The Genesis of the “Dutch Approach” to Asymmetric Conflicts

Introduction: Inviting the Taleban Round to Tea

The Netherlands’ philosophy of winning the hearts and minds of the local population and thus contributing to security was from 2006 on termed the Dutch approach while, as will be discussed later, later on it caused discussion. In contrast to forceful coercion, this approach refrained from using an excess of violence. The approach was designed to win over hearts and minds by reconstructing society, by method of “smile and wave,” and by enabling local authorities to take over public order issues themselves. Using as little force as possible in order to gain trust is risky to the Dutch soldiers themselves for they are often more exposed to danger than they would be otherwise. They did not wear mirrored sunglasses in order not to remind the Afghan population of the Russians. They preferred to patrol on foot if possible. The soldiers wore the minimum of protective clothing and when driving, the soldiers used open roofed vehicles or lightly armoured cars that allowed them to show themselves. The Canadian newspaper Globe and Mail ¹ stated:

The Canadians and Americans establish Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) in unstable areas, often building them into fortresses of giant sandbags and razor wire, and using them as a launching point for operations. The Dutch prefer to build mud-walled compounds they call “multi-functional qalas”, using the Pashto name for house, designed with a traditional-style guest room for visitors.

The British newspaper The Times ² stated that the Dutch “aim to beat Taleban by inviting them round to tea” and the “Military Head Quarter is run as open house.” In contrast to the British who hid in fortresses, the Dutch were building clay huts in which they invited Afghan guests and hosted them with tea, nuts, and dried fruits. A quote from the news clipping reads as follows:

“You don’t want it to look like a fortress—there has to be a balance between accessibility and defensibility”, Colonel Vleugels [the commander of the Dutch Task Force Uruzgan] said. “You have to be among the people to influence them. By offering them help and work, they can make a choice. If they then decide to fight, we’ll fight back, but that should be a last resort.”

This “Dutch approach” met criticism, among others from British and Canadian ³ troops who had lost many soldiers and who would have welcomed a more robust approach by the Dutch. ⁴ Whereas the Dutch at that moment in time suffered only a few deaths (one suicide, one casualty of fire) and some heavily wounded, they therefore did not see any reason to change their approach. At the end of the mission in 2010, the number of casualties numbered twenty-five. The Brits and Canadians were right to point at other factors determining the number of casualties, but the “Dutch approach” was in line with what the Dutch were training for from the start on. In preparation of the deployment, the troops had switched to an experimental and relatively extensive cultural awareness training program. ⁵ The effectiveness of the “Dutch approach” is difficult to assess, but reports discussed at the end of this contribution provide useful data. But the main question regards the future strategy in dealing with the Taleban. What lessons can be learned? How can, in the attempt to reconstruct a war struck society, adversaries be included, not eradicated?

In this contribution, the genesis of the “Dutch approach” is discussed. The question where this concept originates is answered. By use of Lammers’ theory of occupying regimes, some national differences in styles of the use of force are discussed. Occupying styles from colonial times do have an important link to counterinsurgency theory that is relevant to present day missions. Next, the challenging case of the Dutch mission in Uruzgan, in a province in South Afghanistan where the Dutch approach is put to the test, is elaborated upon by following up on several questions. ⁶ First of all the question is whether or not the Dutch faced an enemy in Uruzgan. This question is tied up with the question whether or not the population stood benevolent toward foreign intervention. Another essential question deals with security issues. Could the Dutch provide security to the local population and could the Taleban be separated from the local population? Other questions relate to the topic of reconstruction such as “could economic alternatives for the ‘poppy’ culture be developed?” and “what strategy was most effective to implement forms of local governance?” Together the answers to these questions enable a reflection on what was tentatively coined “the Dutch approach.”

Genesis and Spread of the “Dutch Approach”

The Dutch approach terminology is not reserved only for the military domain. There is a “Dutch approach” to almost anything including the internationally renowned cannabis policies of the Netherlands. But the approach that is relevant to military operations finds its roots in the tradition of community policing introduced in the 1960s after a decade of repressive police operations in the 1950s. Police practices were introduced in the military field in 1977 during a Moluccan hostage taking action. ⁷ A total of forty-five train passengers were held hostage in a train at “De Punt,” forcing the authorities to a policy of “talking them down and out.” The plan was to talk until the Moluccans would surrender. In the end, the military were ordered to intervene, causing the death of six of the nine Molucans and two train passengers. However, foreign commentaries praised the method in use, which was then termed The Dutch approach, ⁸ because it saved the lives of most hostages by patiently talking and buying time. Nowadays, the approach of talking hostage takers out gained worldwide acceptance in hostage negotiation literature. ⁹

Perhaps the aftermath of the hostage taking was even more interesting and even more deserving of the name “Dutch approach” because it ignited a series of economic measures, providing work, education, and welfare. Many Moluccans were offered a ticket so that they could see for themselves how things worked in the Moluccas, thus resolving the political aspirations (a state independent of both the Netherlands and Indonesia!) of the ethnic collective at large and softening resentment issues. ¹⁰ Even when some policies failed, and some promises were broken, many lessons learned from this interesting case fit counterinsurgency theory (political and economic solutions, legality and legitimacy, as low as possible and appropriate use of force) and are therefore interesting for future military conflict resolution missions.

During the Cold War, there was no necessity for the military to resort to the “Dutch approach,” but the advent of stabilization operations changed matters. During the operations in Iraq a Dutch commander, Lt. Col. Richard Oppelaar, drew international media attention in 2003 by putting forward the concept of the Dutch “softly, softly” approach. ¹¹ Quotes from this interview explain the “Dutch approach” more clearly:

I expect a professional conduct during all our operations and activities, during which the population should be approached in a friendly and respectful manner … . it is important to win (and keep) the hearts and minds of the local population and their leaders … It’s all about respect. Respect for the locals and other cultures and their values, … If you don’t grab the culture, you won’t grab the problem.

When Moelker and Van Horssen ¹² interviewed Oppelaar upon his return from deployment, it struck them that the commander operated like a diplomat talking to local authorities, that is, talking to sheikhs, assisting at local elections, doing civil–military work, involving in reconstruction projects (roads), train local policemen, and so on.

One of Oppelaar’s successors Lt. Col. Kees Matthijssen elaborated upon the best practices in Iraq and made it into the New York Times, comparing the “Dutch approach” to the approach used by the United States.

Part neighbourhood police officers, part social workers, the soldiers managed to practice in Iraq what the Netherlands has come to call the Dutch approach to patrolling … . Instead of armored vehicles, the Dutch drive vehicles that leave them exposed to the people around them. To encourage interaction with residents, they go bareheaded and are forbidden to wear mirror sunglasses. Making soldiers accessible and vulnerable to their surroundings increases their security, they contend … . Lieutenant Colonel Kees Matthijssen, the commander of the Dutch force in Iraq, said he could not say whether the Dutch approach would be feasible in a place like Baghdad. ‘On the other hand, it might have helped,’ he said. ‘Everybody is aware of how the Iraqi population is looking at the Americans now. They are happy that the Americans liberated them from Saddam Hussein, but I wonder if the population is still happy with what the Americans are doing now.’ ¹³

The 3D approach, “defence, diplomacy and development” was originally introduced in Canada and the United States before the Dutch embraced it, but at the moment the 3Ds were adopted in the Netherlands they were at the same time equated with the “Dutch Approach.” The Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Ben Bot more or less did declare the “Dutch approach” to be the official policy in a speech before parliament on April 7, 2006. He did also define the “Dutch approach” more narrowly and brought it down to a specific trinity of politics, security, and development. In Uruzgan too, so he explained, “we will endeavour to preserve the trinity in our approach.” ¹⁴ It is politically significant that not only the Minister of Foreign Affairs supports this policy but also the Minister of Development and the Minister of Defense. When the Netherlands took over Regional Command/South from Canada, the three ministers did declare to parliament that they wanted to strengthen the 3D approach, meaning defense, diplomacy, and development. ¹⁵ Regarding Uruzgan stey stated that:

From the description of the social-economic, security, political, ethnic and cultural context above, a number of priorities are clear. These are ordered following the three ‘D’—dimensions of the ISAF mandate for the province: defense (security), democracy (governance) ¹⁶ and development (reconstruction). ¹⁷

Robert Gooren ¹⁸ managed to catch the attention of the American military establishment by publishing his views on the “Dutch approach” in Military Review. The point Gooren is making refers to predeployment training in cultural awareness. This kind of training indeed is fundamental to training for reconstruction missions because it is all about respecting and understanding the cultures of the people that soldiers will encounter. The US military is well enough informed about this topic ¹⁹ and have already changed their training methods accordingly putting more emphasis on cultural competences. ²⁰ But strangely, internationally Gooren promoted cultural awareness training as something different, something special, a typical “Dutch approach.”

Occupying Regimes

When studying reconstruction, assistance to governments, and nation building from a historical and comparative point of view, the theoretical work by Cor Lammers is highly relevant. ²¹

Lammers’ theory on occupying regimes in a nutshell comes down to the interplay of the concepts “occupation,” “coercion,” “legitimacy,” “rewards,” and “indigenous versus loyal elites.” Occupation always involves the use of force or coercion, but force is to be used sparingly because it affects legitimacy negatively and consequently occupations will—varying to the degree of force used—always provoke resistance. Occupations cannot do without legitimacy and rewards. Sometimes the reward is nothing more than ending chaos and violence. The occupier may be authoritarian or despotic, but if some stability and safety is provided, the populace is the better off in comparison with the previous situation. But in the long run, although providing some stability, the foreign occupiers will eventually be swept out of the country. The success of an occupation therefore depends on how the occupier wheels and deals with elites in the occupied society. This was true of colonial times, just as much as it is true of modern times. As the British and the Dutch found out in countries as vast as India or Indonesia, there are never enough troops, civil servants, merchants, and so on, to infinitely occupy another country. Therefore, elites must be used, but there are different sorts of elites and they differ in willingness to cooperate as well as in legitimacy. Indigenous elites are legitimized from below; they enjoy the trust of the people. Loyal (preferred groups by the occupier like the Dutch half-breed segment of the population) elites are legitimized from above, by the occupying power. Whichever elite is used, in the end it will lose credibility and legitimacy and the elite will have to choose sides between the forces that propagate independence and those who favor the occupyer (who will eventually be the losing side).

Figure 1 is ordered according the tendency to build an empire on the one side, while the other pole of the continuum indicates the tendency to withdraw from a specific area. The French have mostly resorted to a style of direct rule when occupying a foreign country. It is an imperial style of occupation that only worked well when they succeeded in turning the occupied country into a province of the French Empire. With this direct style of rule comes a centralist style of governance with orders always stemming from Paris. A large bureaucratic apparatus is needed to govern territories in this manner, making human interaction rigid.

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Figure 1.

Continuum of occupying regimes.

The German style of occupation during World War II (WWII) in Western Europe depended much on creating loyal elites, like the Vichy Regime in France or the Dutch Nationaal Socialistische Beweging (NSB) party (National Socialist Movement: a Nazi sympathetic Dutch party) in the Netherlands. These collaborating elites enjoyed little popularity and to be called a collaborator became abusive language. Lammers comes to a reappraisal. Yes, these elites may have collaborated, but in doing so they kept their own societies from a greater harm, such as the harsh regime that fell upon the Eastern European countries. Since these loyal elites are not legitimated from below, the population will be tempted not to play by the occupier’s rules. And when the population breaks the rules, the instrument of coercion will be used. ²² As the occupier feels left out of options and thus uses violence, legitimacy will spiral down as a consequence, making resistance an even more attractive response. The more attractive is resistance, when the occupier cannot use rewards to regain legitimacy.

Although Lammers’ analysis of the German style of occupation is historical in nature, it is relevant because of its resemblance with the present day American style of occupation. ²³ The style “play along with our rules and we will treat you decently” seems to apply to postwar Iraq and other examples of US occupation. The difference is that the United States does not really want to be an occupying power. It wants other nations to comply, but it never wants to stay and become a territorial occupier. In the words of Ignatief, it strives for “Empire Lite.” ²⁴ Even in the case of the Philippines, the United States were reluctant occupiers. The United States never wanted colonies and it does not need colonies to be an economic and military superpower. The United States increased activities of Civil Affairs units during WWII, but never wholeheartedly embraced these instruments of occupation because it meant getting entangled in public order management and dealings with civilian authorities. ²⁵ To quote General Dwight Eisenhower “The sooner I can get rid of all these questions that are outside the military scope the happier I will be!” ²⁶

According to Lammers, the British and Dutch styles of occupation look very much alike and stem from colonial times. India and the East Indies (Indonesia) could not be governed by direct rule in French occupying style. The territories were too large, the populations too diverse, and the distance from the mother country too far. The British and the Dutch had to govern by indirect rule making use of loyal and indigenous elites. The British and Dutch also had to use coercion, but they succeeded at the same time to offer rewards to the indigenous elites (who as a result became loyal) and to gain legitimacy. In the end, resistance to the occupancy grew, the more indigenous elites were legitimized from above, the more they lost their legitimacy, rewards were no longer sufficient to buy compliance, and the battle for independence forced the old colonizers to retreat.

In an interview, Lammers ²⁷ pointed at a recent example of operations in Afghanistan where the Dutch also tried to establish good relations with the indigenous population. The method that was used was called Smile and Wave. ²⁸ Soldiers posted in Kabul were supposed to be friendly, polite, and show as little aggression as possible. The method was incorporated in a predeployment training with role players. However, in 2003, the soldiers were not trained to be culturally sensitive which was demonstrated in the documentary by Jongbloed ²⁹ showing footage of a soldier giving porn movies to one of the interpreters. From 2006 to present day, the emphasis during mission-oriented training is on respect for culture and religion. Knowledge of local habits and training of how to behave respectfully, for example, at roadblocks, makes part of the training. ³⁰

The “Dutch approach” is rooted in colonial history. Parallel experiences of the Brits in Malaya led to counterinsurgency doctrine; a doctrine that is also adopted by the Dutch in their “doctrine for irregular adversaries.” The British General Thompson ³¹ formulated five principles as preconditions for success: find a political solution, act in accordance with the law and use minimal force, fight the cause of the insurgency, separate the fish from the water by offering safety to the populace and supplant economies that benefit the insurgents with alternatives that benefit the indigenous population, and support the central government.

The British Approach in Malaya should not be glorified for it often was harsh and brutal. To illustrate, it required that Chinese squatters be forcefully resettled in order to separate them from the communist insurgents. Only after twelve years of harsh campaigns (1948–1960) and the combined effort of 300,000 soldiers, the use of aerial bombing and chemical crop destruction, the conflict ended. The basic needs of the Chinese squatters were met by giving them land in possession, creating decent living conditions, and citizenship. Insurgents were offered the opportunity to be rehabilitated. A committee system was implemented in the new villages where the efforts of military, police, and civil institutions were coordinated. The political solution offered was independence for Malaya.

Thomas Mockaitis ³² effectively argues that the principles derived from the Malayan experience apply also to the present war against terrorism in general:

A hearts-and-minds strategy is as essential to defeating Al Qaeda today as it was to routing Communist guerrillas in Malaya fifty years ago.

The counterinsurgency approach formulated by the British resembles the “Dutch approach” from colonial times, but also it resembles the present day approach, which leads to the question “how is the Dutch approach implemented and does it work?”

Dealing with Indigenous Elites?

Brocades Zaalberg and Ten Cate in Small Wars and Insurgencies state that the “Dutch approach” is only a fabrication for media purposes. Dimitriu and De Graaf in the same journal ⁶⁸ point to the fact that the Dutch government did not explain well the true nature of a Counter Insurgency mission to the public. Therefore, public opinion did not understand well the kinetic character of the mission. Three-block war would have been a more correct narrative, but it would not have sold the mission politically! From the study into the genesis of the “Dutch approach” above, we learn how the narrative got constructed. The narrative was not intentionally designed by spin doctors, but it simply emerged from soldiers themselves, it proved useful for a while, and then was rooted out of the political arena with some effort from the Ministry of Defense and replaced by the 3D concept.

Although the above-mentioned scholars rightly pointed to the constructed nature of the narrative, it is at the same time plausible that the Dutch operated differently from others. All reports by The Liaison Office claim the Dutch to use much less violence than the Australians and the Americans (in the same province!). Evidence discussed above from other provinces point in the same direction and as Soeters and others would state it does also fit Dutch culture:

Obviously, this approach—the ‘Dutch approach’, the ‘Dutch touch’—reflects the consensus seeking character that dominates Dutch society and also the Dutch military. It is an example of a people-centric approach in irregular conflicts. ⁶⁹

Evaluative institutions like The Liaison Office are positive in their overall evaluation of the progress that has been established in Uruzgan: “Despite initial scepticism from larger NATO powers when the Dutch took command of Uruzgan in August 2006, the troubled Province is now widely seen as one of the only positive developments in Afghanistan’s increasingly insecure South.” ⁷⁰ Even the United States, once skeptical of the Netherlands-led mission, is now considering the integrated “whole of government” approach combining military might with development followed by the Dutch in Uruzgan, worth replicating. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton thinks the 3D approach is a model for US efforts.

‘Dutch soldiers and civilians have done excellent work,’ Mrs. Clinton said (Spring 2009) after meeting her Dutch counterpart, Maxime Verhagen, in Washington. ‘In fact, the Dutch “3D” approach—defense, diplomacy, and development pursued simultaneously … is a model for our own efforts and the future efforts in Afghanistan.’ ⁷¹

President Barack Obama stated:

The Dutch military has been one of the most outstanding militaries there, has shown extraordinary not only military capacity, but also insight into the local culture and the local politics. The review that we conducted in Afghanistan that emphasized the 3Ds of development, diplomacy, as well our ability to deploy troops effectively—that really was adopted from some strategies that had already been pursued effectively by the Netherlands. ⁷²

Politicians can be courteous when they aim to please their allies; therefore, it may seem hard to believe that the United States adapted her strategies because of the Dutch setting the example. But the Dutch approach is not typical Dutch. It merely is an approach to indigenous elites that can be applied by any nation. This approach does seem appropriate in Afghanistan where there is not really an enemy, but only the population, … a population that by majority is Pashtun and therefore in part sympathizing with the Taleban.

In 2010, the mission was ended ⁷³ but not because of lacking effectiveness of the mission. On the contrary, the “Dutch approach” was evaluated a positive contribution to the reconstruction of Uruzgan.

At the end of their four years engagement, the Dutch military can leave knowing that during their mission advances in both security and development were made in Uruzgan, especially in comparison to other Southern provinces such as Kandahar, Helmand, and Zabul. This can be attributed, amongst other things, to the Dutch bottom-up development strategy that engages community leaders. ⁷⁴ … In fact, over time Dutch efforts in the province came to be considered a model of successful civil/military intervention within the context of the counter insurgency in Afghanistan. ⁷⁵

The Dutch were praised for establishing and safe guarding a political balance between ethnic groups and powerbrokers, whereas the Americans were perceived as playing political games favoring Popalzai tribes that were in line with political objectives. Martijn Kitzen ⁷⁶ pointed at key leader engagement, quoting TLO’s finding that the “bottom-up develop strategy that engages community leaders, was very successful as it helped to overcome the existing social and political fractures.” As explained in the theory put forward by Cor Lammers, the importance of key leader engagement is to create political alliances and to manage the tribal balances. The alliances were created by co-opting the key leaders into the governance system, thus sharing power with them and creating mutual interests that contributed to security and stability. According to Kitzen, co-option contributed to de-escalation of violence. The Dutch reluctance to the use of violence was sometimes interpreted as “indecisiveness,” ⁷⁷ but in fact the restraint and co-option created room for political solutions. ⁷⁸ Thus, we return to the theory put forward by Cor Lammers.

To summarize the relevant lessons learned from Lammers for present day nation building and reconstruction missions: occupying regimes are inherently instable; they are dependent on indigenous elites in which case less use of force will be necessary; collaboration with local indigenous elites is a precondition for success, meaning that governance must be supplied by the indigenous population itself (if possible). The last lesson is that benevolent occupations, that is, occupations for the better good of the war struck country need to be temporary affairs otherwise they will lose legitimacy and occupiers will resort to force.

The effects of the Dutch effort at restoring tribal dialogue and collaboration seems positive…The Dutch approach aimed at all tribes participating in the development of the province. This emphasis on tribal balance and inclusion in local governance marks the turning point in the local balance of power in the province. ⁷⁹