Saving Samuel Huntington and the Need for Pragmatic Civil

Abstract

How the U.S. military establishment interacts with other parts of the American government and the people impacts American national power. Because civil–military relationships are influenced by the context of the environment and the “kind of war” being waged, there are a variety of ways that military and civilian leaders can work together to improve the nation’s security. This article proposes an alternative civil–military relations model called pragmatic civilian control. It integrates Samuel Huntington’s objective civilian control theory with traditional American political philosophy and concepts established by Morris Janowitz, while accounting for current geopolitical conditions.

Keywords

civil–military relations public policy military culture democracy

Civil–military relation refers to the relationship between the armed forces of the state and the larger society they serve—how they communicate, how they interact, and how the interface between them is ordered and regulated (Hooker, 2011, p. 1).

Americans remain concerned about the condition of American civil–military relations and the theories that underpin this important subject (Eikenberry & Kennedy, 2013; Rapp, 2015). Such concerns might be related to dysfunctional relationships between civilian and military leaders or institutions (Dubik, 2015b; Fallows, 2015; Thompson, 2015). Even if it were true that the ongoing tension between politicians and soldiers “is really a conflict over the division of labor” (Feaver, 1996a, p. 177), such anxieties may signal a need for alternative ways to describe or designate the relationship between civilians and the military, especially since the United States continues to experience multiple and enduring conflicts.

Samuel Huntington’s concept of “objective civilian control” has been influential among political and military leaders since it was first introduced in the late 1950s. Yet, the United States faces new conditions that have brought about a variety of unforeseen threats. Multiple types of conflicts are waged simultaneously by a large and diverse defense establishment that multitasks and employs a variety of defense capabilities. Indeed, critics suggest that civilian and military leaders remain overly reliant on objective control theory as an operating principle of civil–military relations. If Huntington’s civil–military theories are not sufficient to effectively regulate civil–military relationships, what kind of civil–military theory is needed to supplement objective civilian control? What are some additional ways that the professional military can interact with civilians to strengthen U.S. national security?

To meet the criticisms and questions, this essay introduces a “pragmatic” approach to civil–military relations that acknowledges the convergence of American pragmatism, public administration theory, and national security requirements. Recent research indicates that a pragmatic approach can be applied to military roles and missions (Shields & Soeters, 2013a). Not only has pragmatism been exposed to students of national security since the 1960 publication of Morris Janowitz’s book The Professional Soldier, but it is being explored as a useful theoretical model to improve the administration of national defense (Shields, 2011; Shields & Soeters, 2013b). Nevertheless, any new civil–military theory must not discount Huntington’s objective control paradigm because its precepts are highly regarded. Under the pragmatic ideal, striving to optimize civil–military relationships means that objective control theories will continue to operate and have practical applications for certain conditions and operations.

This essay will first review Samuel Huntington’s objective civilian control paradigm. His theories will be revisited as segue to the next section. Then, a new civil–military relations model—pragmatic civilian control—will be outlined. Finally, some potential implications of the proposed pragmatic civil–military model will be discussed.

Objective Civilian Control

Samuel Huntington’s objective civilian control theory emphasizes the military’s “functional imperative” to provide for national security without undermining the democratic system of government. In the midst of the Cold War, it was believed that growing American military power posed a challenge to traditional political ideals. Huntington developed a successful theory of civil–military relations that sought to insulate military power from politics and protect the political system from military power, while carrying out the functional imperative of protecting the state (Huntington, 1957, pp. 2–3, 84). Two aspects of Huntington’s theory made it distinctive during the Cold War era. First, the importance of obedience and discipline was to be developed within an insulated professional military environment. Huntington explained that “The essence of objective civilian control is the recognition of autonomous military professionalism…[it] achieves its end by militarizing the military, making them the tool of the state” (Huntington, 1957, p. 83). Accordingly, “Civilian control thus depends upon the extent to which the military leaders adhere to their roles as professional advisors. Civilian control is undermined if they stray outside the military sphere or if the civilians make it impossible for them to discharge their professional responsibilities” (Huntington, 1956a, p. 678). The second aspect had to do with the inherent value that the military provides humanity when confronting existential threats. In the context of the Cold War, he asserted that “This objective civilian control is the form required by the conditions of modern western society” (Huntington, 1956a, p. 678). Civilians would provide enough autonomy to the military to allow for the maximization of military power to protect western civilization.

Objective control posits that civilian control of the military is maximized when four interrelated conditions exist: (1) the military is isolated from “other elements in the social structure,” (2) the defense of society is assigned to the “military groups,” (3) the military remains “indifferent” to the social values and political ideologies of society, and (4) the military operates within “an independent sphere of purely military imperatives.” Achieving each of these conditions enhances civilian power relative to the military’s power by confining the military “…to a restricted sphere and rendering it politically sterile and neutral on all issues outside that sphere.” This arrangement “presupposes disagreement” between civilian and military leaders over policy and strategy decisions. Yet, whether the military agrees with a policy or not is irrelevant because “It is altogether mistaken to ask where the Army stands. The Army does what it is ordered to do, and that’s all there is to it” (Huntington, 1956b, pp. 380–381). Given these four conditions, objective control requires professional soldiers to follow a professional code of ethics composed of five precepts (with designated variables): (1) a focused and lifelong devotion to the advancement of military skills and functions (specialization), (2) abstention from politics by avoiding all political activity (politics), (3) disassociation from technical and career areas not related with the military profession (disinterestedness), (4) obedience to identified and legitimate civilian leaders (civilian control), and (5) adherence to a single “recognized” authority (authorities) (Huntington, 1956a, 1957). These precepts serve as the conceptual variables that will evaluate objective civilian control alongside pragmatic civilian control. Before comparing the two models, Huntington’s civil–military ideal is briefly assessed and then the pragmatic civilian control theory is defined and explained.

Huntington’s Theory Revisited

Huntington’s objective control theory has been under attack since its inception. The actual name—objective control—was considered by some to be a misnomer. It implied a tenuous claim of “moral neutrality” and failed to take into account “power aspirations among the military” (Abrahamsson, 1972, pp. 149, 163). Peter Feaver (1996b) and Charles Dunlap (1992/1993) recognized that military and civilian leaders were not operating exclusively within their distinct “spheres.” They observed the “convergence in civilian and military functions,” as the traditional military threats to U.S. interests faded and nontraditional missions increasingly occupied military attention (Feaver, 1996b, p. 150). Christopher Gibson (2009) explained how “…objective control is revealed as a false choice, because it fails to provide insights useful to the preponderance of civil-military interactions…. Objective control was fundamentally flawed from the outset because it presumed that the military and political spheres could be distinguished in a comprehensive and meaningful way” (pp. 240, 242). More recently, the Commandant of the U.S. Army War College challenged the theory’s utility, “However appealing to the military, Huntington’s conceptualization of proper civil-military relations does not reflect the reality of security strategy making and implementation today” (Rapp, 2015, p. 13).

The strategic and historical backdrop that underpinned the emergence of Huntington’s objective control paradigm might reveal its original intentions and how it can be applied to today’s circumstances. Three conditions existed during the post–World War II environment to explain why his 1957 theory was attractive and gained influence. First, global security concerns spawned widespread fear among the American populace. Mao Tse-Tung’s forces consolidated their hold on power in China. The United States was locked in a stalemate in Korea. Communism appeared to be advancing across the world. The ambitions of the Soviet Union appeared limitless as they developed a hydrogen bomb. Modern warfare and emerging existential threats appeared to endanger western civilization itself (Huntington, 1961, pp. 47–54).

Second, in the midst of such insecurity, America’s overreliance on nuclear weapons led to a deteriorating military (Spanier, 1991, pp. 32, 132). There were systemic problems with the U.S. intelligence community that assisted in operational failures during the 1962 Cuban Missile crisis (Absher, 2009). Traditional military capabilities were curtailed based on the assumption that nuclear weapons would provide the principal deterrent to Soviet aggression (Huntington, 1961, pp. 73–79). In the midst of the shift to greater reliance on nuclear weapons, the Strategic Air Command lacked discipline in an area that required the highest standards of proficiency (Kozak, 2009, pp. 281–283). The third condition that influenced Huntington’s theoretical approach was the explosion of scholarship studying the growth of large bureaucratic organizations associated with the ascendance of “scientism” requiring a new faith in a universal “social ethic” (Abrahamsson, 1972, pp. 162–163; Galbraith, 1969, pp. 32–33; Whyte, 1956, pp. 26–27). “Politically neutral” principles to guide human behavior were being developed to allow government and corporations to function apart from or above “group interests” (Huntington, 1956b). The growth of bureaucracies within large corporations and government departments was changing the relationship between the individual, the citizenry, and their government (to include the military) in unforeseen ways. Identifying and implementing simple, easily understood principles of behavior sought to help manage large, highly specialized, hierarchical organizations. The example of the presidency of Dwight Eisenhower illustrated the trend. Ike’s use of delegation allowed him to effectively lead a government that he believed had become too complex and pervasive for one individual to direct (Greenstein, 1982, pp. 81, 103). Proper organizational protocols were practiced by a president in the throes of a burgeoning Cold War bureaucracy. Ike’s style of management appeared to reinforce Huntington’s civil–military theories. But underlying these three conditions was the belief that politics practiced in the saucy and seamy halls of government (to include Capitol Hill) threatened to sully the military’s ability to effectively defend the nation and western civilization against global communism. At the same time, democracy had to be protected. Such was the temperament and tenor of the Cold War era from where objective civilian control was developed, institutionalized across the defense establishment, and deeply embedded in the psyche of career military service members.¹

Pragmatic Civilian Control: Responding to Change

The pragmatic theory of civilian control is based on Morris Janowitz’s ideas on “constabulary forces” that were “grounded in…pragmatic doctrine” (Burk, 1991, pp. 13–14; Janowitz, 1971, p. 418; Shields & Soeters, 2013a, p. 89). In the midst of the fixation on nuclear weapons strategies in the early years of the Cold War, Janowitz presciently observed that the military should pursue a “full spectrum of capabilities” that would simultaneously carry out a range of policies and strategies to include strategic deterrence, engagement activities, and the waging of wars both “big and small” (Gibson, 2009, p. 251). Such observations are analogous to the “new categories of conflicts” currently being explored by the U.S. military that fall between war and peace that are referred to as “Gray Zone” conflicts (Canna & Popp, 2015, p. 1; Janowitz, 1971, pp. 417–440; Votel, Cleveland, Connett, & Irwin, 2016).² Janowitz advanced a brand of pragmatism that exacted a respect for tradition balanced with experience in the pursuit of innovation while being subordinate to the exigencies of political democracy (Janowitz, 1971, pp. 264–279 and pp. 418–427). According to James Burk (1991):
A pragmatic sociology recognizes the constancy of social change and the need for institutional adaptation which cooperative social action makes possible. Its task and contribution, Janowitz taught, is to identify fundamental trends in social development, to indicate their substantive implications for social control, and to clarify realistic alternatives for institution building. (p. 47).
Pragmatism is represented by four broad principles: practical, pluralistic, participatory, and provisional (Brendel, 2006; Shields, 2008). Together they offer a theoretical approach to civil–military relations to help frame options and solutions in the conduct of war (there is a nuanced exception concerning pluralism which is explained later). The primary feature that sets pragmatic civilian control apart from objective control centers on how the professional soldier, as a politicomilitary manager of violence, relates to the other parts of government in policy making, planning, and the management of national security (Janowitz, 1983). The prominent aspect of this feature involves the role of career military professionals in political processes when such processes influence war planning, the execution of military campaigns, and wartime policy making. Pragmatic civilian control recognizes that there are innumerable ways that military professionals and civilian political leaders can interact with one another during times of peace (to prepare for crises) and war (to achieve peace). Relationships between the many actors at play in the national security realm must adapt and practice inclusion (provisional and participatory) to stay effective. The objective control approach to civil–military relations cannot be discounted because it represents a credible option to regulate civil–military affairs under certain conditions.

The pragmatic control paradigm operates from the assertion that the methods used by civilians to control the military, and the ways that the civil–military relationship is conducted, should be determined by the kind of conflict that is waged and the context of the environment (practical).³ Because conflicts or wars vary in their character (Fleming, 2010), waging different wars require diverse civil–military relationships. From the pragmatic control approach, civil–military relationships are based on a threat, crisis, or mission, instead of position, profession, or institution. This requires an intellectually broadened military culture capable of partnering with the broader national security establishment to set the conditions that will identify the most acceptable and suitable options for as many political actors as possible. This means embracing a civil–military culture that can avoid recurring pathologies such as “groupthink,” “mission creep,” or implementing an optimal military solution that efficiently achieves military victory but results in disastrous political consequences. “The military must understand the connection between military actions and the desired political consequences. This is the result not only of good civil–military relations, but politically literate generals.”⁴

Three inter-related assumptions are offered to help explain the rationale behind pragmatic civilian control vis-à-vis objective control, and how pragmatic control relates to “the major tenets of classical pragmatism” (Shields, 2008, p. 2015). The first assumption addresses one of the most important aspects of warfare, “why do officers fight” (Janowitz, 1971, p. 440). The will to fight is connected to the purpose of military service. The soldier’s will to act as the nation’s defender should not be diminished by the debilitating practice of separating soldiers from their own society and culture. Such a separation is the current by-product of relying exclusively on objective civilian control doctrine that often results in the stunting of moral and intellectual development for career military leaders. Pragmatism’s role regarding the will involves the use of a practical approach to understanding the environment that can yield a better appreciation of what is important and what is not. The pragmatist military practitioner operates from experience to establish facts when such facts present themselves as self-evident forces that exist and cannot be wished away or contradicted by rhetorical lines of reasoning (Dewey, 1927/1988, pp. 73, 79). Military service should not be made incompatible with “the traditional goals of democratic political control” to assure civilian supremacy. The values of a professional soldier pose no appreciable contradiction with one’s citizenship rights and membership in political society because professional soldiers are citizens and share common values with civilian society (Janowitz, 1971, p. 440; Dewey, 1927/1988, pp. 82, 150). Career soldiers should remain ethically and morally connected with their own government and the people they serve. By enabling one’s citizenship (involving political duties, responsibilities and privileges) to be reconciled with military service, it might facilitate well-rounded and intellectually agile leaders able to more effectively serve as part of a pluralistic democratic republic to better confront a complex and dangerous world.

The second assumption is that the military operates as a pluralistic system within a pluralistic political environment. This is a reflection of a traditional and fundamental attribute of American society and culture that is better served by a pragmatic civil–military approach. As part of a wider national security system, the U.S. military system is far from being monolithic in any form or fashion. “Our doctrine of plural forms is a statement of fact: that there exist a plurality of social groupings, good, bad and indifferent” (Dewey, 1927/1988, p. 73). There are two subtle meanings associated with pluralism, and both are important aspects of pragmatic civilian control. The first can be characterized as a cooperative pluralism that understands the importance of collaboration and cooperation among a diverse set of actors practicing interdisciplinary approaches to solve complex problems (Shields, 2008, p. 212). In this sense, military leaders and strategists “consider all the relevant options” in an open-minded environment and work side-by-side with their political leaders, other government agencies, and foreign partners to defend the state and maintain global stability (Shields & Soeters, 2013a, pp. 99–100).

The other approach to pluralism involves the struggle for power and falls within the theoretical boundaries of a more traditional American pluralism represented by ideas from the founding of the American Republic (Dahl, 1967, pp. 23–25). The United States is a pluralistic society where ambition countering ambition gives assurance that no single group or faction is able or willing to usurp power (Ostrom, 1987, pp. 77–88). The existence of inevitable internecine conflict between various agencies is an inherent part of a genuine democratic system. Power pluralism is exemplified by struggles not only between the major branches of the federal government but also within the U.S. military establishment itself. This establishment can be described as a professional confederation of military and civilian agencies collectively capable of applying armed force and violence. It is made up of many commands and departments that are jurisdictionally subdivided into armed confederations possessing distinct professional networks, semifragmented administrative subunits, and other decentralized and semiautonomous organizations (Apuzzo, 2014; Bekiempis, 2015; Joint Publication 1, 2013). In the political sense, such an arrangement divides the military power out among a vast and pluralistic governing system. To assure military effectiveness, such a pluralistic system clearly exposes the need to “protect and sustain democratic values” by coordinating the activities of the various security and military agencies that exist across the “different levels of government” (Burk, 2002, p. 24).

The cooperative form of pluralism must exist alongside power pluralism to realize the full potential of American military power by integrating the many civilian agencies (Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and others) with the military. If there is any value in having the broad security establishment exist without political unity or ideological coherence, it will normally be when the nation is at peace to ensure no single group will dominate the nation-state (Dahl, 1967, p. 24).

The third assumption is that the military will need to maintain its distinct sphere of competency if it aspires to remain an effective fighting force (Feaver, 1996a).⁵ Even though it should strive to coordinate and collaborate with a variety of agencies and organizations, it also must maintain its uniqueness because there are practical reasons to maintain strong military discipline, a distinct technical competence and management of weaponry, and a well understood code of ethics and doctrine to promote operational reliability. In addition, as Janowitz points out, there is no reason to militarize all parts of society. “To deny or destroy the difference between the military and the civilian cannot produce genuine similarity, but runs the risk of creating new forms of tension and unanticipated militarism” (Janowitz, 1971, p. 440).

Two additional aspects of pragmatic control need to be addressed. First, pragmatic control is not associated with “subjective control,” which was Huntington’s antithesis to objective control (1956b, p. 380).⁶ Huntington’s (1957) description of subjective civilian control was pejorative,⁷ as it represented the 19th-century way of war. Second, pragmatic control represents the absence of political ideology. How civilians and soldiers manage violence to address a threat must be examined with as much objectivity as possible. Professional standards of conduct dictate that predisposed or intolerant political beliefs have a tenuous place in the national security policy making process. Winning wars in a pluralist system requires the successful integration of varied belief systems and organizational elements.

Synthesis: Objective Control as a Component of Pragmatic Control

The pragmatic approach does not dismiss Huntington’s civil–military theories. Objective civilian control represents a valid approach for military practitioners to consider under certain conditions. Table 1 exhibits the commonalities and distinctions between objective and pragmatic approaches across five variables that were cited previously: specialization, politics, disinterestedness, civilian control, and authorities. Pragmatic control adheres to several tenets of objective control regarding the need for the military to acquire and retain “functional specialization,” professional competence, and associated “technical skills” necessary to accomplish complex tasks and functions (Huntington, 1956a). Pragmatic control also recognizes the importance of soldiers obeying civilian authority (Janowitz, 1971, p. 426).

Table 1.
Dual Attributes of Career Military Service Members.

Variable Objective Civilian Control Pragmatic Civilian Control

Specialization Acquires a distinct area of professional competence. Focused and practiced skills, standards, organization, and discipline reflect occupational imperatives to accomplish specialized functions

Politics Abstains from politics. Political and military responsibilities clearly demarcated. The soldier remains inside the military sphere and stays outside the political sphere Military leaders embrace the political arena as an inescapable challenge. “Best advice” is provided amid adversarial political climate where ambiguity breeds conflict. Political neutrality maintained

Disinterestedness Military professionals “acquire incompetence” in areas outside their field of work Military leaders learn nonmilitary approaches to policy making; skills developed through broadening

Civilian control It is a professional responsibility to obey legitimate civilian authority (the state). Military leaders adhere to their role as professional advisors

Authorities Control over military affairs is in a single recognized legitimate authority A whole of government approach with multiple authorities collaborate toward a common cause

The fundamental departures from Huntington’s objective control model exist in the areas of politics, disinterestedness, and authorities. Regarding politics, pragmatic control theory presupposes the existence of a pluralist system where the sovereign authority of the state is governed by “multiple centers of power” (Dahl, 1967, p. 24). As a result, politics is thought of as a natural process involving “the art of controlling, protecting, assisting, and governing individuals and groups in society,” to include “the art of developing and guiding public policy” (Smith & Zurcher, 1968, p. 289). From this perspective, politics naturally involves bargaining to resolve disputes between opposing groups over areas such as the allocation of resources, foreign policy direction, and numerous national security challenges. Because politics, partisanship, and decision-making processes intertwine to impact military strategies and policies, military leaders have little choice but to interact with civilians to help shape military policy. For the appropriate kind of war there is an expectation that military leaders be enmeshed in the pluralistic political arena as an inescapable challenge. Conflicts fraught with strategic ambiguity could breed more disagreement and conflict among multiple political factions holding divergent values and beliefs. There will be no assurance that military leaders will remain separate from such disagreements. “In analyzing the beliefs of the professional soldier, there is no advantage in assuming that they could or should be unpolitical…. The political beliefs of the military are not distinct from those that operate in civilian society.” What is essential is not that professional career soldiers avoid politics; instead, they must avoid being ideological (Janowitz, 1971, pp. 234–236). If military leaders get drawn into the middle of adversarial political disagreements and disputes, “iterative dialogue at multiple levels” can still allow them to maintain political neutrality while providing the “best military advice” (Rapp, 2015, pp. 20–21). This will be a tightrope to walk during both war and peace, where military and nonmilitary institutions will weigh in to try and achieve effective and prudent decisions. As planning or policy making processes run their course, the military must not be perceived as “an interest group driven by its own needs and ethos” (Kohn, 1999, p. 23).

Pragmatic control also does not embrace the notion of a disinterested participant. Where Huntington believed that military professionals should “acquire incompetence” in areas outside of their profession,⁸ the pragmatic approach understands that career military leaders can no longer remain ignorant of the political system and the policy making process (Owens, 2015). When addressing decisions that directly or indirectly impact military operations, military leaders are expected to be “politically astute without engaging in domestic politics,” as they are expected to learn “the non-military complexities of policy implementation” (Rapp, 2015, p. 17). This will require “strategic broadening” to enhance the understanding of military leaders through exposure to other professional disciplines and perspectives. To prepare for the political arena and associated interagency competition and collaboration, “the Army must develop and promote broadened leaders…leaders capable of developing an intellectual framework for winning” (Warren, 2015, pp. 36–38). The skill sets needed to develop competent career military leaders can therefore be gained from lifelong learning through requisite broadening assignments. In addition, a habit-forming professional disposition to “focus on fighting and winning the nation’s wars” (Betros, 2001, p. 518) can help foster the right kind of “disinterestedness” viewed as the absence of a dogmatic ideology along with a tolerant disposition.

Lastly, Huntington (1956a) viewed military affairs as having a “single recognized legitimate authority” (p. 678). This was applied effectively for the 20th century, and in some cases it is necessary to retain for certain actions involving nuclear, cyber, space, missile defense, and intelligence operations. However, confronting low-intensity “irregular” threats that are fraught with ambiguity and requiring a “whole of government” approach for civil–military planning will compel military leaders to routinely interface with a variety of civilian-led government and security agencies at numerous levels of authority to allow for effective collaboration over a sustained time frame. In pluralist political systems having frequent turnover in political leadership, authorities are bound to shift based on personality and political expediency. This makes it all the more critical to understand, and in some cases relearn, the context of the conflict to determine what, how, and why various authorities will relate and operate.

Applying pragmatic and objective control

For pragmatic control, the Clausewitzian maxim to first determine the kind of war being waged governs the management of civil–military relationships to better address uncertainty, ambiguity, and complex geopolitical conditions. The context of the war might determine the degree of contact between military and civilian leaders and the extent of iterative dialogue required. In Figure 1, the implications of the kind of war being waged are considered. In one extreme case (upper right), waging total war that might include the use of nuclear weapons, which is exclusively a civilian decision, is almost absent ambiguity. The decision to enter the Second World War in 1941 was decisive, and the military actions taken were amply supported by the people and their political leaders. Such existential wars will likely represent a clear and unambiguous commitment by government civilians, the military, and the people to act together for common survival. Ideally, the closer we get to a total war, the more likely that policy will entail a single, recognized civilian authority that would be more amenable to objective civilian control principles to guide civilian and military behavior (Huntington, 1957, pp. 315–317).

Figure 1.
Civil–military spectrum of control by intensity of conflict.

However, in spite of the fact that the war is existential and total in character, contentious opposition may exist (Snider, 2008). Under such conditions, whether it is limited or total war, the military may need to retreat from the political arena to focus energy exclusively on waging war.

Actions and activities that belong in the upper left quadrant of Figure 1 might include persistent Gray Zone operations such as cyber, counterintelligence, and space. To be effective, the organizations conducting such operations might require insulation from political partisanship along with a more unified and clearly defined authority. A clearly defined single recognized authority might be more effective to manage and direct activities necessary to protect the commonweal against “irregular” threats.

Moving from the top right to the bottom left of the chart, the lines between high- and low-intensity conflict and objective to pragmatic control become “impossibly blurred,” but their implications for civil–military relations are quite real. Another way to characterize ambiguity is through Charles Krauthammer’s (2001) “Wars of Choice” versus “Wars of Necessity” paradigm. “Wars of choice…are fought for reasons of principle, ideology, geopolitics or sometimes pure humanitarianism…. A war of necessity is a life-or-death struggle in which the safety and security of the homeland are at stake.” It is now generally believed that the Vietnam War was a war of choice that involved a wider scope of military activities and varying types of operations. One could argue that the Korean (1950–53) and Iraq (1991/2003) wars were more conventional and slightly less ambiguous than Vietnam. Many might characterize the Afghan and Iraq Wars (2001–2015 and 2004–2013, respectively) as wars of choice.

Along the left area of the chart (lower intensity or “Gray Zone” conflicts), greater ambiguity will dictate that military planners should avoid emitting parochial political convictions when providing the best military advice. Yet, a lower intensity war may be considered a war of necessity. Identifying and then correcting any “political blind spot” will be necessary to gain greater understanding of the conflict. Having “reflective conversations about past and potential conflicts…” might improve the military’s “ability to appreciate the political context within which wars occur” (Joseph Clark, 2016, pp. 27–28). Doing this will also allow the U.S. military to better confront “Gray Zone” conflicts where a “blurring of war and peace” results in greater “strategic ambiguity” (Canna & Popp, 2015, p. 1). This might better equip military and civilian leaders to handle subtle nuance and complexity in an environment where they will work alongside each other across organizational boundaries (Moten, 2005, p. 741; Rapp, 2015, p. 23).

Three additional points are offered to help explain the dynamics in Table 1 and Figure 1. First, objective civilian control could continue to apply to activities and operations across the full range of conflict. Huntington (1956b) recognized that “the civil-military relations of any actual society…” will combine elements of both objective and subjective civilian control (p. 380). Under the right conditions and circumstances, there will continue to be an operational need for military leaders to carry out missions on a strict diet of objective civilian control. Choices will always be left to individuals and organizations as long as we continue to operate in a pluralist and democratic society.

Second, the complexity of the American national security structure and the federal government system engenders diverse relationships among civilians and military service members when confronted with multiple conflicts that span several domains⁹ of activity. Sets of “interdependent relationships” might include “civilian elites with military leaders, of military institutions with American society, of military leaders with their professions, among civilian elites, and of civilian elites with American society?” (Nielsen & Snider, 2009, pp. 2–4). Such organizational complexity challenges any attempt at finding unambiguous solutions. This is why flexibility in the pragmatic sense is essential. If the United States simultaneously wages several limited wars across multiple domains against various state and nonstate actors, space and cyber operations might require an objective control approach, while a simultaneous and coordinated land, air, and maritime campaign might entail a more pragmatic approach. The struggle to establish coherent and functional civil–military relationships will be based on the threat and the context of the conflict, understanding that operating inside the U.S. security system can be challenging, just as the threats we define will be ambiguous because of countervailing values and divergent belief systems across a diverse and pluralistic society. This exposes the importance of moral agency where military and civilian leaders must be held “responsible for their decisions and actions” (Dubik, 2015a). In this context, leaders must strive to effectively balance between pragmatic control and objective control principles.

Finally we come to the most disturbing part of the civil–military spectrum shown in Figure 1: the lower right area where higher intensity conflicts could be fraught with ambiguity, manifesting in extreme forms of partisanship and internecine conflict (Snider, 2008).¹⁰ When a nation lacks sufficient unity and resolve to confront existential threats, there may be no luxuries for professionals. Under horrific conditions, broadened and adept civilian and military leaders will need to find innovative ways to protect the state. The Roman Historian Titus Livy (1939) puts this challenge in perspective when recounting the civil war of Ardea in 443 B.C., as he lamented over what was described as a chief cause for the demise of nations:
This is said to have had its cause and origin in the rivalry of factions, which have been and will be fraught with destruction to more nations than foreign wars, or famine and pestilence, or whatsoever other scourges men attribute, as the most desperate national calamities, to the wrath of Heaven. (p. 287)

Conclusion: Developing Professional Agility Amid Complexity

Civilian and military leaders must develop alternative civil–military approaches and attitudes that will allow them to share in “the moral responsibilities associated with waging war” (Dubik, 2015a). Will we be able to allow political and military expertise to join together to maximize state military power and overall military effectiveness?¹¹ Adopting a pragmatic approach to civil–military relations offers many challenges and opportunities. Four potential implications of pragmatic control are offered here.

First, a pragmatic civil–military culture can help leaders to grapple with multiple conflicts simultaneously. In a dynamic world, numerous factors will shape or influence civil–military relationships. Potential factors include the degree of danger to American interests and people, the degree of ambiguity, the nature and context of the threat, and the complexity of the U.S. governing system. These factors singly or in some combination could impact the efficacy of civil–military relations and the policy making process. Complexity is compounded when multiple conflicts or crises occur at the same time with each requiring a unique civil–military approach.

Second, the extent that policies and strategies are developed as part of a pragmatic and pluralistic national security dialogue could enhance the strength of national will: that essential element in war mentioned by Janowitz (discussed above) and Clausewitz (1976/1989), as part of the iron calculus of war (p. 77). In this sense, a pragmatic approach can yield triumphant military–civilian interactions to more effectively resolve conflicts and wars. One risk could be heated and contentious debates that may lead to better clarity while causing increased tensions that could undermine national resolve. This is a feature of the American system that exists and must be allowed if the United States is to live up to its fundamental democratic ideals so essential to gaining the support of the people. In the 1970s the nation’s military and civilian leaders conducted a soul-searching review of the military system as they sought to move away from a “more restrictive national defense sense” and instead adopt a more “comprehensive national security sense.” To reinforce civilian control over the military, it was recommended that the United States return to a more traditional American approach to military policy that would involve a “complex, pluralistic system of civil–military relations” (Millett, 1979, pp. 27, 37–38, 59–61). The ability of the armed services to integrate and coordinate with a variety of nonmilitary organizations and institutions could be that intangible but essential element to winning wars and keeping the peace. The act of cooperation, in and of itself, may facilitate higher levels of mutual trust and confidence.

Third, a pragmatic civil–military culture recognizes that it is not possible to separate the management and use of military power from politics and political processes because the management of organized state-sanctioned violence involves political decisions and consequences. Segregating career military service members from the partisan political arena may do great harm to civil–military relations and ultimately result in the degradation of national power. Relying on objective control alone might limit military effectiveness if leaders lack the understanding and skill to navigate politically partisan waters. It is also not certain that objective control operates best when the United States confronts existential threats. Military leaders must be prepared, as they risk human lives, to protect the state under any and all political conditions. Their citizenship has to matter if and when a high degree of ambiguity leads to fundamental disagreements over war policy. Under such conditions, the civil–military dialogue amid the arena of politics may be absolutely essential to national survival.

Finally, civil–military tension will always exist—the question is whether it is constructive or damaging to the body politic. This may especially be true regarding wars of choice. The debates recounted by Thucydides between Nicias and Alcibiades over whether it was necessary for Athens to launch the Sicilian Expedition during the Peloponnesian War is a classic example of a civil–military dialogue gone awry. According to Thucydides (1972), a political malfunction in the democratic functioning of the city state, coupled with misleading intelligence and poor assumptions, led to catastrophic consequences for Athens (pp. 414–426). The development of a professional disposition (Roman & Tarr, 2001) may be the essential element to temper passions and direct military discipline into a positive direction during policy debates. As long as we avoid pronouncing professionalism as the singular magic bullet to assure that the military “obey” civilian authority, we should be able to avoid the consequences of our own delusions.¹² Pragmatic control theory strives to bring about the “good kind of tension” that can result in productive dialogue by recognizing the importance of inclusiveness and participation to garner sound and experienced advice. If the appropriate civil–military approach depends on the context of the environment and the kind of war, military leaders must be allowed to develop, over a lifelong career, a tolerant belief system with an absence of dogmatic ideology to allow them to contribute to the stormy confrontations that invariably result when money and power intersect with national survival. The defense culture must continually strive to develop new ways for military leaders to interact with their civilian masters to assure that the best decision-making processes are employed that will represent the interests of the greatest number of citizens.

Achieving a civil–military culture in the pragmatic sense will not alleviate a persistent concern about allowing military leaders to enter the political arena (Kohn, 1999, 2008). But the attempt is probably worth the risk (Hooker, 2011, p. 11). The uneasy and often contentious association between civilian and military leaders is an expression of a pluralist democracy. It is considered by some to be “natural, and indeed…has characterized most of the history of American civil–military relations” (Kohn, 2009, p. 272).

Variable	Objective Civilian Control	Pragmatic Civilian Control
Specialization	Acquires a distinct area of professional competence. Focused and practiced skills, standards, organization, and discipline reflect occupational imperatives to accomplish specialized functions
Politics	Abstains from politics. Political and military responsibilities clearly demarcated. The soldier remains inside the military sphere and stays outside the political sphere	Military leaders embrace the political arena as an inescapable challenge. “Best advice” is provided amid adversarial political climate where ambiguity breeds conflict. Political neutrality maintained
Disinterestedness	Military professionals “acquire incompetence” in areas outside their field of work	Military leaders learn nonmilitary approaches to policy making; skills developed through broadening
Civilian control	It is a professional responsibility to obey legitimate civilian authority (the state). Military leaders adhere to their role as professional advisors
Authorities	Control over military affairs is in a single recognized legitimate authority	A whole of government approach with multiple authorities collaborate toward a common cause

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

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Saving Samuel Huntington and the Need for Pragmatic Civil–Military Relations

Abstract

Keywords

Objective Civilian Control

Huntington’s Theory Revisited

Pragmatic Civilian Control: Responding to Change

Synthesis: Objective Control as a Component of Pragmatic Control

Applying pragmatic and objective control

Conclusion: Developing Professional Agility Amid Complexity

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

Funding

Notes

References