Abstract
This book of interviews with junior officers from line and support units of the Royal Netherlands Army deployed in Afghanistan from 2006 through 2010 provides solid description and offers valuable insights into the Dutch participation in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). It should be on the reading list at our military academies. It is neither a personal memoir nor a collage of personal accounts or stories of battle per se, but a detailed presentation for the purposes of leadership analysis and training. The Chief of Infantry Reading List, an online bibliography from Fort Benning, lists a good number of excellent books, including several from other conflicts, yet none of these titles are a solid comparison to Groen in method, organization, or purpose. 1
Groen’s work captures the participation of junior officers (primarily platoon commanders) and is a testimony to the experience of the Dutch in Afghanistan. The first section consists of structured interviews with line and support operations line grade/junior officers by year, 2006–2010, and the second section approaches the same relevant material, but in a framework of themes uncovered in the interviews and presented in a topical format. These themes include (1) preparation: culture issues, leadership, and team building are among the topics; (2) execution: leadership, the opponent’s characteristics, tactical and psychological operations, working with interpreters, and ethical dilemmas discussed; (3) reflection: including difficult and demanding moments, successes, important lessons, and mistakes.
Groen’s description of the Dutch military’s experience in Afghanistan illustrates some of the phenomena common to all war and particularly to modern warfare, for example, the difficulty of determining exactly who the enemy is. The Dutch were not always certain whether their opponents were simply bandits, warlord militias, or actual Taliban. Also, perhaps more characteristic of the professional modern military is the extent to which full briefings about an area of operation reach down into the ranks; the Dutch conducted “hot” (immediate) debriefings and additional debriefings after patrols and other actions. Another obvious dissimilarity was the practice of enlisted men appealing to their officers on other matters beyond the function and roles of the moment, and especially different—the ability to contact home. The length of tour and rotations are also vital topics, whether inequities influenced trust, confidence, or related esprit de corps issues. One interviewee, a lieutenant, spoke of the connection between rotation and the training and mentoring of Afghans in the Operation Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) effort. The lieutenant in question considered this a weakness that emaciated continuity and trust, moving the relationship back to square one.
The book makes salient the appropriate mix of defense, development, and diplomacy at the platoon level. As a comparison to the US effort, according to the then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the importance of a soldier’s ability to shift from “… rifleman to diplomat in a matter of blocks.” 2 This dilemma brings up perhaps the thorniest issue in the intervention process, the cultural awareness. Here is a great sociological debate modernized and canted in military sociology. Are there universal values among cultures? Is there a degree of intersubjectivity of meaning and intention that is valid across cultures? In some cases, it seems not to be the case; one officer noted how the Afghans saw the conflict in markedly different terms lending credence to the view that the conflict is a clash of civilizations. Yet, a social–cultural seam supporting the concept intersubjectivity in values was found by one junior officer. The Dutch platoon commander realized the local Afghan leadership could be gently embarrassed into cooperation by linking comments about cooperation as a challenge to the Afghan cultural sense of cultural honor.
When sociologists think of leadership, they are apt to conjure up notions from several vectors. One would be Weber’s classical notion of charismatic authority, that leaders have qualities, characteristics, or traits that inspire subordinates. From the classical world, these leaders with unique traits have been military commanders; in more modern times political figures. During the last sixty years or so, a far greater variety of conceptualizations about leadership has been developed with the rise of organizational behavioral studies stimulated by the needs of the national and transnational corporate entities. The practices of leadership advanced with the rise of sophisticated corporate organizational development and its processes of rationalization and bureaucratization have been noted, emulated, and adapted by modern military organizations.
For the Dutch, the focus has been to develop and advance the techniques of situational leadership theory throughout their military structure. This is clearly evident in Groen’s discussion concerning the needs for team building, processes of growth, the duality requiring the officer to be among and yet above the men, appropriate delegation of tasks, instilling motivation by example, and a iterative loop of preparation and training, so as to constantly assess and reassess competence and commitment. Groen notes how training and preparation often mixed roles and functions among the men to raise their “horizons” providing a more comprehensive picture of the overall effort. 3 Also frequently mentioned is the necessity to be fluid, to possess the capability to change the focus from warrior to diplomat as circumstances required. These circumstances were often tied to enemy capability, which varied significantly—sometimes amateurish, sometimes quite adroit, and keenly aware of their own, and the ISAF opponents confronting them. In addition, there are various references to contingencies which highlight the requirement for tight team building and the need for the “traditional” closed group psychology; in the end, soldiers most often fight for each other. The commanders interviewed noted the importance of the team. Without this commitment to the group, the commander has problems and if the commander is not cognizant of group dynamic issues impacting the platoon, it (the commitment, the élan, the very unity of the platoon) can be in danger of unraveling. Groen’s effort is an informative piece of work and has earned a solid place in the literature concerning junior leadership in military studies.