Building Security through Insecurity: The Nigerian Military and Counter-Violence Campaigns in the Fourth Republic

Abstract

Since independence on October 1, 1960, Nigeria has been a victim, at one time or the other, of intra-ethnic, inter-ethnic, religious, and communal conflicts which have undermined the human security of her citizens. Nigeria’s corporate existence had also been threatened by 3 years (1967–1970) civil war which impacted negatively on the well-being of its people. In addition, the inability of the Nigerian Police to cope with the magnitude of the surge of violence in recent years has brought about the idea of involving the military, a core component of traditional security apparatus to deal with internal insecurity. This article is anchored on human security paradigm with reliance on secondary data to analyze the operations of the Nigerian Military in counterviolence campaigns between 1999 and 2017. This article points out that the involvement of the military in internal security has worsened the problem of insecurity due to the military’s unprofessional approach and, at times, deliberate targeting the civilian populace which it is supposed to protect. It, therefore, recommends among others, the need for the Federal Government of Nigeria to urgently review the role of the armed forces in addressing internal security situations in a way that will bring about respect for the rule of engagement in internal security operations and adherence to global best practices.

Keywords

counterviolence campaign insecurity military security-building Nigeria

Introduction

Since Nigeria’s independence in 1960, the country has witnessed numerous internal crises that undermine its corporate existence and negate the security of its people (Akinyeye, 2001; Okoli & Orinya, 2013). Notable among them are the irredentist claim that led to the civil war of 1967–1970, various forms of political violence, and activities of ethnic militias and religious zealots. The inability of the police to cope with these crises prepared the ground for involving the military in the internal security operations of Nigeria. This move is necessary because the dangers posed by internal insecurity are greater than that of external one. Thus, Kautilya, 321-296 BC argues that:

the various kinds of dangers are those which are of internal origins and internal abetment; those which are of external origins and external abatements; those which are of internal origins and external abatements; those which are of external origins and external abetments; of these four kinds of dangers, internal dangers should be got rid of first; for it is the internal troubles, like the fear of a lurking snake, that are more serious than external trouble. (cited in Mallick, 2007, p. 68)

It is essential to note that using the military for internal security is not peculiar to Nigeria. For instance, Schnabel and Krupanski (2012) observes that the European countries, the United States, Spain, Canada, and Belgium, have all experienced the use of the military in internal security operations. Where the problem lies is the lack of professionalism and perceived excessiveness of soldiers in internal security operations. This has generated public outcries to the point that these soldiers are tagged oppressors (Nwolise, 2007; Okoli & Orinya, 2013). In the same vein, Ahmad (2012) submits that military brutality in suppressing internal security challenges makes it appear efficient; however, this has left indelible marks in places like Maiduguri, Zaki Biam, Kano, and Odi and in many other places in Northern Nigeria today (cited in Okoli & Orinya, 2013).

The fact that insecurity has become a major challenge in Nigeria and that efforts made at curbing it had escalates it, rather than abate it, makes its investigation compelling. Arising from the foregoing, the questions that come to mind are the following: (1) What are the issues surrounding the use of military for internal security operations? (2) How can the military conduct their internal security operations without aggravating insecurity? and (3) How can violence that generates spiral of insecurity in the country be mitigated?

The main thrust of this article is on how military involvement in internal security could bring about stability rather than further insecurity and its social implications in Nigeria. The study is anchored on a single case study method. We are not unmindful of the criticisms of this method. It has, for instance, been argued that in this method the data collected cannot be generalized and that it suffers from scientific rigor which makes conclusions of such studies difficult (N’Diaye, 2002). On the other hand, however, some scholars have argued that case study method has advantages and strengths, which can meet the standard of a number of sound scientific purposes, allows for the kind of detail that would not normally be easily obtained by other research designs, and can be used for hypotheses testing (E. O. Ojo, 2006).

In order to achieve the desired purpose, this article is hereby organized into the following: introduction, literature review, theoretical framework, military involvement in internal security operations and the role of engagement, Nigeria’s Military and counterviolence campaigns and its implication for societal stability between 1999 and 2017, and conclusion and recommendations.

Literature Review

The Concept of Security

Some scholars like Zabadi (2007) have argued that defining the concept of security is frustrating because of the lack of consensus among scholars. He, however, sees it as having often been associated with the safety and survival of the state and its citizens from harm or destructions

He observes that for African states, the threats to their security today go beyond the narrow confines of the traditional perspectives to include:

internal political instability that poses threat and resulting in state failure or better still failed state, terrorism and flagrant abuse of human rights;

economic threats such as poverty, the widening gap between rich and poor countries, international financial recession at international level, influence of unstable neighboring states or economically powerful states;

environmental related threats and threats caused by man like nuclear disaster, global–ecological changes, degradation of land or water, lack of food and other resources, and socially related threats such as minority/majority conflicts, organized crime, over population, migration and disease, illegal trade, transnational drug trafficking, uncontrolled wars (Zabadi, 2007, pp. 125–126).

According to Akinyeye (2001, p. 17), security connotes the preservation of properties from damage and preservation of human beings from injury and loss. In the context of this article, security denotes the preservation and protection of individuals in a state, as well as their properties and that of the state from attack. In other words, security connotes the safety of individuals, their properties, and the corporate existence of the Nigerian State at large. This implies that security is the vital cord that binds society together and without it, things are likely to fall apart, and thereby making the essence of a united and stable country a mirage.

The Concept of Military

The military consists of the tripartite divisions of the army, air force, and navy. These institutions put together form the national security of any nation. They are expected to work in harmony. Thus, while the army specializes in land soldering, the navy specializes in sea soldering, while the air force specializes in air soldering (Okoli & Orinya, 2013, p. 21). The involvement of the military in the internal security operations is necessitated when security scenarios appear to outweigh or overwhelm the police and other civil security agencies charged with the responsibility of providing internal security for a country. Nwolise (2007, p. 385) puts it more pungently when he avers if the police happens to be overwhelmed by any crisis, the military operating alone or jointly with the police should come in to bring the situation under quick control.

The Concept of Violence

Anifowose (2011, p. 4) observes that violence as a concept encapsulates every form of protest, militancy, destruction, or muscle flexing which an observer happens to condemn or fear. He, however, contends that the frequent use of force and violence tends to introduce confusion, when making a distinction between legality legitimacy and specific acts. He asserts that force is often used to denote legal and legitimate use of violence by a government in order to protect the state, while violence is conceived as illegal and illegitimate acts undertaken by nongovernmental individuals and groups. This is why violence carries overtones of “violating,” meaning illegitimate use of force.

In this article, violence is seen as the use of threat of physical act by an individual or group of individuals within a political system against other individuals or groups and/or property, with the aim of causing injury, damage, destruction, or death as a means of achieving a specified objective.

Theoretical Framework

Human security paradigm is used in this study as a framework of analysis. Lee (2004) contends that human security is a paradigm in the making. Similarly, Goucha (2008) argues that human security can be seen as a paradigm in the making, to ensure a better understanding of the rapidly evolving large scale risks and threats that can impact negatively on individuals and population.

The concept of human security is traceable to the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP, 1994) Human Development Report. The report focused on seven dimensions of human security which include economic security and environmental. Included also is personal security which denotes security from physical violence and threats. In essence, the concept of human security connotes the protection of individuals from violent and none violent threats. Goucha (2008) posits that the strictly military conception of security had been superseded by a global conception of the security of population. Hussein et al. (2004) argue that human security denotes that threats and challenges to security transcend national defense and law and order and encapsulates political, economic, and social issues that guarantee a life free from risk and fear. The focus has shifted from the state to security of persons.

Goucha (2008) postulates that human security is an adequate framework for (1) accelerating change from past limited notions of security, which tend to restrict it solely with defense issues to a much more encompassing concept of security that focuses on the respect for all human rights and democratic principles; (2) concretizing effort to prevent different forms of violence, discrimination, conflict, and internal strife that are taking a heavy tool, mainly on civilian populations in all regions of the world without exception; and (3) providing a unifying theme for multilateral action that will be of benefit to the populations affected mostly by insecurity problem among others. It is important to note that security should not be considered in terms of the state, rather in terms of individuals that live within the state. This is because states do not exist in isolation outside the individuals; it is the human beings who live in states, territories, or environment that give it a meaning.

Fakuda-Parr and Messineo (2012) argue that the concept of human security sees security of human lives as the main objective of national and international security policy. Also Haq (1995) contends that the world is entering an era in which interpretation of security will be predicated on people not territories and not just nations but individuals and it means security of people everywhere. Thus, the idea is that the state should not be the only reference point when thinking about security and that security should encapsulates interests of individuals and humanity.

As stated before, human security encapsulates the gamut of human rights which spans from meeting basic needs, political freedom to social freedom viz freedom from fear and wants. From the array of literature on human security, there seem to exits two strands of scholars; those that view security from broad perspective and those that see it from narrow angle. Scholars who focus on the broad view of human security include Leaning and Arie (2000), Thomas (2000), King and Murray (2001), Bajpai (2003), Chen and Narasimhan (2003), Tadjbakhsh and Anuradha (2007), and Kaldor (2007), among others. Security according to this perspective is premised on human freedom which permeates political, economic, health, safety, personal security, community and environmental security, food security, and a host of others.

Conversely, the narrow view of security championed by scholars like Mack (2002 cited in Fakuda-Parr & Messineo, 2012), Liotta and Owen, (2006), and MacFarlane and Khong (2006), among others, focus on vulnerability of people to physical violence in times of conflict. The argument is that since not all cases of socioeconomic problems result in violent action, they should not be brought under the rubric of human security. It is not a surprise when scholars like Owen (2004) argues that human security is different from the expansive field of international development and therefore, should not be mixed up with human development nor viewed from the precarious conditions (hunger, environmental pollution, and disease, among other) that human beings may find themselves. Walt writing as far back as 1991, states that widening human security outside threats to human life, use and control of military force will make the theory of human security loose it focus, become meaningless, incoherent, and unable to address issues of security concerned in a frontal manner.

In this context, the narrow sense of human security is adopted as a focus of this article, as it relates to protection from threat and physical attack on individuals. In Nigeria, going by the level of violence perpetuated by the military in their internal operations showed that human security has not made inroads into security thinking as innocent civilians seem to be worst hit in counter violence campaign by the security agencies.

The general notion of “security” in Nigeria is a reflection of the Westphalian model which premised the state as security reservoir, hence, undermining the security of other considerations including the individual and social groupings in pursuit of its agenda. The operationalization of security in Nigeria differs remarkably from the “national security” practice in other parts of the globe. The state-centric security operationalization in Nigeria is intricately webbed to the security of the regime in power. Therefore, the entire gamut of security institutions such as the military, police, and other paramilitary outfits works concertedly to preserve, promote, and project the regime in power to the detriment of individual and group’s security (Ibeanu & Abubakar, 2008).

The hegemony of this notion of security in the Nigerian security architecture could be traced to the colonial era when the colonized people were completely alienated from the state. Hence, the state is seen as a container of security which can tamper, tinker, or perhaps undermine the human security capabilities of the individuals and social groupings in furtherance of her goals. However, the inability of the state-centric security notion to adequately resolve perennial security challenges and effectively confront emerging problems has led to broadening and widening of security concept to cover other areas that were previously undermined. Hence, the security forces are mobilized and managed to protect the politically influential and the rich by using state violence against other sections of the population (Pearce et al., 2011).

It is important to point out that one of the frequently mentioned term in this article is the Fourth Republic. The next section explains what the Fourth Republic actually connotes.

Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, 1999 Till Date

The Fourth Republic in Nigeria simply denotes the fourth democratic transition from military to civilian rule. Nigeria gained her independence in 1960 and became a republican state in 1963 when the queen of England ceased to be the head of Nigeria. The First Republic was from 1963 to 1966 when the military took over power. The Second Republic started from 1979 to 1983 when the military handed over political power to a democratically elected government the second time in 1979. The Third Republic was aborted (1991–1993). The military took over power in 1983 and later promised to hand over political power to a democratically elected government in a transition that was inconclusive due to insecurity on the part of the military. The Fourth Republic commenced from May 29, 1999, when the military leaders at the helm of affairs handed over political power to another democratically elected government. Thus, the Fourth Republic started from 1999 and continued till date. The next section focuses on the debate of military involvement in internal security and control of violence in Nigeria.

Military Involvement in Internal Security and Control of Violence in Nigeria, 1999–2017

Traditionally, military involvement in internal security other than war appears as a departure from the status quo; as a result, it has generated much controversy. Schnabel and Krupanski (2012) and Stephen (2010) are of the view that the use of military in internal security, counter insurgency, or anti militant operations is not out of place. Stephen (2010) argues that while law enforcement (internal security) is not a traditional core skill of military training; however, military forces on deployment often undertake such duties.

Conversely, Brooks (2005) in his contention, using the U.S. military as a case study, sees it as a bad development and risky adventure for some obvious reasons. First, on the list is that involving the military in homeland security may harm readiness to perform their external missions; it will strain resources available for defense and also distract the department of defense from its other external assignments. The author argued further that military and police work requires fundamentally different mindsets. This is exacerbated with the fact that the skill required for both responsibilities cannot be easily interchanged. While police are trained to deescalate situations and use weapons as last resort, military personnel by their training are accustomed to liberal use of force and combat situation. They are not trained in basic citizen protections. Azinge (2013) has documented the training of military that presupposes them to liberal use of force. They include the fact that, they are trained to defend the country in terms of war and their training is usually tailored toward inflicting maximum damage and destruction, thereby defeating opponents within the shortest possible time, although taking into cognizance the law of armed conflict. Internal security only requires restrain and the minimum use of force. Quite frequently, soldiers involved in internal security operations are often equipped with guns, not tear gas and rubber bullets. How will they not use it?

Campbell and Campbell (2010) compared the major skills and attitudes needed for policing and for combat rifle crew members based on their training. For internal security which falls within the realm of policing, the orientation is to protect and prevent crime, while the orientation of traditional fighting role is to pacify. While police are trained to work in mostly benign environment, the military are trained to work in a typically hostile environment. In military training, discretionary judgment, problem-solving and investigative, negotiation, and communication skills are highly relevant and necessary; in military training, discretionary judgment is used sporadically or moderately, problem-solving, investigative, negotiation, and communication skills are less relevant.

In a nutshell, there are quite a number of differences between the resources, skills, and instincts required for policing and fighting war. The Nigerian perspective to the above has been aptly captured by the Athekan (2012) that as a result of some exigencies in contemporary security challenges, soldiers are increasingly involved in internal security operations. This has been corroborated by Ahmad (2012) that the pervasive role of the military in addressing severe challenges of internal security and threats to law and order has been a major attribute of our nation’s approach to handling national crisis both (cited in Okoli & Orinya, 2013).

The two statements above reveal that the use of the military in quelling increasing threat to internal security is becoming increasingly popular in the Nigerian context. However, it is necessary to note that civilian protection is often central to military involvement in internal security. Three of the works of some scholars that have emphasized the need and means for civilian protection in military involvement in internal security is hereby discussed.

Breakey et al. (2012) identified five distinct modes through which civilian’s lives and dignity can be protected. To them, civilian protection can be understood as constraints, as an action or as larger objectives. These five modes of protection are represented in Figure 1.

Figure 1.

Five modes of protection. Source: Breakey et al. (2012, p. 15).

Mode I: Prohibition on Harm

Mode I above prohibits actions that harm the lives, bodies or dignity of civilians, and the incitements to such acts. Mode I above is enhanced through laws that prohibit murder, rape, pillage, the use of certain weapons, the targeting of civilians and civilian objects, and enlisting children as combatants.

Mode II: Direct Protection

This is a direct attempt at protecting civilians from third parties attempting to harm them. This could be done through the use of a security presence, patrolling, escorts or the interposition of forces, and ultimately the threat or use of forces and the threat or use of robust force against perpetrators.

Mode III: Dedicated Protection Activities

Activities are undertaken specifically to achieve protection of objectives. Such activities are often geared toward better protection of environment where threats to civilians are diminished. Such activities may include early warning and assessment, monitoring and reporting, advocacy, moving or hiding vulnerable civilians, strategic use of unarmed presence, and information dissemination (radio broadcasts).

Mode IV: Mainstreaming Protection

Mainstreaming protection entails activities tailored toward improving and never to impair the larger environment under protection. The most important element of Mode IV is to do no harm to make sure that the way operation and agency pursues its other goals does not have downstream consequences exacerbating civilian vulnerability.

Mode V: Restorative Protection

Mode V comprises actions which remedy the situation of those persons who have previously been harmed. Williams (2010) came up with a similar multilayer onion that pictures the relevance of civilian protection in peace keeping operations (Figure 2).

Figure 2.

The civilian protection “Onion.” Source: Williams (2010, p. 22).

The author encapsulated the activities of civilian protection as responsive, remedial, and environment building. To him, protection can be thought of in minimalist (physical survival) or maximalist (the enjoyment of rights). He concluded that, ideally, civilians could enjoy the whole package, but in practice, they may forfeit the outer layers of protection and still survive, but the inner core of physical protection is vital for all the other layers.

Mallick (2007) came up with four principles governing the action of troops acting to assist civil authority to restore law and order. They are the principles of necessity, minimum force, impartiality, and good faith.

Principle of Necessity

Enjoins the need for justification for every action the troops take while acting in the rule of maintaining law and order. This includes no punitive action, reprisals, or striking terror. All these are violation of requirements of this principle.

Principle of Minimum Force

It requires the least amount of force, depending on the situation on ground. It is important to note that this principle is often misunderstood by soldiers. Although it requires the application of as little force as warranted by the situation, it does not set absolute limit on the quantum and type of force to be used. It is left entirely at the discretion of the professional judgment of the military commander on the spot.

This particular principle emphasizes the primacy of civilian protection in the use of force in military peace keeping efforts and military involvement in internal security of a country.

Principle of impartiality

It simply implies that troops are forbidden to take sides in any disputes. This is particularly relevant in case of communal riots.

Principle of good faith

This is automatically complied with when the previous three principles are observed. No animus (a strong feeling of opposition, anger, or hatred) should be shown, even indirectly, by troops or their commanders.

In fact, Williams (2010), in buttressing this fact, took a historical excursion into the origin of noncombatants/civilian protection. That effort at strengthening International Humanitarian Law (IHL), International Criminal Law, and Human Right Law which form the legal bedrock for civilian protection is traceable to general conventions in 1949. The convention led to the development and codification of IHL. This was followed with two additional protocols in 1977 and other protocols that cover the use of certain conventional weapons (1980, 1995, 1996, and 2008). Of particular note is the convention on the protection of civilians (Convention IV), which—offered among other things, the legal protection of noncombatants in occupied territories. Combatants were forbidden from attacking noncombatant or their property. In fact, attacking military objects that may be expected to cause excessive civilian causalities was outlawed.

In addition, IHL, which created standard for civilian protection, prohibited the use of certain weapons and behaviors and seek to punish perpetrators of individual or mass crimes. The submission here is that, if protection of civilians is that important in International conflicts, it is even more important in curbing internal insecurity and violence. Article 13 of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August, 1949, which Nigeria is a signatory to according to Azinge (2013) emphasized the protection of person who does not take part in hostilities, he also states that, civilian population, individual civilian shall not be the object of attack.

The Nigerian Military and Counterviolence Campaigns, 1999–2017

Military involvement in internal security in Nigeria dates back to independence of 1960. In October 1960, the military was deployed to quell the Tiv in present Benue State of Nigeria uprising. The Nigerian Military was also called upon by the Federal Government of Nigeria to get involve in internal security in 962 during the implementation of Emergency rule in Western Region of Nigeria. The military were also involved in quelling Biafran rebellion between 1967 and 1970, quelling of Zango-Kataf mini-war of 1993, June 12 protests of 1993, Ogoni uprising of 1993–1994 to mention just a few (Okoli & Orinya, 2013).

However, the focus of military involvement in counterviolence campaigns in this study is on the Fourth Republic (1999–2017) which has received less attention than earlier examples of military involvement in Nigeria’s internal security. The First Republic, starting on October 1, 1960, was enmeshed in cutthroat political competition among the political leaders of the three major ethnic groups (Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba, and the Igbo), which culminated into military takeover of political power from the civilian through coup d’état on January, 15, 1966. The Second Republic started from 1979 to 1983, when the military handed over political power to civilian government after setting up a Constitutional Drafting Committee and election body to conduct elections in the country. In 1983, the military took over political power again via another coup d’état, and there were many countercoups and efforts were also made to translate power to civil rule without success as a result of lack of sincerity on the part of military and political leadership in the country. The period from 1983 to 1999 before the handover of political power by the military to civilian government is often referred to as the aborted Third Republic. The Fourth Republic started from May 29, 1999, when the military eventually handed political power to a civilian.

Military Involvement in Internal Security in Nigeria: Five Cases in Focus

a. Odi Town Massacre in Bayelsa State, Niger Delta: South-South Region, November 20, 1999

In November 1999, a youth group in Odi Town, associated with Egbesu, one of the militia groups in the Niger Delta, kidnapped and killed 12 policemen (B. J. Ojo, 2002). Odi Town case had to do with longstanding struggle by the people of the Niger Delta for resource control, people’s demand for fairer deal from the multinational oil producing company, the Nigerian government and youth restiveness brought about by government-economic policies which resulted in massive unemployment among the youths, particularly in the areas where oil prospecting activities have caused environmental degradation leading to low fishing prospect for the local people (B. J. Ojo, 2002; Ukiwo, 2003).

Thus, youth restiveness in the Niger Delta led to the deployment of a battalion of soldiers to Odi Town in November 1999. The soldiers, sent on the order of the former President Obasanjo, totally destroyed Odi Town in a vengeful mission to the point that, shortly after the invasion by soldiers, only a church building and the branch of First Bank stood as a monument that a town once existed in that location. The soldiers, who invaded Odi Town on the order of Federal Government of Nigeria, freely used different kinds of weapons which included the following: bazooka, the General Purpose Machine Gun with a capacity of 50 rounds of ammunition, and FN Rifle with Capacity of 25 rounds of ammunition and hand grenade (B. J. Ojo, 2002).

Adisa (2018), commenting on military abuse of civilians in Odi, Bayelsa state during counteroperations to check militants in the area, argued that in the 2 days of unstopped bombardment of Odi community, lives and properties were destroyed on a large scale. This was because the military engaged in constant bombing of the militants in civilian areas. Some of the operations were conducted with the use of aircraft, grenade launchers, mortar bombs, and other deadly weapons. According to the author, about 2,483 persons who were mainly women and children were killed. Little wonder that the author surmise that counterattacks of the Nigerian Military are opposite of human security.

Alamieyesiegha, the then Governor of Bayelsa State, was to choose between two ominous, evils: declaration of a state of emergency or deployment of troops to fish out the culprits. He chose deployment of troops to fish out the culprits. He was shocked at what he saw in Odi Town after the military invasion. He saw some of the decomposing bodies of the local people littering everywhere in the town, the burnt houses, and odor of death permeating the area. He concluded “Odi is no more. Odi is leveled. They have finished Odi” (The Punch Dec. 12, 1999, p. 19). The invasion of Odi and other Towns like Choba on the direct order of the Nigerian Federal Government in retaliation for the murder of the 12 policemen by the youth in the areas was also accompanied with rapes of women and girls, beating, sexual harassment, and burning of properties (Ekine, n.d.).

The rapes of women by soldiers were captured by a journalist and published in the Nigerian daily press. The response of President Obasanjo (the then President of Nigeria) was to declare the photographs as fake, asserting that his soldiers would never do such a thing (Ekine, n.d.).

The late Senator Chuba Okadigbo, the then President of the Nigerian Senate, visited Odi Town a week after the massacre pointed out that what he saw on ground portrayed vivid picture of what transpired that there was no need to speak because there was nobody to speak to (cited in Aghalino, 2009). In fact, when former President Obasanjo visited Odi Town, he acknowledged that the soldiers had gone beyond their brief yet he would not apologize as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and never compensated the affected community (Doifie & Akinbode, 2002).

The military personnel that invaded Odi Town left behind some inscriptions on the walls of homes and commercial premises in the areas of their operation. Few of these inscriptions are reproduced below:

I fork your mama, wetin you do?

Odi, where is your pride,

You are burnt,

Resource control under my foot,

Bastards, why run, come and fight us now? and

I will kill all Ijaws, among others (Albert, 2003, pp. 15–17).

b. Zaki Biam Massacre in Benue State, Middle Belt of Nigeria (October 25, 2001).

Another case of military involvement in internal security operations in Nigeria was that of a vengeful mission by the Nigerian Military personnel that took place in Zaki Biam because of the conflict between the Tivs of Benue State and Jukuns of Taraba State in 2001. The soldiers were deployed there to quell the conflict, but 19 of them were captured and killed by the Tivs from Zaki Ibiam for their alleged partisanship in the course of stopping the conflict (Ukiwo, 2003). The conflict was aggravated with the fact that General Victor Malu, a Tiv by ethnic group, from Zaki Biam who was the then Chief of Army Staff had just been removed from his position by the then Minister of Defense General (Rtd) Theophilus Danjuma, who is of Jukun ethnic group of Taraba State (Ukiwo, 2003). The soldiers invaded many Tiv communities, resulting in more than 200 deaths (Anifowose, 2003).

In response to a question posed to the then President, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, by Williams Wallis of the Financial Times on the raid of Zaki Biam by the Nigerian Military personnel, he justified the action of the soldiers, thus:

My dear man, you must think of cause and effect. You have a situation in Taraba and Benue States where two tribes from time immemorial have been at each other’s throats. The two governors called on the need to send troops. And 19 soldiers were captured by local men. They were decapitated. I told the Governor of Benue State to look for the culprits. For two weeks, he could not do anything. You don’t expect me to fold my hands and do nothing, because tomorrow neither soldier nor policemen will go anywhere, I send them. I sent soldiers. When you send soldiers, they do not go there on picnic. They went on operation. (Ukiwo, 2003, p. 142)

He stated further that:

The people who kill them (the soldiers) were civilians, and the people who killed them were not innocent. They were looking for the people who killed them. This is the kind of thing one finds really irritating coming from people like you. Those soldiers are they not humans? Have they no rights, too? Are their lives not important? They have wives, they have families. It is not justification, but what you must bear in mind is, as I always say, action and reaction are not equal and opposite. They are equal and opposite in physics. In human nature, reaction is always more than action. (Ukiwo, 2003, p. 142)

c. Baga Town, Borno State, North East of Nigeria (April 16, 2013)

On April 16, 2013, Baga, a town in Maiduguri, Borno State, Northern Nigeria, was raided by the Nigerian army in a reprimand attack. It was observed that Boko Haram militants had attacked a military patrol and killed a soldier and wounded five others in the town of Baga. The Nigerian troops went on a rampage, killing and destroying civilian property. The reprisal attack was carried out with the conviction that the community was harboring the insurgents. According to Didymus (2013, p. 3):

The tactical procedure the Nigerian troops adopted has been criticized by local and international observers: An incident in which militants kill an army personnel will often be followed by a vengeful reprisal attack after insurgents might have withdrawn or taken up positions facilitating easy tactical withdrawal, but leaving innocent civilians exposed to soldiers who, under the pretext of fighting insurgents, open fire on anything that moves.

It has been observed that the crude tactics of the Nigerian troops provoke opposition among the local civilian population and win popular support for the militants (Didymus, 2013). In fact, in Baga, the military were alleged to have set more than 2,000 homes ablaze which killed nearly 200 people. As a matter of fact, soldiers were heard saying that since the people were not cooperating with them by hiding militants who the soldiers claimed were their brothers, then they (the civilians) will be treated as the militants would have been treated (Didymus, 2013). It is therefore, not a surprise that President-General of the Jama’atu Nasril Islam and Sultan of Sokoto, Alhaji Muhammed Sa’adu Abubakar’s call on the military and security agencies to respect the professional rule of engagement in tackling security challenges so as to reduce the death of innocent people. He advised on the need for the security agencies to supplement firmness with such means that are sufficiently seen to be just and human to earn the people’s trust, support, and cooperation to enable them to overcome criminal elements. In the same vein, the African Director, Human Right Watch, Daniel Bekele, argues that:

The Nigerian Military has a duty to protect itself and the population from Boko Haram attacks, but the evidence indicates that it engaged more in destruction than in protection. The glaring discrepancies between the facts on the ground and statements by senior military officials raise concerns that they tried to cover up military abuses. The destruction and killings by soldiers in Baga are grave human right violation. Government should prosecute perpetrators regardless of rank. (cited in Didymus, 2013, p. 5)

Also, Mamu (2012) noted that already public perception and opinion about the Joint Task Force (JTF) deployed to curb Boko Haram insurgence had changed from bad to worse. Opinion sampling conducted by Amnesty International revealed that residents of troubled areas like Potiskum and Damaturu in Yobe State preferred to be left at the mercy of the Boko Haram members than the JTF. This is based on the fact that JTF members have committed more atrocities than the Boko Haram fighters. The residents of the troubled areas were of the view that most victims of Boko Haram counterinsurgence are innocent civilians killed either by police or army (Amnesty International, 2014).

Amnesty International (2014) provides evidence of war crimes, including extrajudicial executions, and other serious human rights violation perpetrated by the Nigerian Military in the war against Boko Haram. The gruesome video footage on the activities of some soldiers and Boko Haram militants obtained by the Amnesty International from several sources revealed graphic evidence of multiplier war crimes perpetrated by all sides (Amnesty International, 2014). The gruesome video include frightening images of detainees whose throats were slit and dumped in mass graves by men who appear to be members of the “Civilian Joint Task Force” (CJTF) and the Nigerian Military.

Further graphic picture of possible war crimes committed by the Nigerian Military and sometimes in collaboration with the CJTF in their operations against Boko Haram in the North-Eastern Nigeria reveals extra judicial execution of more than 1,200 people and arbitrary arrest of not less than 20,000 people, mostly youths. They have equally committed numerous acts of torture and not less than 7,000 people have died in military detention as a result of starvation, extreme overcrowding, and denial of medical assistance (Amnesty International, 2015).

The Nigerian Military operation in Baga, in fact, received international condemnation. For instance, Ban Ki Moon, the then Secretary General of the United Nations (UN), said he was shocked and saddened by the arbitrary killing of civilians in Baga (UN News, 2013, cited in Odomovo, 2014, p. 53).

d. The Shiites Massacre, Zaria, Kaduna State, North West of Nigeria (December 12, 2015)

The Shiite population in Nigeria is estimated at 10 million of the 86 million Muslims in Nigeria as at July 1, 2014 (Amnesty International, 2016). The Shiite communities are basically located in the Northern Nigeria most especially in Kaduna, Kano, and Sokoto. The Shiites were almost unknown in Nigeria until the early 1980s when Ibrahim El-Zakzaky, a Muslim radical, under the influence of Iranian revolution canvassed for stricter adherence to Islamic law (Sharia law) and Islamic government.

Although Sheik El-Zakzaky is said not to have publicly advocated violence, his group has had clashes with other Muslim groups and security forces. In 1991, El-Zakzaky and his group had a clash with security forces in Kaduna, in 1996, his followers killed a Christian on the pretext that his wife cleaned up for an infant with pages torn from Quran. In September 2009, El-Zakzaky group clashed with police in Zaria, leading to some deaths on both sides (Shadjareh & Choudhury, 2014). In July 2014, when the group went on pro-Palestine procession in Zaria, Nigerian soldiers killed 35 of its members including the three sons of the leader of the group, El-Zakzaky. Shadjareh and Choudhury (2014) stated that the procession was peaceful; the army vehicles that came around were given priority passage, in spite of that the two authors pointed out that the Nigerian soldiers shot some of the unarmed demonstrators at close range. This scenario can be seen as unprovoked aggression for the military to open fire on unarmed defenseless citizens.

Furthermore, in 2015, when Lieutenant General Tukur Buratai, Nigeria’s Chief of Army Staff, was on his way to pay homage to Emir of Zazzau and also to stop by to attend a review parade by 73 Regular Recruit at the Zaria military Depot of the Nigerian Army. El-Zakzaky group armed with weapons such as cutlasses barricaded the road with bonfires, tires, and heavy stones, the aftermath was that the Nigerian army responded by killing over 1,000 members. The religious center of the group and the house of the leader were targeted, his deputy, spokesman, and his son Aliy were killed. El-Zakzaky was later arrested, and he has been in detention ever since (Amnesty International, 2016). In this incidence, the response of the military to barricade was overwhelming and the target killing of the leader’s children, wife, spokesman, and deputy is uncalled for.

On July 24, 2019, the Nigerian government responded to the street protest of the members of Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) on the need for their leader Elzakzaky to be released from detention by sending the army to disperse them through the use of force. As confirmed by the Amnesty International, the Nigerian authorities have consistently sent in the military to respond to IMN protests or marches. On its part, the Nigerian government has accused the IMN, which claims to have several million members, of supporting militancy and aiming to undermine the state. Apart from demanding its leader’s release, the Shiite group claims it only seeks freedom to practice its faith in northern Nigeria (Human Rights Watch, 2019).

The latest case of military highhandedness in handling civilians is the issue of Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) which is explained below.

e. Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB, 2015–2017)

IPOB is a brain child of the unsuccessful attempt by the people of eastern Nigeria (Ibo) to secede which led to civil war in Nigeria between 1967 and 1970. The Ibos felt cheated in the tripartite federal matrimony of the Yoruba, Ibo, and Hausa/Fulani that constitute major ethnic groups in Nigeria. The perceived marginalization seems not to have been corrected, hence the emergence of IPOB campaigning for self-determination (Goggins, 2017).

Amnesty International (2016) pointed out that since the agitation for self-determination started in 2015, not less than 150 members of IPOB have been killed by the Nigerian Army between 2015 and 2016. Hundreds have been injured during nonviolent meetings, marches, and other gatherings. Hundreds have also been arbitrarily arrested. On February 9, 2016, at Aba National High school, Nigerian Army ran into a field were the unarmed pro-Biafra gathered for a nonviolent march, they did not make effort to disperse them, they fired tear gas and later life ammunition at the crowd.

Although, Nnamdi Kanu, the leader of the IPOB group had in an interview with Sahara reporter on March 25, 2014, made some inflammatory statements, where he pointed out that “our promise is very simple. If they fail to give us Biafra, Somalia will look like a paradise, compare to what happened there. It is a promise, it is a threat and also a pledge, we have had enough of this nonsense” (Ingin, 2017). Yet the group has not engaged in open violence. The leader of the group was arrested and detained for a while and was released after meeting very tough bail conditions. Shortly after the release of the leader, the group did continue their demand for self-determination and Nigerian government responded by declaring IPOB a terrorist group (Ingin, 2017), this was followed by the deployment of the military for operational duty known as “operation crocodile dance 2” (Ingin, 2017).

Furthermore, in a bid for the Nigerian government to silence the self-determination agitation of IPOB, the Chief of Army Staff, General Tukur Buratai, gave an order to the General Officer Commanding and Formation Commanders (Brigade Commanders) in the South East (Nigeria) Area of Responsibility to immediately embark on a clampdown on the proscribed IPOB and other such groups. This operation led to the loss of unarmed innocent lives, thereby, making the Nigerian Military an active participant in the onslaught against unarmed protest groups in Nigeria (Sahara Reporter, 2019).

The effect of military attack on unarmed civilians in counterviolence campaigns appears graver when one remember an air strike by the military on an Internally Displaced Persons camp in Rann, Bornu State, in which 52 persons were killed on January 17, 2017 (Adefioye & Ariyo, 2019).

From the above analysis, juxtaposing the operations of the Nigerian Military vis-à-vis the global best practices in military involvement in internal security left much to be desired.

Looking at the five modes of protection, Nigerian Military fall short of some of them in its internal security operations. Mode I: Prohibition on Harm—forbids the military from doing anything that harm the lives, bodies, or dignity of civilians. It also forbids rape, pillage, and targeting civilians for destruction, among others. However, the analysis above reveals that the Nigerian Military are involved in the aforementioned forbidden acts.

Similarly, Mode II: Direct Protection was also observed in contradiction going by the activities of the Nigerian Military in internal security. The Nigerian Military harm those they supposed to protect.

Mode III: Dedicated Protection Activities—was also observed in contradiction. Instead of military presence to protect the environment it’s meant to secure, its presence constituted a threat to the civilian population in the environment it ought to secure as discussed above.

Examining the way and manner the Nigerian Military conduct its operations when called upon for internal security of the country is also antithetical to Modes IV: Mainstreaming Protection. For instance, the mode reiterated that in conducting its operation in internal security, the military should do no harm to the civilians or do things that exacerbate civilian vulnerability. This also has been violated as discussed in the cases above.

Also, looking at the work of Mallick (2007), the principle of Necessity—which forbids reprisal attack by the military was observed in bridge.

The principle of minimum force too was violated as the analysis above reveals the use of some weapons which ought not to be used going by the level of violence the military is meant to control especially in Odi.

The next principle forbids the military from taking side in disputes. But the case of Zaki Biam in Benue state depicts the military taking side between two army Generals Victor Malu and Theophilus Danjuma which aggravated the violence. This is not in tandem with the global best practices.

The analysis above shows that the Nigerian Military operations in internal security exposes the civilian to harm and made them vulnerable. Thus, there seems not to be tenacity of purpose in adhering to the principles governing military involvement in internal security operations in line with the global best practices. The atrocities of the Nigerian soldiers against the civilian population in the name of counterviolence campaign, specifically in the Fourth Republic, actually authenticate this fact. The next section in on recommendations and conclusion.

Conclusion and Recommendations

This article examines the role of the military in internal security operations in the area of security-building through insecurity means in Nigeria between 1999 and 2017. From the array of analyses above, it can be seen that, rather than the military protecting the lives and property of unarmed citizens, it has exacerbated the security problem it claims to solve by turning its weapons against the ordinary citizen due to the highhandedness manner it has carried out the operations of internal security matters in Nigeria.

In fact, activities of the Nigerian Military in curbing violence and terrorism have become tantamount to creating more insecurity. As a result, it is therefore, recommended among others that:

Nigerian government needs to urgently review the role of the armed forces in addressing internal security situations in a way that will bring about respect for the rule of engagement in internal security operations and adherence to global best practices.

There is the need to train and retrain the Nigerian Military personnel in contemporary security operations, so as to be able to differentiate between curbing domestic violence from full scale war. This is because their training permits liberal use of weapons which may not be in tandem with the demand of curbing domestic violence most times.

Also, there is the need to reorientate the Nigerian army about internal security operations. They need to solicit for the cooperation of the citizens or local communities rather than targeting them along with perpetrators of violence. They should be informed that the essence of their deployment is to protect civilians’ lives in crises prone areas. In other words, there is need to emphasize professionalism in their operations.

Soldiers who are deployed for internal security operations are to be accountable for their wrong doings. This will serve as deterrent to others. Those involved in unethical practices like looting and sexual abuses should be severely dealt with. This calls for oversight function of the political leadership on the activities of military personnel engaged in internal security to enable their activities be in consonance with the global best practices.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to acknowledge the anonymous reviewers for their critical review of the article and the editor and editorial assistant for their comments that also strengthened the manuscript.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Segun Joshua

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