The Strategic Significance of Ethical Imperatives

The Societal and Functional Imperatives in the Theory of CMR

The question of significance of societal ethical and normative imperatives has been dealt with in the theory of CMR since the very beginning of its development. In particular, it was Samuel Huntington’s seminal work The Soldier and the State, that made the relationship between societal norms and military security central to its enquiry. Moreover, the theoretical and conceptual framework stipulated in Huntington’s book continues to influence the academic discourse on this topic until now.

Huntington postulates that the military institutions of any society are shaped by functional and societal imperatives. The functional imperative forces the military organization to reflect the security threats coming from the international anarchical environment, and the societal imperatives compel the military to accommodate ideological norms and institutions dominant within the society. The functional imperative is thus important for the military in order to perform effectively its military function. On the other hand, military institutions shaped purely by functional imperatives, without any reflection of the societal imperatives, would hardly gather societal support necessary for sustaining their institutional existence. ⁵

Yet, the problem that Huntington identified in the 1950s was that in liberal Western societies, in the United States in particular, the relationship between the functional and societal imperatives is inherently antithetical. The international anarchical structure is argued to force liberal-democratic states to suppress their societal normative preferences regarding military institutions in favor of the externally imposed functional imperatives, or even to change their societal ideology entirely. “Faced with certain threats, some societies may be incapable of providing for their own security except at the price of becoming something different from what they are.” ⁶ Huntington thus argued for an ideological transformation toward conservative attitudes tolerating the military professional ethic. However, as Bernard Boëne aptly notes, such a proposal seemed to be “a classic case of the tail wagging the dog.” ⁷

The idea that military organizations are formed by two analytically distinct and largely antithetical imperatives is nowadays discursively perpetuated, for example, through the image of the military as a “Janus-faced” organisation. ⁸ One of its faces has to watch the strategic requirements and the viewpoint of this face is commonly used to lend support to the demand for the distinct military culture and ethic. Yet, the other face has to look at its parent society and be responsive to its normative requirements. It would contradict the physiognomy of the double-headed god if the societal and strategic views were to overlap. This analogy thus presents, in a similar way as Huntington’s theory, an opposing relationship, or at least distinction, between the strategic, on one hand, and societal ethical and normative views, on the other.

This Huntingtonian tradition in the CMR is based on the assumption that the military and social spheres are to certain extent independent of each other. James Burk points out that Huntington’s theory is based on the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, for whom the sovereign/state played an instrumental role in providing security and the rule of law to the people. The sole raison d’être of the state—and analogously of the military too—should be the protection of the lives and property of its citizens. ⁹ Hence, it was the protector–protected relationship between the military and the society that was to legitimize the military’s claim for internal autonomy from its parent society.

Burk contrasts Huntington’s theoretical foundation in Hobbes’s philosophy with the civic-republican strain in the CMR of Morris Janowitz. Civic republicanism, which originates in political thinking of Niccolò Machiavelli and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, emphasizes the importance of individuals’ responsibility for the common good. In this respect, any external threat is manageable as long as all citizens are conscious of their civic responsibility to protect the republic. Civic republicanism thus requires the military and societal sphere to integrate. In practical terms, Janowitz, on one hand, argued for a form of national service and, on the other, that professional soldiers should think of themselves as citizen-soldiers. In order for the citizen-soldier ideal to endure, he proposed a political education scheme that would connect professional military training to societal political and ethical purposes. ¹⁰ Provided the citizenry properly maintains their civic duties, the notion of antithetical relationship between the functional imperatives and societal ethical imperatives contradicts the civic-republican philosophical tradition. The military security here requires a normative and ethical identification of the roles of soldier and citizen.

To Janowitz, Huntington’s separation of societal and military spheres and purely instrumental role of the latter was unattainable also due to the rapidly growing destructive power of war. Huntington’s instrumentalism is based on his interpretation of Clausewitz’s concept of the dual nature of war. “War is at one and the same time an autonomous science with its own method and goals and yet a subordinate science in that its ultimate purposes come from outside itself.” ¹¹ From this, it is said to follow that the political point of view—including ethical consideration, we may add—dictates goals and objectives of war and controls the overall conduct of war, but the “grammar” of war remains a subject to military science. The military professionals thus have to be permitted to develop their expertise “without extraneous interference.” ¹² However, Janowitz aptly points out, the instruments of warfare have become “drastic devices of social change, with almost unpredictable and revolutionary consequences.” ¹³ Therefore, the military professional expertise can by no means justify its absolute autonomy even in the substrategic or technical level.

Janowitz’s theory thus places the societal imperatives on equal footing with the functional or technical aspects of military profession. However, the role and function of the military remain to be dictated, in realist terms, by the material nature of international anarchical structure. Constructivism in international relations questions the deterministic logic of realism by stipulating that the international structure consists of norms that influence foreign policies of individual states and, simultaneously, these international norms are constructed by societal preferences of individual states through their acting on international stage. ¹⁴

Constructivism-informed research in the CMR questions the idea that there is anything like a proper military role. Anthony Forster maintains that, although the military function continues to be dominated by the centrality of the use of violence, ¹⁵ the military’s specific roles may vary quite extensively and, moreover, independently of “an objective threat.” The prioritization of different military roles is thus argued to reflect broader sociopolitical perceptions of threat. ¹⁶ The ontological issue in the CMR research was further advanced by Frederik Rosén, who suggests that “there has never been and never will be any military organization other than what we communicate as belonging to the military.” ¹⁷

It follows from the previous discussion that the Huntingtonian image of divergent societal and functional imperatives may be considered artificial and unnecessary. For Janowitz, it is the question of survival in an anarchical and nuclearized world that necessitates the identification of the military with its parent society. From the constructivist perspective, it is the military function itself that is socially constructed.

Kantian Model of Societal-military Relations

Following the theoretical discussion mentioned earlier, in this part I introduce a model of liberal-democratic societal–military relations in which the societal ethical imperatives are considered important for effective functioning of the military organization. This model may be called “Kantian,” as its logic is derived from three principles promoted in the philosophical work of Immanuel Kant. The point of departure of the model is in the view that the utility of force is regulated by the notion of “cosmopolitan rights.” This is not to deny the fact that the existence of an external threat—regardless of whether material or only imagined—may determine the mission of the armed forces. In particular, the case of West German rearmament presents such a situation in which the condition of the East–West antagonism initiated the creation of the Bundeswehr as a territorial defense force. However, even this mission was shaped by the societal belief in norms transcending the sovereign rights of nation-states. The case of post–Cold War transformation of the Bundeswehr shows a situation when external existential threat disappeared and cosmopolitanism has become a leading force in determining the mission of the armed forces.

The second feature of the Kantian model rests on the logic that the composition and internal normative structure of the armed forces is closely related to their mission and overall aims. Kant viewed standing mercenary armies as continually threatening “other states with war by their willingness to appear equipped for it at all times” and hence incompatible with the aim of perpetual peace. ¹⁸ Instead, he argued for establishing militia because such a force would “bring the hardship of war” upon all men and could not, therefore, be used for anything but the defense of the republic. ¹⁹ Kant’s case for establishing a part-time militia is obviously related to a specific historical situation. However, the two German case studies presented in this article demonstrate the relevancy of the logic behind Kant’s reasoning. It is not only that the Cold War mission of territorial defense required a conscription-based mass army, whereas the process of transformation toward an expeditionary force brought about complete professionalization. The case studies presented here are designed to identify the relationship between the normative aspect of the mission and the value structure of the military organization. Thus, the aim of preservation of peace in Europe and free society in West Germany led to the articulation of the Innere Führung, the institutional philosophy of the Bundeswehr, whose purpose was to integrate the military into liberal society. The cosmopolitan character of the mission of the post–Cold War Bundeswehr then required the transformation of the professional identity toward “cosmopolitan social worker” or “guardian soldier.”

Finally, closely related to the previous aspect, the Kantian model focuses on the agency of individual soldiers. It stems from Kant’s categorical imperative proscribing the use of other person as a mere means to an end. With regard to military service Kant stipulated that “being hired out to kill or be killed seems to constitute a use of human beings as mere machines and tools in the hand of another (the state), a use which is incompatible with the rights of humanity in our own person.” ²⁰ The case studies in this article show that individual commitment to the mission of the armed forces was considered important not only for military’s legitimacy but also for the mission to be effectively carried out.

The case studies that follow next present a conflict between two normative forces in the defense policy of the FRG. On one hand, a significant effort has been made to shape the German defense policy and the organization of the Bundeswehr along ethical norms possessed by German society—the philosophy of Innere Führung being a clear manifestation of this. On the other hand, these efforts encountered an opposition among professional soldiers, who required their professional ethic to be based on traditional military norms and virtues and thus clearly distinct from that of society.

Looking through the prism of Huntington’s theory of CMR, these cases would offer a clear illustration of a conflict between the societal and functional imperatives. German society might be seen as hostile to military professional ethic, which, nonetheless, would be important to military security of the FRG. Through application of the Kantian model, the case studies will demonstrate that the demand for autonomous professional ethic was functional only in appearance. Since the Bundeswehr’s missions were prescribed by society, it was the societal ethical imperatives, rather than the autonomous professional ethic, that better reflected the Bundeswehr’s missions/function.

West German Rearmament

The FRG was established in 1949, at the time when the relationship between the Western allies and the Soviet Union plunged into the Cold War. Under these structural conditions and also because of the control of occupational powers, the FRG was more of a passive object in international politics subjected to the decisions of others. Konrad Adenauer’s decision to join the Western allies with a mass army thus may be understood primarily as a response to the external political conditions, despite the fact that there were some politically relevant alternatives to this form of Germany’s rearmament. ²¹ In Adenauer’s view, nonetheless, only a mass army was suitable for West Germany’s needs. Yet, in order to gain domestic support for his vision, Adenauer had to convince postwar West German society—demilitarized not only physically but also spiritually—that, because of the severity of the Soviet threat to Germany and to Western Europe, rearmament was indispensable.

However, it would be absolutely unacceptable in postwar West Germany to resurrect German military in order to pursue national interests. Already the preamble of the FRG constitution (Grundgesetz) endowed the new state with “the determination to promote world peace.” In addition, the article 24, the so-called Peace Clause, was explicit that disturbing “the peaceful relations between nations, especially to prepare for a war of aggression, shall be unconstitutional” and would be regarded as a crime. ²² The emerging Bundeswehr thus was built upon the understanding, as expressed by Wolf von Baudissin, author of the Bundeswehr’s institutional philosophy, that the Cold War was an “international civil war.” ²³ Not only the state but also the individual was to be targeted by the enemy attacks, primarily in the form of propaganda. The state, therefore, was to be conceived as a means in this conflict rather than an end in itself. ²⁴ The new armed forces thus were to be built with the aims of preserving peace and liberal-democratic order within the state.

To carry out such a mission, it would not be enough to introduce compulsory military service and raise a mass army of half a million troops with an additional million of reservists. Considering that West German society was in strongly antimilitaristic mood after the Second World War, it was of utmost importance to design the new armed forces in such a way that they would be perceived as a legitimate and integral part of society, rather than a divisive factor reminding the Germans of their militaristic past. The new military organization thus had to take on some crucial societal norms. This normative integration of the military into society found its form in the Bundeswehr’s institutional philosophy of Innere Führung, or Inner Leadership, and the concept of “citizen in uniform.” These concepts were created chiefly by Wolf von Baudissin and a circle of his colleagues in the Amt Blank, the predecessor of the Federal Ministry of Defence. ²⁵

The Innere Führung meant a transformation of some traditional military institutions, such as hierarchy, discipline, and obedience, along the lines of liberal normative preferences. A democratic way of life was, according to Baudissin, not at odds with the life of soldiers; on the contrary, it was said to be the precondition for every form of decent existence. Despite the undeniable importance of the military hierarchy and discipline, the military leadership should not be reduced to it alone. In Baudissin’s view, the superior should not exercise his authority paternalistically. “The superior ranks above his subordinates for purposes of coordination.” ²⁶ A mutual partnership, rather than just a power relationship, should emerge between the superiors and the subordinates.

The guiding image of the citizen in uniform appealed to the responsibility of individual citizens to participate in the defense of their state and society. It was understood, however, that the soldier, in order to become a citizen in uniform, had to feel that he had a stake in the community which he was supposed to defend. The soldier should retain all the rights and freedoms of citizenship except for those which would preclude the performance of military duties. Moreover, the citizen in uniform as a morally mature individual could not be rendered blind in obeying orders. No trustful obedience would be given unless the soldier is convinced that the order was meaningful and both legally and morally right. The conflict between freedom and totalitarianism compelled the armed forces, Baudissin argued, to rely on those who were prepared to risk their lives for a moral principle. Therefore, the concept of command and obedience in armed forces had to be adapted so as to support building up such a character among soldiers. ²⁷

The philosophy of Innere Führung and the concept of the citizen in uniform proved to be a genuine articulation of the imperatives of West German society. Not only that the core principles upon which the concept rested were clearly stated in the FRG constitution (Grundgesetz) but also a vast majority of the members of the Bundestag, the lower house of the German parliament, espoused these concepts. The principles of Innere Führung were, therefore, quite unambiguously enacted in a series of laws that enabled the creation of the West German military, the Bundeswehr in 1955/1956.

The concepts of Innere Führung and citizen in uniform represent quite a clear manifestation of the Kantian model. However, despite the fact that these intellectual concepts were quite successfully enacted into law and regulations, their realization within the military encountered a considerable resistance. Serious shortcomings were described in various reports on the situation within the Bundeswehr in the 1950s and 1960s. For instance, the annual report of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces from 1963 described the Bundeswehr as “an institution built upon ancient organisational principles, which maintain outdated hierarchies and traditions and which, even when innovations are tentatively carried out, desperately clings to lore regardless of whether useful or not.” ²⁸

The resistance of military officers culminated in a revolt, as it were, at the end of the 1960s. At this moment, the officers took part in an open discussion on the future development of the Bundeswehr and the concept of Innere Führung in particular. The main contributions to this discussion were a paper produced by the army staff, so-called Schnez-Studie, and a paper composed by company leaders from the garrison town of Unna, so-called Hauptleute von Unna. ²⁹ These two documents present a genuinely Huntingtonian argument.

Like Huntington, also these dissident officers argued that soldiering should be recognized as a sui generis profession. Moreover, because they understood the need for active interactions between the military and society, they suggested a transformation of society:

Every attempt to cure symptoms promises as little effective success as the removal of individual deficiencies. Only a root-and-branch reform of the Bundeswehr and society, which has the goal of going after the ills at its roots, can decisively raise the fighting power of the army. ³⁰

Thus, to paraphrase Huntington, West German society was supposed to evolve an intellectual climate more favorable to the existence of military professionalism. ³¹

Do these objections of the officer corps prove Huntington’s view of an inherent conflict between the functional imperatives and the societal imperatives in the liberal societies? Indeed, the philosophy of Innere Führung broke up with the traditional notions of military discipline and martial prowess and hence engendered quite a strong resistance among military professionals. However, it is important to realize that the intellectual climate within the Bundeswehr was not favorable for an unbiased analysis of strategic requirements. Such a climate evolved because, first, the vast majority of the officers in charge of implementing the Innere Führung had been militarily trained and educated in the Wehrmacht and Reichswehr and, therefore, deeply internalized the training methods, leadership style, and military culture present in these military organizations. ³² Second, the extremely rapid build-up of the Bundeswehr and the inadequate resources allocated for it did not allow for an effective reeducation even if there had been a good will. ³³ Finally, the worst obstacle to the reform was the fact that the open rejection of the Innere Führung as a set of rules tended to be “quite expedient and sometimes even fashionable.” ³⁴

The opposition to the Innere Führung rested on the experience of the officers and NCOs with warfighting in 1939–1945. In particular, these experienced officers and NCOs wanted to replicate the Wehrmacht’s unit cohesion and performance in combat. Yet, although the Innere Führung might be lacking in combat efficiency, it helped to build a mission-effective organization. The emphasis on social integration and the extensive allowance for individual rights and freedom played an important role in creating a socially accepted military force that would be large enough to deter the enemy. Under the conditions of the Cold War, it was the need to engage entire society in defense and deterrence—effort that also included the need for resistance to ideological subversion—that stood behind the process of rearmament. Important though martial culture, strict discipline, and instant obedience may be to actual combat, the trade-off between liberal openness and traditional martial culture could not hinder the actual mission of the Bundeswehr to work as a deterrent in a latent ideological war.

Transformation of the Bundeswehr Toward Liberal Interventionism

The function of the Bundeswehr as a deterrent in a latent ideological war was rendered obsolete in the early 1990s when a thorough transformation of the military organization became necessary. The end of the Cold War brought about the possibility of exercising cosmopolitan responsibilities with military means. As liberal thinkers insist, resourceful liberal states have a duty to assist those societies that are deprived of basic achievements of civilization, such as basic human rights and human security. ³⁵ Yet, such a responsibility could not be exercised in full extent until the risk of major war between the East and the West eased up. Therefore, it has been only since the early 1990s that Germany conceived of its armed forces as a potentially useful instrument when cosmopolitan moral responsibility dictated to deal with other peoples’ crises and emergencies.

Accordingly, an independent commission chaired by Hans-Adolf Jacobsen concluded as early as 1991 that the new international situation poses new challenges that need to be faced also with the deployment of the armed forces. “German forces should in the future, when the federal government is requested by the UN institutions, participate in international operations in accordance with the UN Charter.” ³⁶ In the same vein, another document submitted by the Ministry of Defence to the Bundestag in January 1992 seems to take for granted that “the maintenance of peace, humanity, and international security” is Germany’s responsibility as well as it is in her interest. ³⁷

The transformation of the mission toward expeditionary operations naturally decreased the functional importance of conscripts in the Bundeswehr. Although compulsory military service persisted in Germany until 2011, conscripts were effectively dissociated from the Bundeswehr’s expeditionary activities since the early 1990s. Besides that, the humanitarian character of the new mission required a transformation of the professional identity of Bundeswehr soldiers too. An adequate normative adjustment of the “citizen in uniform” has been presented in concepts, such as the “Athenian type of soldier” or the “guardian soldier,” which proposed an adaptation of the meaning of individual responsibility and the professional identity in accordance with the new military mission. ³⁸

The professional identity of the soldiers should address the aim of these missions, which is not to win a war over a conventional enemy, but to manage crises and conflicts and to enable a peaceful development of war-torn societies. In such a situation, the line between the military and the nonmilitary worlds become blurred. The armed violence would still play an important role here, as it is necessary to provide security, but the application of violence “can only deal with the symptoms, while the key to the lasting resolution of conflicts and crises lays elsewhere.” ³⁹ In order to accomplish the complex task of conflict resolution and state building, the soldiers, first, besides their role of combatants, need to adopt a role of “cosmopolitan social worker” whose task is to protect, assist, rescue, and mediate. Second, they need to cooperate with a whole range of nonmilitary actors. Civilianization of the military professional identity, or rather approximating the character of the police, is therefore considered necessary. ⁴⁰

This way of reasoning was embraced quite early on also by the Federal Ministry of Defence. “The soldiers of the Bundeswehr have to develop a new identity in order to face successfully the challenges of the future.” ⁴¹ With these words, the Ministry of Defence introduced its vision of the new guiding image as early as 1992. Indeed, at the time when the Bundeswehr was making the first hesitant steps toward the expeditionary engagements, the Defence Policy Guidelines exercised a very forward-looking view of soldierly identity. The German soldiers were urged to “take on responsibility for the threatened freedom and the welfare of other nations and states” and to devote their energy to develop skills necessary for international cooperation and for the rescue of and help to people in need. “Soldierly professionalism must be geared to the real conditions of war, danger, and human misery in which soldiers will perform their service in future.” ⁴² The ability to “protect, help and mediate” has become a part of the soldierly identity that is, since the early 1990s, constantly promoted. ⁴³

In a similar vein, the individual commitment of soldiers toward the cause of their service required an alteration. The guiding image of the citizen in uniform played a crucial role during the Cold War, as it constituted the unity between society, the state, and the military service. Although various aspects of the citizen in uniform are considered timeless, ⁴⁴ the civic responsibility to defend one’s country—a norm upon which this guiding image was built—loses its relevancy with regard to expeditionary operations. As early as 1994, Arenth and Westphal introduced the thesis that the out-of-area deployments require a new guiding image of the soldier—the “world-citizen in uniform.” Germany “cannot afford soldiers with the mentality of a ‘foreign legionnaire’,” argue Arenth and Westphal. Instead, they propose an alternative in the form of “a humanistically educated, ethically acting homo politicus.” ⁴⁵ The risk of one’s own life by protecting strangers requires from a soldier that he or she exercises a strong altruism and commitment to the cosmopolitan cause. ⁴⁶

Such a transformation of soldiers’ commitment was officially proposed in the White Paper of 1994, which called for such a soldier that is able to assume “responsibility for the freedom and human dignity of others” and “who recognizes and is a firm advocate of the political causes, conditions and consequences of the military action he takes.” ⁴⁷ Moreover, the latest service regulations on the institutional culture, the ZDv 10/1 2008, the Bundeswehr soldiers are supposed, “out of personal conviction,” to “actively defend human dignity, freedom, peace, justice, equality, solidarity and democracy.” ⁴⁸ They should be able to “assume responsibility for other people” and “distinguish right from wrong conduct.” ⁴⁹ The concept of the “citizen in uniform” presented in ZDv 10/1 2008 consistently encourages soldiers to use their individual conscience. This document explicitly legitimizes disobedience based on “freedom of conscience.” This personal right guarantees that “the state does not have the right to force an individual to commit acts that violate ethical standards of good and evil.” ⁵⁰

Similarly as in the case of West German rearmament, the Kantian model in the post–Cold War period has faced challenges stemming primarily from within the military. A strong proponent of a martial image of soldiering was, for instance, General Hans-Otto Budde, inspector of the army 2004–2010. ⁵¹ General Budde became known as a promoter of the image of “archaic warrior,” which stands in an effective opposition to those cosmopolitan concepts of guardian soldier or cosmopolitan social worker. General Budde insists that combat is the fundamental aspect, the common denominator, of the soldierly profession. “Protection, mediation and assistance are to be considered rather subsidiary.” ⁵² The soldier should not be regarded as an “armed social worker” or an “armed THW” (Federal Agency for Technical Relief). ⁵³

While General Budde’s essaying may represent merely an isolated opinion of one, prominent though, officer, the concept of “archaic warrior” was rendered politically significant by the development in the Afghan theater. On September 4, 2009, the commander of German Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kunduz, Colonel Georg Klein, ordered an air strike on two hijacked tanker trucks. According to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) account, up to 142 mostly innocent civilians were killed during the strike. “And that night,” as the Spiegel noted, “the mistaken hope that Germany could go to war without getting her hands dirty died too.” ⁵⁴

Since the spring 2009, the security situation in German sector had dramatically deteriorated. The Taliban switched its tactics from small hit-and-run attacks toward larger, company-strong strikes. Consequently, the Rules of Engagement of the German contingent were amended to allow for the offensive use of lethal force. ⁵⁵ The Kunduz airstrikes thus became an open manifestation of this recent development. In contrast to the ingrained image of peaceful soldiers concentrating on reconstruction and development of the Afghan civilian communities, Colonel Klein ordered bombing of the two hijacked tanker trucks with the explicit intention to “destroy” the enemy combatants. ⁵⁶ Vilified though he became in public, his action in Kunduz was seen with sympathies within the Bundeswehr. Colonel Klein had turned into a symbol of the soldiers engaged in a genuine war and Defense Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, when lending support to Colonel Klein, implicitly granted recognition to the guiding image of war-fighting soldier.

It might be quite plausible to consider the recent militarization of the Bundeswehr as a functional response to present-day challenges. The armed forces are adapting to the security situation in Afghanistan. However, this situation is a result of a mission creep, rather than of a conscious political choice. The mission of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was originally meant to assist in post-conflict reconstruction and state-building, which is the kind of tasks strongly preferred by the German public and politicians. ⁵⁷ In the aftermath of the Kunduz affair, Defense Minister zu Guttenberg became the first member of the Government who acknowledged “that in colloquial language one may actually speak of war-like circumstances in parts of Afghanistan.” ⁵⁸

Since the operation in Afghanistan became a war, discursively as well as materially, the nature of the Bundeswehr’s role has been undergoing a slight yet noticeable shift toward a universal real-political tool. The last Defence Policy Guidelines issued in May 2011 characterize armed forces as an “indispensable tool of [Germany’s] foreign and security policy.” ⁵⁹ This contrasts with previous documents that always qualified the character of the security policy or the nature of the Bundeswehr’s instrumentality. For instance, the White Paper of 1994 was explicit that “The Bundeswehr is one of several tools of German foreign and security policy. The aim of this policy is to advance international cooperation and to prevent crises and conflicts.” ⁶⁰ In a similar vein, the Bundeswehr’s slogan Im Einsatz für den Frieden (In action for peace) was replaced with the less lofty and significantly less cosmopolitan motto: Wir.Dienen.Deutschland. (We Serve Germany).

These changes in self-presentation correspond with the fact that the weariness of the protracted engagement in Afghanistan led to a declining support for foreign military operations in general. ⁶¹ The reluctance to get militarily engaged in any new major foreign mission became apparent in the Merkel Government’s decision to abstain in the vote on UN Security Council Resolution 1873 imposing a no-fly zone over Libya and not to contribute to such a military effort. ⁶² “I warn against having a discussion in Europe about a military intervention every time there is injustice in north Africa or in Arabia,” Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle defended the abstention of Germany. “[W]e cannot threaten military action against every country in north Africa where there is injustice.” ⁶³

The Bundeswehr is thus turning into a universal tool of foreign policy at the time of increased skepticism in Germany about the utility of force. As German society and its political representatives seem to be losing a specific conception of to what strategic objective the armed forces should be geared, ⁶⁴ The Bundeswehr has begun to show signs of distancing itself from the Kantian model. The Bundeswehr thus may be approximating Huntington’s model of the insulated military—armed forces which lack any considerable position in society as well as any importance in security policy, but are free to develop their autonomous professional ethos. ⁶⁵

Conclusion

The defense policy of the FRG has been built upon conflicts between models of military organization that reflected societal ethical and normative imperatives and requirements for autonomous military ethic. Such a conflict may be viewed as lending support to the Huntington’s thesis of antithetical relations between liberal societal imperatives and military functional imperatives. However, it was demonstrated in the case studies that the claims to autonomous military ethic were functional only in appearance. It is quite possible that they are functional with regard to combat efficiency, as the proponents of military uniqueness in the 1950s and 1960s based their arguments on their experience from the Second World War battlefields. Yet, a military culture concentrating on combat does not necessarily fully reflect the mission given to the armed forces.

This article thus introduces the Kantian model of societal–military relations as a way to understand the role of societal ethical considerations in defense policy. The Kantian model reflects the normative character of military missions. This is quite evident in the Bundeswehr’s focus on operations of humanitarian character after the end of the Cold War. But also during the Cold War, the Bundeswehr’s mission of territorial defense, necessitated by external conditions, took its specific shape along the societal requirements. This should not be understood as compromising or hindering the strategic role of the military. On the contrary, in the situation of West Germany in the Cold War, there was no realistic option for real warfare due to the fact that Germany would have very likely become a nuclear battlefield, or at least would have been engaged in an internecine war of Germans against Germans. Instead, the demonstration of strong national determination to defend their societal values and way of life was the genuine strategic function of the military organization at the time.

The Kantian model also suggests that, in order for the military to carry out its prescribed mission effectively, it has to be based on a normative structure that is consistent with such a mission. This includes the need for individual commitment of soldiers to their mission. The institutional philosophy of the Bundeswehr, the Innere Führung, and the concepts of citizen in uniform, world citizen in uniform, or guardian soldier represent aspects of military culture which is fit for its mission.

The case of Germany thus demonstrates the need to conceive societal ethical imperatives as integral to military functional requirements. Although this article has examined the most likely case in this respect, it is quite plausible that in other liberal societies the situation will not be significantly different. In this sense, also the field of strategic studies may benefit from far more centrally including the societal ethical norms in its considerations, alongside or even partly in place of more “traditional” issues, concerns, and focus. To contemplate military strategy with no regard to domestic societal preferences makes such thinking an irrelevant pursuit.