czech military is becoming an internal force, adapted to a more attuned use of force with corresponding equipment and training, and more strictly regulated by law. In order to do this, the rest of this article is organized as follows. First, the development of the Czech military after 1989 is briefly presented and the turning points of its evolution are pointed out. Second, the three factors distinguishing the military and the police are analyzed against the background of the Czech military’s evolution. Third, conclusions are offered on the changing role of the Czech military and the possibilities of generalization.
Development of the Czech Military after 1989
The Czech armed forces had to face a number of challenges during the years following the Velvet Revolution. Some of these challenges came from within the country, such as the establishment of civilian control over the military, the need to dispose of high-ranking Communist officers, and the breakup of Czechoslovakia. Others came from outside, first and foremost the integration into NATO and later the EU, and the participation in missions abroad as part of UN forces or with new allies. The military forces did not attract much attention of the ruling politicians in the first years due to the preoccupation with economic and administrative reforms. Even if security and defense discourse reappeared in the following years, Czech political elites have never been particularly strong in consensual and long-term defense policy planning.
In general, four key phases or topics can be identified in the development of the Czech military. During the first phase, the defense sector had to tackle the Communist heritage. Besides dismissing the Communist generals and disposing of the Communist Party structures within the military, the key challenge was to establish a working relationship with the civilian authorities and with the general public. 30 The military suffered from very low support and trust among the population. 31 Its reputation was damaged by the lack of action during the 1968 occupation as well as by the personal experience of male citizens acquired during their two-year obligatory military service. First, civilian control of the military was established, drawing on the Western standards of civil–military relations. 32 Later, public trust was restored, especially after effective military assistance during the 1997 floods in the Eastern parts of the Czech Republic and the successful integration into NATO.
During the second phase, which started in the early 1990s and culminated in the second half of the decade, the military was transformed profoundly in order to meet the requirements of NATO membership. Moreover, it participated extensively in international operations abroad, supporting the political argument for accession into the Alliance. Through its presence in international military operations and the Partnership for Peace, the Czech Republic could prove its commitment to the common cause and its allegiance to the West. The Czech (and Czechoslovak) army participated in operation Desert Storm in 1990–1991 and later in all operations in former Yugoslavia, such as United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), Implementation Force (IFOR), or Kosovo Force (KFOR). 33 These efforts were concluded in March 1999 when the Czech Republic became a NATO member, but the transformation of the military and the participation in foreign operations continued.
Sized, equipped, and trained for a full-scale land conflict between the east and the west, the military was much larger than necessary after 1989. Moreover, it relied on conscription. The conscripts were not useful in foreign operations and they cost a lot of money that was needed elsewhere. During the third phase of development, therefore, the Czech military moved toward an all-volunteer service. The reform was already being debated throughout the 1990s. During this period, the length of obligatory service was shortened several times. It was successfully concluded in 2004 when the last cohort of conscripts left the service. 34 The abolishment of the obligatory military service turned out to be a double-edged sword. On one hand, the military got rid of hordes of conscripts that could not be sent to overseas operations. Moreover, the conscripts engaged a lot of manpower since the professional soldiers responsible for them could not be sent overseas either. On the other hand, without the conscripts the military was lacking footmen for guarding military infrastructure. Moreover, the obligatory service had provided a pool of potential volunteers and after the reform the military became just one employer among many others. It had to compete for personnel with the private sector, which turned out to be rather difficult, especially with the shrinking demographic base. 35
The last phase of the development of the Czech defense sector started after 2004. The Czech military is an all-volunteer force, integrated into NATO and the EU, but it has suffered from a lack of long-term planning and a lack of resources. 36 There were a number of reform proposals and planning documents adopted since 2004, but all of them were substituted by newer proposals within months or years. The lack of conceptual planning for Czech security followed a conceptual vacuum of Czech foreign policy: the first foreign policy and security concepts after EU accession were adopted only in 2011. The lack of political will and a missing governmental mandate had prevented the ministry officials from drafting new documents earlier.
The troubled financial situation of the Czech security sector is not a result of the latest financial and economic crisis. The defense budget has been steadily declining since 2000 37 and Czech defense procurement has been well known for its inefficiency and corruption. 38 The Czech Republic has already been criticized by the European Commission for not observing the European rules on procurement and only high-level political lobbying in combination with pledges for reform prevented a legal action for breaching EU law. 39 The latest development offers reasons for some optimism because the White Paper on Defence, also adopted in 2011, has identified the main causes of the current unsatisfactory situation and called for a reform of the procurement system. The budgetary problem, however, seems to remain acute. The defense budget can be expected to decrease further within the context of overall cuts in public budgets.
The Czech Military’s Adaptation to the New Security Environment
Against the background of the four phases of its post–Cold War development, the Czech military also had to adapt to the changing security environment that has led to confusion between internal and external threats. The following part will analyze to what extent the Czech military has changed with respect to the three main factors identified above, and to what extent its distinct military character has been blurring into a comprehensive internal/external security force. In the first years after 1989 and the breakup of Czechoslovakia, the evolution of the Czech military was driven primarily by the democratization and reduction efforts with limited impact of new security concerns. Thus, most of the attention is paid to the period after 1995 when the Czech military had to adapt to the new security environment in the framework of NATO and EU accession. Also, particular attention is given to the period after 2001 when the so-called new security threats became prominent. 40
Territorial Scope of the Czech Military’s Activity
The obligations of the Czech armed forces are not based on the territory of the military’s activity but on the territory of the origin of the threat. The Armed Forces Act identifies the main task of the armed forces as “preparing for the defence of the Czech Republic and defending it from an external attack” as well as participating in the mutual defense commitments of the Czech Republic. 41 Also “defense” is understood in similar terms as “measures to ensure sovereignty, territorial integrity, principles of democracy and rule of law, protection of the lives and possessions of citizens from an external attack.” 42 The law does not rule out activity on the Czech territory and as such, it provides for a potential overlap between the scope of police and military action. The difference is determined by the intensity of the threat. Whereas the military provides for defense from an attack, the police ensure security and public order. This implies that the police maintain security first and only when the public disorder exceeds a certain (unspecified) level of violence the military is summoned. This distinction is reflected in the institutional arrangements for the various states of emergency. 43 The Central Emergency Committee of the Czech Republic is managed by the minister of the interior in all situations, except for a “state of war” or a “state of peril in the country in connection with an external attack” when the minister of defense is in charge. 44 As a result, the responsibilities of the police and the military are delimited relatively well.
There are, however, several other occasions when the military may fulfill tasks on the territory of the Czech Republic. The military may be used for protection of critical infrastructure, rescue operations in case of floods or other disasters, emergency medical transportation, humanitarian tasks of civil protection, and for fulfilling the tasks of the Police of the Czech Republic for a limited period of time if the police capabilities are insufficient. 45 It should be mentioned that the catalog has been enlarged since the adoption of the act; rescue operations and civil protection were not included in the original version of 1999. The last option, the assistance to police forces is of the most importance here. The law clearly allows for the military to take up police tasks. The question remains, though, to what extent the military is ready to initiate this and to what extent this has actually been done.
According to strategic documents, the military is indeed ready to fulfill tasks in the Czech territory. The 2008 long-term vision of defense sector development includes support to police and the Integrated Rescue System. 46 The objective is to achieve universal capability that would allow for an “efficient usage along with fulfillment of an ever wider spectrum of tasks in eliminating military and nonmilitary threats within and outside the territory of the Czech Republic.” 47 It is not so clear, however, whether there are capabilities on the ground that can actually be used in support of the other forces in the Czech territory. Whereas the 2004 military strategy defined the numbers earmarked for these tasks (1000 soldiers in support of the police for up to three months and 1200 soldiers in support of the Integrated Rescue System for up to one month), the 2008 strategy does not list any concrete numbers. 48 Although, theoretically, the whole force should be ready to assist, the lack of a tangible commitment has caused doubts. As a result, the crisis reaction scenarios have not been updated since 2006 at which point the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic (ACR) specified its contribution for the last time. 49
Moreover, the military has been increasingly disengaging from internal crisis management since the establishment of the Integrated Rescue Service in 2000 when the responsibility for civil protection was transferred from the Ministry of Defence to the Ministry of the Interior. Almost all civil protection units were taken over by the fire rescue service. In 2008, the remaining rescue battalions were reformed because they were regarded as too costly: two were reduced to rescue companies; one was transferred to the fire rescue service, one was abolished completely, and the last two were transformed into sapper battalions deployable overseas. 50
The numbers of soldiers actually deployed in support of the police in the Czech Republic has been decreasing over time. As apparent from Figure 1, military assistance in not a standard tool 51 and the soldiers are used in exceptional situations only, usually during large international events (the 2000 IMF meeting or the 2002 NATO summit) or crisis situations (floods in 2002, 2006, and 2009 and alerts after 9/11 and during the Iraq War in 2003). In 2004–2009, the government earmarked a stable if low number of soldiers (100–200) in support of the police, but since the beginning of 2010 there have not been any units deployed. In fact, the military planning does not anticipate any long-term support of the police beyond 700 soldiers for the case of a nuclear accident. 52 The units used ad hoc are primarily designated for overseas operations. If deployed overseas, there would be no reserves that could be used for domestic assistance.
Number of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic (ACR) soldiers earmarked in support of the police in the Czech Republic. Source: Author, on the basis of government decrees published in the Collection of Laws.
To sum up, the Czech military can be deployed within the Czech territory and tasked with police work according to the Czech legal order. It was also used as an internal security force at various occasions in the past. The practice, however, gives evidence for a negative trend. The use of military within the state’s territory is decreasing, the military abolishes units specialized in tasks required domestically in favor of units deployable overseas, mostly for financial reasons. The use of military at home is perceived to be costly and not of primary importance. In terms of convergence to the police forces in domestic deployment the record is therefore rather mixed in potential. The practice clearly shows that the distinction has remained or has even increased during the last years.
The Czech Military and the Use of Force
Czech law does not regulate the use of force by the military in war or in overseas operations. In such situations, the Czech soldiers have to comply with the standard international law (jus in bello). There are, however, clauses that regulate the use of the service weapons when patrolling or protecting military infrastructure. 53
Since 2005, the Czech armed forces have been allowed to use nonlethal “coercion means” as well. 54 The reform was motivated by a bad experience in the Kosovo riots in 2004, where the soldiers were not able to control the crowd due to limited competence and capabilities. The coercion means, such as tear gas, batons, or incapacitating agents, can be deployed in overseas operations, while protecting critical infrastructure or the seat of the President, and when assisting the police. The explanatory note to the respective law amendment argued that the armed forces needed this equipment because they were executing assignments in overseas operations that would usually be fulfilled by police units. 55 As a result, the Czech military is able to conduct a number of tasks in an asymmetric conflict in a flexible way. The possibility to use nonlethal equipment against civilians has allowed the Czech government to deploy soldiers without the political caveats that are often used by other European countries. Along with the amendment of the law, the military also acquired new equipment and introduced new training. In cooperation with the police and later through its own means, the armed forces started training all units that should be deployed overseas in crowd control techniques.
The police functions are, nonetheless, considered an additional activity. The police training does not form part of the standard military training. The soldiers are trained before deployment only and upon return they are “re-trained” for their primary task again—combat. 56 The same is true for the equipment. Whereas the armed forces procured some basic crowd control equipment such as shields and batons originally, nonlethal weapons do not score high in defense procurement priorities. A 2008 debate on nonlethal weapons initiated by the armaments department of the Ministry of Defence and motivated by similar debates within NATO fell flat due to lack of money. As a priority, procurement is concentrated on ABC protection (the Czech expertise in NATO) and the operation in Afghanistan, for example armored vehicles. 57
The Military Police constitutes a special force subordinated to the Ministry of Defence that disposes of all the necessary equipment and expertise to fulfill police tasks in a less secure environment. The Czech Military Police has not, however, played a major part in Czech engagement in peacekeeping and peacemaking operations. The numbers of soldiers serving in the force have been stable over the last decade and they have been primarily engaged in policing ACR units (both at home and overseas) and in protecting military infrastructure. Their tasks and the legal background have not changed significantly since the adoption of the 1992 Act on Military Police. 58 The Military Police has trained police forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, which is one of the priorities of the respective operations. The training of police forces abroad has remained, however, a secondary task for the Military Police, which is neither mentioned in the Act nor mentioned in the Czech military doctrine. 59
To sum up, the Czech military has indeed undergone a significant change by including the nonlethal coercion means into their toolbox. As a result, the deployment of the military units in overseas operations, notably in Kosovo, has involved police-like tasks, such as crowd control. This change reflects that the Czech military has moved closer to a police force in this respect, despite the fact that the police tasks are considered secondary by the military leadership.
The Czech Military and Regulation by Law
Legal responsibility is directly connected to decision making. Individuals are responsible for their deeds, but their position and function plays a role as well. Czech law recognizes subordination as a mitigating factor and superiority as an aggravating circumstance, respectively. The adoption of a new penal code in 2009 changed nothing in this respect. It has even increased the responsibility of the superiors in the military. In addition to the failure to prevent a crime, which was already punishable in the previous criminal code, the new code lists failure to punish or to charge a subordinated person committing specific crimes against humanity or peace, and war crimes as criminal offenses as well. 60
At the same time, the initiative has shifted to lower levels of command and the responsibility is therefore borne by more people and closer to the level of the individual soldier. This is recognized by the military doctrine, which emphasizes the “significance of lower-rank commanders’ initiative at the tactical level.” 61 Wrong decisions at the tactical level may have strategic consequences and the training of these commanders has focused on a better understanding of strategic goals and on communication with other actors, such as the local population or nongovernmental organizations. 62
In substantive terms, the new penal code has not changed the types of charges that a soldier may face. The catalog of specific military crimes, such as defection or cowardice facing the enemy, has remained the same with a single exception. In addition to the previous clause on wartime cruelty, already in 1990 a new clause on the persecution of populations was introduced that prohibits inhuman treatment of a civilian population in wartime. The penalties, moreover, have risen significantly. In almost all willful wartime crimes, the maximum and often also the minimum lengths of imprisonment have been raised.
There are no data available on crimes and penalties in the military. Partly it is because of the command authority principle that allows the commander to punish minor disciplinary offenses without any record. Major crimes should be investigated by the Military Police and handed over to the regular police, but there have only been a few cases of war or military crimes so far. 63 No soldier has ever been charged with illegal use of force, such as war cruelty or the use of a forbidden weapon. 64 The Military Police has kept a record of crimes within their jurisdiction, but the statistics are not very representative and do not say much about the trends in holding soldiers accountable for their actions. First, it is impossible to compare data before and after the abolishment of obligatory military service. The professional soldiers have much higher motivation to observe the rules than conscripts, because they risk losing their job. Second, and more importantly, the statistics include crimes committed by both military and civilians against military property or personnel and crimes committed by civilians in collaboration with soldiers.
To sum up, no significant change can be observed in the Czech military development in terms of legal responsibility. The institution of military crimes remains in place as well as the subordination/superiority factor, even though the potential punishments have risen. The new strategic environment has shifted decision making to lower levels of command, which does bring the military closer to the police. The difference has been clearly preserved though.
Conclusions
Current academic debates have addressed the blurring border between internal and external security threats and between internal and external security forces. This article attempted to contribute to this discussion and explore to what extent the retreat of the nation state has been manifested using the concrete example of the Czech armed forces. Within a limited scope, it has focused on three key factors distinguishing the military and the police—territorial scope, use of force, and regulation by law. The blurring border thesis suggests that there should be a visible change in these areas because the military functions and methods should be converging with the police.
The Czech armed forces have undergone a number of reforms since 1989. During the first years, the double challenge of democratization and creation of an independent military after the breakup of Czechoslovakia had to be faced, soon to be replaced by the thorough reform of the NATO accession process. A similarly intensive change was caused by the transformation of the Czech military to an all-volunteer force in 2004. Financial constraints have affected the military’s development since 1989, but they culminated in recent years due to the financial and economic crisis and the following budgetary cuts.
Changes have occurred in all of the areas investigated in this article. The Czech military has become a more universal force, which may be deployed both within the country and outside. The legal framework has allowed for new tactics necessary in the new security environment, such as the use of nonlethal equipment and coercion in riots and crowd control in peacekeeping missions. A relevant level of command and initiative has been given to lower ranking officers who might have strategic influence in asymmetric warfare. Moreover, the legal responsibility of soldiers has risen; while types of offenses have not increased very much, potential punishments are much higher than before.
On the other hand, the actual change has not been so dramatic. The military declares that the whole force is ready to act on the territory of the Czech Republic in support of the police, but it has abolished units designated primarily to intervene domestically and it has not earmarked other units in its long-term planning. The actual numbers of soldiers deployed in support of the police have even decreased over time. The police capabilities and training are regarded as an addition to the regular training needed for overseas operations, which the soldiers must get rid of upon return. The increased legal responsibility of individual soldiers has not become evident in practice either. The articles of the penal code that have been changed refer to very particular situations and they have not been used in practice (and will not be as long as Czech soldiers do not commit crimes against humanity or war crimes). Moreover, the obedience to orders is still considered a mitigating circumstance and the military has kept a special system of punishments for minor offenses outside the scope of the law.
To sum up, the Czech military forces have been in flux during the past two decades. Much of the change was caused by the abolishment of Communist rule and the accession process to the North Atlantic Alliance. This article has shown that there has been significant adaptation to the new security environment beyond the democratization, professionalization, and NATO accession. A number of changes have been introduced in reaction to the Czech military’s experience in overseas operations that allow for the police-like use of combat units. Nevertheless, there is a distinct restraint in carrying these changes over to the domestic environment, especially on a day-to-day basis. Whereas some shift can be witnessed in all three factors investigated, the practical impact is fairly limited. In none of the areas we can conclude that the difference between the military and the police disappeared completely. Moreover, the impact of the changes is much stronger in overseas deployments than in the Czech territory. The Czech military is a force that may both fight wars and control crowds abroad but remains more distinctively “military” at home.
The Czech case suggests that even though there is a strong pressure to adjust nation state’s military forces to the new security environment, which makes the military increasingly similar to the police in foreign operations, the distinction remains more clear-cut domestically. The use of military force at home continues to be an exception in practice, not the new rule. There are multiple reasons for this fact. The parallel abolishment of legal limits on the use of the military in crowd control and the abolishment of Czech army units designated for use on Czech territory demonstrate that the military remains too expensive for domestic use. The re-training of units for combat upon return from overseas deployment also suggests that the understanding of what it entails to be a soldier has not changed in the military and continues to be defined traditionally. While capable of controlling crowds, the military still remains a force to fight wars and very distinct from the police.
Footnotes
Acknowledgments
This article is based on a PhD thesis defended at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague in May 2011. A previous version was presented at the UACES convention panel “A New Generation? The Evolution of European Security Forces” in Cambridge in September 2011. I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers and the editor for valuable comments on an earlier draft of this article.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.